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THE DOWNFALL of LOBENGULA



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THE
DOWNFALL OF LOBENGULA:

THE CAUSE, HISTORY, AND EFFECT OF THE
MATABELI WAR.

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THE
DOWNFALL OF LOBENGULA:

THE CAUSE, HISTORY, AND EFFECT OF THE
MATABELI WAR.

By W. A. WILLS and L. T. COLLINGRIDGE.

With Contributions by

*Major P. W. FORBES, Major SIR JOHN C. WILLOUGHBY, Bart.,
Mr. H. RIDER HAGGARD, Mr. F. C. SELOUS, F.Z.S.,
and Mr. P. B. S. WREY, A.M. Inst. C.E.*

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
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


ERRATA.

Page 16, line 6, *for* "contumelious" *read* "contumacious." Page 25, line 13, *for* "A." Maguire *read* "R." Maguire. Page 80, line 32, *for* "flanking" *read* "left flanking." Page 81, line 14, *for* "to place his men" *read* "to his place." Page 91, line 23, *for* "taken" *read* "recovered." Page 94, line 4, *for* "two" *read* "four." Page 176, line 9, *for* "before" *read* "below." Page 195, line 22, *before* "bank" *read* "south." Page 211, line 24, *for* "Mapondein" *read* "Umpandine." *For* "Gwynyd" (Captain Williams) *read* "Gwynydd"; and *for* "Raaf" (Captain) *read* "Raaff," wherever occurring.

of those—whether commissioned or otherwise—who lost their lives in protecting their Mashona dependants, their hard-won interests, and in providing for their own safety, which was threatened by their fierce and intractable neighbours. This information has necessarily been difficult to obtain, and the chapters devoted to the subject are still incomplete. It is hoped, however, that relatives or friends will, before the next edition, enable the deficiencies in this respect to be remedied by forwarding biographical particulars and portraits.

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PREFACE.

IT has always been felt to be a matter of great regret that so very few, if indeed any, reasonably comprehensive and authoritative histories of any of the numerous campaigns fought between the European colonists and the warlike native tribes of South Africa have been written. That which is recorded on the following pages has the undeniable advantage in that the story of the war is told by the commanding officer of the forces engaged. It has further a special feature—and one which will be considerably amplified in subsequent editions—in the form of two chapters in which a brief biographical reference has been made to most of the officers of the expedition, and to nearly all of those—whether commissioned or otherwise—who lost their lives in protecting their Mashona dependants, their hard-won interests, and in providing for their own safety, which was threatened by their fierce and intractable neighbours. This information has necessarily been difficult to obtain, and the chapters devoted to the subject are still incomplete. It is hoped, however, that relatives or friends will, before the next edition, enable the deficiencies in this respect to be remedied by forwarding biographical particulars and portraits.

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insensibly but largely exceeded. The occasion may be taken to record our obligations to members of the British South Africa Company's forces and others for much valuable aid; notably to Major P. W. Forbes, who has furnished a complete and careful account of the operations of the columns under his command. Originally it was intended to print Major Sir John Willoughby's account also in full, but as it came to hand somewhat late for that purpose, and as it was in a large measure practically identical with that of Major Forbes, it was finally decided to publish only such portions as referred to the origination of the war, to the tragic but splendid incident which marked its close, and to the circumstances under which the pacification of the country was carried out. Thanks are also due to Mr. H. Rider Haggard, who has related all that is known, or reasonably conjectured, as to the murder by Lobengula of Captain Patterson's Embassy; to Mr. F. C. Selous, who has traced, in his own graphic style, the causes of the war, and alluded to its results; to Mr. P. B. S. Wrey, who has dealt with "the Victoria incident," and the prospects of the new South African colony; to Captain C. H. W. Donovan, Mr. Cecil R. Batley, Mr. J. Murray Gourlay, Mr. R. T. Coryndon, Mr. W. Hacker, and numerous others who have assisted with much valuable information, and a number of notes, sketches, and photographs which have been utilised in the body of the book. Finally, it should be said that in the ensuing pages stress is naturally laid upon the services of those volunteers who formed the advancing columns. At the same time it is hardly necessary to say that those volunteers and burghers who stayed behind to garrison the forts at Salisbury, Victoria, Charter, and Tuli, and to forward supplies to their comrades at the front, formed an important and indispensable portion of the volunteer army, and that their services demand grateful recognition by the Rhodesian community.

W. A. WILIS.

L. T. COLLINGRIDGE.

10, BASINGHALL STREET, LONDON, E.C.

20th August, 1894.



Photo by Elliott & Fry, Baker Street.]

THE HONOURABLE CECIL J. RHODES.

(Premier of the Cape Colony ; Founder and Managing Director of the British South Africa Company.)

THE DOWNFALL OF LOBENGULA.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY REVIEW OF THE WAR.

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The downfall of Lobengula—Struggle between civilisation and savagery—One of the boldest enterprises—A tribute to the brave—The war forced by the Matabeli—The little England party—Mining capital lying idle—Mr. Richmond's Mashona boy killed—Mashonaland abandoned, or Lobengula's power broken—Memorial drawn up by Mr. Philip Wrey—Mr. Rhodes and Dr. Jameson organise the force—Diversion caused by Colonel Gould-Adams' column—Khama's desertion unjustifiable—Gambo disheartened—The effect of the war—Plenty of room for Englishmen—Picturesque natives—Dutch or British in Matabeliland—Development of the country—Trains to Buluwayo—Power broken of military despotic rule—Supremacy of British power in South Africa.

THE year 1893, most fateful in the history of British enterprise in South Africa, has passed and gone; but the events of that year, culminating as they did in the conquest of Matabeliland and the downfall of Lobengula, will never be forgotten by the colonists of Mashonaland, who will ever look back upon the Matabeli war with feelings of pride mingled with sorrow. Sorrow for the comrades who have fallen in the struggle between civilisation and savagery; pride, not alone in the valour of those dead comrades, but also in the steady courage and strength of purpose which marked the conduct of the whole campaign.

As a detailed account of the war will be found in the pages of the book to which this little sketch is a prelude or preface, I shall not touch upon the conduct of the campaign; except to say that, successful as it was, it was yet one of the boldest enterprises ever undertaken by

our adventurous race. A slight reverse at the commencement might easily have led to a grave disaster, and that no reverse occurred until after the white men were in occupation of Buluwayo is due, I think, at least as much to the absolute want of generalship displayed by the Matabeli, as to the care and skill of the whites. The luck seems to me to have been all on our side. However successful though this enterprise has been, the conquest of Matabeliland has cost the colonists of Mashonaland dear. In number, the lives that have been lost are comparatively few, but it is a regrettable fact that amongst the fallen are a large proportion of the best men in the country—men like Allan Wilson and Henry Borrow, whose places none can fill. On the day that these two splendid specimens of the British race fell fighting side by side—Allan Wilson the Scotchman and Henry Borrow the Englishman—there fell with them their thirty followers, a picked band from a body of brave men. But sad though the death may be of these gallant fellows, and wide-spread as must be the grief amongst relations and friends at their untimely loss, the sorrow and grief must be in some sort mitigated by the manner of their death and the knowledge that their splendid spirit of comradeship and true nobility of character have embalmed their memory in every true man's heart wherever the English language is spoken. Amongst the others who have fallen in this brief campaign are many to whose memory I would fain pay a tribute of regard. Poor Ted Burnett, by whose side I have lain for months at a time beneath the stars which look down upon Mashonaland, without ever a cross word; and Gwynyth Williams, untimely slain in his early manhood, beloved by all who knew him, and as gentle and kind and brave as any Bayard; and Lendy, soldierlike and handsome, and as kind-hearted as he was brave; and poor Raaff, too, and Eustace Forbes, who, like Lendy, both lost their lives after the campaign was over, but were none the less the victims of the war. These men were all my personal friends, and there are others whom I did not know so well whose loss will be deeply mourned, not alone by their relations in this country, but also by their friends and fellow colonists in Mashonaland. Great, however, as has been the price paid in noble lives for the conquest of Matabeliland, I am one of those who think that the war was an absolute necessity, and the crushing of the

Matabeli power at any cost the only possible means of maintaining the supremacy of our race on the plateau of Central South Africa.

Was the war against the Matabeli justifiable or not? In Mashonaland there has never been but one opinion on the subject; an opinion, be it noted, which was not only held by every white man who had gone to the country with a view to bettering his condition in life, but which was also fully shared in by every member of every religious denomination in Mashonaland with one single exception, that exception being Mr. Douglas Pelly, a member of Bishop Knight Bruce's mission. This gentleman, who, save for a few days spent in the hospital at Salisbury before the outbreak of the war, had been stationed in Manica, and who therefore could never have seen a Matabeli in his life, or had any opportunity of studying the character of these people, or of knowing the paralysing effect on the enterprise of the colonists produced by their encroachments in the district of Victoria, seems to have been somewhat rash and presumptuous in the expression of opinions so adverse to his fellow-countrymen, as that "the war was a most unjust one, and was forced on the Matabeli by the Chartered Company." However, unjust as such an opinion undoubtedly is, it is as well that it should be recorded, if only that the colonists should know their enemies. With this single exception all the members of the different religious denominations in Mashonaland—Wesleyans, Church of England ministers, and Roman Catholic priests—were in complete accord that the war with the Matabeli was a necessity, and was forced on the colonists by the action of the Matabeli themselves. In this country, however, there is a small and contemptible class of men, a part of whose political creed it appears to be to discredit the actions of British colonists in all parts of the world, and these men have not only been constant in their denunciations of all that has been done by their countrymen in Mashonaland during the last four years, but have been particularly venomous in their criticisms concerning the cause and the conduct of the Matabeli war. Mr. Labouchere has, by his constant attacks upon the dead and the living alike, won for himself the reputation of being the most unscrupulous, dishonest, and virulent enemy of the colonists in Mashonaland, and his lead has been followed by some of the press in this country, who, curiously enough, seem to

believe that they are serving the political ends they have in view by calumniating indiscriminately a large body of their fellow-countrymen in South Africa.

Mr. Labouchere has summed up his opinion concerning the origin of the war in a sentence which I quote from the number of *Truth* for November the 16th, 1893. This sentence runs :—" The Mashonaland bubble having burst, a war was forced by the Company on Lobengula in order to get hold of Matabeliland." My answer to this charge was lately given in the course of a lecture before the members of the Royal Colonial Institute, and ran as follows :—" What exactly Mr. Labouchere means to convey by the expression, 'the Mashonaland bubble having burst,' I don't know ; but if he means that Mashonaland had been proved by this time to be worthless as a field for British enterprise, and that the officials of the Chartered Company had therefore made all the preparations necessary for a war of aggression against the Matabeli, then I say that Mr. Labouchere states what is absolutely untrue, for what are the facts? In July, 1893, when the Victoria district was devastated by the Matabeli, and the settlers' servants were killed within sight of the houses ; when their cattle were driven off, and their farmsteads destroyed, there were only thirty-eight horses in the whole of the Victoria district, and less than 150 in the whole of Mashonaland. At this time the first half of the dry season had already passed, and I ask if, given this absolute state of unpreparedness so late in the dry season, it is possible to suppose that at this time—the time of the Matabeli invasion of the Victoria district of Mashonaland—an aggressive war against the Matabeli could have been in contemplation by Dr. Jameson and the officials of the Chartered Company? Now for the assertion that the ' Mashonaland bubble had burst.' "

In this connection I have been authorised by Mr. Philip Wrey, the mining engineer of the Mashonaland Agency, a gentleman who has spent nearly three years in Mashonaland, and who is one of the best, because one of the most experienced, authorities upon mining work in that country, to state that the working capital represented by the different companies floated in London early in 1893 for the purpose of fully developing Mashonaland amounted to between £300,000 and £400,000. Now, as the people who subscribed this large sum of money

must have been more or less in the confidence of the directors of the British South Africa Company in London, is it to be supposed that they would have subscribed this amount of capital if a war with so powerful a nation as the Matabeli—a war which at that time must have seemed of very doubtful issue—had been in contemplation? Owing to the breaking out of the war the greater part of this capital has never been utilised. At the very time when the raid took place in the Victoria district, in July, 1893, there were 120 natives working at Long's Reef in the employ of the Mashonaland Agency, all of whom had been brought, at a great expense, from the east coast, and 100 more were actually on their way to Victoria from Inhambane. At the same time something like 300 men were at work on the "Cotopaxi," one of the properties belonging to the "Gold Fields of Mashonaland," whilst other large gangs were working on reefs belonging to Willoughby's Syndicate, the Zambesia Exploring Company, and many other mining syndicates in Mashonaland. Indeed, in July, 1893, so far from the Mashonaland bubble having burst, as Mr. Labouchere has so often asserted, I fail to see in what way the men who were interested in the development of the country could possibly have shown their belief in its value in a more tangible form than by undertaking the works of development upon which they were engaged in all the mining districts.

And what, I would ask, is occurring now that the Matabeli power has been crushed and Matabeliland lies open to European enterprise? Have the mining operations in Mashonaland been abandoned? Have the men whom Mr. Labouchere calls greedy adventurers, border ruffians, riff-raff, marauders and murderers, abandoned the burst bubble of Mashonaland en masse, and flocked, to use another of Mr. Labouchere's choice similes, like vultures to the fresh-killed carcass of Matabeliland? Not at all. In every district of Mashonaland mining development work and every other enterprise has now been resumed; and that fact is, I think, the best refutation of the false assertion, that war was made on the Matabeli without just cause, in order to raise money, because "the Mashonaland bubble had burst."

As to the actual circumstances which led to the war, I cannot recapitulate them at length here, but the raid by the Matabeli into the Victoria district in July, 1893, is a matter of history; and if that raid

itself was not a sufficient justification for the war which was subsequently undertaken against the Matabeli, I fail to see how any war that has ever taken place can be justified. It is true that no white man was murdered by the Matabeli during the prosecution of this historical raid ; but, short of this, everything was done to stir up the bitterest feelings of exasperation in the hearts of the colonists. More than 400 Mashona men, women, and children were killed in the neighbourhood of the township of Victoria. This, Mr. Labouchere tells us, ought not to have been resented by the settlers, as Lobengula was acting within his rights in slaughtering Mashonas at his pleasure. Probably the colonists in Mashonaland would not have been very strongly moved had they heard of the slaughter of native tribes by Lobengula at a distance from their settlements. But the killing of natives in the immediate vicinity of Victoria created a panic throughout the district, and not only put a stop to all mining development work in the country, but brought every other description of industry and enterprise to a standstill. Besides this, not only were many natives killed by the Matabeli close to the houses forming the little township of Victoria—so near, in fact, that their bodies had to be buried for sanitary reasons, by the white men—but in several instances, personal servants of white men were killed before the eyes of their masters. Amongst others who have made sworn affidavits to this effect, are the Rev. Mr. Sylvester, the English chaplain at Victoria, and Mr. Richmond, a prospector. The latter having been summoned to Victoria by Captain Lendy, in common with all the white men who were living at the various mining camps in the outlying districts, was coming in with all his worldly goods packed on a donkey. This donkey was being led by a Mashona lad, Mr. Richmond walking behind. A party of Matabeli being encountered, the Mashona boy let go the donkey, and ran and clasped Richmond round the legs. The Matabeli dragged him shrieking and assegaied him to pieces before the eyes of his master. Richmond, although I believe he had a rifle with him, was afraid to use it ; but he remonstrated strongly with the murderers of his servant, when one of them, placing his hand on his arm, said, “ You keep quiet, white man ; we have been ordered not to kill a white man now, but *your day is*

coming." This same threat was made to other white men. Concerning the murder of this boy, Mr. Richmond, as I have said above, has made a sworn statement before Dr. Jameson and the magistrate at Victoria, whilst Mr. W. B. Harris and others saw the boy lying dead in the road. A party of Matabeli also visited Mr. Napier's farm near Victoria and completely wrecked his homestead, destroying everything in his house. The throats of all his fowls were cut, and the dead birds left lying on the ground. All his goats were killed and skinned and the carcasses left, whilst all his cattle were driven off, and three of his cattle herds murdered. Altogether between three and four hundred head of cattle belonging to white men were driven off by the Matabeli in the course of this raid. Now these murders of white men's servants, the wreckage of homesteads, and the stealing of large herds of cattle belonging to the settlers, are not fictions, but facts, which can be sworn to by between 400 and 500 Europeans, and such being the case, there could be no further safety for white men in Mashonaland until the power of the Matabeli was broken. It was absolutely necessary, if the work of colonisation was to be carried on in Mashonaland, to assert the supremacy of the white race at once and for always. No middle course was possible. Either Mashonaland had to be abandoned, or Matabeliland conquered, and the military organization of Lobengula broken up. Had the colonists of Mashonaland been the mean, sordid, and cowardly wretches that Mr. Labouchere has asserted them to be, then they would have abandoned the country rather than embark on such a hazardous enterprise as the invasion of Matabeliland. But such a course was never dreamt of, for the men who to-day are fighting for the supremacy of their race on the borders of our Empire in Africa never forget that they are the countrymen of Drake and Raleigh and Frobisher, and of Clive and Warren Hastings; and so they did even as those bold Englishmen would have done in similar circumstances. Their success is their crime with those degenerate Englishmen in whom the spirit of adventure has been killed by a life of soft luxury and self-indulgence. Such men seem to consider that the word adventurer is a term of reproach to an Englishman, forgetting that it is adventurers who have made the British Empire what it is. From the time of the raid on Victoria, the settlers in Mashonaland determined on

war with the Matabeli, and in a memorial drawn up by Mr. Philip Wrey, and signed by every white man in Victoria, they called upon the British South Africa Company, under whose auspices they had come into the country, to protect their interests in the only possible way in which those interests could be protected, by at once supplying them with horses and everything else necessary for an immediate march on Buluwayo. Luckily at this supreme moment, when the supremacy of the British race in South Africa trembled in the balance, there were two such men in the country as Mr. Rhodes at Cape Town, and Dr. Jameson in Mashonaland. All that money and energy and strength of will could do in Cape Town was done by Mr. Rhodes. Although, owing to the severe drought and consequent want of grass, the season was a most unfavourable one for sending any kind of livestock for long distances over the burnt-up country, some 800 or 900 horses were bought and sent up to Mashonaland, and over 300 men were recruited in the Transvaal to assist their fellow-countrymen in the coming struggle. In Mashonaland itself Dr. Jameson was untiring in his efforts to organise and equip his small force as efficiently as possible. In this he was most ably and zealously assisted by Sir John Willoughby, Major Forbes, Major Allan Wilson, and all the officers and men under their command. Thus, by the end of the first week in October, 1893, Dr. Jameson's little force of 670 white men, supported by a small native contingent, were ready to advance in two columns from Victoria and Charter. These two columns met at the head of the Tukwi river, and then travelled together to Buluwayo. Luckily this combined force, though small, was thoroughly efficient and was especially strong in artillery, all the guns being in charge of first-rate artillerymen, such as Captains Lendy and Biscoe, and Lieutenants Reid and Llewellyn. Another point, too, which must not be overlooked in considering the great success of the invasion of Matabeliland from the east, and the dispersal of a tribe so well armed and organised as the Matabeli by such a numerically small force of white men, is the fact that the country lying between Mashonaland and Buluwayo is for the most part of the character of open grass land, and therefore most favourable for the operations of mounted men, supported by artillery. Had eastern Matabeliland been a broken, hilly country covered with thick forest, I

think that a very much larger force would have been required than that which actually scattered the Matabeli at the Shangani and the Imbem-bisi, and took possession of Buluwayo after a campaign that had lasted for less than a month. To the colonists of Mashonaland, to Dr. Jameson, and the officers and men of the Salisbury and Victoria columns, is due the lion's share of whatever laurels may be bestowed on the conquerors of Matabeliland ; but they themselves will, I think, be the last to refuse to recognise the great assistance rendered them by Colonel Goold-Adams, and Commandant Raaff, and their officers and men, who by a simultaneous invasion of Matabeliland from the west, through a most difficult and dangerous country, diverted quite half the military forces of the Matabeli nation from taking part with their comrades against the white men who were advancing on Buluwayo from the east. Nor ought the part played by Sir Henry Loch, the High Commissioner for South Africa, in the late war to be forgotten by the colonists of Mashonaland, or by any Englishman who is loyal to his race. In the earlier phases of the disputes between the colonists and the Matabeli, Sir Henry Loch did everything in his power to bring about a peaceful solution of the difficulties that had arisen ; but when he found that war was not only justifiable but inevitable, he exerted himself to the utmost to do all in his power to assist his countrymen, and thus Colonel Goold-Adams, with a small but most efficient force of 200 men of the Bechuanaland Border Police, was ready to advance upon Buluwayo from the west, simultaneously with Dr. Jameson's force that was marching from the east. Colonel Goold-Adams' little force was supported by 200 men recruited in the Transvaal, and commanded by Commandant Raaff, a man than whom there was not in all South Africa anyone who had had a greater experience in native warfare. At Tati this little force of 400 white men was joined by Khama, the chief of the Bamangwato, and nearly 2,000 of his people under the command of his brother, Radi-kladi, and his son Sikumi. Khama and his men were present at, and took a conspicuous part in, the fight with the Matabeli on the Sangezi River, near the kraal of Impandin ; but two days later they left Colonel Goold-Adams near the Mangme Pass, and returned home. This action of Khama's naturally excited a great deal of adverse criticism, and was strongly commented on in the colonial

press. Looked at from a European point of view, Khama's action was certainly most unjustifiable, and might have been disastrous to Col. Goold-Adams' small force, which was thus left without support in a very difficult country, and in the face of a large force of Matabeli under Gambo, Lobengula's son-in-law. However, as things turned out, no harm was done ; as Gambo, disheartened by the defeat of that portion of his forces which attacked Col. Goold-Adams at the Sangezi river on November 2nd, and receiving the news almost immediately afterwards that the Mashonaland columns had broken the King's best regiments on the Impembisi river and were marching on Buluwayo, abandoned the strong position he was holding at Mangwe Pass, and disbanded his forces, thus leaving the road to Buluwayo from the west, which leads through a most difficult and broken country, open and undefended. In Khama's defence, I will say that I do not think he was able to take the same view of things as his critics. He and his people were tired of the campaign, and as the season for ploughing had arrived, they were all most anxious to get home. On the evening of November 3rd, two of his men were taken ill of smallpox (which at the time was rife amongst the Matabeli), and this, causing as it did a scare amongst his people, decided him to leave his white allies and return home. It is unfortunate that he should have arrived at such a decision at such a time, but I entirely deny that unfriendliness to the white men, or disagreement with Col. Goold-Adams, had anything to do with it, and I trust that in any future dealings with Khama and his people, his conduct on this occasion will not be remembered against him, or allowed to outweigh the consistent friendliness he has always shown towards the British in South Africa, and the great assistance he rendered us at the time of the occupation of Mashonaland in 1890.


As to the effect of the war, I will state my view of it in the words of the lecture which I delivered upon this same subject, under the auspices of the Royal Colonial Institute. The first and broadest general effect of the conquest of Matabeliland is that a large tract of plateau land, well watered and fertile, lying at an altitude of 5,000 feet above sea level, and with a climate that will compare favourably with that of Southern Europe, is now in the hands of Englishmen, for thousands of whom there

is plenty of room, as well as for the natives, instead of being exclusively occupied by a savage and barbarous race. Savages are doubtless more picturesque than British settlers, but looking at the question of the conflict between savage and civilised races, which has been continually going on in the world from time immemorial, from the broadest point of view, and recognising it as a law that, when savages come into contact with an advancing civilisation, causes of friction must arise, which always end in the subjugation of the inferior people; and knowing, moreover, that in this particular case the military organisation of the Matabeli was certain to be broken either by the Dutch or the British in South Africa, I think it is a matter for congratulation and not for sorrow that it is the British and not the Dutch who have secured Matabeliland. It has been said and it will be said again, that neither Matabeliland nor Mashonaland are worth having; that there is no gold in these countries, that nothing will grow there; and that no one can live there, and so on. Let it be remembered that forty-five years ago the British Government was induced to give up the Orange Free State, then the Orange River Sovereignty, very much against the will of the bulk of its inhabitants by the expression of exactly the same sort of pessimistic opinions as are now from time to time published by ignorant and prejudiced people concerning Mashonaland. The same kind of things were said, too, of the Transvaal many years ago; yet both the Transvaal and the Orange Free State are now rich and prosperous territories; and so will Matabeliland and Mashonaland become during the first decade of the next century. The power of the Matabeli having been broken, the development of the gold industry in Mashonaland can now be carried on without any further fear of interruption. In all the different districts of the country where payable reefs are found, a European population will be established and townships will be formed; and these centres of population will afford markets for the farmers who will take up the land in the neighbourhood of the gold-producing areas. The resumption of enterprise, and the successful and continuous development of both Mashonaland and Matabeliland will be the direct effect of the Matabeli war, for all enterprise had been paralysed by the action of the Matabeli just previous to the war. In time townships will arise in Matabeliland as they have done in Mashonaland; the telegraph

wire, which has been already advanced to Tati, will be carried on to Buluwayo, and from there to Victoria or Charter; railway lines will, too, creep gradually into the country. The Beira railway will be carried on to Umtali and to Salisbury, and from thence along the watershed past Charter to Buluwayo, with a branch line to Victoria. The Silati line, too, will be carried on to the latter place, and the Mafeking extension will also eventually reach Buluwayo by way of Palapye and Tati. All this enterprise will not be undertaken and completed in a day, or a month, or a year, or five years; but it will infallibly come to pass within the next twenty years. There may be, and there will be, checks and hesitations in the future as there have been in the past; but the tide of civilization will advance steadily northwards in South Africa as it has travelled westwards in America. All this enterprise, which I may live to see, on the plateaux of Central South Africa will have been called into vigorous life by the effect of the Matabeli war. Nor can I see cause to grieve at the change which is about to come over the country. As an unbroken military power, the Matabeli were an insolent, cruel, and overbearing people, undeserving of the sympathy of the most quixotic of philanthropists. Their power having been broken, the countries over which they ruled, directly and indirectly, have been opened up to British enterprise, and in these countries there will be a field for the exercise of the energy and intelligence of many young Englishmen. And such fields are required; for this country is teeming with young men, full of energy, intelligence, and integrity, whose best qualities are dwarfed and stunted in the struggle for existence in the overcrowded towns of England.

In conclusion, I will say that the political effect of the conquest of Matabeliland will tend to secure the eventual supremacy of the Anglo-Saxon in South Africa, for the Dutch states are now completely surrounded by British territory except to the east of the Transvaal, on which there is no outlet for immigration. In the Transvaal itself, every year the power and influence of the European element (which is chiefly British) is increasing, and it cannot be many years before this British element will have a fair share in the legislation of the country; whereas the Dutch settlers, who will probably trek into the British South Africa Company's territories in considerable numbers during the next few

years, now that the military power of the Matabeli has been broken, will gradually lose the hatred of British rule which their forefathers carried with them from the Cape Colony into the northern Transvaal, and their children will live as happily under the British flag as do the Dutch of the Cape Colony and Natal. Had Mr. Cecil Rhodes not secured Mashonaland and Matabeliland for the British, these countries would have infallibly fallen to the Dutch, and British enterprise would have been hampered in those territories, as it has been in the Transvaal during the last few years. Briefly, the effect of the Matabeli war, though it may have been prejudicial to the happiness of the military caste in Matabeliland, has been distinctly beneficial to every other native race in Central South Africa ; whilst what is of far more importance, it has regained for Englishmen the prestige that was lost amongst both whites and blacks when Sir Evelyn Wood was ordered to make peace with the Boers after the defeat at Majuba Hill ; has insured the peace and security of Mashonaland, and reduced to a certainty the eventual supremacy of the British race as the dominant people in South Africa.



CHAPTER II.

MATABELILAND UNDER MOSELIKATSI.

The Greeks and Africa—Vasco da Gama at Cape of Good Hope—The expedition in 1890—A Dutch trek—Moselikatsi natives across the Drakensberg—Early Matabeli military training—Murder of Boers—Battle at Vechtkop—Kruger's first fight—Defeat of the Matabeli—Moselikatsi driven further north—Lobengula condemned to be strangled—Saved by Umcumbate—Policy of extermination—Death laws—Death of Moselikats—Succeeded by Lobengula in 1868.

IT was Herodotus who first described Africa as "the land of surprises." The famous Greek, of course, was referring to the monumental magnificence, the unique geographical characteristics, and the bizarre customs of a country where, as a much later writer has well said, paradox seems rooted in the soil. But though lacking the cultivated and historic splendour of the Africa known to the ancients; though steeped in original barbarism and the cruder forms of sin instead of boasting a completed civilisation which literally carries back to the dawn of history, the southern portion of Africa has not altogether failed to maintain the established reputation of the Dark Continent for the novel and surprising. It is, of course, its extraordinary industrial career which, above all else, marked out South Africa for the wonder of mankind. Nevertheless, it is to be said, that though comparatively commenced but yesterday, Afrikaner history includes many chapters rich in colouring and incident. And there, too, as in Old Egypt, it is the unexpected that has most frequently happened. †

Since the days when Vasco da Gama first sailed the Portuguese galleons round the stormy Cape poetically named "of Good Hope," there have been no more surprising and stirring contributions to South African history than those of which Mr. Rhodes has been the principal author. The occupation of Mashonaland in 1890 by a hastily organized column of five hundred men was freely characterised at the time as an

nstance of politico-commercial audacity which ranked with the exploits of Clive and Hastings. If that be so, what shall be said of the boldness which prompted the same small number of men to attack a powerful and well-organised nation of warlike savages, believed to muster some 15,000 fighting men, armed with rifle and assegai, amply munitioned, on their own ground, and on the eve of the deadly rainy season? And what tribute of praise can be too high to those who carried so dangerous and difficult an enterprise to a splendidly successful issue, with an expenditure of life and money which has stamped it as unique among our "little wars"?

It must not be supposed that Mr. Rhodes was alone in realising the climatic and commercial importance of the South Central-African plateaux. Indeed, but for the secrecy and rapidity with which the preparations for effective occupation were made, it is now generally recognised that Matabeliland and Mashonaland would have been acquired by a large and well-organised trek of Dutch colonists from the Cape Free State and Transvaal, a dissatisfied portion of whom did, in fact, endeavour to effect a forcible entry into Mashonaland in the following year. Fifty years, however, before these incidents took place, another "occupation of the hinterland" had been effected, under quite other auspices. Umziligazi, or, as the Dutch call him, Moselikatsi, and his impis, defeated by the Transvaal voortrekkers, had fled across the Limpopo, and, in looking around for a new home, had selected the country now called Matabeliland as the healthiest, the most fertile, and the best watered of all the vast stretches of prairie land and forest lying between the Zambesi and the Limpopo.

Umziligazi and his followers, the Amandabeli (as the Matabeli race were then called), originally formed a portion of the various Ama-Khosa tribes consolidated by the military genius of Chaka into the Zulu nation. Umziligazi, who must have possessed considerable abilities, was one of Chaka's most trusted generals, and achieved a reputation as a warrior and ruthless exterminator of human beings which extended far beyond the confines of the Zulu kingdom. Like many men who have "arrived," however, the chief of the Amandabeli began to consider that he might with impunity take liberties with the powers that were. It was in 1817 that, after a raid or foray, successful as usual, in

which great numbers of men, women, and children were mercilessly assegaied, and much loot in the shape of cattle and grain obtained, Umziligazi omitted the usual formality of forwarding the booty to his liege. Chaka was one of the last men to overlook presumption of this sort, and immediately despatched a strong impi, or army, to annihilate the contumelious chief and his followers. Umziligazi, however, received warning of the king's intention, and at once fled across the Drakensberg, followed by his men, who were animated with the strongest devotion to his person, and who knew that to expect mercy from Chaka was as sensible as to put faith in the humane instincts of the lion or the hyaena. These considerations considerably expedited their flight, and the Matabeli were soon across the Vaal River and in the territories now belonging to the South African Republic. Here both reasons of state and natural tendencies induced Umziligazi to carry out a policy of extermination against the less warlike tribes by which he was now surrounded. Still fearful of the vengeance of Chaka, he resolved to place between that monarch and himself a desert which no Zulu army could cross. Over and above that, the impulse to destroy human life was even stronger among the Zulus than it usually is among savage tribes. It must not be supposed, however, that the race was destitute of what all men have agreed to consider as ennobling traits. Ferocious, cruel, and treacherous, they undoubtedly were; but on the other hand they possessed the prime virtues of courage, and the capacity of work. The mental faculties of the Zulus are also by no means contemptible. To considerable powers of organisation and habits of discipline, they at various times displayed great capacity for planning and carrying out a settled and continuous policy. Among the Zulus of Chaka's time, absolute contempt of death and the habit of strict and unquestioning obedience to the chiefs were established as common to the whole nation. Among the women chastity was enforced by terrible penalties, the infliction of which were, however, seldom or never necessitated. The rigid military training to which the young Zulu warriors were subjected, had the natural result of bringing the national physique to a very high standard; and no more striking instance of their military qualities need be cited than the Zulu War of 1880, in which the natives, armed with assegai and shield, inflicted

heavy losses upon English and colonial troops, splendidly armed and completely equipped as these were.

Before such invaders the unwarlike Makatese and other natives dwelling north of the Vaal fell like wheat before the scythe, and Umziligazi soon succeeded in his object of placing a howling wilderness between himself and Chaka. The local tribes were soon almost exterminated, and only the comeliest girls and some of the youths were spared; the former as wives for the victors, the latter as slaves for purposes of transport and agriculture. Throughout the country military kraals on the Zulu system were established, and from these centres foraging or raiding impis were despatched in all directions. Entire tribes of the Bechuana nation were practically annihilated, and in one way or another Umziligazi and his followers found their new surroundings entirely congenial and satisfactory.

But a change was soon to come over the spirit of their happy dream, and they were about to meet in close quarters a foe against whom even their disciplined valour would be of no avail. In 1836, the Boers of the Cape Colony, animated with old restless longings for independence, the same impatience of British misrule, and the same weariness of the trammels of modern civilisation which had always characterised them, trekked into the Transvaal, carrying with them their wives and children, their cattle, and their effects. They soon came into collision with the Matabeli, who signalised the occasion by immediately murdering all but two members of an isolated hunting party. The survivors escaped and rode for their lives to the nearest party of the voortrekkers, who fortunately were only distant a few hours' ride. Mr. Theal, in his admirable "History of South Africa," proceeds thus: "They obtained the assistance of eleven men, and were returning to ascertain the fate of the others, when they encountered a division of the Matabeli army, and turned back to give notice to those behind. The families furthest in advance had hardly time to draw their waggons in a circle and collect within it, when the Matabeli were upon them. From ten in the morning until four in the afternoon the assailants vainly endeavoured to force a way into the laager, and did not relinquish the attempt until fully a third of their number were stretched on the ground. Of thirty-five men within the laager, only one, Adolf Bronkhorst, was killed, but a youth named

Christian Harmse and several coloured servants, who were herding cattle and collecting fuel at a distance, were murdered. Another party of the Matabeli had in the meantime gone further up the river, and had unexpectedly fallen upon the encampment of the Liebenbergs. They murdered there old Barend Liebenberg, the patriarch of the family, his sons, Stephanus, Barend, and Hendrik, his son-in-law, Johannes du Toit, his daughter, du Toit's wife, his son Hendrik's wife, a schoolmaster named Macdonald, four children, and twelve coloured servants; and they took away three children to present to their chief. The two divisions of Matabeli warriors then united and returned to Mosega for the purpose of procuring reinforcements, taking with them large herds of the emigrants' cattle."

Following this, a series of important battles took place. Most notable was the fight at Vechtkop (Battle Hill) in the country now known as the Orange Free State. The Matabeli attacked the laager of the voortrekkers with the greatest determination. President Kruger, then a mere stripling, who took part in the fighting on that memorable day, says that the Matabeli impis charged right up to the muzzles of their rifles no less than three times, in the face of a withering hail of bullets. In many respects this, the first campaign against the Matabeli, resembled that which has just taken place, nearly sixty years later. The natives, after fighting most bravely, retired with very heavy losses. Of the small force defending the laagers, only a very small number—two—were killed, and twelve wounded, while the severity of the attack was instanced by the fact that 1,113 assegais were afterwards picked up in the circle of the Boer camp. Umziligazi (the name means, appropriately enough, "a track of blood,") then retired to the Marico district, in the western Transvaal.

The voortrekkers now decided to assume the offensive, and a small force of 107 mounted Dutch colonists, 45 mounted Griquas, and 60 natives on foot, at once pushed forward. The Matabeli were surprised at dawn on January 17, 1837, and were routed with considerable loss. Later on in the same year, a brief campaign of nine days was brought by the farmers to a similar successful conclusion. This brought the Matabeli war of 1836-1837 to an end. Umziligazi completely resigned all hopes of holding his own against the Boers, but his troubles were

not yet ended. Shortly after the campaign, he was attacked by an impi sent by Dingaan, Chaka's successor, to recover the royal cattle. The Matabeli suffered even more at the hands of their kinsmen than they had from the Boers. Umziligazi, broken and dispirited, gathered together the remnants of his men and cattle, and trekked northwards across the Limpopo. Fixing his headquarters in the neighbourhood of Thaba Induna, where he left the bulk of his tribe, he started off towards the north-west with a picked body of men, partly with the object of looking for traces of a previous Zulu emigration under a chief named Umpezane, and partly to capture cattle. Umziligazi appears to have been absent on this expedition for about three years, and his indunas, thinking that the king and his impis must have met disaster and been killed, elected his eldest son by his "royal" wife to take his place. Hardly was the ceremony completed when, to the general horror, Umziligazi re-appeared. Explanations were of no avail, and Umziligazi, after listening in dreadful silence, ordered the indunas who had conducted his affairs during his absence to be put to death. Next came the turn of the king's two chief wives, who had acquiesced in the election, and lastly, his son Kuruman, a lad of fifteen, and his younger brother Lobengula were condemned to be strangled, following the Zulu custom that royal blood should not be spilt. Contrary rumours notwithstanding, there seems no doubt but that this sanguinary edict was fulfilled with regard to Kuruman. Zulus and Matabeli are not all, however, incarnations of cruelty, for Umcumbate ventured, at the risk of his own life, to disobey Umziligazi and save the younger scion of the royal house, whose name, not inappropriately, as it seemed at that time when he was born, signified "Driven by the Wind." Later on, in a milder mood, Umziligazi acquiesced in this arrangement, and formally recognised Lobengula as his heir. The story is very picturesquely told by Mr. Dennis Doyle, who knew Lobengula well, and resided for two years at the royal kraal.

Umziligazi established his sovereignty throughout the countries now somewhat loosely termed Matabeliland and Mashonaland. The Makalakas, Balotsi, and Banyai, all numerous tribes, were quickly subjugated. According to some authorities, most of the tribes already inhabiting these countries were subjected to a policy of extermination ; though in some

cases, Umziligazi appears to have been satisfied by a profession of submission and the payment of tribute by the vassal tribes. At any rate, fixing upon the magnificent plateau now known as Matabeliland as a centre for his military kraals, he extended his sphere of influence between the two great rivers mentioned, to the Portuguese frontier on the west, and to the borders of the Gaza country on the east. The tribe, or certain portions, no doubt deteriorated in physique and in other respects from intermarriage with the women captured on its raids, but maintained, on the whole, its Zulu characteristics—the contempt of danger and death, the love of battle, the military organisation, and the ingrained aversion to agricultural labour, which distinguished the splendid legions of Chaka. In course of time, Umziligazi waxed fat and flourishing. Matabeliland, watered by perpetual springs and streamlets, timbered like a vast English park, and healthy from its high altitude above the sea, was soon covered with enormous herds of cattle captured from the subject tribes. The “sour veld” gave place to that “sweet” herbage which clothes the cultivated parts of South Africa, and which renders the country lately acquired by “Mr. Rhodes’s young men” so valuable for pastoral purposes. Meantime, the old system of raiding, murder, and pillage was diligently continued by Umziligazi’s warriors, either as training for the young braves who had not yet dipped their assegais in blood, or for what may be called strictly business purposes—namely, the acquisition of cattle and other loot upon which the Matabeli supported a happy existence. The formula applied was both simple and invariable. At break of day, the Matabeli impi would rush upon the hapless kraal selected for their operations with terrible shouts. All who came within range of the formidable stabbing assegai were at once exterminated. Old men and young, matrons and maids, children, and babes at the mother’s breast—all would be sacrificed to the horrid Zulu lust for bloodshed, save a few young women, who would be carried as the spoils of victory, in the fashion of the Greeks with which we have been familiarised in the epics of Homer. A few young men and boys, too, would be occasionally taken alive as slaves, to act as porters and cattle herds. Instances might be cited ad infinitum; but here it will be sufficient to say that this picture is by no means overdrawn, and that it is founded on the published experiences of the

members of the European missions which have come into actual contact with the Matabeli. Among these, Mr. Selous mentions that veteran missionary the Rev. Robert Moffat, and the Revs. S. H. Edwards, C. D. Helm, W. A. Elliott, John Mackenzie, and M. Jalla, of the Paris Missionary Society. The European travellers through Matabeliland, too, have had the same story to tell. Mr. Selous, chief among these, has recited his experiences before many of the learned societies of this kingdom. His testimony is especially valuable, since he bears in South Africa the reputation of being a cool and careful observer, and an unexaggerative and, of course, absolutely reliable witness.

But, indeed, it is not only against other tribes that the Matabeli were guilty of gross cruelty and insatiable bloodthirstiness, which has, for the matter of that, characterised all other South African tribes before the establishment of white rule. The state of affairs in Matabeliland was no worse than that which obtained in Pondoland at the beginning of March, 1894, prior to Major Elliott's mission and the annexation of that fair and fertile province. There, as in Matabeliland, no subject of the barbarian despots was at any time safe from mutilation, or death under torture, for the most trivial and imaginary offences. Under Umziligazi and his successor, nothing was more certain to attract the king's wrath and summary vengeance, than the report that an induna or petty chief was growing too rich, too popular, or too powerful. Emissaries would, in the usual course, at once be sent to scatter the unhappy chief's brains with a knobkerrie, or to decree him to the more honourable method of execution with the assegai. To do them justice, the doomed men almost invariably suffered death with firmness, or even tranquility, and without attempt to evade the royal displeasure by escape. Ready as they were to inflict, the warriors of Matabeliland were no less ready to meet it with what, among more humane nations, would be called heroic fortitude.

In 1868, Umziligazi's career of rapine and bloodshed was brought to a natural close. Kuruman, the former heir apparent, had been "removed," and Lobengula, a younger son, was elected to reign in his stead, after a brief interregnum during which the nation was governed by a council of indunas.

CHAPTER III.

THE DAWN OF CIVILISATION.

Lobengula preserves the old traditions—Every inch a king—Cruelty tempered with humanity—Champagne and luxury—Strength of Matabeli army—Matabeliland coveted by the Boers—Rival missions—Mr. C. D. Rudd wins for Rhodes—Burying the concession—Effective Occupation—Organising the pioneer force—Selous as pioneer—Lobengula's opposition—Pioneers arrive safely at Salisbury—Early day troubles—Boer filibusters retire before "Maxim"—Dr. Jameson administrator.

KING "Driven by the Wind" faithfully followed in the footsteps of his forefathers. The military and social traditions of the Zulu race were carefully observed, and the royal authority was exercised and maintained throughout the vast areas subject to his influence in the usual sanguinary manner. But there was, at any rate, one redeeming feature in Lobengula's character. With a single exception (that of Captain Patterson, who, according to Mr. Rider Haggard, was foully done to death by the Matabeli king's orders) he treated individual white men with consideration, kindness, and in cases not a few, in a manner which may almost be called chivalrous and humane. Many Europeans who have held intercourse with him, speak of Lobengula with something of admiration and even strong personal liking. In figure Lobengula was tall—almost six feet two inches in height—broad and muscular, though as he grew old he inclined to that obesity which is common to almost every native chief in South Africa. His mien and manners have always been described as majestic. Mr. C. D. Rudd, who knew him well, and who owed his life on one occasion to Lobengula's firmness, says that the royal Matabeli looked "every inch a king." His features were those of a remarkable man, and his expression was, according to the last authority quoted, somewhat sphinx-like and very varying—now appearing to indicate extreme good nature, and again diabolical ferocity and cruelty. Several alleged photographic representations of Lobengula have appeared in the press from time to

time; but in point of fact, Lobengula never, on any occasion, permitted himself to be sketched or photographed, the native superstition being that the process involved the stealing of the soul of the person so pictured. There seems to be no doubt that he possessed considerable force of character, and abilities of no common order. Mr. Selous says of him that he possessed a native shrewdness which would not have shamed a European statesman. He appears to have been possessed of many of the attributes of a successful ruler, and in particular to have been a good judge of his fellow men. His partiality for white men (especially for individuals, among whom Mr. E. A. Maund was a great favourite of the old king) was well known, and it will always redound to his credit, that on the outbreak of the late war he gave formal notice to all the whites resident in his country full permission to leave in safety. Still more honourable was the fact that amid the fierce excitement and sanguinary passions aroused by the incidents of the campaign, although he detained the two white traders—Usher and Fairbairn—at Buluwayo, he protected them against the rage and fanaticism of his “majaghas,” threatening to assegai with his own hand anyone who should harm them. It is not too much to say that the colonial forces, on their arrival at the royal kraal, were astonished to find these two alive and unhurt; and probably there is not another chief in South Africa—Khama excepted—who would have acted with such generosity under similar circumstances.

Among other royal characteristics, it may be recorded that Lobengula was, in a primitive way, decidedly a *bon viveur*. He was particularly fond of Kaffir beer, and was wont to wash down his enormous meals of half-cooked meat with copious draughts of that beverage. Even the disturbing incidents of the flight from Buluwayo did not cause the king to forget his luxurious tastes, the writers being assured by an officer of Major Forbes' patrol that the spoor of the royal waggons from Inyati could almost be traced by numerous bottles.

Somewhat vague ideas were held, at the date of the Pioneer occupation, upon the subject of the numerical strength of the Matabeli nation. The best authorities seemed inclined to fix the number of fighting men at about 15,000, to which have to be added the old men, women, and children. Some of the regiments, notably the

Imbezu and Ingubo, prided themselves upon possessing the pur sang of the old Zulu stock. Most of them, however, contained an admixture of the local tribal element—in the shape of the offspring of captured Mashona and Makalaka women. Occasionally, too, male children from the raided districts would be adopted, so to speak, and brought up in all respects like the pure-blooded Matabeli. These half-breed regiments were called Amaholi.

The story of the occupation of Mashonaland forms one of the most interesting and picturesque chapters of South African history. Lobengula's country, covering, say, some 100,000 square miles, had for a great many years been coveted by Boers, especially of the northern Transvaal, by whom it was regarded as their particular "hunting veld," and their proper ultimate area of expansion. They had, in particular, cast envious eyes upon Matabeliland proper, a high plateau lying from 4,000 to 6,000 feet above the sea-level, and to whose climatic, agricultural, and pastoral advantages they were fully alive. Its attractiveness was not lessened, naturally, by its reputation of being highly auriferous. In the "scramble for Africa," into which the Great Powers had plunged with so much eagerness, Matabeliland had either been overlooked entirely, or left alone as the natural hinterland of the British dependencies. Up to the beginning of 1888, it was, with the exception of the huge Mohammedan sultanates behind the French and Turkish possessions in the Mediterranean littoral, the only portion of Africa which had not been taken formally under the protection of a civilised or semi-civilised government. It was therefore ripe for occupation, and in 1887 or 1888, the organisation of a "trek," to number some 2,000 members, was mooted among the Boers of the Zoutpansberg district. Fortunately, in the early part of 1888, a treaty was made whereby Lobengula established friendly relations with Great Britain. Prior to this, however (in the beginning of 1888), Mr. Rhodes had, in conjunction with Mr. Beit, sent a Mr. J. Fry to Buluwayo to obtain a concession from Lobengula, the said concession to be of as wide a character as possible. Mr. Fry, who had much experience of the natives, and was well known as a hunter, reached Buluwayo in due course, but severe illness (cancer) prevented him from carrying out the object of his expedition, and in about June, 1888, he returned to

Kimberley and died. A second expedition was organised in London under the auspices of the Exploring Company (specially formed for that purpose), which despatched a deputation, under the charge of Mr. E. A. Maund, to negotiate, if possible, a land and mining concession from Lobengula. The objects of Mr. Maund's expedition were announced to the Colonial Office in May, 1888. But a still more successful mission was, upon the death of Mr. Fry, despatched by Mr. C. J. Rhodes, who had for many years meditated the acquisition, in British interests, of the vast areas lying between the Zambesi and the Limpopo, regarding them as the natural hinterland of the colony of which he is the elected head. Mr. Rhodes induced Mr. C. D. Rudd (with whom he had been closely associated in the Diamond Fields since 1870) and Mr. A. Maguire, M.P., to undertake a mission to Lobengula; these gentlemen being accompanied by Mr. F. R. Thompson. They obtained from the king—somewhat to the general surprise—a concession ceding the mineral rights to the whole of his territories. This was formally signed on November 30th, 1889. Hurrying back with this priceless document, bearing Lobengula's mark and the famous elephant seal, Mr. Rudd was lost in the veld. After burying the concession and leaving written instructions as to its whereabouts, he lay down, as he thought, to die, overcome by hunger, thirst, and fatigue. He was however, discovered by some of Khama's Bamangwatos, and by them nursed back into health. Mr. Maund also received certain encouragement from the king, and the two interests were subsequently fused into one group, the proportions being defined in the Central Search Company. The latter subsequently became the United Concessions Company, which was in turn absorbed by the Chartered Company. Meantime, steps were being taken to obtain a charter and to place the newly-acquired concessions upon an adequate financial basis. A scheme for the development of the Bechuanaland Protectorate and the more northern territories was submitted to Her Majesty's Government on 30th April, 1889. Later on, on 13th July of the same year, a petition was presented praying for a charter. This resulted in the granting of the latter on 29th October, 1889, on which date also this bold enterprise was incorporated as a joint-stock concern with a capital of a million sterling.

So far all had gone smoothly. But now the formidable task of effective occupation—to use the Foreign Office term—had to be faced. It was universally believed at the time that the Matabeli could not be trusted to fulfil their bargain, and recognised authorities expressed the opinion that it would be impossible to enter into possession of Mashonaland without a force of at least 5,000 men. This opinion, however, was not shared by Mr. Frank Johnson, who afterwards became a Major in the British South Africa Company's military service. He knew the country well, and had acquired a reputation for exceptional daring and resource. His view was, that a force of 500 men would be ample for the purpose; and on being invited to do so, tendered to carry out the military occupation for £90,000. This extremely novel offer was accepted, and Major Johnson immediately set about the formation of the historic Mashonaland Pioneers, a corps d'élite of Englishmen and colonists, all expert shots and horsemen, of all trades and professions, and numbering 192 men. At the last minute it was also decided that two troops of armed police should be enrolled, and the supreme command was entrusted to Lieutenant-Colonel Pennefather, of the 6th Dragoon Guards. The command of the Intelligence Department was entrusted to Mr. F. C. Selous, whose knowledge of the little-known regions to be traversed was unique; and that of the transport department to the late Mr. E. Burnett, who was killed in one of the earlier skirmishes in the recent campaign. The force was accompanied by 300 picked colonial natives, and the equipment included 800 waggons, 1,600 head of trek-oxen, two seven-pounder guns, three machine guns, and an electric search light as a precaution against night attacks. Every care was taken to ensure a successful and permanent occupation. Fortunately this was effected without fighting, but it afterwards transpired that the Matabeli had, as anticipated, intended to dispute the advance of the occupying force. Their plans, however, were all upset by the extraordinary celerity with which the Pioneers traversed the country and made good their position. The advance-guard left Kimberley on March 19th, 1890, and the whole force reached Salisbury on the 12th September. This speed is little short of marvellous, when it is remembered that 250 miles of the track, from the Macloutsie River to Salisbury, a distance


of 460 miles, had to be literally chopped through the dense bush, as the Pioneers, led by Mr. Selous, went along.

This brilliant march was followed by a "rush" of improvident independent trekkers, who effected an entry into the country without complying with the Chartered Company's regulations as to stores and supplies. The company, though adequately provisioned for the needs of its own men, had not, of course, made preparations to provision the large number of trekkers who came in. During the rainy season which followed the occupation, therefore, the food supplies ran short, and the general distress was aggravated by fever and the want of proper nursing, shelter, and drugs. Unhappily, some splendid young Englishmen and Afrikanders succumbed under the very terrible privations endured, but which, unfortunately, are almost invariable concomitants of pioneer enterprise. During the next dry season all this was remedied, and since then the high veld of Zambesia has proved itself to be as healthy as any other part of South Africa.

The second initial batch of difficulties attending the northward expansion were thus grappled with and overcome. And now a new trouble arose, compared with which Colonial Office complications, Matabeli menaces, and the privations of the pioneers, seemed comparatively unimportant. For this time the danger that threatened was that of civil war between two jealous Afrikander populations. The great Boer trek, to which reference has already been made, was at last brought to a head under the auspices of Colonel Ferreira, C.M.G., and a Mr. Adendorff, and it was freely stated at the time that it had the warm though unofficial support of General P. J. Joubert—"the farmer who beat us at Amajuba." Mr. Rhodes' influence with the Afrikander Bond and Sir Henry Loch's prompt and determined action with the Transvaal Government prevented the trek from assuming the large proportions which originally appeared inevitable; but in spite of official proclamations issued by the High Commissioner and President Kruger, a formidable body of well-armed Boers reached the Limpopo drifts, where they were met by the Chartered Company's forces, supported by the Bechuanaland Border Police, and armed with machine guns. Fortunately, bloodshed was averted at the last moment. The trekkers or "filibusters," who were solemnly warned that they would

be fired upon if they attempted to cross the drifts, lost heart before taking the irrevocable step. One man alone galloped into the stream, but seeing that a Maxim gun was being trained upon him, turned round and fled. The trek then broke up in confusion. Part of the farmers entered the country under the Chartered Company's regulations, and the rest returned to their farms.

From the day when the Pioneers first entered Mashonaland to the present time, the development of that country has progressed with rapid strides. Townships have been laid out, a number of important goldfields have been developed, the Cape telegraph system has been extended to Salisbury, and communication has been opened up with the Mozambique coast. From the fine harbour of Beira, a railway line has been constructed for a distance of seventy-five miles inland. When completed it will span the coast belt ravaged by the deadly tsetse fly, which entirely prohibits annual transport. In face of enormous difficulties, the administration in the capable hands of Dr. Jameson had established law and order throughout Mashonaland. Justice is now meted out, and commerce fostered, just as in the older provinces of South Africa.



NATIVE MASHONA WORK.

From Mr. Selous' Museum at Wargrave.

CHAPTER IV.

THE FOUNDERS OF THE HINTERLAND EMPIRE.

Cecil Rhodes and General Gordon—South Africa or Khartoum—The Consolidation of the Diamond mines—The belief in Mr. Rhodes' resources—The Cape to Cairo idea—Dr. Jameson's career—The direction of the Chartered Company—The Duke of Abercorn—The Duke of Fife—Lord Gifford—Sir H. B. Farquhar, Bart.—Mr. A. Beit—Mr. G. Cawston—Mr. A. H. G. Grey—Mr. R. Maguire—Mr. Herbert Canning—Dr. F. Rutherford Harris—Mr. B. F. Hawkesley—Mr. C. D. Rudd—Mr. F. C. Selous—Mr. P. B. S. Wrey.

THE personalities of Cecil Rhodes and his associates in the extension of the South African frontier have had such intimate relation to the success of that Elizabethan enterprise, that it would be inadvisable, or even impossible, to avoid detailed allusion to their individual action therein. Of Mr. Rhodes himself, who is generally acknowledged to be one of the most remarkable Englishmen of the day, it may be said that he has originated systems of statesmanship and finance which are wholly his own, and like no others. The story of his career forms one of the most interesting chapters in what may be called the romance of South African trade.

Mr. Cecil John Rhodes, who is the fourth son of the late Rev. F. W. Rhodes, vicar of Bishop Stortford, Herts, was born at that place on July 5th, 1853, and is therefore just over forty years of age. He was educated at the local school, acquitting himself there one is told creditably. Thence, the state of his health being a matter of some concern, he left England to join his eldest brother, Herbert, who was planting in Natal. On the discovery of the River Diggings in Griqualand West, Mr. Herbert Rhodes took part in the "rush," and was shortly afterwards joined by his young brother. Not long after this, Mr. Cecil Rhodes determined to try for a University degree. He accordingly managed, while carrying on work on the fields, to do some reading, and to spend enough of each year at home—at Oriel College—to qualify for his degree. One occasionally meets—in South Africa—people who remember Mr. Rhodes in this chrysalis-like stage of his career. The general estimate of him at this time appears

to have been, "A nice young fellow enough, and a hard-working—but a dreamer." However, he worked on, and dreamed on; and here and there, at any rate, were found people who were sufficiently discriminating to detect the latent existence of those rare powers since so fully displayed. Among these, at a considerably later period, was "Chinese" Gordon, who was accompanied by Mr. Rhodes on the mission to Basutoland which resulted in the annexation of that country by the Cape Colony. The two men, with strong fundamental similarities and divergences, could not fail to be attracted by each other, though they were not the kind of men to share opinions upon each and every topic. Now and then, doubtless, discussion would wax warm. "You are the sort of man," the General impatiently said to Mr. Rhodes on one of these occasions, "who will never approve of anything you don't arrange yourself." One interesting little reminiscence was related by Mr. Rhodes to the Chartered Company's shareholders on his last visit to England. Alluding to the terms that were sometimes applied to his acts and his nature, he said that he had, for instance, been called an adventurer. Well, when he was at the Bank of England the other day he noticed that the charter for that institution had been granted to "adventurers." Similarly he was occasionally described as a speculator. He did not deny that charge. He remembered asking General Gordon why he had declined the chamber full of gold offered to him by the Emperor of China for his splendid services. Gordon replied by a counter question, "Would you have taken it?" "Certainly," replied Mr. Rhodes, "and three more rooms full if I could have got them," for, he explained to his audience, "one cannot carry out one's ideas, however good they may be, without wealth at one's back. That is the reason why I have always tried to combine the commercial with the imaginative, and that is the reason why I have not failed in my undertakings."

The hero of Khartoum appears to have had a liking for and a high opinion of Mr. Rhodes, and before he started on his last mission to the Soudan, wrote to Mr. Rhodes asking the young politician—Mr. Rhodes was then in the Legislative Assembly—to join him as private secretary. One cannot help speculating upon what the position would be to-day had Gordon quelled the Soudanese rising, and been

left to throw his abilities and his fame into the Cape-to-Cairo movement, and the civilisation of the dark interior. However, Gordon has passed, with firm steps, the grim frontiers of an unknown "hinterland," and his "young friend" must find another coadjutor in the difficult and dangerous problem which incidentally involves what he himself has lightly called "squaring the Mahdi." γ

Mr. Rhodes is one of a family, of whom seven are sons. The eldest, Mr. Herbert Rhodes, was killed while elephant-hunting in the Shiré district. The rest are nearly all soldiers, the second son being Colonel Frank W. Rhodes, D.S.O., who was educated at Eton, and until recently was in command of the 1st (Royal) Dragoons. He was late Military Secretary to the Governor of Bombay, and took part in the Soudan campaign under Sir Herbert Stewart, who described him as "the best aide-de-camp a general was ever fortunate enough to have." Colonel Rhodes was chief of the staff to Sir Gerald Portal on his Uganda Mission, and has just returned from a short visit to Matabeliland and Mashonaland, where he will shortly take Dr. Jameson's place as administrator during the latter's approaching visit to Europe. The third son is Captain Ernest Frederick Rhodes, R.E.; and the fifth is Captain Elmhirst Rhodes, D.S.O., of the Royal Berkshire Regiment. The sixth is Mr. Arthur M. Rhodes, who is farming near Buluwayo; and the youngest is Captain Bernard M. Rhodes, R.A.

It is barely a quarter of a century since Mr. Rhodes landed in the Cape. Those who only know South Africa as she is to-day would find it difficult to realise the absolute commercial stagnation which ruled supreme before the discovery of diamonds in 1867. When Mr. Rhodes arrived, he entered a country sunk in a veritable Slough of Despond, from which, however, the Kimberley mines were soon to extricate her. At the very outset of his Kimberley career, he made the acquaintance of, and formed a lasting friendship with Mr. C. D. Rudd, an old Harrovian and a Cambridge man, whose health had broken down in training at the University, and who had determined to try the virtues of the South African climate. The two friends purchased a tiny interest—a quarter-claim each in "Baxter's Gully." The partners prospered exceedingly, their first success being a remunerative pumping contract in De Beers Mine, and their

half-claim grew and grew until, in course of time, it had become in 1888 a powerful company controlling the whole of De Beers Mine, while Mr. Rhodes had become a millionaire. Simultaneously, the example of consolidation had been followed in the Kimberley Mine, resulting in a strong corporation known as the Kimberley Central Diamond Mining Company. In 1888, these two great concerns fused to form the colossal venture known as De Beers Consolidated Mines, Limited, and the diamond trade was placed upon an assured footing by placing the world's supply under a single control. It was the reconciliation of the innumerable rival and divergent interests which originally existed in the various mines at Kimberley which made for Mr. Rhodes a European reputation as a financial diplomatist of the first rank.

It is only fair to say that Mr. Rhodes emerges from the somewhat sordid milieu of Kimberley finance with the reputation of a man of incorruptibility, whose promise is a bond that will be strictly fulfilled to friend or opponent. As a company promoter and a director he has splendidly rewarded the trust reposed in him by his shareholders. Throughout South Africa Mr. Rhodes has a vast Pretorian Guard of young colonists, who look upon him with something like personal devotion, and among the rank and file of the Dutch and English Afrikaner populations the confidence in him is well-nigh unlimited. When a difficulty arises, the prevailing sentiment seems to be, "Oh, leave it to Rhodes; he'll manage it somehow." When the Matabeli war broke out, and the columns marched for the front, South Africa felt a lively dread that the task of her young men was beyond their strength; but they took comfort in the belief that "as Rhodes was going up himself to Salisbury, it would be all right." This all-pervading article of faith is quite one of the features of South African life, and has been wittily alluded to by two lady writers who visited Mashonaland (Miss Blennerhassett and Miss Sleeman). In an interesting book upon their adventures the authoresses mentioned that the "fly belt" was not causing very much anxiety, since it was generally believed that Mr. Rhodes would "somehow" find means of "squaring the tsetse fly."

It is this belief in Mr. Rhodes' never-failing resources of mind and money that kept the Zambesian colonies alive and progressing in face of the stupendous difficulties encountered from '90 to '94; and

it can hardly be denied that the thousand and one things left to Mr. Rhodes' resourceful management have been ultimately accomplished.

In due course Mr. Rhodes entered the Cape Legislative Assembly as the representative of a Diamond Fields constituency, and in 1890, on the resignation of the Sir Gordon Sprigg's Ministry, accepted the premiership. His success as a statesman has been complete. Perhaps his really most important political achievement has been the unification of the interests and sentiments of the Franco-Dutch and English colonists at the Cape. This desirable consummation was effected by enlisting the all-powerful support of the Afrikaner Bond, led by Mr. Hofmeyr, whom his followers variously compare to Bismarck and Parnell. The Rhodes Cabinet at present has a voting power of two to one upon party questions, and upon some points, notably the expansion of the frontier,—for the Cape Colonists are anti-Little-Englanders to a man—carries practically the whole House with him. Mr. Rhodes' current ambition—or one of them—is the unification of Anglo-Dutch South Africa, including the Cape Colony, Natal, the two Dutch Republics, and the British Crown Colonies and Protectorates, including Cis- and Trans-Zambesia. There are those who believe that, when that is accomplished—and of its own inherent political gravitation it is inevitable—Mr. Rhodes contemplates the fusion of the whole of the British territorial and political interests in the Continent. The first step towards this end, they say, has taken the form of a telegraph line, which is being constructed in great measure at Mr. Rhodes' own expense, from Capetown to Cairo, and which has already crossed the Zambesi.

It is hardly necessary to point out that Mr. Rhodes is well known to be a strong Imperialist, though an equally strong believer in the justice and advisability of self-government for the larger colonies. The circumstances which would tempt him to advocate political independence for South Africa cannot be conceived. That, however, affords no reason why Her Majesty's Government in this country should needlessly and unwisely interfere in strictly Colonial affairs, as they have done on too frequent occasions in times gone by. In spare moments of his political life, Mr. Rhodes has given his keen attention to the development of the Witwatersrand goldfields. By the formation of a powerful

joint-stock company—the Consolidated Goldfields of South Africa, Limited—he has acquired for himself and those associated with him in the venture, immensely large and important interests in the celebrated Main Reef Series, and has taken a prominent part in the opening up of the deep-level areas.

Mr. Rhodes is perhaps, however, best known to the general public of this country as the subject of Her Majesty who has added nearly three-quarters of a million square miles of valuable territory to the Empire. In these days—perhaps it has been so in all times—it is the fashion to belittle contemporary reputations, and to regard none as “great” upon whom that epithet has not been bestowed by posterity. Perhaps the tendency is a creditable and conservative characteristic. Still, there are many—especially in South Africa—who regard Cecil Rhodes’ genius and his patriotic ambitions with undisguised admiration, and who will be much surprised if he does not leave “footprints on the sands of time,” and another famous name to add to the roll of those who have extended the imperial horizon—a roll which bears the names of Raleigh, Clive, and Hastings; and which, but for a wilfully blind Home Government, might have numbered that of Washington amongst the others.

No more striking illustration of Mr. Rhodes’ accuracy of judgment in gauging the capabilities of his lieutenants need be adduced, than the selection of Dr. L. S. Jameson to fill the important post of Administrator of territories covering a larger area than France, Germany, Austria, and Italy combined. No ordinary abilities would have sufficed to deal with the innumerable and thorny questions periodically presenting themselves in the government of a mixed population such as that of Rhodesia, and no ordinary constitution was required to stand the wear and tear of business added to the strain of a rough life in a frontier settlement. Not only had the Company’s affairs to be conducted with due regard to its commercial character, but an immense native state in immediate contiguity had to be watched and tactfully handled; a rough, determined white population, mainly consisting of miners, had to be controlled; the country’s unknown resources had to be developed, and last, but not least, the relations of the Company with the Imperial Government had



DR. L. S. JAMESON.

(Administrator of the British South Africa Company's Territories.)

to be at all times carefully considered. A medical man, in full practice, and absolutely without any sort of experience of public or private administrative business, Dr. Jameson was about the last man who would have been selected by the Colonial Office to solve such a number of delicate and difficult problems. Nevertheless his appointment has been the one point upon which Mr. Rhodes' wisdom has never been questioned, even by his most fanatical opponents.

Dr. Leander Starr Jameson, a Scotchman, born in Edinburgh on the 9th of February, 1853, is the youngest son of the late R. W. Jameson, Writer to the Signet, a well-known politician of half a century ago; his mother being a daughter of Major-General John Pringle. The family subsequently settling in London, Dr. Jameson, after distinguishing himself at school, both as a student and an athlete, studied for medicine at University College Hospital. There his career was a brilliant one. He obtained silver medals for medicine, surgery, anatomy, and pathology, besides a surgical scholarship, and graduated in 1875 at London University, obtaining the gold medal for medical jurisprudence. Everything promised him a successful and lucrative practice in the highest walks of the medical profession in London; but his health gave way under the strain of over-work, and after a short health tour in America he accepted, in 1878, a partnership with Dr. Prince, in Kimberley. His reputation grew rapidly, and he was soon recognised as the chief authority in South Africa in every department of medicine. For instance, the Free State Parliament, by special resolution, requested his attendance on the late President of the Orange Free State, Sir Henry Brand, at Bloemfontein. To a thorough knowledge of his profession, industry, and a conscientious sense of the responsibility of his work, Dr. Jameson added an amount of tact and keen sympathetic insight into human nature which gave to his society a charm for which he has become so well known, and which has been so useful in his official career.

Among the host of firm friends made by Dr. Jameson during his residence in Kimberley, Mr. Cecil Rhodes stands out prominently; and at the time when the amalgamation of the diamond mines was in process, and the extension of British influence northward was still a dream of the future, their life was one of intimate association. At this period

Mr. Rhodes was only beginning to be known, and was regarded even by his friends as somewhat over-sanguine, and Dr. Jameson was possibly the one man who gauged his powers and his plans correctly. With an enthusiasm which equalled Mr. Rhodes', and with a generosity of spirit by which he has always been distinguished, Dr. Jameson saw the greatness of his friend's schemes, and the possibility of their realisation. Henceforth, his one desire was to assist Mr. Rhodes in carrying them out; and with what loyalty, tenacity, and intrepid daring he has adhered to his purpose, the record of his connection with the British South Africa Company from its inception will testify.

In 1888 it became necessary for Mr. Rhodes to send a trustworthy agent to Buluwayo, to carry out the various and delicate negotiations connected with the development of the concession granted to himself and Mr. Rudd. Mr. Rhodes, after much careful consideration, selected Dr. Jameson; and he, with a complete disregard of personal and pecuniary considerations, immediately sacrificed the most lucrative and extensive medical practice in South Africa to undertake this difficult and dangerous task. He persuaded Mr. Doyle and Major Maxwell, both skilled interpreters, to accompany him to the King's kraal, and remained three months with Lobengula, whom he meanwhile cured of an attack of gout. Before he left he acquired great influence with Lobengula and his principal councillors, and his mission was completely successful. The Charter was formally recognised, and full permission was given for the advance of a pioneer force into Mashonaland. Having completed his mission, Dr. Jameson returned to his practice in Kimberley. Difficulties arose at Buluwayo after his departure, however, and at Mr. Rhodes' request he again returned there, and once more succeeded in persuading the King to agree to the proposals made on behalf of the Company. Dr. Jameson remained in Buluwayo in communication with Mr. Rhodes, and the Pioneer Expedition started on its road up country. Ultimately Dr. Jameson joined the columns, and accompanied them to Salisbury as the representative and attorney of Mr. Rhodes. The next task was originated by Dr. Jameson himself, and was an exceedingly arduous one. Recognising the necessity of a shorter and less expensive route to the coast than the long overland journey from the south which they had accomplished, Dr. Jameson, accompanied by Major Frank

Johnson, left Salisbury, and traversed the country to the east down to the Pungwe, striking that river at about seventy miles from its mouth. The two adventurous explorers proceeded down the river in a portable boat, brought with them in sections by native carriers, and successfully reached the steamer waiting for them in Pungwe Bay, after which Dr. Jameson proceeded to Capetown to give an account of his expedition to Mr. Rhodes. The ultimate result of this hazardous journey was, of course, the establishment of the Beira Railway Company.

Shortly afterwards, believing that Dr. Jameson could best carry out his plans with regard to Mashonaland, Mr. Rhodes requested him to return there as his representative, and in the latter part of 1890 Dr. Jameson again returned to Salisbury. After a short stay there, utilised in furthering the interests of the Chartered Company, and in stabilising much that had already been done, he determined, on the occasion of a visit to Manica, close on the Portuguese border, to proceed to the Gaza country—ruled over by the Zulu Chief, Gungunhana—with the object of securing that vast territory for the Chartered Company. The year 1890-91 was memorable in the interior by reason of its exceptionally heavy rains, the entire country towards the coast being under water, and the rivers flooded, for which and other reasons the journey he proposed to make was not lightly to be undertaken. Yet, taking with him Messrs. Doyle and Moody, and totally unprovided with comforts, or even the bare necessities for such a journey, he pushed across the veld to Gungunhana's chief kraal, and arrived there in spite of innumerable difficulties—sleeping by day or night as and when he could, drenched to the skin by the heavy rains, marching knee-deep in water, crossing broad and raging rivers with no better means than paddling across on frail pieces of bark—and so penetrated what at that time was believed to be one of the most fever-stricken districts south of the Equator.

On arriving at Gungunhana's "Great Place," both of Dr. Jameson's companions being prostrated with fever, he found the King surrounded by Portuguese officials, who had with them a strong following of Portuguese native troops. But in the face of all this, the expedition resulted in a complete success in so far as concerned the negotiations with the King, who freely invited the occupation of his country by

the British South Africa Company. As, however, this concession was made the subject of negotiations between the two Governments then discussing the Anglo-Portuguese treaty, the expedition did not result in an accession of fresh territory to the Chartered Company. This fearful march to the Limpopo left Dr. Jameson on his return to Cape Town in a very debilitated condition, and the victim of repeated and severe attacks of malarial fever. About this time Mr. Colquhoun announced his desire to resign office as Administrator of Mashonaland. Mr. Rhodes pressed the appointment upon Dr. Jameson. The position in Mashonaland was then exceedingly difficult. The Company had been incurring enormous expense in administering the country, while at the same time the Boers of the Transvaal were organising treks to invade and take possession of a portion of the territory, with a view to establish a new Boer Republic; and in addition to all this, the white population was in a condition of much discontent. But Dr. Jameson, ill though he was, at once consented to face all these difficulties, and, receiving full power from the High Commissioner to deal with the Boer trek, set out for Mashonaland as Administrator. He immediately took steps to meet the most pressing danger. On the banks of the Limpopo, supported by a troop of the Bechuanaland Border Police, he found himself faced by a large body of armed Boers preparing to cross the river. An error in judgment might have precipitated a war between the English and Dutch elements, but fortunately the new Administrator was equal to the occasion, and the Boers were persuaded to give up their enterprise and return to their homes.

Still suffering from fever, Dr. Jameson went on to Salisbury, where he conciliated the discontented colonists, very materially reduced the costs of administration, and in twelve months was able to show a financial statement in which the revenue and expenditure almost balanced. The splendid tact of Dr. Jameson in reconciling, wherever they conflicted, the interests of the Company, of the colonists, and of the blacks, became a matter of universal comment and congratulation; all united in almost affectionate approval of the Administrator—all recognised that he was doing his best in the general interest.

In this brief sketch Dr. Jameson's professional ability, the kindly disposition which has obtained for him the goodwill of everyone in

British Zambesia; his unselfish devotion to the cause which he has taken up with such splendid spirit, and his skill in the management of men, have been chiefly dwelt on. Further pages in this volume will point to his equally rare capacity for organisation; his tactful adaptation of means to the end required; his power of infusing into those under him the same confidence of success which he himself possesses, and the foresight which enabled him to declare before starting, almost to a day, the time when the British South Africa Company's conquering forces would arrive at Buluwayo, the Matabeli army having been crushed, and the King either a prisoner or a fugitive. Future history will assign Dr. Jameson a prominent place among those who have been called the "makers of the Empire," and his name is, and always will be, associated with recollections grateful to the colonists of British South Africa.

While arrangements were being made for the formation of a company on a royal charter, to develop and maintain civilised governments throughout the new territories of the empire, it was stipulated that three members of the Board of Direction should be nominated by Her Majesty's Government. In due course the Duke of Abercorn, K.G., the Duke of Fife, K.T., and Mr. Albert Grey joined the Board, the first in the capacity of president. The other members of the Board, who represent the commercial element of the administration more fully than the Dukes of Abercorn and Fife and Mr. Albert Grey (who may be said to act as trustees for the nation), are Lord Gifford, V.C., Sir Horace Farquhar, Bart., Mr. Alfred Beit, Mr. George Cawston, besides, of course, Mr. Rhodes, the managing director, who is represented on the Board by Mr. Rochfort Maguire, M.P.

The president of the company, James Hamilton, second Duke of Abercorn, and one of the best-known members of the Upper House, takes a strong personal interest in the affairs of the Chartered Company and devotes a large portion of his time to the conduct of its affairs. He was born in 1838, and succeeded to the title in 1885, his father being a former Viceroy of Ireland. He was educated at Harrow and Christ Church, Oxford. His Grace, who is one of the two Irish Dukes in the peerage, is very popular among all ranks and classes on both sides of St. George's Channel. He has filled several offices,

amongst others, that of Lord of the Bedchamber to the Prince of Wales, and Groom of the Stole. From 1860 to 1880, as Marquess of Hamilton, he represented Donegal in the Conservative interest, and is now Lord-Lieutenant of that county, and Hon. Colonel of the 5th Battalion Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers. He holds an immense number of titles,



Photo by Russell & Sons.]

THE DUKE OF ABERCORN, K.G., P.C.

being C.B. (1885), P.C. (1887), and K.G. (1893), and married, in 1869, Lady Mary Anna Curzon, daughter of Lord Howe, and has five children. The Chartered Company was exceedingly fortunate in securing his services as a director; and by the large amount of his time and attention which he has devoted to its management, the Duke of Abercorn has again shown how deeply at heart he holds the

welfare of Greater Britain, and the importance of opening up new fields for the expansion of the race, and the widening of England's commercial frontiers.

The same may be said of the vice-president, who has greatly assisted and added to the prestige of our modern John Company



Photo by W. & D. Downey.]

THE DUKE OF FIFE, K.T., P.C.

by taking a seat—his sole directorship—upon its Board. His Grace, Alexander William George Duff, K.T., P.C., first Duke of Fife, was born in 1849, and succeeded to his titles in 1879. In 1889 he married H.R.H. the Princess Louise of Wales, and has a daughter, the Lady Alexandra Duff. The Duke of Fife is Lord Lieutenant of Elginshire, Deputy Lieutenant of Banffshire and

Aberdeenshire, Hon. Colonel of the Banffshire Volunteers, and Member of the Council of the Royal Duchy of Lancaster. He takes the opposite side in politics to the Duke of Abercorn, having represented Elgin and Nairn for five years in the Liberal Unionist interest. He is head of the great banking house of Sir Samuel Scott and Company. It may be said, without any sort of exaggeration, that the British South Africa Company was unusually favoured in his having accepted a seat upon its board, seeing that it is his sole and only directorship. Those who have attended the annual meetings of the Company cannot have failed to be impressed by his acquaintance with, and mastery of, the details of its business. He holds statesmanlike views upon the leading South African questions of the day, and it is not unfortunate for British Zambesia that it has the benefits of his political prestige, influence and common-sense views upon the problem of African development under British auspices. He is a good debater and a fluent speaker, and taking a strong personal interest in the aims and work of the Company, has taken a leading part in directing its policy and shaping its destinies.

Another prominent member of the Board is the Right Hon. Edric Frederic, Lord Gifford, who holds the coveted and honourable distinction of the Victoria Cross, won during the Ashanti War. He was formerly Major in the Middlesex (Duke of Cambridge's) Regiment, and on the staff of Viscount Wolseley, when Governor of Natal. Lord Gifford took part in the Zulu War as well as the Ashanti Campaign. He was Colonial Secretary of Western Australia from 1879 to 1880; a member of the Legislative Council from 1880 to 1883. From that year till 1888 he acted as Colonial Secretary at Gibraltar. He was born in 1849, and succeeded his father, the second Baron Gifford, in 1872; and in 1880 married a daughter (Miss Sophie Catherine Street) of General J. A. Street, C.B.

The other directors are Sir H. B. Farquhar, Mr. A. H. G. Grey, Mr. A. Beit, Mr. George Cawston, and Mr. Rhodes, of whom Mr. Alfred Beit, a member of the great house of Wernher, Beit and Co., of London, Johannesburg, and Kimberley, is not the least widely known. The firm is the leading house in the Kimberley diamond trade, and is also by far the largest mine and land owner in the Transvaal. Mr. Beit, who bears the reputation of being one of the most far-seeing men of business in the

commercial world, is an intimate friend of Mr. Rhodes, having taken a very active interest in most of his schemes, and he is also one of the Life Governors of De Beers Mines. When the Zambesian Hinterland idea was first brought forward, Mr. Beit's firm at once took a most prominent part in the movement, and he accepted a seat upon the



LORD GIFFORD, V.C.

Boards of the British South Africa, United Concessions, and Exploring Companies. Mr. Beit is also a member of the Board of the New Jagersfontein Diamond Mining Company, the Robinson Gold Mining Company, and a few other similar concerns of the first rank. Mr. Rhodes alone excepted, there is no one who is so largely interested in, or who exercises a more invigorating and healthy influence upon, the commerce and

industries of South Africa. He has thrown himself vigorously into the development of the country's unique resources, and has actively supported all schemes having that object. He was born in Hamburg in 1853, and went out to South Africa when quite a young man. From the first he displayed a genius for business, and his determination of



MR. ALFRED BEIT.

character and earnestness of purpose soon resulted in the achievement of a great position. From 1875 to 1888 he was engaged in the diamond mining business in Kimberley, and in the latter year came home to share the management of the London house with an immense fortune, and—what is not quite so common a thing—the reputation of being honourable to the verge of Quixotism in all his dealings.

Sir Horace Brand Farquhar, Bart., is one of the partners of the Duke of Fife in the great banking firm of which the latter is the head. He was born in 1844, is J.P. for the County of Middlesex, and a leading member of the London County Council. His father, the first Baronet, was a Governor of the East India Company.



Photo by W. & D. Downey.]

SIR HORACE BRAND FARQUHAR.

Mr. Albert H. G. Grey, who was born in 1851, is a son of the late General the Hon. Charles Grey, M.P., and is nephew and heir-presumptive to Earl Grey. He was educated at Harrow and Trinity College, Cambridge, and holds the degree of B.A. In 1878 he was elected M.P. for South Northumberland, but withdrew. Some two years later he was re-elected, and represented that constituency until

1885, when he became Member for the Tyneside Division. He is also J.P. and C.C. in the County of Northumberland. He married Miss Alice Holford in 1877, and has four children.

Mr. George Cawston is the senior partner in the well-known firm of George Cawston and Co., and is a leading member of the



Photo by J. Worsnop, Rothsay.]

MR. ALBERT H. G. GREY.

London Stock Exchange. As previously stated, he took early and, at first, independent action in the Hinterland question. He first addressed the Colonial Office on the subject in a letter dated May, 1888, stating that it was his intention to send an expedition to Matabeliland. This was the foundation of the Exploring Company. Mr. E. A. Maund took charge of the expedition, the fortunes of which have already been

followed. Ultimately the two groups fused, and the Central Search Company was formed to define the respective interests. From this again arose the United Concessions Company, recently absorbed by the British South Africa Company. Mr. Cawston, who takes a keenly active part in the conduct of the Company's affairs, was born



Photo by Van de Weyde, Regent Street.]

MR. GEORGE CAWSTON.

in 1851, and is the son of the late Mr. S. W. Cawston, of Balham, Surrey. He became a Member of the Inner Temple, and was called to the Bar in 1882. He takes a deep interest in geographical questions, is a Fellow of the Royal Geographical Society, and recently read an excellent address dealing with Matabeliland affairs to the Fellows of the Imperial Institute. He married a daughter of

the late Mr. Richard Haworth, of The Argoed, near Shrewsbury. Mr. Cawston, besides being a director of the British South Africa Company, is chairman of the South-West Africa Company, and a director of the Exploring Company. The former is, next to the British South Africa Company, the most important territorial concern in South Africa, and embraces within its scope of operations some sixty thousand square miles of land, while the Exploring Company holds immense and varied interests in Zambesia. Mr. Cawston is thus deeply concerned in the development of the less known portions of South Africa.

Of the three who proceeded on behalf of Mr. Rhodes to Buluwayo to obtain the great concession from Lobengula, Mr. Rochfort Maguire, the present member for West Clare, has had a peculiarly interesting and varied career. He was a first-class man of Merton College, Oxford, and passed for the Indian Civil Service ; but having obtained a fellowship at All Souls', he entered for the Bar. Subsequently, he became private secretary to Sir George Burn, the then Governor of Hong Kong. He then returned to Oxford, where he received an invitation from his friend and college contemporary, Mr. Cecil Rhodes, to join him in South Africa. His selection for the dangerous and important mission with which he was entrusted was decidedly a happy one. Mr. Maguire bears the reputation of possessing a sang froid which knows no variations of temperature under the extremest conditions of danger and difficulty. It is said that he became a great favourite with Lobengula, possibly winning his way to the royal favour by that imperturbable demeanour which is so much in vogue among savage tribes, and which is one of Mr. Maguire's characteristics. Mr. Maguire spent a lengthy period in Matabeliland, and carried out his mission effectively and completely. Not only did he secure important concessions for his own party, but he contrived to keep all competing candidates for the royal favours away from Lobengula's person. Ultimately he won his way almost too completely into the King's good graces, so much so indeed, that he found some difficulty in getting away from the royal kraal. This he ultimately did, however, and returned to England with a comfortably holding of shares in the Chartered Company, and went into Parliament as a supporter of Mr. Parnell. He is a quiet speaker, given to argument and not declamatory abuse, and during the Labouchierian attack upon

the Chartered Company, defended his friends in one or two moderate and convincing speeches. He represents the managing director on the London board of the Chartered Company as his alternate.

The secretarial duties connected with the business of the British South Africa Company are almost as important as those of the directors.



Photo by Debenham, Ryde, I.W.]

MR. HERBERT CANNING.

and are so closely associated with the latter that this, perhaps, is the most fitting place for reference to them. Chartered companies are not merely trading associations. In them are vested all the functions of government, from the levying of taxes, the infliction of capital punishment, to the carrying on of war. It is hardly necessary to say that so much falls upon the secretary, that it is imperative that he

should possess high abilities, unflagging industry, never-failing tact, and great business experience. Up to the present, the Chartered Company has been well served in this direction. The first secretary was Mr. C. H. Weatherley, who was for several years chief of the staff of Messrs. Cooper Brothers and Co., the well-known firm of accountants. Mr. Weatherley, whose capacity and geniality soon made him a prominent and popular figure in African circles, retired to accept a partnership in his old firm. He was succeeded as secretary by his friend, Mr. Herbert Canning, who had filled similar positions. Following such a predecessor, much was expected from the new secretary, who took office about a year-and-a-half ago. Those expectations have not been disappointed. Mr. Canning, whilst being earnest and energetic, is patient, thorough, and diplomatic; he has discharged his functions, at times exceedingly onerous—notably during the war—with conspicuous success and remarkable tact, and above all, he has contrived to comfortably cope with the immense volume and various kinds of work which have thrust themselves upon him since he accepted the important position offered to him by the Chartered Company. It is no mean tribute to Mr. Canning's power of utilising time profitably to say that while posted up both in the broad lines and in the important details of the Company's administrative and commercial business, he even contrives to digest the immense mass of English and Colonial newspaper literature relating thereto; the business in London of the African Transcontinental Telegraph Company and of the Bechuanaland Railway Company is also conducted by him.

The secretary of the British South Africa Company in South Africa, Dr. F. Rutherford Harris, M.L.A., is, like the Administrator, a medical man. He went to the Cape originally in search of health, and soon feeling the benefit of the climate, established a good practice as a doctor at Kimberley, where he became intimate with Mr. Rhodes. When in 1889 Mr. Rhodes was looking about for a suitable staff to carry into effect his scheme for the settlement of the Zambesi regions, he offered to Dr. Harris the position which he now so ably fills. At the beginning of this year (1894) Dr. Harris was elected to the Cape Legislative Assembly as one of the four representatives of Kimberley. Dr. Harris is a man of great energy, possesses administrative and business

talents of a high order, and has amply justified his selection to carry out the onerous and responsible duties of his office. Some idea of their extent may be gathered when it is stated that the ordinary mail letter of the Cape Town Office deals with an average of twenty-five subjects, ranging from administrative matters of the first importance to purely formal details.



DR. F. RUTHERFORD HARRIS, M.L.A.

No reference to the administration of the Chartered Company would be complete without allusion to the active share taken in the conduct of its affairs by Mr. Bouchier F. Hawksley, of the firm of Hollams, Son, Coward, and Hawksley, who are the Company's solicitors. The Company is practically an amalgamation of an immense number of separate interests, and in many cases the titles have been of a

complicated nature, involving an amount of knowledge, research, and inquiry which has rendered the post of solicitor to the Company unusually responsible and laborious. This may be seen by tracing Mr. Hawksley's connection with it throughout its successive stages of development, at each of which agreements of no ordinary character had



MR. BOURCIER F. HAWKSLEY.

to be drawn up. Mr. Hawksley was born in 1851, articulated at Bristol in 1866, admitted in 1872, and has ever since been connected with his present firm, in which he became a partner in 1889. He was solicitor to the old De Beers Company, and to the De Beers Consolidated Mines. He was also solicitor to the Exploring Company, and it was no doubt in some measure owing to his connection with the rival groups that



MR. CHARLES DUNELL RUDD.

arrangements were concluded, by the formation of the Central Search Association, for uniting the former company's interests with those of the Rudd-Rhodes' concession. Mr. Hawksley drew up the Royal Charter which was applied for by the Central Search Association, and also the Deed of Settlement, and acted throughout these difficult negotiations. The acquisition of all the competing interests which Lord Salisbury required should be merged also entailed arduous labour upon Mr. Hawksley. In 1889 the Association was taken over by the United Concessions Company, involving more complicated agreements, followed by others under which the Charter was extended to embrace the British area across the Zambesi. Then followed the creation of the British South Africa Company. Quite recently difficulties arose with the "Ochs group," and on the occasion of the meetings called to sanction the amalgamation of the Chartered Company and the United Concessions Company it was found advisable to explain the whole position from its legal aspect. This Mr. Hawksley undertook to do, and in a masterly speech, of which the delivery occupied some seventy minutes, lucidly set the whole facts before the shareholders, and relieved them of all anxieties as to the issue. Subsequent legal proceedings, in which Mr. Hawksley acted for the company, amply justified his remarks on that occasion. Mr. Hawksley acts for the numerous offshoots of the Chartered Company—such as the Transcontinental Telegraph Company, the Beira Railway Company, and the company which is constructing the trunk line through Vryburg and Mafeking, as well as numerous mining concerns.

Mr. C. D. Rudd, the leader of the concessionaire trio, is an old Harrovian and a Cambridge man, whom a breakdown of health in training sent out to South Africa to recuperate. This was in 1865, from when to 1868 he occupied his time in shooting in Zululand and other parts of the country. In 1870, he took part in the first great "rush" to the diamond fields, where he met Mr. Rhodes. The two young men went into partnership, from which rose, as is elsewhere explained, the gigantic scheme culminating in the De Beers Mines (Limited). When the Witwatersrand goldfields were discovered, Mr. Rudd went up to the Transvaal to represent the Rudd and Rhodes Syndicate, out of which ultimately arose the Consolidated Goldfields of South Africa, Limited.

Of this powerful and successful company Mr. Rudd became co-managing director with Mr. Rhodes, and it is largely due to his prescience that that concern has achieved such conspicuous success, and acquired such gigantic interests at so low a cost. Mr. Rudd is not a politician, although he entered the Cape Parliament in 1884. That, however, was only with specific objects—namely, the passing of the Compound System, the Illicit Diamond Trade, and the Liquor Question—all matters connected with the diamond industry, with which Mr. Rudd was intimately associated at the time. The desired objects were attained in 1889, and at the next election Mr. Rudd did not re-offer himself to the constituency.

Among those who are largely responsible for the occupation of Zambesia must also be mentioned Mr. Frederick Courtenay Selous. As a hunter in South Africa, he stands first and foremost among those whose names have become household words amongst all lovers of sport, and also as a keen observer of the ways of savage races and wild animals. Even at the age of twelve, when at Rugby, he had a better collection of birds' eggs than any other boy; and the keenness for obtaining any coveted specimen was not damped by swimming rivers at midnight, when his rivals were snug and warm in bed. At the age of nineteen he went to South Africa, fired by the accounts—then much more meagre than now—of a hunter's life under the southern sun, the favourite of those books being Gordon Cumming's "Five Years' Hunting Adventures in South Africa," which probably fixed his mind more than any other. Upon a small capital of about £300 given to him by his father, he started upon the "Hunters' Wanderings," so graphically described in his first book. For years Mr. Selous, in his quest for rare and valuable animals, wandered many times over and thoroughly explored the Mashonaland plateau; and when the scheme for forming the Chartered Company was in its infancy—although there were many stories about the glorious country lying between the Limpopo and Zambesi Rivers—it was to Mr. Selous that Mr. Rhodes looked for accurate information which enabled him, with his great political and financial resources, to develop a scheme for the effective occupation of Mashonaland. The work which fell upon Mr. Selous' shoulders was by no means light, for his duty as the "Pioneer"



MR. F. C. SELOUS, F.Z.S.

(Pioneer, Hunter, and Chief of the Intelligence Department of the Southern Column.)

was not only to head the force, and to cut the road for the numerous waggons, but to scout for miles round the line of march, as although Lobengula had signed the concession, it was well known that he had been urged very strongly by his young warriors not to allow the white man to settle in Mashonaland, which at that time was the chief raiding ground of the Matabeli. Throughout the whole of the trials and hardships of the expedition, the unanimous opinion of those who formed the advance party was that they could not have had a more capable leader, nor one who had so much thought for their comfort; and it was the enthusiasm which he infused into the work that enabled the Pioneers to reach Salisbury in so short a time.

Mr. Selous remained in Mashonaland until the latter part of 1892, during which time his aid in exploring the country was invaluable, and returned to England on 17th December for a well-earned rest, leaving behind the townships of Salisbury and Victoria busy and hopeful of the future. Gold was being found in payable quantities, various companies were formed, money and mining materials were brought into the country—in fact, everything looked promising. Lobengula certainly was not to be depended upon; but he was receiving subsidy of £100 per month, and there appeared no reason to expect anything of an outbreak from him, when news came of the eventful Sunday (July 9th) when the Matabeli under the charge of two old indunas, Manyou and Magan, and the young induna Ingna, appeared at the township of Victoria, indiscriminately murdering the Mashona servants, but contemptuously sparing the white men, saying, “We have been ordered not to kill you—yet,—but your day is coming.”

Mr. Selous was at that time in England, but with that promptness and decision which is one of his characteristics, at once decided that his duty was to return and contribute his share to the downfall of Lobengula. The Victoria and Salisbury Columns were already on the march; but he lost no time in getting to the front, and at special request joined Colonel Goold-Adams, commanding a force of 225 men of the Bechuanaland Police, and 225 volunteers recruited in the Transvaal under the command of Commandant Raaf. During this march, Mr. Selous' knowledge of the country and the natives was of the greatest possible value to Colonel Goold-Adams—in

fact, he has been called—and very rightly so—"the ears and eyes of the force." At the battle near the Sangezi River, when they were attacked while on the march by the Matabeli under Gambo, Mr. Selous, who was with the rear-guard, showed he was as expert with his rifle as a military weapon as when using it for sporting purposes. He was unfortunately wounded by a bullet during this engagement, but he probably owes his life to this circumstance, as Dr. Jameson would not allow him to accompany Major Forbes in his pursuit of Lobengula; for had he gone, with his knowledge of the country and love of adventure, he would almost certainly have gone forward with Major Wilson's party. There is a melancholy interest in speculating whether, had this been so, the chance of capturing the King would have tempted him beyond the bounds of discretion, or whether his experience and counsel would have saved any or all of that band of brave men. To all lovers of sport and adventure Mr. Selous' books are well-known, but his last, "*Travels and Adventures in South East Africa*," in which he has given a most graphic account of the occupation of Mashonaland and in which he anticipated the events of the last few months, showed clearly that the young Matabeli warriors must sooner or later insist upon a trial of strength with the white settlers.

Since his return to England, he has given a very interesting lecture before the members of the Royal Colonial Institute, upon the "*Cause and Effect of the Matabeli War*," in which he very stoutly defends his fellow comrades from the calumnious attacks of the Little England Party headed by Mr. Labouchere. His defence was not composed of empty words, but of absolute facts, all of which he has verified; Mr. Selous is a man who will take infinite trouble to master the truth of a story, and thereby had made for himself a reputation amongst both white men and natives as one whose word can be absolutely relied upon. Mr. Selous, should he ever return to Matabeliland, will see a vast change round his old haunts—changes which are, no doubt, improvements upon the old scenes of savage revelry at Buluwayo, but which as a hunter he will often, perhaps, be tempted to regret. Mr. Selous has recently married Miss Gladys Maddy, daughter of the Rev. Canon Maddy, Rector of Down Hatherley, Gloucestershire.

One of the best known of those who have thrown in their lot with the Rhodesia movement is Mr. Philip Bouchier Sherard Wrey, Assoc. M.Inst.C.E., who is second son of Sir Henry Bouchier Toke Wrey, Bart. (tenth of the line), of Tawstock Court, Barnstaple, Devon, and a descendant of the Sir Philip Bouchier Wrey, whose name occurs so frequently in the records of the attempted invasion by the Great Armada. Mr. Wrey, who has kindly contributed two chapters to this book, was born in 1858, and was articled to Mr. James Henderson, C.E., from 1876 to 1879. In the latter year he left for South Africa, and until 1881 was engaged professionally at Kimberley. From that year until 1885 he was employed as a government surveyor in the Cape Colony, and, among other things, undertook the delineation of the Walfish Bay territory. In 1886 he went up to the Transvaal Goldfields, where he acquired a considerable practice as a mining engineer. When the occupation of Mashonaland was effected, Mr. Wrey accepted the offer of the post of consulting engineer to the Mashonaland Agency Company, a concern closely allied to the Chartered Company and the Consolidated Goldfields. In that capacity he has taken a very prominent part in the mining affairs of Rhodesia; and, as he himself recounts on other pages, was actively engaged in the development of his company's properties when the war broke out. He travelled down with the Administrator from Salisbury to Victoria, and was with him throughout the "indaba" with the Matabeli indunas. Mr. Wrey has recently returned to Mashonaland, to which country he holds that the motto of his family, "*Le bon temps viendra*," is peculiarly applicable.



CHAPTER V.

THE COLLISION AT VICTORIA.

BY P. B. S. WREY, A.M.I.C.E.

Matabeli impis cross the border—Mashonas' fear of the Matabeli—Dr. Jameson remonstrates with Lobengula—Telegraph wires cut at Gomalla's kraal—Lobengula claims the right to raid the Mashonas—An impi at Victoria, Sunday, July 19th—Dr. Jameson arrives at Victoria—Loath to take active measures—The indaba—Lobengula breaks his compact—Young Matabeli warriors beyond control—The impi ordered to leave in an hour, or be driven out—Threats of the colonists to leave the country.

MR. SELOUS, in his lecture at the Royal Colonial Institute, March 13th, has ably described the policy pursued by Lobengula, of harassing the white man, and seeing how much annoyance he really would stand. The commencement of this was undoubtedly the killing of the chief Lomaghondi, in the latter part of 1891. That chief was under the protection of the Chartered Company, and Dr. Jameson remonstrated very strongly. Lobengula professed extreme regret, stating that it was a mistake. The following year, however, Matabeli impis were sent across the recognised border in defiance of the agreement with and promises made to the Company, and commenced raiding in the Victoria district.

It was then, for the first time, we fully realised how damaging to work and industry was the unsettled state of affairs caused by these raids. A large impi passed through the camp of the Mashonaland Agency, situate about fourteen miles from Victoria, at the time we were employing about 150 natives; these were absolutely paralysed with fear and announced their intention of leaving directly. It was only with great trouble and persuasion that they were induced to remain, and our position was a most false one; for, as the natives very plainly said, "When you white men came into Mashonaland, you promised that if we worked for you, you would prevent the Matabeli from raiding us. Here we are

working for you, and here are the Matabeli killing our wives and children, and raiding our homes." Dr. Jameson, still desirous of maintaining peaceful relations, contented himself with again remonstrating. Lobengula's answer was to the effect that he had merely sent his men to collect some arrear taxes and tributes owing before the granting of the concession. Dr. Jameson pacified the people as best he could, and all this time was most particular not to break his promises to Lobengula, and most stringent instructions were given to prevent any prospector from crossing the border to look for the gold reefs known to exist within a few miles of the boundary. X

In April, 1893, occurred the incident of the cutting of the telegraph wire at Gomalla's kraal, followed by the imposition of a fine, and the payment of same in cattle, which were afterwards stated to belong to Lobengula. There can be no doubt the cause of the cutting of the wire was the dissatisfaction of the chiefs at the present state of affairs. Natives do not understand diplomatic remonstrances, and their natural argument was: If the Chartered Company do not punish the Matabeli for raiding us last year, they must be afraid of them, and it is only a question of time when the white men will be killed, and we shall again be raided and murdered worse than before. On this line of argument, instead of having any feelings of awe and respect for the white man, they despised him, and showed their feelings by committing an offence they knew to be a very grave and serious one.

Matters reached a climax in July. Having met with no resistance from the Chartered Company on the raid of 1892, Lobengula sent a far larger and picked body of men, with instructions to raid in the neighbourhood of Victoria; at the same time writing to Dr. Jameson, that "he made no excuses for so doing," but, in defiance of all treaties and promises, "claimed his right to raid when, where, and whom he chose." His instructions to the indunas were that no white men were to be killed, but that they were to particularly direct their operations to those Mashona tribes who had been, and were, working for the white men. There can be no doubt but that, from the death of Lomaghondi to this time, the system of harassing and annoying the white man had been gradually increased and magnified in proportion to the pacific remonstrances made by the Chartered Company, and I am

absolutely confident that in 1893, had not the company taken the action they have done, the orders to the indunas would have been, not to harass and annoy the white men, but to kill every one of them in the country.

The actual climax was reached on Sunday, July 9th, and the following days of that week, when the impi, carrying out their instructions, commenced killing every Mashona they could find near Victoria. In many cases these atrocities were committed in the presence of the masters of some of the men, and the only answer given to them when they tried to save the lives of their boys was, "Stand on one side, your time has not come yet." The effect was, of course, to paralyse all work and enterprise, and it is not easy to describe the feelings of exasperation of the colonists. Meetings were held at which the very strongest language was used, at what was termed the weakness of the Chartered Company in trying to deal in a conciliatory manner with Lobengula, and at which the company was called upon to take some decisive measure.

Meanwhile Dr. Jameson was hurrying down from Salisbury; and as I travelled with him during the last section of the journey, I can most emphatically state that, even after having heard the fullest details of how serious the aspect of affairs was, he was most loath to take offensive measures, could he have seen any other way out of the difficulty. It may be thought by some that the events above-mentioned were made the excuse for the taking of Matabeliland for the sole object of acquiring fresh ground. Such is not the case. All Dr. Jameson decided on was, that it was imperative that the impi then surrounding Victoria should at all costs be driven away and made to cross the border, and that, when that was accomplished, Lobengula must be dealt with according as he explained his action in deliberately breaking his agreements.


On arrival at Victoria, Dr. Jameson summoned the head indunas, in number about twenty; and as I was present at the indaba, I shall be glad to correct an error that many have fallen into, namely, that the impi was given one hour to cross the border, a distance of thirty miles.

The conversation was a very brief one. Dr. Jameson, after telling the head induna that Lobengula had distinctly broken his compact in sending this impi over the border, asked him if it was a fact that he could no longer control his young men. The answer was "Yes."—

"Very well then," he said, "You go back with those whom you *can* control, and leave me to deal with your young men. Go," he continued, "back to your men, and tell them that they must instantly leave for the border." Then he told them how long he would wait. Pointing to the sun, he said, "*Wa bona ilanga*" (Do you see the sun?); then, pointing lower in the horizon, he said, "When the sun is there, if you have not cleared (*lapa wena ai ga suka*), you'll be driven out. I shall send out my men, and those of you who have not left I shall drive over the border." The indaba then ended. I am sufficiently acquainted with the language to understand the speech as interpreted by Mr. Napier, and I am certain the Matabeli indunas understood it as I have written it. That this is so, indeed, was proved by the fact that the majority of the Matabeli started there and then, and crossed the border that night or early next morning, whereas the minority, consisting of some 300 to 400, waited for the patrol, and were actually raiding a small kraal when Captain Lendy and his men arrived. These were the only

men on whom he fired. Next

day a patrol was sent out, and found evidences of the rapid departure of the main body of the impi. All the men in the patrol were anxious then and there to follow them and revenge these outrages; but Captain Lendy stated most emphatically that his orders from



DR. JAMESON HOLDING THE INDABA AT VICTORIA.

Dr. Jameson were most positive ; namely, that he should satisfy himself that the impi had crossed the border, and that he should on no account take offensive measures if they had crossed until after Lobengula had been communicated with.

Feeling in Victoria was running very high at this time, for everyone felt if no further action was to be taken, Lobengula would again make excuses and promises, and the following year, if not sooner, things would be much worse. Capitalists openly spoke of withdrawing capital. Farmers and traders threatened to trek out of the country, and a very strongly worded address was presented to Dr. Jameson, with a request that it might be forwarded to the High Commissioner, to the effect that, unless the Company settled this question, once and for all, in the only way it could be done, namely, by breaking up the Matabeli power, they were determined to do one of two things : leave the country, or—undertake the settlement of the question themselves.

These facts should prove very clearly that, instead of the Chartered Company having forced the war on the Matabeli, they used every means to avoid any collision with them, and that the latter by breaking every agreement and promise, and by the most brutal atrocities, clearly brought a just punishment on their own heads. Further, that the colonists of Mashonaland were simply actuated by a feeling and desire to obtain some sort of security for the property and possessions for which they had worked so hard and so patiently.






Photo by Salmon, Reading.]

MAJOR PATRICK WILLIAM FORBES.

(Commanding the British South Africa Company's Forces in Matabeliland.)

CHAPTER VI.

ORGANISING THE FORCES.

BY MAJOR P. W. FORBES.

Declaration of War—Major Forbes to take command—Dr. Jameson arranges for starting to Buluwayo—The Matabeli fighting strength—Military stores at Salisbury—Lack of horses—Organising the Salisbury Horse—Selecting the officers—The conditions for volunteering—The Victoria Column—Buying the horses—Leaving Salisbury—Practising military manœuvres—The Tuli Column delayed—The Matabeli reported massing at Shangani River—Dr. Jameson reviews the Salisbury Horse at Charter—Ammunition—Forming laager—Manning the waggons.

THE events at Victoria in July, 1893, which rendered the recent Matabeli war a necessity, have been fully described ; and it will be enough for me to say that on the 19th of July, the day after the Matabeli had been driven out from Victoria, Dr. Jameson, the Administrator of Mashonaland, decided to make such arrangements, that, should it prove necessary he would be able to break once and for all the power of the Matabeli, and his plans announced that day were carried out with but little addition or alteration.

At that time I was, and had been since the occupation of Mashonaland three years before, Magistrate at Salisbury, and was also in command of the Salisbury Volunteer Corps. I knew, and was known to, almost everyone in the district, and being an Imperial Officer, and having served for five or six years among the Zulus, was in a better position than most to judge of our chances of success in a conflict with the Matabeli.

On the morning of the 19th July, as I have said, the programme of the Expedition was drawn up. Mr. Duncan, a retired naval officer (the senior official of the Company in the absence of Dr. Jameson), and myself, were sent for that morning to the telegraph office to talk to the Doctor, who was at Victoria. When we arrived there the Doctor

began. The clerk was writing down what the Doctor said, and Mr. Duncan was reading it to himself as written. He suddenly turned to me and said, "You have to go to Buluwayo." This made me take more interest than I had been doing in what was being said, and he and I read the message together. The Doctor said that the events of the previous day had shown him clearly that if we wished to remain in Mashonaland, and not to sacrifice all that we had gained in the previous three years, we must settle the Matabeli question once and for all. He went on to say that he had thought it all out, and his plan was that 250 men should advance from Salisbury, Victoria, and Tuli respectively, the former under myself, those from Victoria under Captain Lendy, an Imperial Artillery Captain, at that time Acting Resident Magistrate at Victoria, and those from Tuli under Captain Raaf, Resident Magistrate of Tuli, while I was to assume command of all the Company's forces when joined. (Captain Raaf had had a considerable amount of experience in native warfare in South Africa, and was said to be a very good man.) The Doctor further said that his idea was that the whole force should be mounted, should start simultaneously from the three places, and march on Buluwayo. We were to take no waggons, but to carry three or four days' food on the horses, after which we would live on native produce; 100 rounds ammunition per man, and, he added, he counted on our reaching Buluwayo, having done all that was required, before Christmas. He then asked if I was willing to go. I, of course, agreed at once, and the expedition was then and there determined on. The Doctor told me to let him know that evening what I should require in the way of horses, arms, equipment, clothing, etc., to complete the Salisbury Column, and then went off to consult with Mr. Rhodes, who was at Cape Town.

In accepting the responsibility of invading Matabeliland with 750 men, I was doing what many thought was a very rash thing, more especially as one of the greatest military authorities on South African native warfare had only three years before stated that he would require 7,000 men to take the country; but I always looked upon the Matabeli as being over-rated, and thought that with the material we had, both as regards men and arms, we ought to be successful; in addition to which I knew that Dr. Jameson had had considerable

experience in Matabeliland, and that if he was satisfied it was safe, I was. Although the Doctor had sketched out his plan and authorised me to make arrangements accordingly, the whole affair had to remain in abeyance for some time. There had not been sufficient time for the Imperial authorities to go thoroughly into the question, and it was doubtful whether His Excellency Sir Henry Loch, Governor of the Cape, would see how vital the question was and allow the Doctor to take action ; but the time was so short before the rains came on that the Doctor thought it advisable to make all arrangements, so that in the event of permission being given later on, we could move at once. I immediately saw Major Browne, at that time Staff Officer of Volunteers in Mashonaland, and previously Adjutant of the Diamond Fields Horse in Kimberley, and who had had considerable experience in native fighting both in New Zealand and South Africa, and asked him if he would go in with me as Staff Officer. I told him the programme, and he at once agreed. We then set to work to take stock of the military stores in Salisbury, and that evening I was able to wire to Dr. Jameson that I required nothing but 250 horses to complete the Salisbury Force. I asked for the full number of horses, as at the time there were very few in Salisbury, and I knew that we should lose some of those purchased on the way, and others would probably not be fit for much when they arrived. I also said that, if procurable, fifty swords would be useful, as there were a considerable number of ex-cavalry men in Mashonaland. I thought that one troop could be armed with them, and I knew from experience in Zululand what a horror the natives had of mounted men who could gallop them down.

"Truth," and some other papers that took a pleasure in vilifying the Company, had talked of Mashonaland as a place where the people were starved, where there was no military organisation and no means of defence ; and yet in Salisbury alone I was able to raise, fully arm, and equip a force of 250 men, providing them, too, with machine guns, and all this from the stores that the Company had had on the spot for the last three years ; and they were able to do the same both at Victoria and Tuli.

Although I had agreed at once to Dr. Jameson's plans, I knew as soon as I came to think it over that there was one alteration that must

be made, and that was on the question of transport. We should require more ammunition than he had allowed for, viz., 100 rounds per man; and it would also be necessary to carry food for the horses. They had to be bought in the Transvaal or Free State, driven at least 600 miles fast, at a time of year when there was little if any grazing, and then would have to do a long and tedious march immediately on arrival. I did not think that there would be much trouble about feeding the troops, as we could arrange our advance so as to pass kraals most of the way, and could get sufficient grain there for food, while we could drive oxen for meat. The other two points were, however, so important that I at once calculated out the least number of waggons that would carry what I required, and found that I could manage with twelve. As soon as Dr. Jameson returned to Salisbury, about a week after the first arrangement had been made, I spoke to him and he agreed at once. In addition to the advantage of carrying reserve ammunition and grain, twelve waggons would form a small but compact laager, in which all the horses could be put, and would save our having to construct a strong scherm (bush fence) every night.

Immediately after my talk with Dr. Jameson, on the 19th July, I set to work to organise the corps which I called the Salisbury Horse. My first intention was to have four mounted troops of fifty men each, making up the remaining fifty men by gun detachments. I proposed to take two Maxim guns on galloping carriages, one one-pounder shell Maxim and one Gardner gun. This would leave in Salisbury for defensive purposes one seven-pounder gun, one Maxim, two Nordenfeldt, and one one-pounder Hotchkiss, the three latter having been taken from the Portuguese in Manica in 1891. I found, however, that there would be some difficulty in raising four troops mounted, and eventually changed it to three mounted of fifty men each, two of which had, in addition, a galloping Maxim with an escort of ten men, one dismounted of fifty, and the different gun detachments. As the one-pounder Maxim was a very clumsy gun I took the seven-pounder instead, and also one of the Nordenfeldts. The first question was the officers to command the three Troops, and in this there was rather an "embarras de richesses." All the officers commanding troops in the Mashonaland Horse, i.e., the Salisbury Volunteer Corps, thought that

they should be the first selected, and there was consequently some little dissatisfaction about my selection from among them all. The three that I selected first for the three Troops were Messrs. M. Heany, H. F. Hoste, and A. Eyre. The former had served in America, and had had considerable experience of native warfare; he had also been one of the firm of Johnson, Heany, and Borrow, who had brought up the Pioneer Force in 1890, and had been Captain of the senior Troop in that Force. In addition to having large interests in the country he was a large employer of labour, and one of the most popular men in the country. He at once accepted and placed himself at my disposal, and from beginning to end assisted me in every possible way. Mr. Hoste had also been a Captain in the Pioneer Corps, and before that had commanded one of the U.S.S. Company's ships. He had had a good deal of experience with natives, and was well known and liked in the country. He agreed at first, but appears to have been under a misapprehension as to the number of waggon I intended taking, and at the last moment objected to come unless I took considerably more than twelve. Mr. Eyre had been in the Pioneer Corps, but I knew nothing of his soldiering abilities, and my reason for selecting him was, that he had shortly before been elected by the Salisbury Burghers—i.e., all adults who were not volunteers—as Commandant; and as the Burghers comprised about one-third of the population of Salisbury and the district, I thought to secure some of them through his appointment. He agreed to come, but at last followed Captain Hoste's example.

I have not mentioned the conditions upon which men were asked to volunteer, but the principal ones were as follows:—(1) Protection on all claims in Mashonaland until six months after the war was finished. (2) A farm of 3,000 morgen (6,000 acres), free of occupation. (3) Twenty gold claims. (4) Share of all cattle taken, half of which was to go to the Company, the other half to be equally divided among all members of the Expedition, share and share alike.

On Messrs. Hoste and Eyre's withdrawal I gave the two Troops B and C to Messrs. Borrow and Spreckley, both of whom had been officers in the Pioneer Corps, and were well known and very popular in

the country, and I do not think that any selection could have given more satisfaction. Captain Borrow was at the time Local Managing Director of Frank Johnson and Co., and Captain Spreckley Acting Mining Commissioner in Manica.

For the command of all the Artillery I selected Captain Moberley, an ex-Imperial Artillery Officer, who was thoroughly conversant with the working of all machine guns, and I also placed the dismounted men under his command. These were to have been fifty, but I could only eventually get about twenty-five. For the two galloping Maxims I selected Messrs. Tyndale-Biscoe and Llewellyn, both ex-Naval Officers, the former of whom had distinguished himself in Egypt, receiving a D.S.O. for service there, and had been in charge of one of the Maxims of the Pioneer Corps; the latter had had considerable experience of machine guns on the coast. Mr. Tennant, who had previously served in South Africa as an artillery officer, had charge of the seven-pounder gun. Mr. F. E. Lockner, who had three years before successfully negotiated the Barotse treaty, but who was not in very robust health at this time, undertook the duties of Commissariat Officer or Quartermaster, but afterwards handed them over to Mr. J. H. Kennedy, the Company's Accountant in Mashonaland, who was able at the last minute to get away, and Mr. Lockner then joined Captain Heany's Troop as junior lieutenant. The officers were as follow :—

PERSONAL STAFF.—Mr. C. M. Acutt, Interpreter and Guide; Mr. P. L. Chappé, Veterinary Surgeon and Trumpeter; Mr. J. H. Kennedy, Quartermaster; Mr. T. E. Tanner, Orderly Officer and Galloper.

A TROOP.—Captain Heany, with Messrs. Bodle and Lockner as Lieutenants, and Lieutenant Biscoe in charge of Maxim attached.

B TROOP.—Captain Borrow, with Messrs. Snodgrass and Reid as Lieutenants, and Lieutenant Llewellyn with Maxim attached.

C TROOP.—Captain Spreckley, with Messrs. Laing and Christison as Lieutenants.

ARTILLERY AND D TROOP.—Captain Moberley, with Mr. Tennant in charge of seven-pounder gun as Lieutenant.

REMOUNT OFFICERS.—Captain Finch and Mr. J. Carden.

ORDNANCE STORE OFFICER.—Captain J. A. L. Campbell, late R.A.

MEDICAL OFFICERS.—Dr. H. Edgelow and Dr. J. Stewart.

Mr. J. W. W. Nesbitt volunteered to raise a force of Colonial natives and Coolies, several of the latter of whom had expressed their wish to go in, and as I was doubtful whether I could get my full number of 250 white men, I authorised him to raise them to the number of sixty. This he did, and they were of the greatest assistance to us. He had the rank of captain, and applied for Mr. Papenfus as lieutenant, which appointment I made.

There were several gentlemen in Salisbury who did not wish to join troops, but were willing to go into Matabeliland, and to make themselves generally useful, so I formed them into a Scouting Section for special duty ; this consisted of Captain O. Gwynyth Williams, Messrs. Ifah Williams, Gerald Paget, and J. Murray Gourlay.

The only difficulty in providing equipment was over the saddlery. Although the Company had a large number of saddles in store, most of them were in bad repair, and it was very hard to obtain sufficient material to repair them. However, by using all I could get in the shape of serge, flannel, etc., and by collecting different articles of saddlery all over Salisbury, I was able to complete sufficient.

The Company had a large stock of M.H. rifles in store, and each volunteer was in possession of one, and I was able to arm the whole force with them ; I allowed anyone who had a private rifle or carbine that carried M.H. ammunition to take it. The Coolies were armed with combination guns, one barrel carrying M.H. ammunition, the other twelve-bore cartridges loaded with loupers.

The supply of sword-bayonets was not sufficient to complete all round, but all the dismounted, and about seventy-five per cent. of the mounted men were armed with them, and 150 revolvers were also given out, which, with private ones, gave almost everybody one. One hundred rounds of M.H. ammunition was issued to each man, and twenty rounds revolver ammunition to all who had revolvers.

There was not sufficient clothing to issue a complete set to everyone, and the majority preferred wearing their own clothes. Each man had a khaki tunic, pair of gaiters, bandolier, and haversack issued to him, and those that required them Bedford cord breeches and hat, and each man had a waterproof sheet, and either a cavalry cloak or cape,

and was allowed to take two blankets ; and private kit not to exceed, with the blanket, twenty pounds in weight.

While I was making my preparations in Salisbury, Dr. Jameson was doing the same in Victoria. He had told me soon after the first arrangements were made that Captain Lendy had declined to take in the Victoria Column, and he had therefore entrusted it to Captain (afterwards Major) Allan Wilson, than whom no better man could possibly have been found. Captain Wilson had seen a considerable amount of service in the native wars in the Colony, and was at this time in command of the Victoria Volunteers. He was exceedingly popular, and had an extraordinary power over his men.

The raising of the number of men required was not effected without some slight difficulties. Many of them wished to know more particulars of the plan of campaign than could be given them, and several wished for different terms ; and in addition to these difficulties there were several men who did their best to persuade others not to come. However, none of these difficulties did very much harm, and by the time I required them I had my full number of men.

As soon as Dr. Jameson had decided on his plans, he sent down at once to buy horses. He ordered altogether about 1,000, a good number of which were to be purchased by Captain Raaf, and some by Messrs. Zeederburg and Kirton, and towards the end of August they began to arrive up country. It was decided that the Salisbury Column should meet the horses at Charter instead of waiting at Salisbury for them, as this would save the horses sixty miles, and it would be a more convenient place to start from, as we should avoid all the thick bush and broken ground which we should have had to go through if we had gone by the direct road from Salisbury to Matabeliland ; and on the 28th of August, I sent off my first party under command of Mr. Alan G. Finch, late of the 1st Life Guards, to whom I gave the rank of Captain, and who was to receive the horses at Charter and get a camp ready for us. With him were Mr. Carden, as assistant remount officer, and four others, including two farriers. I sent three waggons with them, carrying all the saddlery and some ammunition, besides entrenching tools, etc. The date that had been given me by Dr. Jameson as the earliest that he could have all the horses up and we could make a forward move was the

15th of September, and I therefore arranged to march from Salisbury on the 5th September, and orders were issued to march at 2 p.m. on that date (Tuesday). On the Sunday we had a full church parade, which nearly everyone attended, and Archdeacon Upcher gave us a short farewell address. I may say that the clergy of all denominations had supported the movement from the first, realising its necessity, and how impossible the tenure of Mashonaland was while the Matabeli power was unbroken.

At 1.30 p.m. on Tuesday, 5th September, the whole of the Salisbury Column, with the exception of those who had already gone on to Charter and a few who could not get away for a day or two, but were to follow by the next post-cart, paraded, and at 2 p.m. were ready to move off. Unfortunately, although the waggons had all been loaded some time before, the oxen had not come in, and we were delayed nearly an hour by them; however, at 3 p.m. we moved off. Mr. H. Bezeidenhout had been given a contract to supply twelve waggons, each complete with driver and leader and sixteen oxen, at £14 a day for the twelve, and at the last moment I engaged two others from Messrs. Tuck and Papenfus at the same rate; and in addition, both Captains Heany and Borrow volunteered to take in their own waggons to carry extra stores for their troops. These waggons and oxen were guaranteed against loss, and the drivers and leaders paid by the Company. As the number of waggons to be taken had increased, I found that I could take a month's rations for the whole force, and I arranged before leaving Salisbury that in the event of my being delayed longer than I had expected at Charter, further supplies should follow, so as to enable me to leave Charter with a month clear. I was very much gratified at seeing the way in which the force marched out of Salisbury. Although we were leaving for an indefinite time with a dangerous venture in front of us, and the good-byes that had to be said were many, and as anyone who knows life in South Africa knows each good-bye generally entails a parting drink, there were only five out of the total strength who were reported absent. ✕ All Salisbury turned out to see us off, and cheered us heartily, while several photographers, amateur and professional, "shot" us from different points.

As we were to meet our horses at Charter, nearly the whole force

was on foot, only the few that had private horses being mounted. (All private horses taken in by their owners were valued and guaranteed by the Company.) We did a hot and dusty march to the six-mile *spruit*, and then as we had taken a short cut had to wait till dark for our waggons. I had arranged with one of the Salisbury butchers to take out a day's meat, to be ready for us there, and he was also to carry a day's bread ; he failed to arrive till nearly midnight, and everyone came off rather short that night. We went on to the Hanyane River at daylight and crossed without difficulty, although we had to double-span most of the waggons ; marched about six miles that evening. The following day, Thursday, we did about twelve miles, and on Friday about the same, laagering across the Umfuli on that night. I began to practise laagering as soon as we left the Hanyane, as it takes some time for both the drivers and the oxen to get accustomed to it. The following day, Saturday, we did five miles in the morning, but in the afternoon got into very heavy sand, and to my great disgust a considerable number of the oxen knocked up. We managed, however, to do about five miles, but had to double-span most of the waggons for the last mile, and did not get them all to the camp till after dark. As we were now within about eight miles of Charter, I rode on there at daylight, leaving Captain Heany in charge, with instructions to move on as soon as the oxen had sufficiently rested ; and sent back the three spans which had previously come down to Charter. The Column got in just before dark, and laagered on the north bank of the stream.


I found when I got to Charter that Captain Finch had selected a very good site for a camp, on the south bank of the stream, and had cleared sufficient space of bush, marked out horse lines, etc. I also found that he had only received fifty-nine horses, which had arrived on the 7th September. They were a very good stamp of horse, averaging from 14 hands to 14.1, and strongly built, but in poor condition, and a good many suffering from horribly sore backs. These were in most cases caused by the gross carelessness of the men who had been sent up in charge of them from Victoria, who were most of them men who did not know a horse from a cow, and who had picked out what they were told were the easiest to ride, and had ridden them quick right through, quite regardless of the fact that the saddles, which were badly stuffed, had

rubbed their backs, and in several cases the iron arch had cut right into their withers, making wounds some of which took a month to heal, and one of which was not healed, nor had the horse even had a saddle on him up to the time that we arrived in Buluwayo two months later.

Mr. Chappé, my trumpeter, who had had to do with horses all his life, had kindly offered to act as veterinary surgeon, and had gone down to Charter with Captain Finch. He was doing all he could, and barring the worst of the "backs," soon got the horses fit for work.

On Monday morning the Force moved across the stream and I formed camp. The waggons, sixteen in number, were laagered in the centre, and the Troops put up rough shelters outside—A Troop on the right, C in the front, and B on the left, while the dismounted Troop and the Artillery remained in the laager, the horse lines being in rear. As there were now enough horses to mount one Troop I started mounted drill each morning, one Troop at a time; Troops being forty-eight file, drilling in single rank and forming a squadron, and in a short time all of them had had some practice in skirmishing, outpost duty, etc. I also started rifle and revolver practice, and each Troop went through a short course of the former. I had sent all the oxen to some good grass, five or six miles away, as soon as we arrived, hoping that by the time we moved forward they would be fit to travel. I would have got others to replace them had I been able to, but there were none procurable at the time.

Although the 15th September was originally put down as the day on which we were to leave Charter, it was evident as soon as we got



MR. CHAPPÉ, BUGLER TO THE SALISBURY HORSE,
CALLING IN THE HORSES.

there that we should not get away till some time after that date. Owing to the difficulty of purchasing good horses quickly, and the distance they had to travel, it was not till the 14th September that our large lot of horses arrived at Victoria. One hundred and seventy-one had left Tuli, of which only 136 eventually arrived at Victoria, and this number was further reduced to 109 before arrival at Charter, the remainder having had to be left along the road, sick or knocked up.

As soon as I heard that this lot was at Victoria I sent Captain Finch with a small party to meet them. He was to send them on with my men from wherever he met them, going on himself to Victoria to bring on the next lot. The 109 horses arrived at Charter on 22nd September, and were an extraordinarily good lot. They were in very fair condition, and a very good stamp, with scarcely a bad one amongst them. The arrival of these horses cheered everyone up; time had been hanging very heavy on our hands and we were all keen for a move. I was now enabled to mount the three Troops entirely, and fitting and altering saddlery, etc., kept everyone busy for a few days. By this time Dr. Jameson and Major Wilson had got the Victoria Column pretty well ready on much the same lines as mine, and they were only waiting for their horses and 150 men, whom Dr. Jameson was having sent up from Johannesburg.

Dr. Jameson went to see the Tuli Column before they made a move. On arriving he found that Captain Raaf had not yet returned from buying horses, and he had to wait some days for him, and it was not till the 23rd September that Captain Raaf returned, and Dr. Jameson found that he had failed him in a large number of horses. I still required about eighty or ninety to complete, and Dr. Jameson could not find me any more. I wired to Mr. Duncan, at Salisbury, and he at once commandeered all the horses there, and much to my surprise and gratification, managed to send me forty. These were nearly all good salted horses—private ones, which the owners had not cared to sell when I started. In commandeering them the Company and the owner fixed a price, and if they could not agree, put it to arbitration. Captain Finch managed to get eighteen more from Victoria, all of which belonged to my two previous lots, but had

either been left on the road, or had had to go back with the men who had brought up the first lot, and with these I had to be content.

I had been in daily communication with Dr. Jameson by wire, and the two points that I always impressed upon him as being, in my opinion, most important, were: (1) That each column should be absolutely complete in itself, and not in any way dependent on either of the others for anything; and (2) That ample provision should be made for supplies to follow us in; I had had an experience in 1890-91 of this, and was anxious to avoid a recurrence of it. Dr. Jameson quite agreed to the necessity of both of these, and made the necessary arrangements. The Salisbury and Victoria Columns were arranged on the same lines, only that Salisbury had about 250 whites, and Victoria 400, but the Tuli Column was to go in without waggons, carrying ammunition on pack-horses, and living on the natives. This was Captain Raaf's wish, but before the time came to move he had changed his mind and taken waggons.


My idea was for the three Columns to act entirely separately, and to go straight for Buluwayo from their three starting points, clearing the country on both sides of them as they advanced so as to leave no danger in the rear. I thought that the effect of the three Columns coming from three different directions would serve to demoralise and break up the Matabeli, and should they fall back and concentrate on Buluwayo we could join forces in that neighbourhood. I was quite satisfied that a Column such as mine was quite safe against attack, as with the rifle and machine-gun fire that I had, I knew no natives could get up to the laager, and my only fear about the success of the Expedition was that the Matabeli might fall back before us and take up a strong position somewhere in the bush, out of which, with the limited time at our disposal before the rains, we might not be able to turn them. I always hoped, however, that being so confident of their own strength, they would attack us on the road, and so give us an opportunity of breaking them up before we got to Buluwayo, and this hope was realised. I have said that I wished the Columns to go in separately, but the Victoria Column were very anxious to join us, and Dr. Jameson considered it advisable. It was therefore arranged that we should start about the same dates from Charter and Victoria,

and join at the "Iron Mine" Hill. This was a small hill on the edge of the high veldt, about eighty-five miles from Charter, according to the map, and one hundred from Victoria. We received very few reports as to the movements of the Matabeli during this time, and nothing very definite. Lobengula was reported to be massing his forces on the Shangani River about where the combined columns would cross it, and small parties were reported to be along the border. The

Umniati and Shasha Rivers, which formed the border of Matabeliland proper, were about thirty-five and thirty miles from Charter and Victoria respectively, but it was known that there were no Matabeli kraals for a considerable distance further, although the country was largely populated with Maholi (Matabeli slaves), whose attitude towards us was doubtful.

I had asked Dr. Jameson to come and see the force at Charter, as I knew that all the men would like to see him, and that he would be able to tell them various details, which up to then had had to be kept quiet. Although it was very inconvenient to him, he agreed to come, and having seen the Tuli Force ready to start, drove right through in the post-cart and arrived at Charter on the morning of the 30th September, accompanied by Sir J. Willoughby.

The latter had come out from England when he heard of the disturbances, and was accompanying Dr. Jameson as his friend pure and simple, so I understood, but in reality as his military adviser. This I did not know until after the whole business was over, and I can



WAITING FOR THE ORDER TO
ADVANCE.—A MESS AT CHARTER.

safely say that he never advised me in any way. I had a parade of the whole force for the Doctor, marching past at a walk, then the Mounted Troops cantering past (and considering that they had never done it before, they did it extraordinarily well), and an advance in line, after which the Mounted Troops did some skirmishing practice. The Doctor expressed himself much pleased with the efficiency of the Force, and promised to meet the men at a smoking concert to be held that evening. After the parade the Doctor and I discussed several details that had yet to be settled, and he then walked round the camp to see the men. At the smoking concert he spoke to them and thanked them for the way in which they had come forward to help Mashonaland, and assured them of his complete confidence in our success. He also informed them, and this cheered up any who were inclined to hesitate, that the Bechuanaland Border Police with a large force of Khama's natives would advance *via* Tati at the same time as we began our advance ; and he also told them that although we could not begin the actual advance into Matabeliland for a few days more, as some of the preparations for the other Columns were not quite complete, yet we could leave Charter and move slowly forward pending orders to advance.

Dr. Jameson and Sir J. Willoughby left the same evening to return to Victoria, and Mr. Duncan, who had come from Salisbury to meet the Doctor, returned the following morning.

While we were at Charter, Bishop Knight-Bruce, Bishop of Mashonaland, had ridden across from Umtali to see us, and expressed a wish to accompany the Column. He saw Dr. Jameson and arranged to go with us, but had first to return to Umtali upon business ; however, he said that he would catch us up. It was Saturday when the Doctor left, and on Monday, 2nd October, the Salisbury Column marched.

Our strength on leaving Charter was as follows :—Whites, 258 ; Natives, 115 ; Horses, 242.

The order of march which I arranged then, and which was followed until we joined the Victoria Column, was as follows :—One mounted Troop furnished the advance guard and right flanking party ; half a troop, i.e., twenty-four file, forming each. The constitution of each troop was one Captain, two Lieutenants, one Troop-sergeant-major,

two Sergeants, four Corporals, one trumpeter, and forty-two rank and file ; each troop formed a squadron of two troops of twenty-four file divided into six sections, each one of which was a unit in itself, and as far as possible the section system was carried out all through. The advance guard consisted of an advance party of three sections (twelve file) in extended order, and a support of three sections with a galloping Maxim drawn by four mules. The right flanking party consisted of three sections in single file on the outside, and a support of three sections inside. Another mounted troop with a Maxim furnished the left flanking party and rear guard, which were disposed in the same way as the advance guard and right flanking party. The third mounted Troop remained in reserve with the Column.

The waggons, sixteen in number, marched in a double column about fifty yards apart, a private Scotch cart belonging to Mr. Acutt heading the right column and opening the spoor, the seven-pounder gun with ten oxen leading the left, while the Gardner gun with six oxen followed in the rear of the right column. The Nordenfeldt gun, which had no limber, was carried on the artillery waggon which followed the seven-pounder gun at the head of the left column. The waggons in the two columns were as follow :—

RIGHT COLUMN.—Staff ; A Troop ; A Troop ; Hospital ; C Troop ; Commissariat ; Commissariat ; D Troop.

LEFT COLUMN.—Artillery ; B Troop ; B Troop ; Commissariat ; Commissariat ; Commissariat ; Commissariat ; Forge.

Each waggon carried a certain amount of M.H. ammunition, and two boxes (2,000 rounds) were always kept open at the front of each waggon.

The ration scale was as follows :—Meat (fresh) $1\frac{1}{2}$ lbs., (tinned) 1 lb. ; Meal, $1\frac{1}{2}$ lbs. ; Tea, $\frac{1}{2}$ oz. ; Coffee, 1 oz. ; Sugar, 3 ozs. ; Vegetables (preserved) 1 oz.

On leaving Charter we had about forty days' full rations for the men, including meat which we drove, and three days' mealies for the horses, and I counted on getting another three days' mealies at Mr. Dawson's cattle post about twenty miles on the road. We had at starting 242 horses, all told, and 276 oxen.

The ammunition that we carried was 176,000 rounds of M.H., of

which about 15,000 were carried by the men, each mounted man carrying 100 rounds, fifty in his bandolier and fifty in his wallets; 16,000 Gardner, 150 rounds seven-pounder gun, and 4,000 special Maxim ammunition. The Nordenfeldt gun fired M.H. We had also about 5,000 rounds revolver ammunition. I also had with me two dozen socket signals, which we found most useful, seven dozen one-pound signal rockets, and two dozen magnesian lights. The latter, which had been given me by Mr. Markham shortly before leaving Salisbury, had been specially made for him for shooting lions, and, although I never had an opportunity of trying them at an attack, I am sure that they would have been most useful. They burn very brightly for about a minute, and throw a brilliant light for about 200 yards all round. I am sure that this brilliant light would have had a great effect on the Matabeli, and four men were told off daily to hold them, one in the centre of each face of the laager. I also had sufficient entrenching tools.

On leaving Charter I commenced forming laager regularly, and this form was adopted by me during the whole of the Expedition, and was found to be very convenient. It could be formed when on the march in from two to three minutes, and when bushed was very strong. It provided room for all the men and horses inside; the oxen were all picketed in front of the right, left, and rear faces. Each driver was provided with two three-foot steel posts, and immediately his waggon was driven into its place, he unhooked the whole span of oxen, and took them clear of the waggons, and as soon as the side was complete, fastened both ends of his trek-tow down, and then tied the oxen up to it. The oxen when crowded close into the waggon,




DIAGRAM SHOWING FORMATION OF SALISBURY LAAGER.

took up very little room, and formed a most efficient obstacle. If time allowed, a thick thorn bush fence was always put outside them, and all the waggons not covered by oxen were protected by thorn bush pulled under them. It was found that in bush country the whole laager could be completed and bushed up in about ten to fifteen minutes.

The duties when on march were distributed as follows :—A captain and subaltern of the day were told off daily. One mounted troop came on duty at guard-mounting (6 p.m.) daily. This troop found the outlying white pickets for that night, and the pickets the following day. The night pickets consisted of three double white and three single native pickets, posted at regular intervals, not more than 200 yards away from and round the laager. The white pickets consisted of one non-commissioned officer and six men, and the native pickets of one non-commissioned officer and three men. Each white picket furnished two patrolling sentries, and each native one stationary sentry, and the white sentries patrolled continually to the native on each side of them, so that there was a continuous moving circle of sentries round the laager. These were relieved at daylight, when the day pickets were posted. The day pickets consisted of one section each (the No. 1 of each section being in charge), and were posted immediately on halting by the captain of the day. Their number varied according to the nature of the country ; but, as a rule, two or three were sufficient to command all the surrounding country, and to enclose a large enough space for all the animals to graze inside them. This troop also furnished the advance guard. Another mounted troop formed the inlying picket for the night, and slept at the end of the laager. This troop was always available for any special duty during the night, and in case of an alarm had to immediately saddle up its horses. It formed the reserve troop during the march the following day, and when the Column was spanned out in the middle of the day, always kept a certain number of horses in, and grazed the remainder within easy distance of the laager. The third mounted troop formed the rear-guard and flanking party on the following day. The dismounted troop and the artillery always furnished the main guard, consisting of one non-commissioned officer and three men at first, and later, of two non-commissioned officers and twelve men.

As long as the smaller guard was sufficient, it was posted at the left rear corner of the waggon, and furnished one sentry. The only entrance into the laager when it was completed was in this corner, and was made by the Maxim being drawn back into the laager. It was the duty of the non-commissioned officers of the guard to have the Maxim pushed into its place at "last post," thereby completely closing the laager. When I found it advisable to have a larger guard, a non-commissioned officer and six men were posted at each Maxim, and a sentry was furnished for each side of the laager. Each sentry's beat was along the outside of his face, communicating at the corners with the sentries of the other faces.

As soon as the horses were fastened up and fed each evening the general parade sounded, and everyone in the laager was told off to place his men in case of an alarm. Each waggon was manned with eight men, and any that were to spare were told off to the front face. A Troop always occupied the right, and B Troop the left face, except when either of them was inlying picket, and its place was then taken by C Troop. Each man slept as near his post as possible. All natives, except a few good grooms who slept in the laager, and whose duty it was in case of alarm to remain among the horses and keep them quiet, were divided equally, and slept outside each end of the laager, with orders to come inside to man the front and rear faces in case of an attack. ✓

In addition to the natives who had joined the Native Contingent before leaving, there were a considerable number of private native servants whom I had allowed to accompany their masters, provided they were passed as efficient by the officers commanding troops; and on consideration of the Company feeding them, they were available for any duty, and took their turn on the roster for night pickets. All these, as well as all the waggon-drivers and leaders, were armed. I found that the natives were thoroughly reliable for picket duty at night, and only one native during the campaign was found asleep on his post. As a rule I think that the whole of the native picket remained awake all night from fear, but no false alarm was ever occasioned by them. Their hearing and eyesight are both so superior to a white man's, especially at night, that I consider them very useful

in this capacity so long as they feel that they are in touch with and supported by white men.


The horses were fastened up to picketing lines pegged down at each end, and their saddles placed close behind them. I with my staff always slept under or near the "Staff" waggon, and I had a socket for socket signals permanently fastened on the front of the waggons, and also had some one-pound rockets in readiness each night, besides the four men already mentioned who were posted, one in the centre of each face with magnesian lights.

Although we had been delayed at Charter for three weeks, and the delay had been very irksome and trying to everyone, the discipline of the force had been extremely good. There had only been two aggravated cases for orderly room—Belburn and Carroll—and they had both been discharged at once; and during the whole campaign I think that there was only one other white man brought before me. The force was enlisted under the Cape Mounted Rifles Act, and officers commanding troops had power to punish for any trivial offence. Two men took their discharge from Charter—Trooper L. T. E. Llewellyn and Corporal W. Keppel Stier. The former was suddenly recalled home by very pressing business, and left *via* Beira, he told me what the business was, and I advised him to go. Keppel Stier went to Victoria, where he was given a commission as a subaltern by Major Wilson.



POINTS TO BULUWAYO.

pass.




COLLINGRIDGE, LITHO. LONDON

- 6 E. Burnett's Grave.
- 9 E. Burnett shot, 23rd Oct., 1893.
- 19 Trooper Thompson's Grave, killed in action at M. Bembei.
- 18 Graves of Troopers Cary and Siebert, shot at M. Bembei.
- 17 Caicraft's Grave, shot at M. Bembei.
- 10 Capt. Williams lost at Jingen, 26th Oct., 1893.
- 16 Cattle captured by patrol under Major Forbes, 18th Oct., 1893.
- Country covered with bush.

THE DOWNFALL OF LOBENGULA. PLAN I.

SKETCH MAP, SHOWING ROUTE TAKEN BY THE SALISBURY AND VICTORIA FIELD COLUMNS, FROM THEIR STARTING POINTS TO BULUWAYO.

Total distance from Fort Charter to Buluwayo, 220 miles by Trocheometer. Bearings taken by Prismatic Compass.



Route of the Salisbury Column from Fort Charter to Buluwayo.

Route of the Victoria Column from Iron Mine Hill to Buluwayo.

Rivers and running Streams.

Probable course of Rivers.

7 Battle of Shangani, 25th Oct., 1893.

14 Battle of M. Bembezi, 1st Nov., 1893.

4 Capt. White's scouts skirmish killed 7 Natabeli, 22nd Oct., 1893.

3 N. Swameni Regt. Kraal destroyed by patrol under Major Wilson, 21st Oct., 1893.

5 Kraal destroyed by C. Troop, Salisbury Horse, Capt. Spreckley, 23rd Oct., 1893.

9 Kraal destroyed by B. Troop, Salisbury Horse, Capt. Borrow, 24th Oct., 1893.

10 Jingen Kraal destroyed by A. Troop, Salisbury Horse, Capt. Heaney, 26th Oct., 1893.

11 Jingen skirmish with Matabeli—C Troop, supported by B. Troop, killed over 40 Matabeli, 27th Oct., 1893.

12 Euxla Kraal shelled by Victoria 7-pounder and destroyed by A. Troop, Salisbury Horse, 28th Oct., 1893.

13 C. Troop skirmish with strong force of Matabeli in hills } 31st Oct., 1893.

13b Victoria Horse skirmish with strong force of Matabeli in hills } Sir John Willoughby present.

13c C. Troop, Salisbury Horse, Capt. White's scouts skirmish with Matabeli, 3rd Nov., 1893.

1 Capt. Campbell's Grave.

2 Capt. Campbell shot, 15th Oct., 1893.

6 E. Burnett's Grave.

9 E. Burnett shot, 23rd Oct., 1893.

19 Trooper Thompson's Grave, killed in action at M. Bembezi.

18 Graves of Troopers Cary and Siebert, shot at M. Bembezi.

17 Caicroff's Grave, shot at M. Bembezi.

10 Capt. Williams lost at Jingen, 26th Oct., 1893.

16 Cattle captured by patrol under Major Forbes, 18th Oct., 1893.

Country covered with bush.

COLLIERIDGE LITHO LONDON

CHAPTER VII.

LEAVING MASHONALAND FOR THE FRONT.

BY MAJOR P. W. FORBES.

The Salisbury Column advance from Charter—Crossing the Umniati river—In Matabeliland—A scouting party—Halt at Iron Mine Hill—Capturing cattle—First sight of the Matabeli—Captain Campbell shot—The Victoria Column join us—Formation of their laager—Their strength and officers—Difficulties with the Victoria Artillery overcome—Arrangements for the combined march—The realities of war—Native guides.

THE Salisbury Column left Charter on Monday, October 2nd, and were to move quietly forward until I got orders to commence the main advance. Although our waggons were not heavily laden—the heaviest load being less than 5,000 pounds—the sand was very deep and our progress slow; the first water was six miles away, and we had to reach it that night; this we managed to do by dark, but did not get some of the waggons in till nearly midnight.

On leaving Charter, we followed the alternative road from Salisbury to Buluwayo for about twenty miles; this leads almost due west over a high sandy plateau, bare of bush, with the exception of a few small patches here and there. About twenty-five miles from Charter, and on this road, there are the Intabas Insimbi Hills—a large square of bushy kopjes, about 400 feet high, covering eight to ten miles square of country. In these there are several small Mashona kraals, and before leaving Charter I had sent Captain Williams' scouting party to see if they could get any information about the movements of the Matabeli. They were unable to get any at the kraals, and pushed on about ten miles further to the drift on the Umniati River, but without seeing any signs of an enemy.

The following morning (the 3rd) we marched again at daybreak, but had to leave two waggons that had not arrived till late at night, to follow us after the oxen had rested, and got to a disused cattle post of Mr. Dawson. Mr. Dawson has a farm marked out there, but there was

no one in occupation. As there was good water and fairly good grazing, I determined to wait there for a day.

The next morning, 4th, I rode back to Charter with Captain Finch and Dr. Edgelow, to have a final talk on the wire with Major Wilson and Mr. Duncan. Major Wilson told me that the last of his people were leaving that day, and we agreed to meet at the Iron Mine Hill on the 14th. I got a message from Dr. Jameson, saying that he hoped to be able to send me final instructions to move on the following day; we then rode back to camp, getting there just at lunch-time. While at lunch I had suddenly to turn the whole camp out, to put out a grass fire. The grass had been accidentally lighted about a mile up wind, and burnt down on us at such a pace that it was with difficulty we extinguished it. We remained at this camp during the next day, and on the morning of the 6th marched again; we did five miles in the morning march, all through deep sand, and went on again at 3 p.m., doing six-and-a-half miles to Mr. Dawson's other cattle post. The road was very heavy and the oxen all tired before we arrived, which was just at dark; the leading waggon drove into a mud hole and stuck there, and we had about two hours' hard work to get it out. From this point we were to leave the road and strike out our own line; I had originally intended following the road until after we had crossed the Umniati, but as this would have entailed going in amongst the kopjes and through some thick bush, I thought it best to keep to the open country as much as possible. As there was a stream to be crossed about two miles on, over which a drift had to be made, I sent Major Browne on in the morning with a fatigue party, and rested the oxen until the afternoon, and then moved across the drift. I did not wish to get too far from Charter, as the message from the Doctor which I was expecting every minute had to be brought, and so determined to wait where we were until it arrived. It came about 9 a.m. the following morning, and was to the effect that we could push on. The Doctor also said that Colonel Goold-Adams was leaving with the Bechuanaland Border Police, and would have the Tuli Column under him until they reached Buluwayo. I spanned-in at once, and did a short trek of two miles, still through deep sand and over high, open ridges, and went on five miles in the afternoon. The distances were taken by a tracheometer, which I had borrowed from the Hon. Maurice Gifford,

and which generally worked all right, although it sometimes got caked with dust and refused to register. That evening we had some slight rain, sufficiently heavy to show everyone how desirable it was to get our work done before the regular rains began. There were no tents procurable in Salisbury, and I had provided the force as far as possible with canvas to make shelters, it was double width (6 feet) canvas, and when cut off in lengths of $7\frac{1}{2}$ feet, with buttons and ropes sewn on, made a very good protection. One piece stretched between two trees with its back to the weather made a good shelter for four men, and two pieces fastened together made a very good patrol tent. Captain Heany had also provided a large amount of limbo (white calico) for his Troop, and with these and the buck sails, of which each waggon had one, the whole force could keep fairly dry.

The following morning we reached the Umniati River. This was a boundary river between Mashonaland and Matabeliland, and we might expect opposition at any point after crossing it.

The Umniati is a wide sandy river, with at that time of the year very little water in it. We had to cut the bank away a little to get down to it, but had no difficulty in crossing, and laagered about half-a-mile from it. The Native Contingent were divided into two parties, and always went in advance of the two columns of waggons, cutting the bush and making drifts where necessary.

As we were now actually in Matabeliland, I issued a special order warning every one to be on the alert ; and after this I allowed no game shooting along the road. Game had been very plentiful across the flats from Charter, and most of the messes had been able to supplement their rations with buck meat or birds. We moved on the same afternoon three-and-a-half miles, and had to make a drift over a small tributary of the Umniati, on the west bank of which we laagered. The first few miles after crossing the Umniati took us through large granite kopjes with patches of bush. The ground, although dry at that time of the year, is very soft in the wet season.

The following morning, 10th October, I sent out two parties of scouts—one under Captain Williams was to follow the Umniati down its west bank to the waggon road, along that about twenty miles towards Buluwayo, and then strike due south to cut our spoor. They were to be

absent about three days. I had always had in mind the possibility that as we were keeping so far to the south, the Matabeli might make a counter-attack on Salisbury, keeping to the waggon road. I knew that they could not keep much to the north of it, on account of the "fly," through which they could not drive their slaughter oxen, upon which, as being their sole food supply, an impi is entirely dependent. The other scouting party, one furnished by A Troop, I sent forward, giving them what we were told by one of our natives who had previously hunted in the country was our general direction, i.e., slightly to the N. of S.E., and instructing them to push on if possible to the Iron Mine Hill, and return as fast as possible to guide us. This morning we marched six miles and laagered across a considerable sized stream, over which we had to make drifts, and went on in the afternoon, doing four miles. We were in open country most of the day, crossing high pebbly ridges with small streams between them. During the afternoon march we crossed a high ridge, from which we got a very good view, and our natives pointed out the whereabouts of the Iron Mine Hill.


The next day, 11th, we marched as usual as soon as possible after daylight, and after going two miles came to the Sebaque River. This was a wide sandy river with steep banks which we had to cut away, we crossed it without difficulty and were delayed a few minutes only. I had provided before starting two pieces of rope, about thirty feet long, with a hook at the end of each, and these were hooked into the end of the trek-tow of each waggon in turn when they got into heavy ground, and twenty or thirty men soon pulled them out. While we were making the drift we saw a troop of sable antelope about 1,000 yards to our left, and I gave Mr. Murray Gourlay permission to try and shoot one, which he succeeded in doing, securing a young bull. Shooting had been prohibited after crossing the border to avoid a false alarm being given. We went about two miles beyond the Sebaque, and laagered on a small stream. Just after laagering Mr. Acutt found a large bull roan antelope that had been recently killed by a lion. One hind-quarter and intestines only had been eaten, so we took the rest of the meat. We were now in bushy country, mostly Segusi and Machabel, without much undergrowth, and this continued almost up to the Iron Mine Hill. Large open "laagtes" (glades) ran down between the bush and along the streams; in these

there was fair grazing. We did five miles in the afternoon and came to a large river, of which the natives did not know the name, but we found out afterwards that it was the Umvumi.

The following morning, 12th, we found a good drift where no work was required, and as there was good grass we laagered on the west bank, going on in the afternoon five miles. That evening the A Troop Scout ing party returned about 9 p.m., bringing two natives as guides whom they got from a kraal near the Iron Mine Hill. They reported that they had not actually been to the Hill but had seen it from the kraal from which they had got the "boys," and that it was not more than twelve miles away. The natives reported that there were no Matabeli about, that they had heard nothing of my column, but that they heard three days before that there were white men at Chilimanzi's, about sixty miles to the south, coming from Victoria and going into Matabeliland. The scouts also reported that except at the kraal where they had got the guides they had seen no trace of any natives.

The following morning, 13th, we moved on at daylight, and after going about three miles, came to the best patch of grass that we had found anywhere on the road. As we had no grain for the horses, I thought it advisable to laager there, although we had come such a short distance. The guides gave us to understand that it was only about six miles to the Iron Mine Hill, so we started at 3 p.m., hoping to get there by dark. I rode on with them, leaving the waggons to follow, but when we had gone six-and-half miles they told me that the hill was as far again as we had come, consequently I gave up all hopes of getting there that night, and laagered on the head waters of the Bembeswane.

We started at daylight the next day, 14th, and had scarcely gone a mile when we saw a small kopje in front of us, covered with workings. We concluded that this was the Iron Mine Hill, or Sigala, as the natives call it, and found on asking the guides that it was. We were glad to find that we were first at the place of meeting, and that we were up to time. We laagered close under the kopje, which is right at the head waters of the Tokwe, and on the watershed between the Zambesi and the Limpopo, and which, although a small and insignificant landmark from the north, stands out well from the south, where the country falls rapidly away. A picket was posted on the top of the kopje, and they



INDAIMA'S KRAAL.

found a pencilled note stuck on a tree there, which had been left by some of the Victoria Scouts the

day before. From this we made out that the Victoria Force was twenty to twenty-five miles away and could not be there for two days. There was a very extensive view in the direction of Victoria, and after breakfast I took a heliograph to the top of the kopje to try and call up the Victoria Column, but without success. I also took up the guides and examined them about the country. To the south-east, the direction in which the Victoria Column would come, the country was fairly level for some distance, and the hills about Chilimanzi's, and behind them those about Victoria, stood up in the far distance! To

the south, about ten miles away and extending for a long distance to the south-west were the Matoppo hills, in which the guide informed me Indaima, a Mashona Chief, had his kraals. The hills here ended to the east, in a high "spitzkop" which they called Indaima's mountain. They also informed me that Indaima's people had charge of a large number of Matabeli cattle which they had to herd, and pointed out a long bushy ridge, about six miles to the west, behind which they said were the Insukameni cattle posts, at which were some of the cattle taken from Victoria in July, and as I should have to wait at least a day for the Victoria Column, I thought that I could not do better than try to recover some of them.

Shortly after we had arrived in the morning some Mashonas had come into camp to "konza" (pay their respects). They expressed themselves delighted to see us, and hoped that we should be successful in


exterminating their ruthless enemies. I sent some of them back to the kraals to tell the natives to bring in grain and food to trade, and I also told them to make enquiries, and let me know that evening if the cattle were still at their posts. During the morning the American Scouts attached to the Victoria Column arrived; they told us that the Column should be there the following night. As the water was some distance from the Iron Mine Hill, and the grass was poor, I decided to shift the laager to a better site, I found one about two miles away, and we were spanning-in to move when the picket sent down word that they had seen the light of a heliograph. I went up at once and called up; I got their light, and found that it was an advance party of the Victoria Column about ten miles away. I was just asking where Dr. Jameson was, when I saw him and Sir John Willoughby ride up to our laager; I went down at once, and we then moved the laager to the new site. The Doctor told me that the other Column was coming on all right, and had had no opposition.

That evening some of the natives I had sent out in the morning returned, and said that the cattle were still at their posts, but that a small party of Matabeli had been at their kraal that day, that they were going on to Indaima's to collect cattle there, and returning the following day, picking up the cattle from the different kraals and posts as they passed, and driving them into the country. As I did not like to miss the opportunity of recovering the cattle, I started off at 3 a.m. with sixty men, twenty each from A, B, and C Troops. Captain Heany accompanied me, and Captain Borrow was left in command of the laager; Dr. Jameson and Sir John Willoughby accompanied the patrol. I had hoped to have got to the cattle posts by daylight, or anyhow before the cattle were let out of the kraals but the distance was greater than the natives had given me to understand, and we had gone ten miles before we saw any cattle. A large herd of what we thought to be cattle were seen as we were going out, and Captain Heany took the A Troop men to try and cut them off; they turned out, however, to be sable antelope. After going about ten miles, and when I had nearly made up my mind to turn back—as I did not wish to knock up the horses—we saw some cattle coming out of the bush a few hundred yards in front of us. I sent

a small party round each side to surround them and drive them back, and they drove out about 250. They were all fine cattle, but very wild; only one native was seen with them, and he ran away. I told Captain Heany to drive them back to the camp, and to take all the men except ten of B Troop with him, as I wished the others to come with me to visit a Mashona kraal on the way back. Directly after Captain Heany had started, which he had to do at a good pace, as the cattle would not drive slowly, Lieutenant Bodle appeared with the calves (about sixty) belonging to the troop of cattle we had taken; he had found them still in the kraal, close behind where the cattle had been found. He had several men with him, and I told him to drive them out after the others, but in case of an attack to leave them and ride for camp. Dr. Jameson and Sir J. Willoughby rode straight back to camp.

I then went off with my Staff and the ten men to see the Mashona Induna. I had a guide with me and he led us to a kraal on the side of and deep down a very steep rocky valley.

He had told me that there were a few of the cattle there, and I intended to take them. The path was very rough and steep



MAJOR P. W. FORBES
INTERVIEWING THE MATABELI
INDUNA AT INDAIMA'S MOUNTAIN.

and we were walking our horses down in single file, and had just got in sight of the kraal, when Mr. Chappé, who was close behind me, called out, "Look out, there are some men with guns," and we suddenly saw about twelve or fifteen Matabeli, fully armed, moving about in the rocks in front of us. I formed up the men and dismounted half of them, keeping them at the "ready" to see what was going to happen. As soon as we halted, six or seven of the Matabeli came out from the rocks, and we saw that they all had rifles and assegais. One of them, a very fine-looking boy, not more than eighteen, was evidently chief of the party; he stepped forward from the rest, and stood about twenty yards from us without any sign of fear. I told Mr. Acutt to call to them to put down their arms, to which he replied that they would put down theirs when we did ours. He also said he would come forward and talk if any one went forward without arms; I had a revolver on under my coat, but no weapon visible, and I rode forward. He was coming forward when Acutt rode up to me with his carbine, and the Matabeli would not come any closer. It was impossible for us to do anything, shut in as we were and not knowing how many Matabeli there might be there; so after a short parley we retired out of the valley, leaving them in possession of the cattle. We watched to see if they followed us out of the valley, but did not see them do so, although from what happened afterwards it appears that some of them must have. They did not know that we had taken the Insukameni cattle that morning, or that the Victoria Scouts had had a skirmish with some Matabeli that same morning, close to Indaima's, and had killed twenty of them; nor did I know this till I returned to camp.

We rode on towards camp after leaving the valley, passing Lieutenant Bodle and his party in the bush, and off-saddled for half-an-hour at a small stream. We had just saddled up and moved on again when a messenger galloped up from behind to say that Captain Campbell had been shot, and was seriously wounded. I started back at once, but on getting to Major Browne's party, the rear-guard of the party driving the cattle, I heard that he was still four or five miles back, that he was riding on, and that Dr. Edgelow and eight men had gone back to bring him on. As I could have done nothing by going back I

pushed on into camp. On the way in Mr. Tanner, my galloper, whom I had sent back with the cattle, caught me up, hurrying on to get a cart sent back for Campbell; he had been with Campbell when he was wounded. It appears that after Captain Heany started with the cattle, Captain Campbell and Messrs. Gourlay and Tanner got leave to go out on the right flank to look for more cattle; they saw several and were trying to drive them towards the rest, when they got in amongst some large granite boulders, and suddenly Campbell saw a native covering him from behind a rock. He drew his revolver—they had no rifles with them—but before he could fire, the native shot him through the left hip. He fell from his horse, and Gourlay then came up and fired several revolver shots at the native, but without effect. They helped Campbell on to his horse, and he managed to sit there with one of them supporting him on each side.

When I got back to camp about 3 p.m., I found everything in a great state of excitement. Some of the Victoria Scouts had come in and reported that they had had a skirmish with some Matabeli that morning, that they had killed twenty-two, and taken 150 head of cattle, but had had no casualty, and that a large impi estimated at 7,000 was then close to camp. The horses and oxen were got in, and everything got in readiness for an attack, but it turned out to be a false alarm.

I was much relieved to find Captain Williams' Scouting party in camp when I returned. They had gone out six days before, and were only to have been out three days, but the distance was much greater than I had estimated, and they were unable to get back sooner. They had been some distance along the main road, but had seen no signs of any Matabeli.

Poor Campbell was brought in about 4 o'clock, and an examination was made of his wound. It was found that the bullet had gone through the hip joint, completely shattering it, and the doctors decided at once that his only chance was in immediate amputation. Doctors Jameson, Edgelow, and Stewart performed the operation, which they accomplished successfully, and there were hopes that he might pull through. He was extraordinarily plucky over it, but had had no hope from the

Lieut.
Williams.

Lieut.
Hamilton.

Capt.
Fitzgerald.

Capt.
Napier.

Major
Wilson.

Capt.
Judd.

Lieut.
Stoddart.



Lieut. Sampson,
Adjutant Kennelly.

GROUP OF OFFICERS OF VICTORIA COLUMN.

first. He sank gradually, and died about one p.m. the next day. The cattle had arrived safely in charge of Captain Heany, although he had had hard work to keep them together. During the day Bishop Knight-Bruce had arrived with his waggon, and with him Honourable M. Gifford, E. Burnett, and Biscoe, who had not been able to come with us at first, but had been subsequently supplied with horses by Mr. Rhodes, who was then in Salisbury. The cattle were put in a strong kraal near the laager, and we passed a quiet night, which was more than I had expected, as I was sure that if there was an impi in the neighbourhood they would try to recover the cattle.

The following morning, 16th, was dull and wet, and about 8 a.m. the Victoria Column arrived under Major Wilson; their strength on joining us was 414 white men, 172 horses, about forty native drivers and leaders, and about 400 Mashonas, who had been raised near Victoria by Mr. Brabant. They were a very fine body of men, and were all keen for work. They had three galloping Maxims—two with horses, one with oxen, one seven-pounder screw gun on a low carriage, which was carried on a waggon, and one one-pounder Hotchkiss with oxen. The men were all armed with M.H. rifles, and all the dismounted men, of which there were about 250, with bayonets. They had 180,000 rounds M.H. ammunition, 1,000 one-pound shells for Hotchkiss, and 300 rounds for seven-pounder gun. They had eighteen waggons carrying ammunition and supplies, and had about two months' full rations with them. The officers were:—

STAFF.—Major Wilson; Adjutant Kennelly; A.D.C.'s, Lieutenants Bowen and Chalk; Pioneers, Lieutenants Browne and Ware; and Quartermaster, Captain Greenfield.

NO. 1 TROOP.—Captain Fitzgerald, Lieutenants W. B. Harris and Hughes.

NO. 2 TROOP.—Captain Bastard, Lieutenant Sampson.

NO. 3 TROOP.—Captain Napier, Lieutenants Williams and Stoddart.

NO. 4 TROOP.—Captain Judd, Lieutenants Beal and Hofmeyr.

INFANTRY.—Captain Delamere, Lieutenants Steer and Robinson.

ARTILLERY.—Captain Lendy, Captain Reid, and Lieutenant Rixon.

SCOUTS.—Captain the Hon. C. J. White, Lieutenant Dollar, Messrs. Burnham, Ingram, Vavasour, Mayne, and Possett.

NATIVE CONTINGENT.—Lieutenant Brabant.

VOLUNTEER UNATTACHED.—Captain Donovan.




DIAGRAM SHOWING FORMATION
OF VICTORIA LAAGER.

Captain Argent Kirton was in charge of their transport, and had adopted a diamond shaped laager, which they kept all through. The Victoria Column had two mounted Troops each about thirty strong. Captain the Hon. C. J. White had accompanied the Victoria Column, in charge of their Scouts, numbering about forty, and I placed him in charge of all the scouts of the combined columns.

Captain Lendy, as senior artillery officer of the Expedition, had the general superintendence of all the guns, and had to see that they were kept in proper order, although the working of each was left to its own detachment. As the Victoria Column was worse off for horses than even we were, and theirs were not in as good condition as ours, I decided to keep

the two columns as close together as possible when on the march, letting one advance and one rear-guard serve for the combined columns. I did not wish to mix up the duties of the two columns at all, as it would have led to questions of seniority which are awkward to deal with in two volunteer forces, and therefore each column found its own daily duties, guards, pickets, etc., and had its own officers of the day.

There was some slight trouble at first over the artillery of the Victoria Column, as they claimed to have been raised as one Troop under Captain Lendy, and to be independent of Major Wilson. As this was of course impossible, I saw them all and talked to them, giving them ten minutes to decide whether they would come on with the Column under Major Wilson, doing whatever he ordered, or return at once to Victoria; they decided for the former, and I heard no more of the matter.

As the Salisbury Column was always on the right on the march, it

always found the right flanking party, and the Victoria Column the left. They consisted of one Troop each, of about forty men, of which half were extended in single file, covering the whole flank of the Column, the other half with a galloping Maxim acted as support. The two Columns furnished the front and rear guards on alternate days ; there was also a Troop each divided in the same way as the flanking parties.

On the day on which the Victoria Column arrived, Captain Campbell was buried with full military honours at dusk that evening. As he was an ex-Artillery Officer, the Artillery volunteered to furnish the carrying party, and A Troop furnished the firing party. All the Salisbury and a great many of the Victoria Column attended the funeral, and the service was conducted by the Bishop. I think there were a good many standing round the grave that evening who realized for the first time that what we had undertaken was no child's play, but stern reality, and that poor Campbell's fate might at any time be the fate of one or all of us ; but there could be no turning back ; we had undertaken the work, and had to go through with it.

The Victoria Column had brought with them about 150 head of captured cattle, and these with what we had brought up our number to about 450. As it would have been inconvenient to drive such a large herd with us, I arranged with Mr. Brabant that he should send back 100 of his natives, under an Induna that he could trust, to Victoria with all that we did not require for slaughter purposes ; and accordingly the following morning we selected sixty for meat, and sent 362 back to Victoria, where they eventually arrived in safety. Captain White had about sixty Scouts all fairly well mounted at his disposal, and I arranged with him that some of these should always be some distance from the Column, forming a cordon something like ten miles away. I did not wish to have any very distant work done, as it would knock up the horses, and I was satisfied that an hour's notice was enough to enable us to meet any attack.

Captain Napier had brought two natives with him that Dr. Jameson had found some time before at Matipis, and as they were Matabeli who knew the country well, but had to fly from the king on a charge of "umtagati" (witchcraft), and had no sympathy with him, they were

installed as guides in charge of Mr. B. Wilson. The elder one, Mayesi, had a very good idea of the sort of country we wished to keep in, and guided us very successfully all the way. He always accompanied the centre of the advance party of the advance guard; the support followed him, and their Maxim opened a spoor, which one of the columns of waggons, of whichever Column formed the advance guard for the day, followed, the other columns of waggons and the other Column keeping their distance from it. During the night one of the Victoria Column, Percy Wood, died of fever, and was buried by the Bishop at day-break.



A HALT.—MAJOR FORBES AND STAFF AT MESS.

CHAPTER VIII.

FROM SIGALA MOUNTAIN TO THE SHANGANI.

BY MAJOR P. W. FORBES.

Advance of the Combined Columns—A false alarm—Finding gold—Insukameni kraal deserted—Somabula Forest—Matabeli scouts—E. Burnett shot—Crossing the Shangani River—Capturing cattle—Arranging pickets—The eve of the battle—The first attack—Questa's natives driven in—Plucky advance of the Insukameni regiment—Driven back by the Maxims—Captain Heany's skirmishers nearly cut off—The enemy routed—Strength of the Matabeli—Inferior to the Zulu—Effect of fire upon the oxen—The Columns advance—Captain Williams cut off and lost—A threatened attack—Sighting the Matoppo Hills—Captain Heany burns Enxna kraal.

AS I had decided to move forward with the two Columns on the day following the arrival of the Victoria Column, Captain White took his Scouts out that evening, and the next morning the two Columns marched at 5.30 a.m. We followed the same path along which we had gone when we captured the cattle, and for the first three miles kept on a large open plain; we then had to go through a broad strip of bush, in which the Victoria Column had to do some heavy cutting, and laagered after four and a-half miles on a small stream. The Columns marched where the ground would permit about 300 yards apart, each in a double column of waggons, the dismounted men of the Victoria Column marching on the left of their waggons, and the spare mounted troop and the few dismounted men of the Salisbury Column on the right of theirs. The Victoria Column had a large number of natives under Mr. Harry Ware, who went in advance of the waggons and cut roads, made drifts, etc., and the Native Contingent of the Salisbury Column did the same for them as before.

While we were outspanned some natives from a neighbouring Maholi kraal came in to "konza" (pay their respects), bringing presents. They stated that a few Matabeli had passed their kraal the


previous day driving cattle, but they did not know of any impi in the neighbourhood. The stream we were on was one of the sources of the Rhwe-rhwe river, and in the afternoon we followed it down for some distance, going through rather broken country, and over old mealie gardens, and laagered after doing six miles, close to the post from which we had taken the cattle; the country in front all appeared to be thick bush but level, and on our left there was a high range of bare granite hills, the Umgogoghla, in which there were several Maholi kraals.

The following morning (18th) just as the Columns were marching, two waggons which had followed the Victoria Column with further supplies arrived. They were private waggons, but the owners did not wish to take them back, and Dr. Jameson bought them complete and handed them to me, thus giving each Column an equal number of waggons—eighteen. These two waggons I placed on the rear face of the laager, thus closing it up, and the Bishop's light travelling waggon, which had now joined us, stood in front of the artillery waggon opposite the Scotch cart. The Columns marched at 5.30 a.m., crossed the Rhwe-rhwe, and after going about three miles came to a deep stream, Umtangu. It ran through high steep banks, and some time was taken up in finding suitable drifts; at last two single ones were found about half a mile apart, and the Columns commenced to cross. As there was no suitable place for both laagers close together, the only open space being close down to the river, the two Columns began to laager each just across its own drift.

While we were busy getting the waggons into laager, some of the Scouts galloped in, followed by a messenger from the Victoria Column advance guard, to say that there were some hills in front of them covered with Matabeli, the number being estimated at 4,000. Previously all due precautions for covering our crossing had been taken, and it only remained to get the laagers in readiness as soon as possible. This was done, and by putting several of the machine guns in position on ant-heaps covering the open valleys running down to the river, the positions were made fairly good; the alarm however turned out to be a false one. The natives that had been seen were only Mashonas, and did not probably exceed 100 in number, although this

had magnified into the other large number. It appeared afterwards that some of the Mashonas, whose kraals were on these kopjes, had just left their kraals and were bringing grain to us as presents, when they met a party of thirteen Matabeli who were going to collect some of their cattle from another kraal. The Matabeli at once set on them, and killed ten, while the remainder, and all those from the kraals, ran up on the rocks and so caused our alarm. Captain White and some of his scouts were off-saddled close to where the natives were killed, but knew nothing of it at the time.

We moved on that afternoon about five miles and got into fine open country. Just before laagering we crossed a good stream of water, and as the grazing was good I decided on giving the horses a day's rest there. Before marching that afternoon I had arranged with Major Wilson that to save cutting, each column should follow one of the open "laagtes" (glades) running up from the river, and that we should meet about two miles away. There was an old waggon spoor along the one which we were to follow, and I told my advance guard (we both found one advance and one rear guard that day) to follow it. They did for a time, and then lost it, and instead of sending back to me went straight on, with the result that they led us into a large patch of mealie gardens in a clearing in thick bush, where the going was very heavy, and the oxen could scarcely move the waggons. It would have taken longer to go back than to go through them, and so we went on and got out all right, but after the events of the morning it was rather an anxious time. During the previous day I had at last come to the conclusion that I must replace Major Browne as Staff Officer. I therefore asked him to resign, and Captain Finch to act in his place as Acting Brigade Major of the combined columns, and Adjutant of the Salisbury Column; this he did right through the campaign. There were some kraals close to where we laagered, under a Mashona headman, Umchena, and we got two waggon loads of grain from them that evening; and as the Scouts reported that there was a large amount at some more kraals about seven miles away, I sent Captain Heany with twenty of A Troop and two waggons to them at daylight. Owing to their being unable to get the waggons near to



the kraals, which were on high rocks, and so being obliged to have all the grain carried about a mile in baskets, they did not get back till dark, but brought two loads with them. My brother, who was a trooper in A Troop, was one of the party that went out, and just before they returned I saw his horse coming in with a saddle on but no rider. I was anxious lest something had happened, but it turned out to be all right, and that he had only let him go where they were watering the horses at a stream below the laager.

Captain Heany had not seen or heard of any Matabeli, although he had passed the dead body of one of the Mashona that had been killed the previous day. During the day Dr. Jameson and Sir J. Willoughby with a few men had ridden on some distance in the direction in which we were going, but saw nothing. They found that it was a long march to the next water, but that it was all through open country.

We marched at five the next morning, and previous to marching I sent three horses that had knocked up to the Mashona Induna to be taken care of. We crossed fine high open ridges, and after going down a long grass slope about four miles long, came to the Gwailo River, which we found dry except for a few pools. While on the high ground we came across a line of large old gold workings, in one of which my brother picked up a piece of quartz, about three pounds weight, covered with visible gold. From the ridge before going down to the river we got a fine view of the country in front, and it looked as if we should be able to keep in open country for some considerable distance. There was a line of high bushy kopjes just across the river, terminating to the south in a hill, Ugogo, under which we laagered; and to the west and about twelve miles from the laager, is another high hill, Khoboli, just to the west of which our guide told me the Insukameni kraal lay. We crossed the Gwailo and laagered, and as we had done a long march, eleven miles, decided to remain there till next day. As soon as we had laagered I sent out Captain Williams in charge of a party of five Scouts, to try and find out if the Insukameni kraal was occupied.

Until two years before this there were no Matabeli stationed as far from Buluwayo by fifty miles, except the Maveni, who had been sent by Lobengula on to the borders of the country in disgrace some years

previously ; but two years before, since the occupation of Mashonaland, Lobengula had sent the Insukameni and Ihlati regiments to live near the border. Captain Williams and his party returned shortly after dark and reported that they had been as close as it was safe to get to the kraal ; that they had seen cattle and a few men about, and had heard voices in the kraal, but were unable to say if there was any large force there. They also said that they did not think that they had been seen by the natives. As I wished to have as few Matabeli as possible in our rear, I determined to send a force to the kraal, and therefore sent Major Wilson off at midnight with 100 men, fifty from each column, and two Maxim guns, to attack the kraal if occupied and burn it. I had intended to have gone myself, but Dr. Jameson thought that I should remain with the main body. Owing to the darkness they could only travel very slowly, and had some difficulty in getting the Maxims through the bush, and on the way they heard natives in the bush, but saw no one. At daylight they had surrounded the kraal and advanced on it, only to find it deserted. There was fresh spoor both of natives and cattle about, and it was evident that it had only been vacated very recently. They burnt it all down, and after resting the horses and giving them a good feed of grain, returned to rejoin the column. We heard afterwards that the kraal had been occupied when the Scouts were there the previous evening, and that the natives had seen them, and fearing a night attack had left it and gone into the bush. The kraal was quite new and very large, and was probably capable of holding about 3,000 inhabitants. The same morning I advanced with the two columns, Captain Bastard being in temporary command of the Victoria Column. After going through the line of kopjes we crossed the watershed and got on to wide open flats again, intersected by small streams, which formed the head waters of the Lundi. We did six miles and laagered on the Uguamo River, the largest of these streams. It is in this neighbourhood that there has always been alluvial gold reported, but I do not think that any indications of it were seen on the march.

About three miles to the west of the laager we saw the Somabula forest, a thick black line extending from a point rather to the south of us, as far as we could see to the north. This forest is very dense, and is supposed to go right up to the Zambesi, and it was principally to

avoid it that we had kept so far to the south. It was from three to four miles wide where the Hartley Hill road went through it, and it was always looked upon as the most likely place for the Matabeli to wait for us. I did not wish to pass it before Major Wilson rejoined me, and so remained on the Uguamo that afternoon; Major Wilson and his party returned about four p.m. Dr. Jameson had insisted upon accompanying them, although I had tried to prevent him; he would not realise how important it was that he should keep as much as possible out of danger, but whenever there was any outside work to be done he insisted upon going.

The following day, 22nd October, we marched at 5.30, and got to the Somabula Forest, where we found that we had to go through a narrow strip of thick bush with a good deal of cutting to be done. To make things worse a fog came on, and it was a very anxious time. We got through the bush safely however, and after crossing a nasty little stream, got up into the high open ground again, and then went down a gradual slope to the Vungu River, on the east bank of which we laagered. From there we sent back two runners, coloured "boys," to Salisbury, who got through in safety. The only previous communication we had had was from the Iron Mine Hill, and Dr. Jameson had sent back from there to let Mr. Rhodes know of the taking of the cattle and Captain Campbell's death. The Vungu was a wide watercourse, but nearly dry, and we had no trouble in crossing it, which we did that afternoon, and did four miles on to the high ground on the other side. While on the march that afternoon, Captain White sent back to report that he and his Scouts had come across seven armed Matabeli warriors; that they had tried to stop them, but could not; and on their firing at the Scouts, the latter had returned the fire.

The following morning, 23rd, just as we were starting, a dense fog came on. The fogs drift over very quickly, and I hoped that it would clear away again; but it did not, and after going two miles our guide confessed that he could not find his way, and we laagered on the east bank of the Vunguane River. The fog was so thick that it was impossible to see any distance, and when I suddenly gave the order to laager I think that everyone believed we were going to be attacked, and wasted very little time; both the laagers were complete

under six minutes. We had breakfast, and by nine o'clock the fog had cleared and we spanned-in again.

Before marching in the morning I had sent Captain Williams with his brother, Messrs. Burnett, Swinburne, Gourlay, and Hon. M. Gifford, on to see if they could find some kraals—the Amatoilene, inhabited by Maholi—who were reported to be friendly to us, and which should be about ten miles ahead. They started off but lost themselves in the fog, and when we started for the second time, they signalled to me from about two miles away, they then went on again. We trekked six miles and crossed the Tyabenzi River, on the west bank of which we laagered. The Victoria Column oxen were very weak that day, and they got some distance behind, and eventually crossed the river and laagered about half-a-mile above us. We remained there that afternoon, and about three p.m. the Hon. Maurice Gifford rode in to say that E. Burnett had been shot through the stomach at a kraal, and was dangerously wounded. I at once ordered out Captain Spreckley and twenty men, but before they were ready Drs. Jameson and Edgelow and Sir J. Willoughby rode off, with Hon. Maurice Gifford as guide, to the place. Gifford took them seven or eight miles at full gallop, and then had to admit that he had lost his way, and they turned back to camp, where they arrived about dark. Captain Spreckley started as soon as he could and tried to follow Dr. Jameson, but in turn lost his way and found himself at some kraals about ten miles away just at dark. They were fired on from the kraals and returned the fire and burnt the kraals, taking some cattle, which the natives who had accompanied them under Mr. Quested brought back to camp; they did not return till midnight, meanwhile Captain Williams had returned bringing Burnett's body, he had died about half-an-hour after he was hit.

I gathered generally that the incident happened as follows: Our Scouts had gone to a small kraal, where they found an old man and a woman who were very friendly, and who told them that there were no Matabeli about, and only Maholis (slaves), who were in favour of the whites. They had off-saddled, and Burnett walked off to another small kraal close by to see if he could get some grain; as he went up to one of the huts a shot was fired from inside and he fell. It occurred

so suddenly that the others thought that he had shot himself, but other shots were fired, one of which went through Swinburne's coat. Our men fired several shots, but could not see if they had killed any one; and a woman behind the kraal called out that the man who had shot Burnett had run away. They did not believe this and set fire to the hut, and as the man appeared he was shot. They got Burnett on his horse and Gifford started for a doctor, but Burnett died soon after they started; we buried him quietly that night, the Bishop officiating, and only a few of the officers being present. He was a very popular man, well known in Cape Colony as well as in Mashonaland, and had come up to the latter with the Pioneer Column as one of the transport officers; we had now lost two really good men and had nothing at all to show for it.

The following day, 24th, we marched as usual at 5.30, and did seven miles over open country, and laagered on a small stream with high banks about a mile short of the Shangani River. The kraal at which Burnett had been shot was across the river. There was a line of high bushy kopjes on the west side of the Shangani and a pass through, opposite to where we were, and it was for this pass that we were making. As soon as the laagers were formed Major Wilson and I rode down to the Shangani, and after some difficulty found a place where with a good deal of cutting we could make two drifts. We started men at work at once and then rode up the other side to see if we could find an open place to laager. The bush close to the river and extending for about half a mile was very thick mimosa, with deep dongas running through it, but about 1,000 yards from the river there was an open ridge large enough to take in both laagers, and after a little bush was cleared round it, forming a fairly good position. We could see that we should have to go at least three miles to get out of the hills and to get a better position, and as we expected some trouble in getting the waggons across the river, decided on going no further; by three p.m. the drifts were made and we inspanned. Before moving I sent two mounted Troops with two Maxims and a seven-pounder to take up positions on two kopjes on the west bank and so cover our crossing, and also sent a mounted Troop under Captain Borrow across the river to work

down amongst the hills to the north, and one under Captain Fitzgerald to the south, to destroy kraals and seize cattle, and to prevent any chance of our being attacked while crossing. The drifts were not good, but everyone realised that it was a dangerous place and worked hard, with the result that the Salisbury Column took sixteen and the Victoria Column nineteen minutes to get all the waggons across, and in an hour and a-half from the time of starting we were laagered on the west bank. That night for the first time the two laagers were joined; they were about 150 yards apart and a thick fence of thorn connected them on each side.

On his way from Victoria and previous to joining us, Major Wilson had detached Messrs. Arnold and Quested, both of whom were well known amongst the natives, to raise what Mashonas they could and follow on. They joined us soon after leaving Iron Mine Hill with about 300 Mashonas each, so that we now had about 900, and found them most useful in bushing the laagers, making kraals for the cattle, and driving captured cattle.

Shortly after we had laagered, cattle and goats began to come in from Captains Borrow and Fitzgerald, and by dark we had about a thousand head of cattle and 900 sheep and goats; we also saw kraals burning all round. Both Captains Borrow and Fitzgerald returned about dark and reported that they had seen no Matabeli, only a few Maholi who had run away; that they had burnt some kraals and taken the cattle, they said there was very little grain (of which we were again badly in need) in any of the kraals. Mr. Brabant had accompanied Captain Fitzgerald with Mr. Arnold and some of their natives; and at one kraal, Mgandane's, they had found about thirty women and children, who had been captured the year before from their kraals, Gutu's and Bira's, close to Victoria, to which some of Mr. Arnold's natives belonged. The women were delighted to see their own people, and insisted upon accompanying us; they were rather a hindrance, but we could not leave them to the mercy of the Matabeli. There was not time to make a very strong kraal for all the cattle before dark, but as good a one as time would permit was built about 200 yards from and to the east of the centre of the combined laager. As Mr. Quested's natives were not very friendly

with some of the others, they preferred to camp by themselves, and so made a small kraal about 600 yards from the north-east of the laagers on the rise; they had several women with them whom they had re-captured that day. Some of the other natives slept beside the cattle kraal, and the remainder between the two laagers.

While the laagers had been separate each one was surrounded by its own pickets at night, but now that they had formed one joint laager I rearranged the picket. Each laager now found five pickets, Victoria Column all double (i.e., six men each) of white men, and Salisbury Column three double of white men and two single (three




DIAGRAM SHOWING FORMATION OF COMBINED LAAGERS AND POSITION OF PICKETS AT SHANGANI.


men each) of natives. These were posted each evening before dark by the respective captains of the day, who consulted together so as to get a complete circle round the laager. The combined laagers were made very strong that night, and I went round the last thing to see that everything was all right. Shortly after dark I sent up a socket signal, as I did most nights, followed by two rockets, on the chance of some scouts from the South Column being in the neighbourhood. Ever since starting I had had both laagers manned at 4 a.m.—an hour before daylight—which is the natives' favourite time for attack, and every man always slept fully dressed, and in his boots, with his rifle beside him.

At five minutes to four the following morning we were suddenly awakened by quick firing, and realised that the enemy were on us. The waggons were manned immediately, and fire opened all round the laager. It was too dark to see the natives at first, but their position was shown by the flashes that came from the grass all round the laager. I jumped up on the nearest waggon and tried to see into the darkness, but could distinguish nothing but the flashes, which were very close and frequent. The enemy were so close to us that I did not think it safe to stop firing, even had I been able to do so in the noise that was going on, and I was very much afraid that some of the men on picket would be killed either by friends or by enemies, and I was greatly relieved to hear shortly afterwards that they had all got safely in. During the first attack Mr. Quested came into the laager; he had been sleeping with his natives, and they had received the brunt of the attack, waking up to find the Matabeli right upon them and stabbing them. Quested managed to make a stand for a short time, and then retired on the laager with the people; he was wounded in the arm and side, and had his thumb shot off. Most of his people managed to get into the laager, although several were wounded. C Troop was inlying picket, and had saddled up their horses at the first alarm; A Troop was on the right and B on the left face of the laager. The first attack lasted about half-an-hour, and then the enemy's fire ceased; it was still too dark to see any distance, but objects in the immediate vicinity were visible.

As I was afraid that some of our friendly natives might have failed to get into the laager, I sent out Captain Spreckley with twenty mounted men to go round the open ground close to the laager, and see if he could find anyone; he brought in several of our natives, and a few shots were fired at his party from the bush, but no harm was done.

Shortly after they returned, and when it was getting light enough to see some distance, a large number of natives were seen collecting on the top of a small rise about 350 yards to the south-east of the laager. I was standing with Mr. Chappé at the Maxim at the left rear of our laager watching them through glasses, and from the quiet way they were moving about, took them to be some of our natives who had escaped into the bush at the first alarm, and now gone there for safety. There must have been 200 to 300 of them, and I could see

no shields among them. After they had collected on the top of the rise, they opened out and began to walk quietly down towards the laager; I, and I think everyone who was watching them except Mr. Chappé, who insisted that they were Matabeli, thought that they were friendlies. They advanced down the slope in a most casual way, without hurrying or attempting to take cover, and I allowed no firing at them. When they got to the bottom of the slope they suddenly sat down and commenced to fire at us. A very heavy fire was at once



THE INSUKAMENI REGIMENT
ADVANCING UPON
THE SALISBURY LAAGER.

poured on them from two or three Maxims and about 200 rifles, and they were forced to retire over the hill much faster than they had come down. The way they advanced was most plucky, and we found out afterwards that they were the Insukameni, the best regiment there. Had the whole of the attacking force come on in the same way, we should have had more trouble than we had. As soon as they advanced, firing recommenced from the bush all round; but very few natives appeared in the open, and after they retired the firing ceased again.

After waiting for some time, during which only a few shots were fired at us at long distances, and it was now broad daylight, I sent out Captains Heany and Spreckley with twenty mounted men each, and told Major Wilson to send a party of the same strength to see if the enemy had retired. He sent out Captain Bastard, who extended his men in the bush to the south of the laagers, Captain Spreckley doing

A. PLAN III.

EYE
BATTLE

OCTOBER

Major SIR JOHN

Most of the


KEY

- A = Salisbury
- B = Victoria L
- C = Trek oxen
- D = Kraal for
- E = Small Kop from he vigorous
- F = Scherm of who who beli off.
- G = Captain F. large bo viously c
- H & I = Captain F. Troops, (left back flank and
- K & N = Captains S. driven in at 5 a.m.
- L = Hill over t large nu on either Hotchkiss
- M = Low moun portion of for the t against the shelled.

-  = Enemy
-  = Enemy
-  = Enemy
-  = Mount
-  = Bush and indic
-  = Water
-  = Enemy
-  = Route
-  = Points



scale of Yards.



THE DOWNFALL OF LOBENGULA. PLAN III.

EYE SKETCH OF THE BATTLE OF SHANGANI,

OCTOBER 25th, 1893.


Prepared by
Major SIR JOHN WILLOUGHBY, Bart.,

Most of the distances ascertained.

KEY TO PLAN

- A = Salisbury Lager.
- B = Victoria Lager.
- C = Trek oxen in thorn bush Kraal.
- D = Kraal for captured cattle.
- E = Small Kopjie surrounded by thick bush; from here the enemy made his most vigorous attack.
- F = Scherm of Quesed's Native Contingent, who when attacked drove the Matabell off.
- G = Captain Heany's Troop driven in by large bodies of the enemy not previously engaged (8.10. a.m.).
- H & I = Captain Fitzgerald's and Bastard's Troops, showing change of position (left back) to meet counter attack in flank and rear (8.10. a.m.).
- K & N = Captains Spreckley and Heany's Troops driven in by large bodies of the enemy at 5 a.m., it being still too dark to see.
- L = Hill over the lower slopes of which a large number of the enemy retreated on either side, being shelled by the Hotchkiss gun.
- M = Low mound shaped Kopjie where the portion of the enemy that was too late for the 1st and 2nd attack showed against the mounted troops and were shelled.

-  = Enemy's first attack.
-  = Enemy's second attack.
-  = Enemy's third attack.
-  = Mounted Troops.
-  = Bush and Thorn Trees; where not indicated the ground is open.
-  = Water.
-  = Enemy's lines of retreat.
-  = Route of the Columns.
-  = Points shelled.



the same to the east, and Captain Heany to the north-east. Each of these parties found the enemy in the bush within half-a-mile of the laager, and after a sharp skirmish, in which we lost four horses, had to fall back on the laager, towards which the enemy followed them, but were again driven back by the Maxims.

A large number of Matabeli now appeared on a small kopje, 2,000 yards to the west of the laager, and they appeared to be re-forming there, but three very well-directed shells from the Salisbury seven-pounder dispersed them. Meanwhile Captain Lendy was doing great execution with the Hotchkiss gun, firing at small parties crossing the open 1,500 to 2,000 yards to the south and south-west of the laager. It was afterwards found that one of the one-pounder shells had killed twelve men. x

When the Matabeli were driven back for the third time, it was thought that they had retired altogether, and the mounted parties were again sent out. The one from the Victoria laager found a few natives in the bush, and succeeded in dislodging them, pursuing them for some distance and killing a considerable number. Captain Spreckley found that they had all retired from the side on which he went out, and Captain Heany found none within about 1,000 yards on his side; the latter had just got on to an open ridge visible from the laager, and had dismounted his men to engage a body of the enemy in his immediate front, when he was attacked from both sides by a large force; x they were close to him in the bush when they commenced firing, and tried to cut him off, but he managed by retiring at a gallop to get into an open laagte (glade), and halted his troop in the bush on the side nearest to the laager. The enemy at the time were emerging in numbers from the bush about eighty yards in his rear; the troop at once dismounted and engaged them, driving them back into the bush and then, re-forming, returned into laager. He had two horses wounded, but no other casualties, although several men had narrow escapes, one having the sole of his boot and another his belt cut by bullets. The natives fell back behind a bushy kopje, from behind which they attacked, and as they appeared to be in force there, I had the seven-pounder brought to the north face of the laager, and shelled their position. At the same time I sent Captains

Heany and Borrow back again, the latter going to the east of the kopje. When they got there they found the position vacated, and after going a considerable distance round and finding out that the enemy had all retired, returned to the laager; this was the end of our first battle.

A few Matabeli were still to be seen on the hills, and I sent out our Colonial "boys" under Captain Nesbitt to drive them off, the ground being too rough for horses; they advanced in very good order, but the enemy did not wait for them. We ascertained from a wounded native who was brought in that the force which attacked us consisted of the Insukameni, Ihlati, Amaveni, and Siseba Regiments, and Jingen, Enxna, Zinyangene, and Induba kraals, in all not less than 5,000; that they had been waiting for us in the Somabula forest, but that we had passed it before they knew where we were, and that they had then followed us up, expecting to catch us before we got to the Shangani; that they had arrived shortly after dark on the previous evening, and had been in position ready to attack about ten o'clock, but the socket signal and rockets sent up had frightened them, and the attack had been postponed till daybreak; they were all to advance as close to the laagers as possible under the cover of the darkness, and then rush in with assegais. It was finding Quested's natives so far away that caused the first firing, and so gave us the alarm. The wounded native was one of the Insukameni, and had been present when they walked down the slope towards the laager, but had been shot through the back when they were retiring; he said that their orders were to attack us on the march and not in laager, and not to use their rifles; he could give no idea of the number killed and wounded but said that there was a very large number. From what we ascertained later, there cannot have been less than 500. A considerable number of dead were left upon the field, but most of them and the wounded were carried away; several of the wounded hanged themselves or threw themselves into the river to avoid being taken. He said that he thought they would probably attack us again as soon as we marched. Our casualties had been very few, owing to their bad shooting; they believing that the higher they put up the sights of their rifles the harder they would shoot, and consequently nearly all their shots were too high.

We only lost one white man—Trooper Walters, of the Victoria Column—who was shot through the groin, and died the same night. The other casualties were, Trooper Forbes (my brother), shot through the left elbow ; Trooper Conrath (Victoria Column), shot in the back ; and Trooper Nutt, shot in leg ; Trooper Behrmann (Salisbury Column), through right side ; Conductor Dunman (Salisbury Column), through the left arm ; and Levy Leader Quested, through left side and arm. We also had ten horses killed, and one driver (Colonial “boy”) of Victoria Column shot through the head. The loss amongst our natives was heavier, Mr. Quested’s especially having suffered, and there must have been forty to fifty killed, as well as several women and children. As soon as things were quiet, I rode round the field with Dr. Jameson. By Quested’s laager we found a large number of dead and wounded, some Matabeli and some friendlies. When the Matabeli rushed them they had stabbed indiscriminately, and there was one child about two years old stabbed in three places ; we found three women badly wounded and five dead. The wounded were taken to the laager and attended to, and two of the three recovered. One native had to have his arm amputated, and another his leg, and the latter died from it.

It was the first time that I and the majority of those there had been under fire, and I was pleased to find how steady everyone was ; there was little or no excitement, and very little wild shooting. Everyone took it as a matter of course, and set to work as if he had never done anything else. Quite late in the engagement I was standing behind one of the A Troop waggons, on which my brother was stationed, talking to Captain Heany, when a bullet from behind came between our heads ; he just said that it was too close to be pleasant, when I saw that it had hit my brother, who had fallen forward. I ran up and saw that it had passed through his arm, but that although it had cut his coat, it had not entered his body.

The expenditure of ammunition was as follows :—M.H., including Maxim and Nordenfeldt gun, 3,645 ; seven-pounder case 2, shrapnel 1, common 4, Hotchkiss 28, Gardner 400. All the machine guns worked very well indeed, and without a single jam of any importance. The result of the engagement was very satisfactory, as it not only gave all the men

confidence, but showed them that the much-talked-of Matabeli are very inferior to the Zulu, the latter having been the standard by which they had hitherto been looked upon. The Bishop went round and had all the wounded natives carried up to the laager and attended to, and they were afterwards taken on in a waggon. The oxen had been tied up as usual to the trek-tows outside the waggon, and I had been curious to see what effect the firing had on them. I was astonished to see that it had practically none; they all stood up when it began, and after that did not move, standing perfectly quiet although there was a heavy firing going on close over their heads, and several of them were killed by the enemy's fire.

As soon as it was evident that the enemy had finally retired, the pickets were posted and oxen and horses turned out to graze. As I wished the Matabeli to see that their attack had not interfered with our advance, I decided to move on that afternoon. There was a large open plain about three miles from us and just beyond the hills, and if we could get there in safety we need not fear another attack. The open space between the hills along which we had to go was very narrow, and that afternoon's march was the most anxious time I had all through the campaign; if we had then been attacked and had had to laager, the natives could have fired right down into the laagers from the hills, and we should have had great trouble in dislodging them. The two columns moved close together, each in four parallel columns, and as many men as could be spared were kept on the flanks; we got out all right, but I felt inexpressibly relieved when we got round the ends of the hills into a large open valley. We headed for the widest part of it and laagered there, having done about three miles.

We had noticed a curious thing that morning, that whenever a shell exploded all the Matabeli near fired their rifles at it; on inquiry from a prisoner we found that they thought that the shell was full of little white men, who ran out as soon as it burst and killed everybody near; we saw this done almost every time that a shell was fired during the campaign. We had one prisoner, a very good-looking boy of about eighteen, being a pure Matabeli; he was shot through the lower part of the spine, which was all shattered, and was partially

paralysed ; he was very quiet and gentle, and very grateful for all that was done for him ; he sent me messages on several occasions, warning me of certain localities where we were likely to be attacked, and always gave me all the information he could ; we took him to Buluwayo and he was doing well, although he would always have been crippled ; but after the country was settled his people came for him, and I heard that he afterwards died at his kraal.

We made the laagers very strong with bush that night, and I think that everyone would have been pleased if the Matabeli had come again, as we had level open country all round, and we could have given a very good account of them ; but they did not come. A shot was fired by one of the Victoria column vedettes in the early morning, and the alarm was at once sounded ; the laagers were manned immediately, and patrols were sent round to find out what it was ; it appeared that the man had let off his rifle accidentally, and we turned in again ; not a shot was fired from the laagers, so steady were the men, although one of my men wanted to fire at one of the pickets, thinking that they were Matabeli.

That morning we marched at 6 a.m. and did five miles to the Manzimnyama River, and laagered about one mile to the west of it, on the site of an old kraal. We found a number of large kraals close by, all of which had been vacated and were full of grain ; we loaded up three or four waggons while we were outspanned ; our guide told us that two of the large military kraals—the Jingen and the Zinyangene—were not far to the north of us, the latter being the closer ; and when we marched in the afternoon, I sent Captain Heany, with twenty-one men of A Troop, to destroy it. Captain Finch also accompanied them ; they found the kraal—a large one—about six miles away and burnt it ; but before doing so, they saw a very large body of natives coming down on them, and immediately afterwards had to retire towards the laager. They had travelled fast, and two of their horses knocked up and had to be left on the veldt, the riders walking ; Captain Heany then sent a messenger on to me. Captain White had also joined Captain Heany, but at the latter's request had come on to let me know that the natives were following him in force.

The columns marched four-and-a-half miles and laagered on a high

open ridge, a long way from water ; there had been a few natives seen along the march that afternoon and many shots were fired, but nothing to stop us, as we were in fairly open country all the way. Just as we were laagering, the messenger from Captain Heany galloped in excitedly, telling me that the enemy were out in force. I at once sent out twenty mounted men with a Maxim from each laager to help to cover Captain Heany's retreat, and shortly afterwards they all returned to the laager, their only casualty being, as I have said, two horses left on the veldt, although they had narrowly escaped being cut off at one point.

Captain Williams' Scouting party, consisting of his brother, Messrs. Carden, Gourlay, and Swinburne, and Hon. M. Gifford, had joined Captain Heany as he was coming in. They had been cut off by a considerable force, but managed to gallop through, running the gauntlet, though, of a heavy fire at about a hundred yards ; after getting through the natives they had galloped in, and Captain Williams' horse had run away with him ; Gifford was next to him, but could not get up to him, and Williams disappeared in the hills. We were not very anxious about him at first, as he had a good horse and was very good at finding his way about, and Gifford did not think that either he or the horse were wounded. He had gone back to the kopjes near the Shangani, and we expected him to get on our spoor and come in during the night ; I sent up rockets several times that night for him, but he did not come, and was never seen again alive.

We had to march the next morning, 27th, as we had to get to water, and so moved off at 6 a.m. ; Captain Spreckley with C Troop was on the right flank, and after we had gone about three miles we suddenly heard them open a rapid fire ; we were crossing some old mealie gardens at the time, and it was fairly open, and as the fire was very fast and seemed to be approaching, I gave the word to laager, at the same time sending B Troop (Captain Borrow) to support Captain Spreckley, and also sending Captain Finch to find out what was going on. The laagers were on this occasion both formed in less than six minutes, and the Salisbury one would have been done in much quicker time, only for the Bishop placing his waggon in the wrong place.

While we were laagering up, the officer in charge of one of the Victoria Column scouting parties on the left galloped in to say that he

had seen a very large force of Matabeli on that flank; as he did not appear to know much about it, I sent him back again for further information, and heard no more of them. We remained laagered up for about ten minutes, and then, word being brought to me that the enemy had been driven back, we broke laager and resumed our march; the right flanking party had been attacked all along the line, and had at first been forced to retire, but on being reinforced by the Support and B Troop, drove the enemy back, killing a large number of them. Our only casualties were Trooper Lucas, who was shot through the right arm and leg, and was also cut in several places by an assegai; a Matabeli had jumped on him from the bush, and had pulled him off his horse; they closed, and the Matabeli tried to stab him. Trooper Halforty came to rescue Lucas, and in shooting the Matabeli with his revolver, shot Lucas as well; we also lost one horse.

We laagered about two miles further on, on some old lands, and a large body of the enemy were hanging about on our flank all day. Shortly afterwards a large number were reported to be sitting on a kopje about 3,000 yards away, and visible from where one of the pickets was posted; I started to go up to Dr. Jameson, and took the seven-pounder, but on arriving there saw that there were several large bodies round us, and they looked as if they intended attacking. As our position was a fairly good one, I took the seven-pounder back to the laager, and sent out Captain Borrow with his troop, and Captain Bastard with his, to try if they could draw the enemy on; they were unable to however, although they had some slight skirmishing about the edge of the bush, out of which the enemy would not come; they did some slight execution, and had no casualties.

I wished to remain near here for a day to send back and look for Captain Williams, and as the ground on which we were laagered was very dirty and far from water, I moved the laager that afternoon about one mile to the south, and got on to an open space running down from the high ground along which we had been travelling for some time. To the south of this was open flat country for five or six miles, and it then rose gradually up to the Matoppo Hills, which ran right through the country east and west. About six miles away across the flat we could see a very large kraal, consisting of three large enclosures; this we

found to be the Enxna, the Induna of which, Umgandane, had been killed at Victoria. That afternoon Captain Hurrell and a young Dutchman arrived from Victoria, having ridden through in five days with despatches from Mr. Rhodes for Dr. Jameson, and during the night Messrs. Dunne and Harrison also arrived from Charter with duplicates of the same; they both reported that the country seemed quite quiet behind us, and that they had seen no Matabeli along the road.


The following day, 28th, we halted, and the first thing in the morning sent back two Colonial "boys," "John Selous" (who knew Matabeliland well, and who was an old servant of Mr. F. C. Selous) and Ghert, to try and take up Captain Williams' spoor and follow him; they took a spare horse and some food and medicine. There were a number of large kraals around us, and I sent some waggons in charge of Captain Spreckley to get grain. They found all the kraals deserted with the exception of one, in which they found a small Matabeli boy about two years old, whom Captain Spreckley brought back, and he was afterwards adopted by Farrier-Sergeant Wallace; he was an enormously fat child, with a wonderful amount of self-composure, and took to his new life without any trouble. They also got about sixty bags of grain and a few head of cattle.

I did not wish to leave the Enxna kraals so near to our road undisturbed behind us, but at the same time did not want to give the horses more work than I could help, and Captain Heany volunteered to ride over with anyone who would go, and burn the kraal if it was deserted. About six who had good horses volunteered, and Captain Lendy took the Victoria Column seven-pounder about one-and-a-half miles from the laager, and tried to reach the kraal with shells; it was however too far; Captain Heany and his party found the kraal empty, burnt it, and brought back fifty head of cattle.

About ten o'clock "John Selous" and Ghert returned and said that they had followed the spoor of Captain Williams' horse for some time; that it took them into a narrow place between the hills, and that the natives commenced firing at them; they were afraid of being cut off, and so returned. As soon as the horses could be got up, I sent Captain Borrow and twenty men with "John Selous" to try and follow the spoor again, and they did not return till late at night; they followed it for

some miles, and got back to within four or five miles of the Shangani, where they lost it. Where they saw it last the horse seemed to be going strong, and they did not think it was wounded.

When we marched the following morning, Captain Hurrell and "John Selous" went back to try and get information about Captain Williams, and to go on to Victoria; they were unable to get any definite news, but got through safely to Victoria. It was only after we got to Buluwayo that we heard full particulars about him; his horse had run away with him, and had been hit in the flank either before it started or while running away, and the natives had followed him; he got into broken country, and the natives, by calling from hill to hill, always kept near him; at last, his horse failing, he dismounted. The natives were afraid to come to close quarters as he was armed, having a magazine rifle and a revolver, and remained at about 200 yards firing at him. He sat down on a rock and returned their fire, killing several, but at last was shot dead by a bullet in the left temple; they stripped him, taking away everything that he had, but did not mutilate him in any way. Captain Gwynyth Williams was a very great loss; he was the eldest son of General Owen Williams, and until recently a Captain in the Royal Horse Guards; he had come to Mashonaland two years before with Lord Randolph Churchill, was most popular wherever he was known, and he had been most useful with the Expedition by reason of his military training and natural grasp of locality.



CHAPTER IX.

THE OCCUPATION OF BULUWAYO.


BY MAJOR P. W. FORBES.

Scouts sent to reconnoitre Buluwayo—News of Lobengula—Umsingweni kraal burnt by the natives—An anxious march—The battle of Imbembesi—The horses stampeded—The picket surprised—The Matabeli within 300 yards—Attempt to surround the laager—Plucky advance of Captain Delamore's dismounted men—The enemy retire—The Imbezu beaten by a lot of boys—The Matabeli power broken—Heading straight for Buluwayo—Kraals deserted—Buluwayo blown up—Letter from Burnham and Fairbairn—Buluwayo occupied—Short of supplies—News of the Southern Column—A messenger sent to Lobengula—Capturing the king's peacocks—Lobengula's reply: "Where am I to live?"—The first church parade at Buluwayo—Despatches for England.

WE marched at 6 a.m. the next day (29th), and after going about two miles through rather broken country and bush, got out into the high open veldt again. We were on the southern slope of the watershed, and about a mile from it, and to the south of us the country gradually fell away to the Matoppo Hills; we laagered between two good streams of water, having seen no natives that day, although the bush was full of recently-made scherms where they had stopped, and we found a few head of cattle. We did four miles that afternoon, still on the flats, and laagered close to a newly-deserted kraal which we burnt that night, and from which we had taken some grain. The next day we did four miles in the morning and four in the afternoon, passing a good many kraals, but seeing no one except one very old woman, who had been left to starve on the veldt, and whom we brought on in a waggon.

In some kraals close to where we laagered we found a considerable amount of powder, caps, and bullets which had been left behind, and which showed that the kraals had been deserted very hurriedly. As the grass was good here we halted the following morning, and I sent three men—Burnham, Ingram, and Vavasour—the first two being

THE DOWNFALL OF LOBENGULA. PLAN V.



SHOWING POSITION AND FORMATION OF THE TWO LAAGERS
AT THE BATTLE OF IMBEMBESI.

Prepared by
MAJOR SIR JOHN WILLOUGHBY, BART.,


American Scouts, and the third one of the Victoria Column, who knew the country about Buluwayo, to try to get on to Buluwayo or to open communication with the Tuli Column, which we reckoned should not be far from Buluwayo by now.

We were to march at 3 p.m., and just before then one of the Scouts who had gone on ahead with Captain White, galloped in to report that they had ridden into a very large force of Matabeli about three miles ahead, but had been able to ride out without any loss; they estimated the number at 4,000, and Captain White was remaining to watch their movements. There was a narrow strip of bush to go through in a hollow about a mile in front of us, and then it was open country for about two miles, ending in a row of low bushy kopjes running from south to north and terminating in a high detached hill, and immediately behind the kopjes and in our direct route was the military kraal of Umsingweni. I at once sent out Captain Spreckley's Troop and one from the Victoria Column to try and draw the natives on, but they could not get them to leave the bush, and as it was necessary to push on as fast as possible, I determined to move as arranged, and to laager again before we reached the kopjes; we accordingly moved about two miles and laagered on a very good position. We had seen nothing of the enemy, but there was thick bush extending almost from the foot of the kopjes to within 800 yards of us, a small strip just along the bottom of the kopjes being clear. Just as we had finished laagering, we saw a very large force of natives come through a neck between the end of the kopjes and the hill and form up below the hill; at the same time we saw a lot of them along the kopjes. I told Captain Lendy to have the Victoria Column seven-pounder, which was sighted up to 4,000 yards, brought out and to try a shot at them. The first shot fell a little short, and we saw them all fire their rifles at it; the next two went right into the middle of them, and must have done great execution; this scattered them, and they retired over the neck. Two more shells very accurately placed accelerated their movements; but for this, I think that they would have attacked us that night.

There was a thick fog the next morning, the 1st November, and we could not move until 8 a.m.; by this time the Scouts had reported that

the country was clear of natives in front of us. We passed the kopjes, finding that the Umsingweni kraal had been burnt by the natives, and then came to a large bushy basin in which the Imbembesi River rises. Our guide wished to take us across this, but I could see that by keeping to the left we could go through a narrow strip of bush and get into open country again, and so turned the Column that way. During the march, Burnham, Ingram, and Vavasour returned and reported that they had been unable to get close to Buluwayo, as there were too many natives about who had chased them several times; they had caught two women near a kraal, and learnt from them that the King had left Buluwayo, but that some of the people were still there, and that nothing had been heard of the Southern Column. The Scouts, advance guards, and flanking parties saw several groups of natives in the bush, but we were not interfered with, and after rather an anxious march through open bush, came out on a high ridge and laagered. The country was quite open to the west, south, and east, and about ten miles away we saw Intabas Induna, which we knew to be eight miles east of Buluwayo.

The high ridge ran east and west, and to the north of it was level for about 1,000 yards, after which it gradually fell away to the Imbembesi; to the south it sloped away very quickly, but there were several spurs running out, and on one of these, at about 400 yards from the bush, we laagered on the side of an old kraal. The water was some distance away at the foot of the slope, and the horses and oxen were sent down to it, with orders that as soon as they had been watered they were to be driven back towards the laager, and were to feed on the slopes under cover of the guns. It had been very cold when we marched in the morning, and eighteen trek oxen had had to be left on the ground, in addition to which B Troop had lost three horses the previous day, and I was going to send back some of the Colonial "boys" to try and find the horses, and bring them and the cattle on. I was giving orders about it when I saw a large number of natives, several of whom were mounted, driving a few head of cattle, come out of the west end of the bush; I knew that there was a main path to Buluwayo, and I thought that they were going along it; they were about 1,800 yards away, and I had the seven-pounder brought out and commenced to shell them. There was a mounted picket between us,



THE DOWNFALL OF LOBENGULA. PLAN IV.


COMPASS SKETCH OF THE BATTLE OF IMBEMBESI,

NOVEMBER 1st, 1893.

Prepared by
Major SIR JOHN WILLOUGHBY, Bart.,

KEY TO PLAN

- A = Salisbury Laager with wide gaps and unbushed.
- B = Victoria Laager partially bushed.
- C = Small Native Kraal intended to hold part of the trek oxen.
- D.D. = Unfinished enclosure (thorn) for remainder of trek oxen.
- E = Mud walls of partially destroyed huts occupied by small bodies of the enemy 150 yards distant from Salisbury Laager.
- F.F. = Dead ground, shaded, where the enemy could obtain cover over an area of 200 to 300 yards up to within 150 and 80 yards of Laager.
- G.G. = Enemy's first lines of skirmishers 12.58 p.m.
- H.H. = Enemy charging from bush at 2.15 p.m. to cut off Captain Bastard's Troop, his retreat covered by Shell and Maxim fire at 1,800 yards.
- I = Captain Bastard's Troop in pursuit of routed Insukamini, 2.15 p.m.
- J. = Where Vedette was surprised in the bush and assailed.
- K.K. = Dismounted men of Victoria (100) skirmishing after retreating Umbez 2.15 p.m.
- L.L. = Lines of retreat of the enemy's various regiments.
- M.M. = Position of all the oxen during the latter half of the fight.
- N. = Troop in support of dismounted men skirmishing, but too far distant to afford such if required.
- O. = Vedettes.
- P. = Insukamini skirmishers after the stampeded horses, but too late—1.40 p.m.
- a = Nordenfheldt gun.
- b = Maxim gun.
- c = Gardner gun.
- d = Maxim gun.
- e = 7-pounder gun.
- f = Maxim gun slightly advanced from Laager.
- g = Hotchkiss gun moved forward from Laager.
- h = Maxim gun moved forward from Laager.



KEY TO PLAN

- A Salisbury Langer with wide gap, and unsheltered.
 B Victoria Langer partially bushed.
 C Small Native Krand intended to hold part of the tchazim.
 D.D. Unfinished enclosure (thorn) for remainder of tchazim.
 E Mud walls of partially destroyed huts occupied by small bodies of the enemy 250 yards distant from Salisbury Langer.
 F.F. Dead ground, shaded, where the enemy could obtain cover over an area of 200 to 250 yards up to within 250 and 80 yards of Langer.
 G.G. Enemy's first lines of skirmishers 12.50 p.m.
 H.H. Enemy charging from bush at 2.15 p.m. to cut off Captain Bastard's Troop, his retreat covered by Shell and Maxim fire at 2,500 yards.
 I Captain Bastard's Troop in pursuit of routed Insukaminis, 2.25 p.m.
 J Where Vedette was surprised in the bush and engaged.
 K.K. Dismounted men of Victoria (100) skirmishing after retreating Umbeku 2.15 p.m.
 L.L. Lines of retreat of the enemy's various regiments.
 M.M. Position of all the men during the latter half of the fight.
 N Troop in support of dismounted men skirmishing, but too far distant to afford such support.
 O Vedettes.
 P Insukaminis skirmishers after the stampeded horses, but too late—1.40 p.m.
 a Nordenfeldt gun.
 b Maxim gun.
 c Gardner gun.
 d Maxim gun.
 e 7-pounder gun.
 f Maxim gun slightly advanced from Langer.
 g Hottel's gun moved forward from Langer.
 h Maxim gun moved forward from Langer.
 i Maxim gun moved forward from Langer.
 j 7-pounder gun moved forward from Langer.
 k k Men advanced by Major Wilson to assist in repelling the attack on the Salisbury Langer.

NOTES.

Approximate 30 ft. contours.

Mounted troops.

Vedettes.

Thorn bush.

Dismounted Troops.

Dead ground affording cover for enemy.

Water.


Lines of enemy's retreat.

Route of the two Columns.

Enemy's skirmishers.

A regiment of the enemy.

Points sketched.



over which we had to fire, and the first shell, owing to a bad fuse, exploded nearly over the picket, but without hurting them. The picket had seen the natives, and one of them came in to report them ; just as he arrived we saw the whole edge of the bush, about 500 yards away, alive with natives coming towards us ; the alarm sounded at once, the laagers were manned, and the fight began. The attack was entirely on the right face of our laager, and owing to the position of the laagers the Victoria Column saw little of the main attack. The natives had intended to surround us, and those we had seen on the left front were to have come round on that side, but were stopped by the shells, and some others tried in the same way to get round the right, but were driven back by one of the Victoria Column Maxims. The horses and oxen had been sent for immediately the alarm sounded, and the horses were driven up when the fight was at its hottest ; just as they reached the laagers some "boys" ran out to turn the horses in and stampeded them, they went off at a gallop up the hollow towards the enemy, and it looked as if we were going to lose them all, but Sir J. Willoughby, Captain Borrow, and Trooper Neale, the latter of whom was on horse-guard and endeavouring to intercept them, dashed forward on horse-back ; these were followed by Captain Donovan, Mr. Bowen, Corporal Fife-Scott, Lieut. P. H. Browne, and several others, who jumped on some horses that were in the laager ; the stampeding horses were turned when within a hundred yards of the enemy, but not before both they and the relief party were exposed to a very heavy fire which, however, only killed one horse.

There was a mounted picket of three men just at the edge of the bush, and one of them had come in to get his dinner. The other two, White and Thompson, were sitting under a bush not looking out at all, with their horses grazing a short distance from them, when the Matabeli came on and were on them before they saw them. Thompson failed to catch his horse, and then tried to climb a tree, but was pulled down and stabbed ; White caught his and mounted, but fell off on his way into camp and then ran on beside his horse, he luckily kept away to his left, and so cleared our front and enabled the fire from the laager to cover him. Corporal Whittaker, who had charge of the Gardner at the right rear, worked it with great accuracy and coolness, and managed to stop

the natives immediately in rear of White, and so let him get to the laager, which he did, falling down from exhaustion when he arrived. It was entirely owing to their own carelessness that they had been surprised, as although there were small patches of bush that were very thick, they could get a good view for 500 or 600 yards, and would have been quite safe if they had been keeping a proper look out. Meanwhile the enemy had been coming on in great numbers ; their fire was very hot, luckily for us it was high, and for ten minutes or so I thought it quite as hot as ours ; we had a Maxim, a Gardner, and the Nordenfelt gun firing all the time, besides about 150 rifles. The main attack was on our right, and although the natives came on very well to within about 300 yards and held their own there, they could not get closer and were at last forced to retire.

There were three half-built huts about 100 yards to the left front of the face, and a slight depression in the ground enabled five of the enemy to crawl up to them under cover ; they began to shoot rather straight, and were not dislodged for some time, but at last three of them retired, one badly wounded, leaving two dead there. While the main attack was being conducted on our right face, several attempts were made to get round us, but in each case were stopped by the Maxims, and none of the enemy except those in the main attack appeared to care about leaving the bush. The fight lasted about forty minutes and then the enemy retired, but did so in a sulky sort of way, not hurrying or taking cover, but walking quietly back until they were out of sight.



As they still kept up a desultory fire at a long range, I sent out 100 of the Victoria dismounted men, under Captain Delamore and Lieutenant Stier, to clear them out of the bush, and sent Captain Borrow with B Troop to support them and to prevent any attempt that might be made to cut them off from the laager ; I also sent Captain Bastard with his Troop to try and cut off some of the enemy that had been seen going down the valley behind the next ridge to the one on which we were. Captain Bastard got too near the bush, and a large force ran out from the left to try and intercept him ; but several shells from the seven-pounder, and a very well-aimed discharge from Lieutenant Biscoe's Maxim at 1,800 yards, turned the enemy back into the bush. Meanwhile the dismounted men advanced very steadily in skirmishing

order into the bush; they were opposed to a hot fire at first, but luckily no one was hit, and they gradually drove the enemy back in front of them, and after advancing about 500 yards into the bush found that they had all retired and returned to their laager, being greeted with a cheer by the Salisbury Column as they passed. This was the end of the Imbembesi fight.

As soon as the dismounted men had gone forward, I sent out some of the Native Contingent to bring in some wounded, from whom we could find out what the force had consisted of. The first one brought in was a pure Matabeli—one of the Imbezu regiment; although he must have been in great agony—his left leg being shattered by a shell—

he burst out laughing brought into "Fancy the Imbezu lot of boys!" He was to say much, and but from other that the force was attacked us at the addition of the Im-

N'Gobo regiments; and several kraals, including Godhiwayo, Umsingweni, and Umswanansi. The Imbezu and Ingubu were the two best regiments in the country, and had only joined the others on the previous evening; they had been waiting for us in the bush on the Imbembesi, and had we gone that way the result might have been very different. They said that when the Insukameni had told the King that they had been beaten at the Shangani, the Imbezu and Ingubu had laughed at them, saying that



THE PICKET
SURPRISED
BY THE
MATABELI.

ing when he the laager, and said, being beaten by a too badly wounded died shortly after; wounded we found the same that had Shangani, with the bezu, Ingubu, and the

it was ridiculous that they, the crack regiments, should have to be sent to beat us, and told the King that they would not have to fight, but would walk into the laagers, leading us out on the other side, killing the elder men and keeping the rest for slaves. The King had given the Imbezu regiment 100 M.H. rifles and 10,000 rounds of ammunition, and another 10,000 rounds had been distributed among the rest of the force on the previous evening. They had had orders to attack us on the march, but said that they could never find an opportunity when we

were not ready; they all admitted that they were thoroughly beaten, although they could not understand how it should be so, and we found out afterwards that the Imbezu who led the attack must have lost in dead and wounded nearly 500 out of a total of 700 men. Our casualties, considering the very heavy fire of which we had the brunt, were very slight.

Trooper Thompson, as already stated, was killed on picket, and Troopers Cary and Siebert were shot through the head, and never regained consciousness, although they lived to the following night; Trooper Barnard was shot through the knee, and Trooper Crewe through the right leg; Trooper Calcraft through the back, and Captain


Moberley and Trooper Mack were each

grazed the former on the side and the latter on the head; Driver William Brown was also shot in the

hand and a Coolie through the arm; we also lost three horses.

The Victoria Column was protected from the fire, and had no casualty but one horse killed.

There were a large number of the enemy's dead lying on the field, but they had carried away most of them, and during the fight we had seen a number being taken away. The behaviour of all the men was excellent, and although I was continually round the laager I only saw two men who had lost their heads. The machine guns worked



THE INDUNA
OF
THE IMBEZU
REGIMENT
ADVANCING.

splendidly, and to them our success was mainly due ; both Lieutenant Biscoe's Maxim and the Gardner in charge of Corporal Whittaker were outside the laager and under no cover, but were continually in action and were worked with the greatest coolness. At the corner where the Gardner was the enemy's fire was hottest ; Trooper Calcraft was shot while at the gun, but his place was taken at once by Captain Moberley, himself hit by the same bullet, and the gun did not cease firing ; while two men were shot in the waggons immediately behind, and I counted fifteen bullet marks on one of them afterwards.

It was a source of great satisfaction to us to find out what the force had been composed of, and to realise that we had met, and handsomely beaten, practically all that Lobengula could send against us. I wished to send forward 100 men at once to follow up our advantage and seize Buluwayo before the news could reach there, but on consulting Major Wilson, we came to the conclusion that the horses were not in sufficiently good condition to risk it ; for the same reason we could not follow up the natives to any distance. We obtained a considerable number of rifles, some being M.H., and a large amount of ammunition from the enemy ; we found that they had been armed with all sorts of rifles, including four-bore elephant guns, and expresses firing explosive bullets. Our expenditure of ammunition was 8,600 M.H., 25 seven-pounder shells, 30 Hotchkiss, and 570 Gardner.

The following morning I sent out two mounted parties to patrol for a considerable distance through the bush, and on their return, as they stated that the country was clear of natives, although they had found a large number of dead, the two Columns marched. As the country appeared quite open to the Intabas Induna, we struck straight across for it ; each Column was in four columns of waggons, and all the natives marched in between the Salisbury and Victoria Columns. As the country was bare of trees, I made each of the natives carry a thorn bush from the laager, and the sight of the whole Column marching like this was very imposing. We marched at 12 o'clock, but had to make a slight detour to avoid some rocky ground, and it was late in the afternoon when we came to a thick strip of bush, through which we had to go, as the water was on the other side. The


flanking parties were strengthened, and extended through the bush on both sides, the Columns got through safely and laagered in the open on the other side, on the west bank of one of the tributaries of the Koce stream. There were a large number of kraals about, all deserted, and close to us was the Umswanansi kraal, the Induna of which—Malevo—had been at Victoria; we burnt this and all others within reach, and a large quantity of grain. Both Cary and Siebert died at this laager, and were buried the next morning.

We were now about three miles from the Intabas Induna, and saw a large herd of cattle in the bush under the hill in the evening; I tried a few shells from the Victoria Column seven-pounder, but the distance was too great to reach them. The next day, the 3rd, we started at 6 a.m., and crossed the main Koce stream, and shortly after crossing a large force was reported in the bush, about Intabas Induna; I therefore laagered up and sent Captain Spreckley with his Troop to try and draw them on; this they were unable to do, although there was a heavy fire from the bush, and they heard the Indunas trying to get the men to advance; they had no casualties and returned to the laager. As soon as they returned I took out Mr. Biscoe's Maxim to a rise, about 1,000 yards from the bush, and fired a few rounds into the edge of it, and at the same time Captain Lendy put one seven-pounder and several one-pounder shells into it, which effectually dispersed the enemy.

Before starting that morning I had sent Burnham, Ingram, and Posselt on again to see if they could reach Buluwayo; and just as we were crossing the Koce, we saw and

heard a large explosion in the direction of Buluwayo, and shortly afterwards we saw a large column of smoke rising, and soon after we laagered I got a note from Burnham, brought by a native, in which he said he was within sight of and about seven miles from Buluwayo, which had been fired in four places, and that he was going on there.

We marched again at 3 p.m., keeping to the left of the Intabas Induna, to avoid the bush between there and Buluwayo; and close



MESSRS. BURNHAM AND INGRAM,
THE AMERICAN SCOUTS.

to the hill got on to the road from Umhlangeni (Inyati) to Hope Fountain, and followed it for about three miles through open bush, where we got into open country again and laagered on a small stream, a tributary of the Umguzu. Just as the leading waggons were coming in Ingram and Posselt returned, bringing letters from Burnham and Fairbairn; the latter, with Usher, had remained in Buluwayo after the other whites left, and had had a very anxious time since the King had left. They were delighted to see our Scouts, and asked for a few men to be sent on that night to protect them against any stray Matabeli that might still be hanging about. As Captain Borrow was advance guard with his Troop, I sent him off at once with twenty men, and Ingram as a guide, to occupy Buluwayo; and thus, exactly a month after leaving Charter, the main town of Matabeliland was occupied by the British South Africa Company, and the nation was scattered over the country.

There were several small kraals round the laager, from which we got some grain, and in the distance to the south we could see the Inyatini and Umziniyantini military kraals. I gave orders that no kraals were to be burnt now, as we should require all the grain we could get. It was about an hour before sunset when Captain Borrow left, and about half-an-hour afterwards I sent my galloper, Mr. Tanner, after him to tell him not to allow his men to do any looting, and to put sentries over any stores, etc., there might be, until the Columns arrived. Mr. Tanner rode as fast as possible, but failed to catch him, and rode right up and into the burning kraal; Captain Borrow had turned off to Mr. Dawson's store, where Fairbairn and Usher were, and spent the night there. The kraal was lighted up by the fires burning all round, and Tanner rode into the centre of it but could see nothing but hundreds of Kaffir dogs running about. It must have been a very eerie sensation, and he escaped from it as quickly as possible, and luckily found his way back to the laagers, being helped by the rockets that I sent up as usual.


The following morning we marched at 6 a.m., and after going three miles through old lands came to the Umguzu River, which we had some trouble in crossing; there was not much water in it, but the banks were steep and had to be cut away; it is said to be full of crocodiles, which Lobengula always preserved. I had hoped to have made Buluwayo in

one trek, but it was too far, and we had to laager soon after crossing the river; the country all about was covered with low thorn bush, with no grass except close to the river. Dr. Jameson and Sir J. Willoughby rode on to Buluwayo when we halted. We marched again at 12 o'clock, and after crossing two small streams, over the first of which we had to make drifts, arrived at Mr. Colenbrander's house at 2 p.m. The kraal of Buluwayo (which was still burning) was on the rising ground across the stream about 1,000 yards away, and the bush had all been cleared for some distance round. There were several houses and huts in Mr. Colenbrander's compound which would be very useful for hospital and store purposes, and so we laagered up there, the Salisbury laager taking the north-west corner of the compound and forming up so as to flank the north and west sides of it, and the Victoria laager taking the opposite corner. We found that the Matabeli had not interfered in any way with the houses belonging to white men, although by the King's orders they had burnt down Buluwayo and all the other royal kraals.

Buluwayo itself consisted of a large ring about 100 yards wide of kraals, enclosing an open space of

about 700 yards

in diameter, and in the centre of this were the King's own buildings; they consisted of two large brick houses, one being the King's living house and the other the waggon house; a large group of huts belonging to the queens, and a cattle and goat kraal. All these were entirely destroyed, partly by fire and partly by the explosion. The explosion had consisted of 80,000 rounds M.H. ammunition and about



RUINS OF LOBENGULA'S STOREHOUSES
AT BULUWAYO.

The kraal and the surrounding stockade were burnt down, and a large store of ivory, etc., destroyed.

2,000 pounds powder, which had been left by Lobengula in charge of Fairbairn when he left Buluwayo; and he had given orders to the men remaining there, that if the nation was beaten at Imbembesi they were to set fire to the kraal and follow him, carrying the ammunition and powder, but so great was the panic that they would not wait to pick it up, but set fire to the kraal and left. All this time we had heard nothing definite of the Southern Column beyond the fact that Gambo, the Chief of the Ikapa people, had been sent by the King to stop their advance. Gambo, although a son-in-law of Lobengula's, had always been antagonistic to and was not trusted by him, and although the former had 3,000 to 4,000 men, the King had only given him ten M.H. rifles and 1,000 rounds of ammunition, and Dr. Jameson thought it quite possible that, instead of attacking Colonel Goold-Adams' Column, he would join them. We had heard a report that they had attacked the Column, had killed a number of white men and had burnt some waggons, but this had not been confirmed.

As Dr. Jameson wished the news of the occupation of Buluwayo to get to Mr. Rhodes as quickly as possible, Burnham, Ingram, and a Zulu boy who knew the road, started off that evening for Tati—distance 120 miles—where they expected to find a telegraph station. It was a risky ride, as we knew that Gambo's impi was probably on the road somewhere, but Burnham had done a great deal of scouting among the Indians, and could be depended upon to get through if it were possible for anyone to do so; they got through safely, although they only just missed Gambo's impi, and rode for about a mile through the fires, which were still burning. On arrival at Tati they found the telegraph had not reached there, and that the heliograph communication which had been established with Palapye could not be depended upon owing to cloudy weather, Burnham consequently went on to Palapye, he did the whole distance, 210 miles, in four days, and the news of the breaking of the Matabeli power and the occupation of Buluwayo was published in the English papers of November 10th.

I had issued orders that no one was to go into Buluwayo until I had been there myself to see if it was safe (as the fire was still burning and there had been several small explosions where powder had been left in

the huts), and on the following morning I rode up with Dr. Jameson ; we found everything in the King's block of buildings entirely destroyed, a large number of cartridges of all sorts lying about, mixed up with bits of old rifles, loading machines, and beads fused by the heat. Lobengula had had presents of rifles made him by different hunters, and amongst others there were the remains of one double-barrelled rifle with one barrel above the other instead of side by side as is usual. There was nothing of value visible, although several curiosities, including the silver elephant given to Lobengula by the Tati Company, were picked up afterwards among the ruins ; but there was a considerable amount of grain, of which we got about 600 bags, and this we wanted badly.

This being Sunday, the Bishop held a voluntary service which was largely attended, in the afternoon, in Mr. Dawson's compound. On Dr. Jameson's arrival in Buluwayo the previous day, he had sent out to Usher's farm—about fourteen miles away—to try and find a Matabeli boy who was working for Usher, and who he thought would be willing to take a message to the King. As the boy did not come in, Usher went out himself to look for him ; he did not find him but returned about dark and reported that he had seen an impi 500 or 600 strong about six miles out, that several of the large chiefs from round Buluwayo were with it, and that it had been part of Gambo's force. As it was important these men should be prevented if possible from getting to the King, Major Wilson went out before daylight the following morning, with sixty men and one Maxim, to try and find them ; but although they went a large round could not do so, and returned in the afternoon. On the same morning Calcraft, who had been wounded at Imbembesi, died, and was buried that evening ; Rixon, of the Victoria Column, had died the previous day of fever. I had sent a message by Burnham to any transport riders who might be on the Tati road to push on as fast as possible, as we were getting short of supplies.

Dr. Jameson had arranged for 80,000 pounds of meal to be waiting at Tati, and to be ready to come in as soon as he sent for it ; he sent for it by Burnham but it had not arrived at Tati, and did not till some time later. As the Victoria Column was better off for supplies than we

were, all that both Columns had were put into one of Mr. Colenbrander's houses, and Captain Greenfield took charge of them, issuing them as required. The following day (Tuesday, 7th) two Makalakas arrived bringing a letter from Colonel Goold-Adams, who was then at Mangwe—sixty miles away—and the same afternoon Johan Colenbrander, Armstrong, and Mullins also came in, having ridden through from Palapye with despatches for Dr. Jameson. They stated that Colonel Goold-Adams' Column had kept too far to the west in trying to avoid the range of hills through which the main road ran, had run short of water and grass, and had had to come back to the main road, that they had been attacked by Gambo and had lost two white men killed, besides some natives, and Mr. Selous had been slightly wounded, that they were coming on, but very slowly, as their oxen were done up; they also said that Khama had turned back with all his men. Colonel Goold-Adams said he had sent Captain Raaf and 100 men forward, and we heard from Colenbrander that they ought to be on the Kami River, twelve miles out, that night. As our oxen had had a little rest, we sent ten span off to them at once in charge of Captain Judd, who was to hand them over to Captain Raaf at the Kami, or wherever he met him, and Dr. Jameson sent orders to Captain Raaf to return with them to Colonel Goold-Adams. The reason for sending Captain Raaf back was that we could spare no food for his men, and did not want them before their waggons could get in. I had been trying since our arrival to get some natives to take a letter to the King, who was said to be about thirty miles to the north of Buluwayo, in the bush near Shiloh, and that morning three Colonial "boys," John Grootboom, a very plucky boy, Samuel, and Wilhelm volunteered to go. Dr. Jameson gave them a letter written in English, Dutch, and Zulu, to Lobengula, telling him we had occupied Buluwayo, that the nation was beaten, and that he wished to avoid further bloodshed, asking him to come in and see him, guaranteeing his safety. It was a dangerous mission, as although they would be safe if they got to the King, there was a great chance of their being killed before arriving there. Dr. Jameson also said he would give the King two days (I think) after the return of the messengers to enable him to come in, or if he did not by then he would send after him.

The following day (8th) he sent two Zambesi boys as spies to see what they could find out; and during the day Captain Heyman, who had been Acting S.O. to Colonel Goold-Adams, came in from the other Column.

Nothing of interest occurred on the next day except that I sent out Mr. Brabant with some natives to catch the King's peacocks, which were at the Ingugeni kraal about three miles off, and which we did not want to have destroyed; they brought in I think eight. The following day the two Zambesi boys returned, and reported that they had been right amongst the Matabeli, who according to their account were extended across the country about thirty to forty miles north of Buluwayo, protecting the King, who was said to be at the Intaba-gi-konga, a small hill in thick bush at the junction of the Imbembesi and Inquequesi, about fifty miles from Buluwayo. They said there were a very large number of natives there, in three large camps at Shiloh, on the Imbembesi, and at Umhlangeni, but they were all much cowed. As an instance they said they had walked about amongst the Imbezu and talked to them, they themselves pretending to be looking for some of their people who had left their kraals, and the Imbezu had been quite civil, whereas previously no Zambesi natives had dared to go near or speak to an Imbezu.

The mounted messengers should, we calculated, have been back before this, and we were afraid they had been killed, and Dr. Jameson arranged that I should start off the following day with 200 of the Salisbury and Victoria Columns to try and get the King; but after arrangements were made he found there was such a strong feeling against it on account of the danger that he countermanded it. The following day (9th) the three messengers returned, bringing a letter written by John Jacobs, a Colonial "boy" who had accompanied the King; the letter was written in English, and said that the King had received the Doctor's letter and read it, and "so I will come." He asked where he was to live, as all his houses had been burnt, and ended by asking for writing paper, pens, and ink. The messengers said they had gone to Shiloh, where they were taken prisoners and handed over to the Imbezu to be looked after, that the letter had been taken from them and sent to the King, that there was a very large impi there,

but they were kept close prisoners and did not see much that was going on ; Grootboom had had some conversation with Umjan, the chief of the Imbezu, whom he had known when he was in Matabeliland before as driver to Mr. Helm, and who had rebuked him for joining us. They understood that the nation as a rule did not wish to fight any more, the Imbezu and Ingubu being especially averse to it, but that some of the young men of the Insukameni, Ihlati, and Sesiba were still anxious to fight, but wished us to come into the bush, leaving the waggons, Maxims, and seven-pounders behind. They appeared to have a great horror of the Maxims and shell guns and also of the rockets, which they looked upon as white man's medicine. They confirmed the death of Captain Williams, and saw a compass and a chain which he used to wear, there was no question of his identification, as they described the paintings (tattooing) on his arms and legs ; they also said that the Matabeli had lost very heavily at both the fights, and that Gambo and his impi had not rejoined the King, and it was not known where they were.

The following day, Sunday, 12th November, we had a church parade for the whole Force at which the Bishop officiated, and in the evening Colonel Goold-Adams rode in from the Kami River, where he had left his Column. On Monday we sent back despatches to Salisbury ; Trooper Savile of A Troop wished to go back and Dr. Jameson sent Major Browne, who had nothing to do, with him ; Lieutenant Snodgrass also asked, and was allowed to go. Some supply waggons had been sent by Mr. Duncan to Charter, and were to start from there a fortnight after we had left, and we had expected to hear of them before this. As it was important that we should know where they were, I sent Troopers Taylor and Ribstock back with Major Browne, giving the latter distinct orders that they were to return whenever they met the waggons ; Major Browne however, for some reason of his own ignored these orders and took them on to Salisbury. Colonel Goold-Adams was sending despatch riders back to Tati that afternoon, and Mr. G. Paget, who wished to return to England, asked permission to accompany them ; the Bishop also had pressing business somewhere else, and I gave him a horse to go with them. The road was absolutely open, as the Bechuanaland Border Police had

marched up to it, seeing no one after their fight, and waggons were already beginning to come in. On arriving at Buluwayo I found that Mr. Dawson had a few tinned things in his store, which I took over on the Company's account for the Hospital, and as the Victoria Column had brought a fair supply, the patients did pretty well. All the wounded were doing very well except my brother, whose arm had become troublesome; the doctors had thought at first the bone was not damaged, but it appeared afterwards that the joint was broken, and he had to undergo two operations to take out loose pieces of bone.



A GROUP OF CAMP "BOYS."

CHAPTER X.

THE PURSUIT OF THE KING.

BY MAJOR P. W. FORBES.

Preparations for attacking Umhlangeni—The royal kraals deserted—News of the king on the Bubyé river—Messengers sent to Lobengula and the Imbezu—Captain Raaf objects to advance—A consultation—The patrol to retire to Umhlangeni—Imbezu cattle captured by our Mashonas, driven off by the Matabeli, and again recaptured—Further messages sent to the king—Heavy rain storms—Retire to Shiloh—Arrival of reinforcements—The second advance—Lobengula's message to Dr. Jameson—Dividing the force—Following the king's spoor—The Matabeli tired of fighting—Finding the king's bath chair and two waggons.

As the King's two days' grace had now elapsed, and there were no signs of his coming in, Dr. Jameson decided that we should follow him, and arranged with Colonel Goold-Adams—who was returning to his camp on the Kami that day—that he should send on 150 men under Captain Raaf with two Maxims and a seven-pounder gun, drawn by ten mules. These arrived the next morning, and consisted of ninety Bechuanaland Border Police, with two Maxims and the seven-pounder under Captain Coventry, and sixty of the Tuli Column, the whole under Captain Raaf. Although Captain Coventry, as Captain in an Imperial force, was senior to Captain Raaf, he had had but little experience in native fighting, and so Captain Raaf was placed by Colonel Goold-Adams in command. It had been decided that it would be better to attack the impi which we heard was at Umhlangeni, as it was the largest and the country was said to be fairly open, whereas about Shiloh and the Imbembesi the bush was very thick, and it was hoped that if we could disperse this impi it might induce the King to come in, which was most necessary. Although the nation had been beaten and a large number of natives wished to submit, they would do nothing so long as the King remained at large and in the country, and he had therefore either to be captured or driven out of it.

Umhlangeni was about forty miles from Buluwayo, and it was decided to start after dark that night and go as far as possible, remain in the bush the following day, and go on at night so as to reach Umhlangeni and attack at daylight ; and accordingly I started at 7.30 with the following :—Salisbury Column, ninety, with Captains Heany and Spreckley, and one mule Maxim under Lieutenant Biscoe ; Victoria Column, sixty, under Major Wilson,


with a horse Maxim under Captain Lendy ; Tuli Column, sixty, under Captain Hon. C. J. Coventry ; and Bechuanaland Border Police,

ninety, the two latter under Captain Raaf, with two horse Maxims and one mule seven-pounder in charge of Captain Tancred.

We took three days' food carried by natives, and each man carried 100 rounds of ammunition.

Lieutenant Brabant brought about 200 of his natives as carriers, and to drive cattle if we captured any. We marched till one o'clock and then halted on the Koce River, about two miles beyond the Intabas

Induna, having done fourteen miles all the way through fairly thick bush ; we formed up in a square, the Salisbury and Victoria Columns taking the front and right faces, and the Tuli and Bechuanaland Border Police the left and rear, a Maxim being at each corner and the seven-pounder on one face. Our horses were not very first class, and I thought it better to go on earlier than I



HOISTING THE BRITISH FLAG AT BULUWAYO.

had intended in order to save them, we therefore moved on at one o'clock; just before we marched Sir J. Willoughby and Mr. Murray Gourlay came up. We went on about eight miles, about three of which were through very dense bush, and came to the Elebeni kopjes, and in them, just beside the road, the kraal of that name. This was a royal kraal, but a small one, it was quite deserted, and the queens' huts—there were three queens living there—were the best I saw in the country; the kraal was full of grain, mostly mabele (Kaffir corn), but there was also a large amount of mealies here. We dismounted for half an hour and gave the horses a good feed; I climbed on to the top of one of the huts with Mr. Colenbrander, and got a very good view of the country round, he showed me the Umhlangeni Hill and where Shiloh lay. After feeding the horses we went on and halted just at dark about two miles short of the Imbembesi; we passed the site of the old Induba kraal, and saw the new one about 1,000 yards to our left, but no natives. We had a heavy shower during the afternoon, and it was a very nasty squally night and very dark till the moon rose about ten o'clock; we had formed up as on the previous night, except that we had a double line of men on each face, and so reducing the size of the laager. At 11 p.m. we moved on again, crossing the Imbembesi at a wide sandy drift, then quite dry, and getting to the Inkwekwesi River about 3.30. We made a slight detour just before getting there to avoid a kraal of Malabama's that is on the road, and where we heard dogs barking and smelt fires; crossing that river we formed up on the north side to wait till it was light enough to attack.

I arranged that Major Wilson with 145 men and two Maxims should advance to the right of the position where the natives were said to be, and Captain Raaf with his force to the left, Captain Heany with forty-five men and the seven-pounder advancing along the road where it was open, Messrs. Acutt and Colenbrander guiding the two columns. It was a very convenient position to attack, and the dispositions were very well carried out, but no impi was there, nor had there been one; there were a few natives living with their wives and cattle along the edge of the bush, and they after firing a few shots ran away. We killed ten or eleven men, took some women and children prisoners, and about 1,000 head of cattle. From the women we heard that the King

had left Intaba-gi-konga and was on the Buby river, the sources of which were about ten miles to the north of Umhlangeni, that he had four waggons with him, but the oxen were knocked up and they were being pulled by natives, and that he had very few people with him, as they were all sick of fighting; they also said they had no idea that we were coming until they actually saw us there. On hearing that the King was quite close, and as far as I could learn in fairly open country, I determined to wait till dark and then push on after him. We took possession of one of the two Mission Stations belonging to Messrs. Reiss and Eliot at Umhlangeni, both comfortably built, brick houses, thatched, standing in compounds, they had been completely gutted by the natives, everything breakable having been broken to pieces; there was also a large dam built by Mr. Reiss, and round this there was excellent grass.

I had intended to go on that night, but in the evening Captain Raaf persuaded me that it would be better to send scouts out first, to find out whether the King had really left Intaba-gi-konga or not, and although I did not wish to waste any time, as the King might be travelling on all the time, I gave in to him. I sent Burnham and Ingram to Intaba-gi-konga after dark with a native guide, and two of Captain Raaf's men to the Buby, and we remained at Umhlangeni; each of these parties returned soon after daylight. Burnham reported that there were people living about the hill, but he had gone carefully round it, and there were no signs of the King's waggon spoor; he had seen a few natives, but they had all run away, and a great lot of cattle. The other party reported that they had gone about eleven miles to the Buby, and had seen a few natives, but no sign of the King's spoor, and had brought back as a prisoner a native that they had caught in a kraal on the Buby. On their way back they had seen some natives and called to them to stand, but on their running away they had fired on them and killed one.

During the night a native had come in with a flag of truce, extemporised by himself, consisting of a bit of calico tied on a stick, and explained that he had been left by Mr. Eliot in charge of his station, but he had been powerless to prevent the natives looting it, which they did on their return from the Imbembesi fight; he, Makasa, had

been with the impi there, and gave a graphic account of what had happened. He corroborated what the women had said about the King, and this was further corroborated by a prisoner who was brought in the next morning. As all the information went to show that the King was on the Buby, I sent runners to Buluwayo to tell Dr. Jameson what I was going to do, and moved off that night at dark with 200 men, leaving Captain Fitzgerald in charge at Umhlangeni with eighty men, the seven-pounder, and one Maxim (that of the Salisbury Column), with mules. The bush was very thick for the first three miles, and it was too dark to have flankers out, but we marched in two columns, keeping as close together as possible, and having two Maxims in front and one at the rear of the Column. I had sent a patrol out shortly before dark to see that the country through the bush was clear. We followed the main Mashonaland road for about three miles, and then turned off to the left, getting into open country and going due north; we went on till 11 o'clock, and then, having done about ten miles, took possession of an empty kraal and remained till daylight.

We had by now finished all the food that we had brought from Buluwayo, but had plenty of slaughter oxen, and there was a small amount of Kaffir corn in the kraals; we moved on at daylight, and after going about four miles came to the Buby, a series of large pools of water. Just as we got there we saw a large troop of cattle being driven into the bush, about 1,000 yards away, and I told Captain Raaf to send after them; he sent Captain Francis and about twelve men. This was one of the senior officers that Captain Raaf had with him, and he had been specially pointed out to me in Buluwayo as a good fighting man; knowing, however, a good deal about his previous military experiences in Natal, I thought that probably he was not as much to be relied on as was said, and I afterwards proved quite right.

Just after Francis had started off I saw Raaf, who was riding about fifty yards to my left, start off full gallop, followed by his "staff," which always accompanied him. Captain Raaf had a wonderful pony that he rode right through this patrol, and although small it was very strongly built and always kept its condition. We saw them all start off, and then saw that their object was a native who had been crossing the open but had suddenly seen us and commenced to run. It was an

exciting hunt, and he had nearly reached the bush when he was caught and brought back in triumph by Captain Raaf.


As soon as we reached the Bubyé we formed up and let the horses go for a short time ; Captain Francis brought back a large number of cattle and some prisoners, and some more prisoners were brought in by the flanking parties. All the men brought in were interrogated separately and their information was all practically the same ; that the King had struck the Bubyé River about twenty miles lower down, and was going down it intending to cross when he had got far enough to be within a day's journey of the Shangani ; that he had not a large force actually with him, but a very large

number of men, women, and children were following him with their cattle. One of them said he had left the Imbezu Regiment that morning, and they and the Ingubu were following the King and would arrive at the Bubyé that night ; he said they did not wish to fight, but would not give themselves up without orders from the King.

There were several kraals close by, and we moved up to one of them, where we found a quantity of grain, and remained there until the

evening ; we heard from the prisoners that

five of Lobengula's queens had slept at the kraal the night before, and had only left as we came up. From this kraal I sent off some of the prisoners as messengers ; three to Lobengula and two to the Imbezu, telling the King I was going to follow him wherever he went if he did not come in, but that I wished to avoid killing any more of his people, and would not fire on any of them until I got his answer ; I also guaranteed his safety. To the Imbezu I sent to say that I had heard



MR. HARRY WARE IN
COMMAND OF THE PIONEERS
AND ROAD PARTY.

they did not wish to fight, and we did not wish to either, but intended to catch the King if we had to follow him across the Zambesi; I told them my reason for following him was that he had broken his word to us, having sent to say he was coming and then having run away; I also told them that if they came in and gave themselves up they would be allowed to return quietly to their kraals.

I had intended to have gone on down the river that afternoon, but Captain Raaf again persuaded me to wait until we could send out scouts to report what was in front of us. I was very much against waiting, but had to give in to him, as I feared that if I moved after what he had said he would unsettle all his men to such an extent, by talking about the difficulties of the matter, that their *morale* might suffer; I was therefore compelled to remain there for the night, moving out into the open to laager just before dark. The following morning (19th) I sent Burnham and Armstrong down the river at daylight, and soon after they had gone I heard that there was great dissatisfaction in the force about going any further. We had now reached the last kraals to the north, and beyond this there was no certainty of our getting food; I was not told until some time afterwards this agitation had been started among Raaf's men, and that he had actually told them they should go back that day. As I knew if the men were taken on against their wish they would not be much good, I called Major Wilson and Captain Raaf, and we discussed the whole question. Captain Raaf pointed out that it was a very dangerous mission we were on with what he called a handful of men, no reserve ammunition and no means of carrying the wounded. As he had originally proposed to come in and take the whole country on precisely these lines, I was rather surprised at his saying this; he did not tell me his men had raised any objection to going on, nor that he had told them they should not. We then decided we should have a parade of each corps at a certain time, and without letting anyone know beforehand what it was for to ask them if they were willing to go or not. As the Company was unable to fulfil their side of the contract with the men, namely, give them rations, I thought it only fair to give them a choice. I impressed upon both Major Wilson and Captain Raaf that

nothing was to be said to anyone until they were on parade, and then they were only to be asked whether they would go on or not, and no pressure of any sort was to be brought to bear either way. While we were talking Burnham and Armstrong returned, and reported that they had been about six miles down the river, and had seen a large number of natives and cattle, all travelling east, that they had crossed a spoor nearly a mile wide of a very large lot of cattle, which Burnham estimated at not less than 7,000 : this spoor crossed the river, which was full of dead cattle that had been crushed to death, and the pools through which they had been driven were covered with fish trampled to death, that although they had been close to some of the natives they had not been molested in any way, they also said the country was open along the river for five or six miles.

The parade was ordered for eleven o'clock, at which time each corps fell in by itself, I spoke to the Salisbury Column, telling them I could not guarantee food any further, and asked those who wished to return to Buluwayo to step forward. To my astonishment all but seventeen did so, these seventeen included the B Troop men who had come as escort to the A Troop Maxim, and nine from A and C Troops ; I asked these seventeen if they were ready to come with me wherever we might have to go to catch the King, and they said they were. I then went to Captain Raaf and asked him about his men, and he said that only four would go on ; Major Wilson told me all his men wished to go on, but as I knew some of them had been the first to talk about the danger, and feared that owing to some misapprehension pressure must have been brought to bear upon them, I said to Captain Raaf, "As your men want to go back, you will have to go with them," to which he replied, "But I can't go back, I am a soldier, and besides, I have the Bechuanaland Border Police." They being Imperial Troops had of course not been consulted. Directly afterwards some officers of the Salisbury Column came to me and protested very much against the way in which, as they said, their men had been humbugged into refusing to go on, they said they had been told nothing about it, whereas Major Wilson they believed had. I repeated to them what the arrangement had been, and that I had purposely not told them as I did not wish them to influence their men ; they understood me to mean influence them to go

back, whereas I intended exactly the opposite, knowing^a as I did that they would not have allowed a single man to decline to go on. I did not know until long afterwards that they had misunderstood me in this way, but the result of it was to make them and all their men very bitter against me; I told them I should take the force back, and wrote to Dr. Jameson telling him what had happened, stating that I should be at Umlhlangeni the following night, and asked him to send instructions and some food there. I decided to wait there that night and return the next day. That afternoon two natives gave themselves up to one of the pickets and were brought to the laager—they proved to be an Imbezu and his slave, the Imbezu told me that the messengers I had sent out the previous day had come to the impi and delivered my message, that they, the impi, were not satisfied of the genuineness of it, and had sent him to see if it was all right, and that a number of them were awaiting his return in the bush. Previous to this some of our natives had gone out on a raiding expedition by themselves, and had found a large troop of cattle belonging to the Imbezu; these had been brought in, and were then grazing about 1,000 yards from the laager in the open, but close to the edge of the bush. While I was talking to him we were sitting on an ant-heap about 100 yards from the laager, the “alarm” sounded and we all started up, we saw our native cattle guards running to the laager and all the cattle being driven into the bush by Matabeli, although all the Matabeli had rifles they did not fire at the cattle guards. The horses were all got in at once and the laager manned, and I told Captain Raaf to send some men out to bring back the cattle, I also told Major Wilson to send a party out. Captain Raaf sent out Captains Francis and Phipps, and Major Wilson sent Captain Judd, and they returned shortly afterwards with the cattle, having killed eleven or twelve men who were driving them. Several of the officers were for having the Imbezu that had come in shot as well, saying he was a spy, etc., and his statements were all untrue, I would not allow him to be molested in any way, as I believed then and do still, that his statement was quite correct, and that the Imbezu had been waiting for his report, but the sight of their cattle close to them, only guarded by a few Mashonas, was too much for them, anyhow I kept him a close prisoner in the laager. After this

attempt I thought it would look as if we were afraid if we went back at once, and so decided to go a few miles further down the river the next day, returning the same afternoon. I knew that the socket signals had frightened the natives a great deal when I had sent any up, and as it seemed we were not going to succeed by direct means in catching the King, I thought it worth while trying indirect, and by frightening them and working on their superstitious fears, do what we could not by force. I therefore got Burnham and another to ride down the river again in the dark to where he had seen the natives in the morning, and there let off two socket signals right among them ; they cause a very loud report when exploding and leaving the socket, and another when the bursting charge goes off at a great height in the air, dropping a shower of stars. Burnham did this most successfully, getting close to where a large number of natives were encamped, and as he said frightened them for "quite a bit" ; he and his companion then set fire to two kraals from which they were hurrying in their fright, and altogether caused a considerable panic. ✎


The following morning I sent back eight men who were sick, and all the cattle we had captured—amounting to 400 or 500—to Umhlangeni, and Mr. Tanner, who had fever, went with them ; we then went about six miles down the river, seeing no natives, but abundant traces of a large number having been there lately, and came to the end of the open country and laagered near the river, with bush close to us all round. Just after we laagered the "alarm" sounded, everything was got ready at once, and I went to Captain Raaf, who had had it sounded, to find out what had happened, he told me the alarm was a false one, but as he had seen a man galloping towards the laager, he thought we were going to be attacked, this was one of his flankers who was rejoining the force unnecessarily fast. I told him I would not have the alarm sounded by anyone but myself if I was present, as it only helped to upset the men's nerves. While we were laagered here four natives were seen stalking one of the pickets, and one of them fired at the picket, they were in turn fired on and three of them killed. We saw a few natives moving about in the distance, and I think there were probably many more in the bush round us. Before leaving there I sent away all the prisoners (about ten)

that we had, telling them that although we were turning back we were not going to give up the chase of the King, but were only going back for more men and food, and then going to resume it. I also told them that columns would be sent down the Gwailo to the east and Guay to the west to cut him off, and that he must be taken somewhere ; I told off two of them to take this message to the King.

We started back at two o'clock, and at starting I sent Captain Francis out to the right to some kraals belonging to a son of Kisi, a big Induna, which were said to be about four miles off our road, to destroy them, Major Wilson going out on the left to destroy any kraals he could find ; Captain Francis did not get to these kraals, but burnt some others, and Major Wilson burnt a large number on his side. We moved back to our laager of the previous day, seeing no natives on the way, but capturing a small lot of cattle. The next morning I sent Captain Francis out again to Kisi, Captain Coventry and twenty-five Bechuanaland Border Police going with him ; after burning these kraals they were to get across to the Inkwekwesi valley and destroy kraals up it, rejoining me at Umhlangeni ; Captain Heany went out with twenty men to the east to do the same thing. Captain Coventry burnt a large number of kraals and took some cattle, but lost them again in the bush. Captain Heany got very bad with fever soon after going out and had to take his party into Umhlangeni, but previous to this burnt eight kraals. We moved to the first water above, five miles, off-saddled for a few hours and then went into Umhlangeni.

While off-saddled I got a letter from Dr. Jameson in reply to mine, saying that he had consulted with Colonel Goold-Adams, and was sending Captain Napier with a large reinforcement of dismounted men with waggons, more ammunition, and what food he could spare, to Shiloh, and that he wished me to go on there direct from Umhlangeni, get on to the King's spoor there, and follow it right up. He also said that Captain Borrow had left for Shiloh with sixteen mounted men and some carriers with two days' food to last until the waggons' arrival ; he was sending John Jacobs, the King's clerk, to show us the way—John Jacobs had left Buluwayo with the King, but had escaped from him near the Imbembesi. The following morning Captain Borrow and his men arrived, having been to Shiloh and then come on ; he reported the country

quite deserted about Shiloh and along the road. We remained there that day to rest the horses, and had some heavy rain, the first of the season, although we had had slight showers before; in the evening Sir J. Willoughby rode into Buluwayo. Captain Borrow told me that everything was quiet round Buluwayo, and that a great number of the chiefs were giving themselves up, but that many were still waiting to see what the King was going to do. The next day, 23rd November, I sent all the captured cattle, about 1,600, in charge of Mr. Brabant's natives to Buluwayo and started at day-on the west bank of the Imbembesi for four hours, and in crossing the river Mr. Biscoe's Maxim broke its disselboom, and a new one had to be put in. We went on in the afternoon and had two of the heaviest rain storms experienced; the first one was short, but the second lasted until we got into Shiloh, which was shortly before dark. I was at the head of the Column and when the rain was at its worst Captain Raaf halted his men, who were in rear, without my knowing it, and the Column got separated. Shiloh is a deserted mission station situated in a hollow with high ground all round it, and the rain was so heavy that it covered all the ground some inches deep, and caused us to lose the road, and we had some trouble in getting down to the station; we got down at last however, thoroughly wet through and miserable, and found that Captain Napier had just arrived with the waggons and food, a few mounted, and 200 dismounted men. He had brought a small quantity of brandy, there was just enough to give everyone a small tot and small as it was it cheered us all up.



RELIEF WAGGONS ON THE
WAY TO SHILOH.

Captain Napier had laagered his party, and so I formed a separate laager close by, he had brought out ten waggons and spans, but of these only five were fit to go on. It rained heavily during the night, and it was impossible to go on, the next day I went through the supplies Captain Napier had brought out, and found there were three-quarter rations for 300 men for twelve days, and enough to take the other 280 men back to Buluwayo. I did not wish to take any waggons with me, but I knew that as they were there I should have to, if it was only for a few days, and I decided on taking some dismounted men to send back with them when it had been proved to everyone's satisfaction that it was impossible to take them on. As I have said, I had only rations for 300 men for twelve days, and I therefore made up the 300 as follows: Salisbury Column, Captain Borrow and twenty-two men mounted; Victoria Column, Major Wilson and seventy mounted and one hundred dismounted; Tuli, Captain Raaf and twenty mounted, and Bechuanaland Border Police, Captain Coventry and seventy-eight mounted, I took four waggons, four Maxims—two galloping and two on waggons—and the Hotchkiss which had come out with Captain Napier. As Mr. Tanner was still suffering from fever I sent him into Buluwayo, and Mr. Murray Gourlay went in with him.

The following morning I started with the force as above, sending all the other men back to Buluwayo, Captain Heany being in charge of the mounted, who were to go straight in, and Captain Bastard of the dismounted, who were to remain with the waggons. I wrote to Dr. Jameson telling him what I was doing, and also that as I only had twelve days' rations, I should go as far as I could, but should be back on the main Mashonaland road at the Shangani by the twelfth day, and asked him to have food there to meet me. I also asked him to send Captains Heany and Spreckley along the main road to the Shangani and down it, to create a diversion in that direction; this he could not do, but sent Captain Spreckley to the Gwai River. Captain Finch had been suffering from toothache, so I persuaded him to go into Buluwayo to have it seen to, and as he was in a very poor state of health I did not think he would come out again, but he did. We got on to the King's waggon spoor at his camp, about one mile from Shiloh, and followed it through thick bush for eight miles, and then laagered on a small stream;


we passed a great number of large scherms where the King and his people had stopped, and found some grain in some of them; we also passed a few kraals, which we burned, but saw no natives. We laagered up as before, but had a waggon at each corner, and the oxen fastened to their trek-tows in a square inside, and inside them again the slaughter cattle. The following morning, just as we were starting, Mr. B. Wilson came out with some brandy for which I had sent for the sick, and a letter from Dr. Jameson still emphasizing the necessity of getting the King, and saying that messengers had been in from him bringing an answer to the message sent by me from down the Bubyee, also saying that he would send food to the Shangani. These messengers said that the King had only been three miles away when we turned back, that he was very sick and almost deserted; the King asked Dr. Jameson to stop the troops going after him, saying again that he would come in. Mr. B. Wilson did not wish to come on, and as Acutt was sick I allowed him to go back with him. Two of my horses had strayed away from the others in the bush and could not be found when we marched; we went on four miles through very heavy ground, and laagered in a small open valley. Colenbrander had been on the right flank during the march, and had come on a lot of cattle, which he drove in, bringing with them two little boys who had been herding them.

While out-spanned one of the pickets sent in to say that about twenty armed Matabeli had come up to them, and said that they wanted to speak to me, that they were quite civil, but refused to put their arms down. I had the horses brought in at once and the laager manned, and went out with two small parties of mounted men to see them, but by the time I got there they had all run away, nor could any of them be found, although I sent Captain Raaf with some men a long way round to look for them, he did not return till so late that we could not march that night. We had been having heavy storms every day, and there was a very heavy one that night. At daylight Captain Finch returned, bringing Trooper Farquhar of the Victoria Column with him, and my two horses, which I was very glad to see, he had found them at Shiloh; he brought a letter from Dr. Jameson, saying that the King had sent in again asking for Usher and Fairbairn to be despatched to talk to him, and that from all accounts he was in a bad

way. We moved on at 6.30, but the country was so wet and heavy that we only managed to do eight miles all day, and had to halt in the middle of the day without water. When we started in the morning, Captain Raaf asked me to allow him to ride on two or three miles to look for water; he went on eight miles to water, and spent the day with his staff there. Luckily there were few natives about or he would very likely have been cut off from us; although there were twenty-five of his party altogether, there were only twelve duty men, the remainder being his staff. During the march that day some natives had been seen and followed, and one of them who had climbed a tree was caught; Burnham, who had gone off with Captain Raaf, also caught two. These told us the same story about the King that we had heard before, and also said that the people were leaving him fast and coming back to their kraals; they thought he was on the Shangani, and intended to remain there for a time. That night and the next day were very wet and we halted for the day; the oxen were all knocked up, and it was quite evident that if we were to catch the King we must leave the waggons behind, I therefore had all the best horses picked out, and found that I could take on 160 mounted men. As we were not more than eighteen or twenty miles from Umhlangeni, I decided on sending the waggons across there instead of back to Buluwayo. The force to go on consisted of Salisbury Column 28, Victoria Column 46, Tuli Column 24, and Bechuanaland Border Police 60, with two Maxims—one horse and one mule—and one pack-horse carrying ten days' food for every ten men; and the remainder under Captain Delamore were to go to Umhlangeni and wait there for orders from me. We marched the following morning, and after going eight miles crossed the Imbembesi, the river was about three feet deep where we crossed it, we laagered on the east bank, and Burnham who had been scouting brought in two prisoners he had caught; we went on nine miles in the afternoon, and laagered for the night in heavy rain at a recently burnt kraal.

The next day, 30th, we did eight miles in the morning to some water holes, and eight miles more in the afternoon; we could see the Buby Valley in front of us, but could not reach it that night and had to laager about two miles short of it. We had been passing scherms all along the road (we were following the King's spoor all the way), and

some of them had only been very recently vacated, and we did not know where we might catch up some of the people. Shortly before we came to the place where we laagered that evening, we had to go down a long deep donga with high banks and thick bush on each side of us, it was a place where the Maxims could have been of little use, and I was very anxious until we got out of it. It opened into a wide valley, and just as we got out some of the flankers brought in about twenty women and children with a few men that they had found in the scherm, they had not shown fight, and appeared to be thoroughly frightened. Previous to this Colenbrander, who had been in front, had captured a



A CAPTURED MATABELI INDUNA.

native whom he knew as one of the Indunas of Buluwayo, and these were all brought to the laager. Just as we were laagering, one of the flankers came in to say that there was a large scherm in the bush about half a mile away full of people, and I sent Captain Borrow with his men and Colenbrander to interpret, to see them; it was nearly dark when they got there. They found about 200 people, but the men all hid among the women, and Colenbrander could not tell who they were, they seemed to be very submissive, and Colenbrander told them to bring wood and water down to the laager, which they agreed to do but did not; he brought down two "boys" that had worked for him before.

After dark I talked to the Induna and heard from him pretty much what we had been told before, that the King was at the Shangani and had a very small number of men actually with him, but that bits of all the regiments were in the neighbourhood guarding him; that it was only a few of the young men of the Insukameni, Ihlati, and Siseba Regiments who wanted to fight, and that all the rest of the nation were getting tired of trekking, and were breaking away in small parties and going back to look for their wives and children. He also stated that they were suffering very much from hunger and small-pox; the people with him came from the kraals round Buluwayo and expressed

themselves as only too glad to be allowed to go quietly home. X I told him that they were at liberty to do so, and that on arriving at Buluwayo he must report himself to Dr. Jameson ; I also warned him that he must not send on to let the King know that we were coming, threatening to destroy all his people if he did, he promised not to do so, but I afterwards found out that he had. Previous to meeting any of these parties of natives, I had consulted with Major Wilson and Captain Raaf as to what was best to be done about them, and we came to the conclusion that by treating them kindly and not molesting them we should have the best chance of getting to the King. If we attacked them we should probably get some men wounded, which would hamper us, and the news of our fighting would only induce the King to push on faster, and as our horses were in a poor state and our food supply very limited, it was very important that we should catch up with him as quickly as possible. I had not hesitated about leaving these people unmolested behind us, as I always intended to go back up the Shangani River.


The following morning we moved on two miles to the Buby and laagered there, and when we marched I sent Captain Fitzgerald to the party that had been seen the evening before to take whatever cattle they might have, as a punishment for not coming in, he saw none of the natives, but took about twenty-five very thin sheep and goats. The place where we halted was very pretty with very large thorn trees and good grass, and the horses got a good feed. We moved on at two p.m., and before starting I sent Burnham and Ingram forward to look for the next water ; at starting we had to cross the Buby, which was dry, and a very narrow channel with steep banks. By bad driving 'the leading Maxim was upset, the gun turning completely over and throwing the near wheeler right over the top of the off one, luckily no one was hurt and no harm done, and it did not take long to get it right again. We did eight miles that afternoon all through bush and camped in an open valley at the head waters of the Gwambo stream, on the way we passed a number of natives living in scherms, they were in a miserable state and their cattle all half starved, they were delighted at being told that they could go quietly home. Burnham had found some natives on the Gwambo, and had the Induna with him when we arrived, he told the same story as

the others, and said that all his people were in a deplorable state from starvation, fever, and small-pox; I repeated to him what I had just said to the others.

We had been following the spoor of the King's waggons all the way, and it kept a very straight course through the bush, he had done very little cutting, having driven straight over everything but the largest trees. We had passed two of his waggons which he had burnt when he left them, and close to this laager we found the remains of his bath-chair, the latter had been pulled by sixteen men, and hence I think arose the report we had heard on the Bubyé that his waggons were being pulled by natives. We could not see sufficient of the country when at the Bubyé to say how far we were below the point at which we had turned back before, but we thought it to be about fifteen miles. We had been having a great number of heavy storms, and this evening the worst storm that I ever saw threatened passed over us; the clouds came up very fast, inky black and full of lightning, and all thought we were in for a regular downpour. The King's waggons—now reduced to three—had separated here, and we had some trouble in getting on the right spoor again, but we found that they had only separated to avoid a nasty bog, into which some of our horses got. The spoor from here ran down the east bank of the Gwambo, running then almost due north, through an open valley 600 to 1,000 yards wide, and along the edge of the bush on both sides were deserted scherms.



FORDING A RIVER.



THE DOWNFALL OF LOBENGULA. PLAN II.



CHAPTER XI.

THE LOSS OF THE WILSON PATROL.

BY MAJOR P. W. FORBES.

Close upon the king—An anxious time for the scouts—Preparations for an attack—The king's camp deserted—Major Wilson sent to reconnoitre—Preparations for a dash for the king—Messengers sent back to Major Forbes—Captain Borrow sent with reinforcements—Heavy firing across the river—The column attacked—The sole survivors of Major Wilson's party—Burnham's account of the disaster—To retire up the river—Short of ammunition—News sent to Dr. Jameson—A deluge of rain—Mr. Howard's plucky swim across the river.


WE did six miles in the morning, and as we went along a native called out to Colenbrander from the bush and came out to us, he was from a kraal near Umhlangeni, and had been a pupil of the Missionary, he told us that the King was on the west bank of the Shangani, about fifteen miles away, on the previous day, and that the force actually with him was very small, although there were a large number of people scattered about near him looking after cattle, etc. He also told us that the spoor turned into the bush again about three miles below, and that we should find no water between the Gwambo and the Shangani, and said that Magwegwe the Induna of the Buluwayo kraal, and Manyou, and several other Indunas were with the King, and that Ingubugubu, the King's brother, who had just returned from Cape Town, had passed there on the previous day on his way to the King, he said he knew nothing definite about Gambo's movements, but believed, and we afterwards found it to be true, that he had ridden across with two other men and had joined the King, but had none of his people with him.

We moved on in the afternoon, intending to go as far as to where the spoor turned into the bush and then to laager, pushing right on to the Shangani in one march the next morning. I had sent Burnham, Ingram and Mayne, the three American Scouts, on in the morning with

a Zulu boy to interpret for them, as we were getting close to the King and were continually coming on small parties, I wished Burnham if possible to find out the lay of the country for some distance in front, in order to be able to take us across to where the King was, and so save us following the spoor and running into an ambush, in case they laid one for us. Just after we moved in the afternoon they returned, and Burnham reported that they had followed the spoor, which as we had heard turned up into the bush about four miles ahead, they had then followed it about two miles towards a bushy ridge, and just before reaching the ridge they had off-saddled in some rather broken country. Ingram's horse had knocked up, and he started to lead him back; soon after he had left them they were suddenly surrounded by about twenty armed Matabeli, who told them that they belonged to Gambo and that they wanted them to come and see Gambo. Burnham in turn suggested that they should come and see me, and they talked for some time; one of the Matabeli who was, so Burnham said, the most ferocious-looking brute he had ever seen, being for taking them into the bush and killing them. The Scouts had their horses with them, and while they were talking had quietly saddled them up and mounted, and then started slowly back along the spoor, the natives following them. It was an anxious time for them, for had one shot been fired they would have been killed at once, and they were very anxious about Ingram, who had gone on in front by himself, the natives followed them to the edge of the bush, but did not come out of it and the Scouts rode back to us, catching up Ingram on the way. Burnham had always appeared before to be absolutely fearless and ready to go anywhere, but this upset his nerves very much and showed him, what he would not admit before, that the Matabeli were really an enemy to be careful of. I told Major Wilson of this, but no one else except Captain Finch; I had found that Captain Raaf could not keep anything to himself, and did a great deal of harm by talking to the young officers he had with him about the dangers of the march, etc. Major Wilson and I knew what was in front of us, and that we were liable to be attacked by, as far as we could ascertain, 2,000 to 3,000 men, and were quite prepared for it; we had seen in our two fights when going into the country that the natives could not stand against the Maxims, and determined to push on all we could, only taking

care that the Column was always ready to form up and fight at a moment's notice.

We laagered this night in the open and put a strong bush scherm round us, and after daylight started again ; we went over the high open ridge where Burnham had been surrounded the day before, and on it found a large series of deserted scherms ; Burnham went round these counting the blocks of wood used by the natives for pillows, and estimated that 1,500 men, women, and children must have used them. After crossing this ridge we came down again into the open valley of the Lupani, and although we had been told that we should find no water there, found a large pool full ; as we came down to the valley we saw a herd of wild pigs feeding in it, and as they are very timid and easily scared it did not look as if there were any natives about. We went on in the afternoon, entering the bush again and going up a rise similar to the one we had crossed in the morning. I had no scouts on in front of us, as I did not wish to risk losing them, but had a small advance guard of four men about 300 yards in advance of the column, a rear guard of the same strength, and two half sections on each flank, with connecting files between them and the column. One of the Maxims was at the head of the column and the other at the rear, and the men marched in sections between them, the Salisbury Column being first, then the Victoria, the Tuli Column, and Bechuanaland Border Police, and on an alarm the Column was to form laager at once, Salisbury and Victoria Columns taking front and right faces, Tuli Column and Bechuanaland Border Police left and rear, with the Maxim in the left front and right rear. The bush was thick in places, but as a rule was thin enough for a good view 300 or 400 yards on each side, and the column could always have been in fighting formation in two minutes. I thought it more than likely that we should be attacked that afternoon, as I knew that this was the last bush that we had to go through before reaching the Shangani, consequently I was very careful to keep the Column closed up. The ridge near the top was rather broken, and just as we were getting on to it the advance guard sent back to report that five or six natives had crossed the road in front of them, but had disappeared in the bush. I did not send after them, as I did not wish to detach any men ; almost immediately afterwards a shot was fired on our



MAJOR WILSON AND HIS
PARTY LEAVING THE CAMP.

left rear.
Captain
Raaf who
was rid-
ing off
the road
on the left
at once went

to find out if the

flankers had fired it, and sent to
report to me that they had not

and had seen no one; I had little doubt

that this shot was a signal either to attack or

retreat, but nothing happened. Shortly afterwards

the right flanking party sent to report that they had

come on fresh spoor of natives and a mounted man

going the opposite way to us; I sent Colenbrander

to see it, and he said that it was that of two horses

and forty to fifty natives. The ridge was four or five miles wide, and after crossing it we went down again and came into the head of a narrow valley, which the prisoners with us said led right to the Shangani, we followed it for three or four miles, and then came to a roughly built kraal which had only been very recently vacated, and at which we saw by the spoor that the horsemen who had gone back had halted, we were expecting every minute to find someone, and were ready for an attack at any moment.

Burnham and Colenbrander were now with the advance guard, and on going through a narrow strip of bush, several of which ran across, connecting the two sides of the valley, saw a large herd of cattle with two boys guarding them and a mounted man riding about them, they galloped in and caught one of the boys and brought the cattle back, but could not catch the other boy or the mounted man. The boy told me at once that the King's camp was just in front, and that the King had been there that afternoon, that he had left with his waggons on the previous day, but they had stuck in the mud and he had returned on horseback that afternoon for men to pull them out, and that

he did not wish to fight, but he sent back his eldest son, Mnyamandi, that afternoon with a letter to Dr. Jameson, telling him that he was coming in to Buluwayo. As there was no time to waste, I formed the Column into square at once and advanced, we had to go through a narrow strip of bush and then came out in a wide open flat, and found the King's camp just on our right on the edge of the bush, as we came out of the bush a lot of natives ran away across the open, but I would not allow them to be fired at. I rode up to the King's camp and found it deserted, it consisted of a number of roughly built huts and shelters and they had evidently only just been vacated, as fires were still alight and a number of cooking pots were lying about. In one of the huts we found a small slave boy asleep, he was pulled out and suddenly confronted by a lot of us, and I asked him at once where the King was, he said he had left the previous day with the waggons and had not been back since. The Column was marching slowly on and I rode back to it. I called Major Wilson out at once and told him that I wanted him to take his twelve best horses and push on along the spoor as fast as he could to see which way it went, returning by dark, this was about five o'clock, and there was about one-and-a-half hour's more daylight, I said to him that if he went fast he would be able to do five or six miles out and back. At this time we were entirely ignorant as to where the King had gone, and did not know that he had crossed the river which was close in front of us and the spoor was going down the west side. One report that we had heard from the natives along the road was that he was making for the junction of the Gwai and Shangani Rivers, and to get there he might keep on the west side of the Shangani all the way. Major Wilson at once called out his twelve best mounted men, and several other officers, including Captains Kirton and Greenfield, asked if they might go, and were allowed; they all understood that they were to be back that night, and Kirton asked Dr. Hogg, with whom he was messing, to keep some dinner hot for him as they would not be in till dark. Mr. Bowen, Major Wilson's galloper, who had accompanied him everywhere previous to this, asked if he should go, but Major Wilson told him to remain with the Column. Mr. Bowen's explanation of this is, that Major Wilson had promised him some time before that if we caught the King, he would ask me to let him, Bowen, take the news

back to Buluwayo (Bowen had about the best horse amongst us), and that it was to keep his horse fresh that Major Wilson would not let him accompany him. Major Wilson then started off with his party ; Burnham and Ingram were not with him, but were still at the King's camp lighting the huts, I sent for them, and as Burnham's horse was not very fit, gave him my own and sent them on after Major Wilson ; Burnham I thought might be useful, and was very quick at following a spoor. I then took the Column and laagered about 200 yards from the river, in the open. During the evening we heard the natives, who had run away from the King's camp, building scherms across the river.

The day before we got here Major Wilson and I had discussed the question and agreed that it was not advisable to take the Column any further than the Shangani. We had now been nine days out from Shiloh, and I knew that it could not be less than sixty miles to the main drift on the Shangani, and even if we went up as quickly as possible, we could scarcely get through before we had run out of food, and I wished to avoid this if possible. When the laager was formed up I had another talk to the boy we had caught ; he said he was the son of Magwekwe, the chief of Buluwayo, and if this was true, we knew he was of some importance. He told us there were about 3,000 men with the King, belonging principally to the Insukameni, Ihlati, and Siseba Regiments, with a few from each of the other regiments, he said that his father, Manyou, and Gambo were also there, the King he said had a swollen leg and could only travel very slowly, he repeated what he had told me before about Mnyamandi having been sent back with a letter.

As all the accounts made out the number of men with the King to be about the same, 3,000, the majority of whom I knew to be of very little use from a fighting point of view, I made up my mind to take fifty men and a galloping Maxim on the next morning and make one rush for the King. I told Mr. Chappé what I intended doing, and he expressed himself quite willing to go with me, I told him that I should leave the laager where it was in charge of Major Wilson. I sent for Captain Coventry and got him to bring up the driver of the mule Maxim, a Cape "boy," and I asked him about the mules, he told me they were still quite fit, and that if necessary they would do

twenty-five miles out and back again the following day. I intended taking Captain Borrow and his twenty men, who were all good men and well mounted, and thirty of the Victoria Column, with the best horses I could get, and to start about 3 a.m.; I did not give any orders about it as I had to wait until Major Wilson returned to know what he had found out, I told Captain Borrow what I proposed, and he agreed with me that it was the only thing to do as the Column could not go further. Just at dark Mr. Chappé called me on one side and told me that he had been talking to the slave boy, and he told him all that the other boy had told me was untrue, that an impi had gone back at day-break to attack us in the bush, and that only about 100 men were with the King. I sent for the other boy at once and taxed him with telling lies, and he admitted it; he then told me that an impi made up of divisions from different regiments and kraals, of which he gave me the names, had started back at daylight that morning under command of Umjan, the Chief of the Imbezu, with orders from the King to attack us in the bush, and having stopped us there to follow on after the King, he said there were only twenty of the Imbezu with the impi, all the rest having been killed or died from wounds, from the numbers he gave, we made out that the impi was about 2,800 strong and they were to have been doctored that day and leave the next, but on hearing we were on the Gwambo, the King hurried them off to attack us; he also said that the men actually with the King now were only a few Indunas, and some of the Bovani (Maholi slaves). He said they had heard that we had no Maxims with us, and he attributed the fact of our not being attacked in the bush to their having found out their mistake at the last minute, I went round to the other side of the laager and told Captain Raaf what I had heard, and also that I wanted extra precautions taken and the night pickets doubled. It was dark by now, and Wilson had not returned. The prisoners were in the centre of the laager among the slaughter cattle, guarded by some of our "boys," and soon after dark one of our "boys" came to say that the Matabeli boy now said that the King's orders to the impi had been to attack us in the bush, and if they missed us there to follow us up and stop us where they could, and that they were certain to attack us that night. It was very dark, and there were some

slight showers during the night, I sent round again to warn the pickets to be on the alert, and also warned them not to allow any herds of cattle several of which were grazing about us to come near them, as I thought it possible that if the natives attacked they might drive the cattle up to hide their advance.

About nine o'clock two men, Sergeant-Major Judge and Corporal Ebbage, came back from Major Wilson and reported that he had crossed the river and followed the spoor for about five miles, they had been sent back because their horses were knocked up, but Major Wilson was going on and was going to sleep out, and that if I thought it necessary I could send on some men in the morning, and that the Maxims could get along the spoor, but he did not think they would be required; he also said that he had heard that the impi was all behind us, and that the King had very few men with him. Few of us went to sleep that night, as I was expecting an attack every moment, the natives had proved that they could not do us much harm by day, and I thought it more than likely that they would try a night attack, using assegais only; I had the magnesian lights and rockets ready every night in case they might be required.

At about eleven o'clock Captain Napier and Troopers Robertson and Mayne rode in from Major Wilson, and Captain Napier reported that they had followed the spoor, crossing the river about two miles down, and had ridden up to a scherm on the other side. From a native there they learned that the King was only a short distance on, and had very few men with him, but that the impi had gone back that morning to stop us and was now behind us, he volunteered to guide them to the King, and they pushed on as fast as they could. They passed a number of scherms filled with women and children and cattle, and about three miles from the river came to a series of large scherms into which they rode, they passed in succession through five of these looking for the King, Captain Napier who was interpreting calling out in each that they did not want to hurt anyone, but had come to speak to the King, the natives were too astonished to take any action, and thought that the whole Column was on them. By the time they had got to the fifth scherm it was nearly dark, and the natives from the scherms through which they had passed began to run up from behind with their rifles,

and Major Wilson ordered a retreat ; they withdrew without a shot being fired, and went into the bush about half a mile away. The guide had shown them a scherm with a high fence round it, not far from the last one into which they had gone, and told them that it was the King's, and that his waggons were there ; there was a very heavy storm just after they retired, and it became very dark. While riding through the scherms Lieutenant Hofmeyr and two of the men got detached, and in the darkness could not rejoin Major Wilson. As soon as they had formed up in the bush Major Wilson asked Captain Napier if he would ride back and let me know where he was and what he had done, to this Captain Napier agreed, and brought with him Trooper Robertson, one of his employés, and Mayne, one of the Victoria Scouts ; they neither saw nor heard anyone by the way, and arrived as I have said about eleven. ✕ Major Wilson sent no written message, and no direct verbal one, beyond telling Captain Napier to let me know what had happened, but on my asking Captain Napier what Major Wilson expected me to do, he said he thought he expected me to go on at once with the whole force, but that to attack the King at daylight it would be necessary to be there by 4 a.m. I told him at once that it was impossible for me to move that night, but that I intended to push on at daylight as we were surrounded and expected to be attacked at any moment, and that in my opinion if we attempted to move before it was light we should bring the impi on us at once. The Column, owing to the Maxims, could not travel without making a considerable amount of noise, and it would be very dangerous to attempt to cross the river through deep sand and in the dark, when it was impossible to say what force might be waiting for us on the other bank, where the bush was very thick.

The river was very low and there had been no local rain to cause it to rise ; we found afterwards that it rose the following morning from heavy rains on the Gwailo, seventy or eighty miles away. I was then confronted with the alternatives, either to recall Major Wilson at once, or to support him with as many men as I could without materially weakening the Column ; I did not wish to recall him, as I had absolute confidence in his judgment and he had decided to wait there, he knew as well as I did how important it was that the King should be caught


and he knew, which I did not, the exact state of affairs about the King. If I recalled him I undid all that we had been striving for so long, namely, to get in touch with the King, and we should have to start all over again or else give up the pursuit and go back to Buluwayo unsuccessful. Besides this I was quite sure that after Major Wilson had shown himself at the scherms, Lobengula would ride away as quickly as possible, leaving his people to follow, and I thought it quite probable that they might be able to intercept him at daylight (as I did not expect him to leave in the dark), and catch him almost alone. Major Wilson did not consider that his party were in any danger when Captain Napier left, or he would have brought them back to camp.

Having decided not to recall him, the next thing was to decide how many men I could spare without weakening myself too much. Captain Borrow had twenty men all well mounted, and their horses had done less work than the others, so I decided on sending them; before giving him any orders I went over to Captain Raaf, told him all that had happened and what I proposed to do, and he concurred. He was averse to weakening the Column by splitting it up, but I showed him that I was not doing so to any serious extent, as we still had the two Maxims; he raised no difficulty at all to me, but went back to his own officers, told them what I was going to do and also, as he said afterwards, that "this was the beginning of the end." I then gave Captain Borrow his orders, and told Captain Napier what I was doing, and he quite agreed with it, and I asked if he wished to go back with them; he said that as only a small number were going Major Wilson would only be able to act on the defensive, and that he did not care to go back, as he was very wet, but that Robertson would go as guide. Mayne had a touch of fever and did not go back. Just before Captain Borrow started, he asked me if it was necessary for his men to take their full 100 rounds of ammunition, as it was heavy for the horses, and I told him to; each man also had a revolver and twenty rounds; they took out some food in their wallets for Major Wilson's men, who had had none that evening. They started off at about 12.30, and I gave Captain Borrow a note for Major Wilson, in which I told him that I could not move before daylight, as I was surrounded and expected to be attacked at any moment, but that I would move as soon as it was light, and that

meanwhile I was sending Captain Borrow and twenty men, which as I said would make him "safe." I told him to use his own discretion absolutely, as he knew the state of affairs and I did not, but to be careful.

Captain Borrow's men had formed the front face of the square or laager, and as soon as they left I had to close the laager up, to do this it was necessary to drive out the slaughter oxen which were in the centre, and Captain Raaf and I with several of the men did this, we then closed the horses and men in, making the laager into a triangle, with the Maxims at two of the corners. Nothing further happened during the night, and immediately it was light preparations were made for a move; the slaughter oxen had grazed away and were not visible, and I told the "boy," John Grootboom, who herded them to go and look for them. Just as we were ready to move we heard heavy firing across the river where the King was, it lasted several minutes, and then ceased. Just then Grootboom returned with the cattle, which he told me had been put by the natives into the cattle kraals at the King's old camp, together with the cattle which we had taken the previous afternoon, but let go again (although this camp was only about 800 yards away it had been too dark to see it), that he had found some natives there and told them that they had got our cattle, to which they replied that they would drive ours out if he would point them out, this he did and they turned them out of the kraal. While they were doing it they heard the firing at the King's camp and expressed astonishment at it, saying that the men with the King had said that they should not fight again, and that they themselves had no wish to.

As soon as we were ready I advanced the Column along the spoor; we were in as close a formation as we could, with our right towards the river and the two Maxims on our left. Shortly after starting we saw three women, carrying water, come from the river and go across the opening in front of us into the bush, and directly afterwards a man on a white horse came out of the bush followed by about twelve men, and went down towards the drift, they were about 800 or 900 yards in front of us. We kept on along the spoor, which followed the open part of the valley about 1,000 yards, and then turned towards the river, going through some low scrub where the bush had been cut away at some



A HOT CORNER AT THE
SHANGANI RIVER FIGHT.

previous time, and then keeping down close to the river bank, which was here about ten feet high and overhanging. We had scarcely got into this low scrub when we were fired on from the bush about 300 yards away on our left; we formed up at once, all the horses being crowded as much together as possible, some of the men taking cover behind a few mopani bushes that were still standing, and the remainder


lying down round the horses, the two Maxims being on the right and left of our positions as we faced the enemy.

The bush in front of us where the enemy was being very thick mimosa, extending to the right and left in front of our position, and back to a ridge about 1,000 yards away. The enemy's fire was very heavy for some time and very general from all over the bush, but it was impossible to estimate it accurately, as very few natives were seen, only those who, bolder than the rest, advanced to the edge of the bush and took cover behind some large stumps there, appearing at all; but we reckoned that about 300 were firing at us. Their shooting was as usual very erratic, and ours very steady, although there were only the puffs of smoke to fire at, and for some time they did not do us much harm; after a time, however, they began to fire at the Maxims, and then we began to lose some horses. It was evident from the beginning that we must get into a better position as soon as possible, but for a long time it was impossible to move. The river bank was too high for us to get under it, and to move either backwards or forwards necessitated

inspanning the Maxims, and taking them, if only for a few minutes, out of action; and with an indefinite number of natives in the bush within 250 yards, I could not run the risk of their attempting a rush when the Maxims—which were our chief reliance to stop a sudden rush—were out of action. During the fight two of Captain Borrow's men, Landsberg and Nesbitt, crossed the river behind us; they had become separated from Captain Borrow, and had made their way back to us as being the safest thing to do. After about an hour of it the enemy's fire slackened and we saw several natives crossing the opening a long way to our right and going down the river. I thought that we could attempt to move now, and had the horse Maxim inspanned; the firing was still going on on both sides, but I was going to retire one Maxim at a time, keeping the other in action meanwhile.

Directly the horses were put into the gun a heavy and fairly well directed, though rather high fire broke out from the bush to our right front, and it looked as if the enemy were

trying to get round us on that flank. I had the Maxim outspanned at once, and a very well directed fire from it into the bush stopped the enemy's fire from there altogether; I then had both the Maxims inspanned and we retired slowly along the open, the Maxims and all the available men (dismounted) on the right flank. The enemy kept up a slight fire at us as we retired, and we returned it; we had one man badly wounded and one mule killed while retiring. After going about 600 yards we turned into the end of a strip of mopani bush on the river bank where there was fairly good cover and



SKETCH PLAN SHOWING POSITION OF THE KING'S CAMP AND FIGHT ON 3RD DECEMBER.

formed up again, and shortly afterwards the enemy's fire ceased and they all retired. While we were retiring, Burnham, Ingram, and Gooding, one of Captain Borrow's men, rode up from Major Wilson ; as they came up Burnham jumped off his horse, came to me and said, "I think I may say we are the sole survivors of that party ;" I told him to say nothing about it till we were out of our own fight. We had lost sixteen horses killed and two mules in the fight, and had five men wounded, all of whom belonged to the Bechuanaland Border Police ; they were Corporal Williams, shot through the body ; Trooper Middleton, through calf of left leg ; Trooper Shanaghan, through left arm ; Captain Napier and Trooper Newton were struck by spent bullets, and Le Fleur (coloured mule driver), shot through right leg.

As soon as we halted the wounded were attended to by Dr. Hogg, who was in medical charge of the Column, and we proceeded to make ourselves as strong as possible, by cutting down some trees and making a scherm, and by digging rifle pits along the river bank, we made ourselves fairly safe. There was also a narrow strip of bush running along the river from the laager to the north, and this was held all day by reliefs of men stationed about 200 yards from the laager ; the river had been rising all the morning, and by now was much too high to cross. About half-an-hour after the firing ceased I sent a patrol of the Bechuanaland Border Police along the open valley to our right to see if all the enemy had retired, giving them orders to return at once if fired at ; they saw no one, and on their return we turned the horses out to graze. During our fight we had heard a considerable amount of firing where Major Wilson was, and those who could hear it plainly were of opinion that it was getting gradually further away ; about two hours after we laagered there were a few shots fired farther away and more to the right.

Immediately the laager was made safe I had a consultation with Captains Raaf and Napier ; it was quite impossible for us to advance, as we could not cross the river, and we could only hope that some, if not all, of Major Wilson's party had escaped. There was no object in stopping there, as the river might not fall for some days, and if Major Wilson's party did not get back to us that day, we should know that they had either been cut up or had escaped up the river. Major Wilson


knew that it was my intention to return that way, the only thing then was to return to Buluwayo. I had always intended to return up the Shangani, as our supplies should be waiting for us there, and as far as we could ascertain the country was fairly open up the river ; I did not know the exact distance, but did not think it could be more than sixty miles to the drift. Captain Raaf wished to start after dark that night, but I would not allow it, as I did not wish the natives to think that they had beaten us, and I wished to give Major Wilson a chance to get back ; I therefore decided to remain where we were until the following morning and then to commence our retreat up the Shangani. As soon as I had arranged this, I asked Burnham about Major Wilson's party. He told me that as soon as Captain Napier had left on the previous evening, Major Wilson had asked him to go with him and try to find the three men who were missing, and after some time they had managed to do so, but it was so dark that Burnham had to follow the spoor by feeling for it with his fingers, and had at last found them by calling to them ; that Captain Borrow had arrived safely before daybreak, having neither seen nor heard any natives on his way out, but that Major Wilson's party had several times heard natives talking and moving about during the night. He said that after Captain Borrow came, Major Wilson discussed the question with all the officers, and they decided on making a rush for the King's scherm and trying to secure him. At daylight they rode straight up to it, it was at the head of a valley with bush on each side, and got within a few feet of it ; Burnham said that he saw two waggons, one of which he could see right through, and it was empty, they halted at the scherm and called to the King and were at once answered by a heavy fire from in front and both sides. Burnham reckoned that there were about 100 men firing at them ; they dismounted and returned the fire, but had to fall back, and as Major Wilson saw that the natives were endeavouring to get round them, he mounted the men and they retired at a gallop to a large ant-heap 600 or 700 yards back down the valley, behind which they dismounted again. The natives had followed them down the open, but on the white men commencing to fire from behind the ant-heap, they got into the bush again on each side. Firing was kept up by each side for some time, and two of Major Wilson's horses were killed but no one hit, and Major

Wilson saw that the natives were surrounding him again; he ordered them to mount and they galloped away, two horses this time carrying double. They went some distance and got into the waggon spoor again, and away from the natives, they were retiring quietly along the spoor—what Gooding called “shogging along,” not trotting—and Major Wilson and Captain Borrow were riding behind talking. After a bit Major Wilson asked Burnham if he thought that he could get through to me, and he expressed himself ready to try if Major Wilson gave him a man to accompany him. Captain Borrow told Gooding, who was about the best mounted of his party, to go with him, and Ingram, Burnham’s mate, also asked to go and the three started off, they had scarcely gone 100 yards when a large number of Matabeli rushed towards them out of the bush, shouting and waving their assegais; they galloped away to the left and by hard riding managed to get away, although they had a shower of bullets at them and got down to the river. Finding it in flood they had to go some distance up to cross, and eventually swam over, about one-and-a-half miles up; immediately after they had escaped from the last lot of natives they heard Major Wilson’s party come to them, and heavy firing began, and Burnham was sure that none of them could have got away alive, although Gooding was much more hopeful. I checked the firing which we heard with Burnham’s account of what had taken place, and made out that it was only the last burst of fire we had heard that Burnham did not know the result of, and as it was no heavier than the previous ones, from which little harm had resulted, we could hope that some had escaped; we have now learned that none did, but that they all stood and fell together on the one spot.

Burnham was tired out when he returned and naturally his nerves were much shaken, he was sure the natives would come on again and follow us until they had killed us all, as he said, “If I got as ferocious with anyone as those men did with me, I would follow him twenty years until I killed him.” He told me that it would be absolutely suicidal for anyone to try and get through to Buluwayo, and I was not very anxious to send; I knew that we could hold our own marching up the river, as at present we had plenty of ammunition, and I expected to find food and reinforcements at the drift up the river. Soon after this however,

Ingram came and offered to ride into Buluwayo, and I agreed to let him if he could find anyone to go with him; I told him that they could start soon after dark that evening. Soon after our fight was over I had sent up a socket signal to show any of Major Wilson's party who might have escaped where we were. We kept a good look-out during the day, but nothing happened, and no natives were seen on our side of the river, although a large number were seen to come down on the other side some distance below us and then separate, some going up the river and some down; I think that this was done with the intention of stopping us should we try to cross. One of the men on picket reported that he had seen four white men brought down by a number of natives to the river, and that the natives were dancing round them, but no one else saw them; we saw four try to cross the river about 1,000 yards down, but a shot or two turned them back. Towards the evening a number of natives were heard singing and talking in the bush on the other side, but we were not molested in any way.

I wrote a letter to Dr. Jameson telling him what had happened and that we were going to retire up the river, that we were all right for ammunition to stand another big fight, but that if we had this fight, I should have to laager and wait for more ammunition, as our supply would not warrant me in risking a third in the open. I asked him to send off reinforcements at once with food and ammunition, and also wrote to Captain Delamore at Umhlangeni, telling him to push on with his men to the Shangani by the main road and then follow the west bank down till we met. I had just got these ready for Ingram when Captains Raaf and Francis came over and asked if I was sending anything in writing; I replied that I was, and that it was quite safe to do so as there was no native in the country except those in our camps who could read; they implored me not to and as Ingram was perfectly cool and composed and knew everything that had happened both with me and Major Wilson, I gave in to them and did not send the letter to Dr. Jameson, only that to Captain Delamore, which did not refer to our position at all. I did not know until after I returned to Buluwayo that some of Captain Raaf's officers had given Ingram letters to people in Buluwayo, couched in a melancholy strain, saying good-bye to everyone, etc.; it did not occur to me that anyone would write, as I



MR. HOWARD SWIMS THE
SHANGANI RIVER
TO CAPTURE SOME CATTLE.

should of
course
have al-
lowed no
letters to
go that
had not
been
passed
by me,
and I cer-
tainly should
have passed
none that
talked of our

position as des-


perate, as I did not consider it so in any way. We had met almost the whole force that Lobengula had that morning, and had beaten them with scarcely any loss, and if they followed us we could do it again; if they did not, we were very unlikely to meet anything like so many anywhere else. We did not know that all Major Wilson's party had been destroyed, and it was the general belief that some had escaped, the only two I think who always gave them up being Captain Raaf and Burnham, the former always said that he had listened attentively to the firing and that it was all in one place, this differed from the general opinion, but now seems to have been right; Burnham had no hopes from the first of any of them having escaped. I never thought for a moment that we should be followed, as my opinion was always that they had fought in desperation as we had got so close to the King, but that they would only be too glad to see us turn back, and would then follow the King.

Ingram was ready to start at dark, and had selected one or the Victoria Column, Lynch, to accompany him, Mayne the other American Scout also volunteered to go, but I thought two quite enough and could not spare more horses. I told Ingram my reasons for not sending a letter, and told him to tell Dr. Jameson all that had happened, and also

(1) That I was going up the Shangani, and should keep to the river up to the drift, and (2) That I wanted him to send me more ammunition at once, as in the event of another big fight I should have to laager and wait for it. I gave Ingram and Lynch the three best horses we had, one of them being Bowen's, which was to have taken back the news of Lobengula's capture, and they started at dark ; their instructions were to keep up the river for a time, and then cut across to the Bubyee and follow it up to Umhlangeni. They got through all right without being interfered with, but the strain on his nerves had so affected Ingram by the time he got to Buluwayo that he could not remember what I had told him to repeat to Dr. Jameson, and he could not even tell him which way I intended to retire. Immediately after they started I sent up a rocket, and it had scarcely burst when a storm that had been gathering for some time broke, and we had a deluge of rain ; our laager was small and the ground uneven, and in a few minutes everyone was drenched through and most of the horses standing up to their knees in water, altogether we passed an unpleasant night. As the men were all tired Captain Finch asked some of the officers if they would volunteer to do horse guard during the night, and this they did for some nights. We were not disturbed during the night, but everything was so wet in the morning that we had to wait for a time to get our blankets, etc. dry. The wounded had passed a miserable night as the rough shelter which we had put up did not keep the rain out, and the horses moving about had disturbed them, but they were not much the worse for their wetting, and both then and right through were marvellously plucky. I had stretchers made for the worst two, Williams and La Fleur, and they were afterwards carried some distance in them, but it was very hard work on the men carrying, and we found that they could ride all right on the gun carriages, the others rode right through.

Shortly after daybreak I rode with two or three men over the scene of the fight of the day before, thinking that I might find some ammunition left by the enemy, but everything had been taken away and although we saw blood in several places, saw no dead bodies near the edge of the bush, and the ground was too soft after the rain and the bush too thick to go far into it. During the night the slaughter oxen had broken out of the kraal, frightened by the storm and could

not be found the next morning. Soon after daylight three head of cattle came out of the bush on the other side of the river just opposite our laager, and Mr. Howard, a volunteer who had originally served in the Bechuanaland Border Police and had brought despatches up to Buluwayo, swam across the river with his revolver in his mouth to try and drive them across. It was a very plucky thing to do as the bush was thick, and we could not see that it was not full of natives ; he was carried about 150 yards down and his attempt failed. The cattle were frightened at his white skin and ran away ; he went a short distance after them and saw a number of natives and scherms in the distance and then returned across the river.



CHAPTER XII.

RETREAT FROM THE SHANGANI RIVER.

BY MAJOR P. W. FORBES.

Down the river's bank—Horses falling off fast—Short of food—Capturing the royal cattle—A skirmish in the bush—A heavy rain storm—The men depressed—The last of the horses done up—A sudden attack—The gun carriages left behind—Captain Raaf addresses the force—The first night march—Tired out—Horse flesh flavoured with garlic—A fight while on the march—The Matabeli now behind us—Mr. Selous brings tidings of food—Back to Umhlangeni and Buluwayo—Disbanding the force—Pegging out farms—Death of Captain Raaf—A parade of all forces before Mr. Rhodes—Rumours of Major Wilson's party—How Englishmen can die.

—AT nine o'clock we commenced our retreat, moving in solid formation in three sides of a square, left on the river, the Maxims being on one spoor on the right face, the river formed our left face all the way up, and always gave us a clear field of fire for several hundred yards after the river fell, as it did after three days, and at first when the river was full it was a great protection to us. Our horses were by now in a bad state and several had to be left every day, they had hitherto had nothing but young green grass to eat; this did not strengthen them at all, and for the few days previous they had had little time for grazing. Colenbrander and two men who were well mounted were about 300 yards in front to act as advanced guard, and give us notice of any bad ground that might be in front of us, one section was on the right flank and one in rear.

Shortly after starting the strip of bush in which the King's camp had been came down to within 100 yards of the river, and there were some scherms in it. Colenbrander was riding up to one of these when he saw two natives with rifles, one of whom was aiming at him, he just had time to jump off his horse when the native fired, hitting the horse and killing it at once, they fired at the natives and killed one of them—the other


got away. We did ten miles up the river without seeing any other native, halted for three hours and then went on for four miles more and laagered at a bend of the river, where we were able to make a very strong scherm by cutting down several large thorn trees. The river bank formed one-half of our circular scherm, and was here about twenty feet deep; there was a long valley stretching down to the river on the other side, and I thought that if two men could swim their horses across the river under cover of the bush they could get into this valley and ride up for four or five miles, and so probably cut the spoor of any of Major Wilson's party who I thought were retiring up the other bank. I spoke to Burnham but he said it would be too dangerous, and that although he would go if ordered, he should consider it the most risky thing he had ever; tried after this I did not press it. I spoke to Howard afterwards and he was quite ready to go, and volunteered to do so by himself, I would not allow this, and could find no one who would accompany him.

The following day (6th) we did fourteen miles more up the river without incident, four natives were seen on the other bank and four or five on our side, but they ran away when fired at. Our horses were falling off fast and we were now getting short of any that were fit for much, one of mine had been knocked up by Burnham when he returned from Major Wilson, and the other I had given to one of the wounded men, who rode it right through. Captain Raaf's pony was still very fit and as he had still several good horses among his men I asked him to take charge of the advance, rear and flanking parties, getting what men were required from the different corps, and I being on foot remained with the Column and kept it in shape; we laagered this night again in a bend of the river and had a quiet night. ✕We had seen some cattle on the previous day and Captain Raaf had sent after them, but they had been driven away and we did not get any, we had to kill one of our two pack-oxen for meat, and had now nothing left but one pack-ox.

The next day (7th) we started at 7.30, and on a bushy ridge to our right we saw the smoke of some fires and heard cattle, I told Captain Raaf to try and get some and he went off, but came back to say that the country was too broken to attempt it. Shortly afterwards we saw

a troop of half-grown calves and Captain Raaf sent Francis to drive them in, which he did successfully; before marching in the morning one of the men had shot a water-buck cow, which we cut up and took with us. We had to keep away from the river a good deal this day as there was thick bush close to it, and halted in the middle of the day close to a large mud-hole full of "barber," we sent some of our natives in with assegais and they killed a large number. We got back to the river in the evening and laagered, having only done eight miles that day owing to very heavy rain.

The next day (8th) we had done about three miles up the river when Colenbrander shot a roan antelope, I halted the Column while it was being cut up, and while halted we saw a number of cattle 500 or 600 yards away, which I pointed out to Captain Raaf and suggested to him that full-grown beef was better than veal, he rode off at once with several of his men and brought back about 100 head, he also brought the boy who was herding them. When they were driven up I saw at once that they were regimental slaughter cattle, being all well-grown oxen, and thought there might be some trouble about them, the boy told me they were royal cattle and were going down after the King, that there were a very large number of cattle all along the river following the King, and that there were a few men with each lot but no impi anywhere near. The cattle were very wild and we did not want so many, so I had twenty picked out and left the rest and also the remainder of the calves taken the previous day. We went on about a mile and then off-saddled on the river in as clear a place as we could find, but where there was a thick patch of mopani bush on our right, I distributed the meal left by Major Wilson and Captain Borrow's parties here. It was nearly time to get the horses in again when suddenly a hot fire opened on us from the bush in front, the pickets had not been looking out, and the natives had got right up to



A QUIET SHOT AT
OUR PICKETS.


one of them before they were seen, they managed however to get in all right. Our horses were grazing to the left of the laager, and immediately the firing began Captain Finch and some men ran out and turned them towards the river behind the laager, the bank sloped gradually down here, and there was good cover behind it. Raaf's and the Bechuanaland Border Police horses were grazing on the right, and were frightened and stampeded across our front and then stood between us and the enemy; for some unexplained reason the enemy at once ceased firing until some of the men had run round the horses and turned them before the bank.

As soon as they were all in I told Captain Raaf to take out twelve men and turn the natives out of the bush, it was only a narrow strip and by going to one end of it he could open fire on them and drive them out, meanwhile I had all the horses saddled up two at a time, and linked behind the laager. Directly Captain Raaf went out the natives all ran from the bush, and he advanced through it, and on coming out at the other end saw some of them running away in the distance and followed them for a short way, but as he did not want to hurt the horses did not go far. On his way back he saw thirty to forty natives some distance away coming up in our direction, this report spread and it was very soon believed that there was a large impi following us up. Our only casualty was one horse slightly hit, but during the firing the natives had driven away the cattle we had taken that morning as well as the sole remaining pack-ox, and we were left again without meat, with the additional satisfaction of knowing that if we took any, they would probably come and worry us and take it back again. ✕ As soon as Captain Raaf returned we got ready to start, but a tremendous storm came on and delayed us for a time, after waiting until the worst of it seemed to be over we started, but it came on very heavy again, and we had only done two miles when we had to laager. The previous day we had crossed the footpath leading from the Inyoka country, one of the Zambesi tribes tributary to Lobengula, to Buluwayo, and near it Captain Finch picked up a large cake of tobacco, which was most acceptable as everyone was getting very short. We saw a large river running in from the other side during the morning march, and took it to be the Gwailo. Some of the men's spirits were

rather cast down that night by the sight of an old map (Baines', made thirty years ago) which was produced by someone, and which showed that the Gwailo joined the Shangani over 100 miles below the waggon drift; as no white man had so far as is known ever been up the Shangani before, the map could not be in any way relied on, but after the hardships our men had gone through very little served to depress some of them.

The next day (9th) we moved at 5.30, and after going about five miles came to a high ridge running right down to the river bank, it would have taken us a long *détour* to get round it, and there was a narrow footpath at the river end. A few natives had been seen on the ridge but had run away, I sent some men on to the ridge and others to the other end of the path, and then took the Maxims round by hand, running them on one wheel and holding them up with drag ropes. We got round safely and went on, and in the bush about 200 yards further on came to a scherm full of women and children with a few men, they had some sheep and goats and I took them all on to an open space where we halted. They turned out to be people belonging to 'Mhlangabesa, a brother of Lobengula whom the King had had killed some years ago because he was very like the King, and was often taken for him, for this reason they were not at all friendly to Lobengula, their kraals were on the Imwekwesi near its junction with the Imbembesi, and they had run away some time before.

They had heard that the people on the Bubyie had been allowed to go back to their kraals, and most of their people had already started home, and they were only waiting until some cattle which they had lost could be found, they knew nothing about the country round there, and could give us no idea how far it was to the drift, they said that a messenger had come by there the previous day from the King, and he had been sent to tell




FRIENDLY NATIVES BRINGING IN FOOD.

all the men in charge of royal cattle to take them on after the King at once. We took some of the sheep to kill at the time, and I told the Induna I wanted five head of cattle to take on, he sent out and brought in ten head, of which I took the best four.

We marched again at 2 p.m., and soon after we had started it began to rain very heavily. The river here came through very broken country, and for some miles we were unable to keep near it—there must be a fall of 600 or 700 feet in the river in about ten miles here. We only did three miles that afternoon, through thick bush and over broken country, causing great trouble in getting the Maxims

along. The gun horses were now tired out and it was doubtful whether they would be able to pull for many more days; the oxen got away in the bush, we had a quiet night in the bush and waited until eight o'clock the following morning to get our things dry. Marching at eight we went for three miles through very bad country,



SKETCH PLAN SHOWING POSITION WHEN SURPRISED ON
10TH DECEMBER.

thick bush, long grass and broken granite kopjes, and came to a deep dry gully which had to be crossed. The gun horses were done up and we should soon have to halt, I asked Captain Raaf to ride on a little and see if the country got any better, he did so but returned to say it was all the same and that where we were was as good a place to halt as any. I sent Captain Napier and his men across the gully to cover the passage of the Maxim, which had to be taken over by hand, and we got it across all right; there was a good cover in the gully for the horses in

case of an attack, but it was necessary for some of the force to be on each side of it as there were kopjes there which had to be held, I therefore kept one Maxim on our side and we off-saddled ; I only intended to give the horses about an hour, and then to push on again and try to get out of the bush.

The horses were grazing close to us, and just behind one of the kopjes on which there was a picket, when we were suddenly startled by shots all round us, we started up and I shouted to the men to get into the kopjes, running myself with Captain Finch to turn the horses into the gully, we managed to get them down all right, although several were killed while we were doing it. The natives had crawled up in the long grass behind the large boulders that were lying about, and had got close to the horses before being seen ; several of them got among the horses and stabbed two of them, and a few of them tried to get into the kopjes before we could occupy them, but were too late. As soon as the horses were safe I went to the kopjes and saw that the men were all under cover, and warned them to be careful of their ammunition ; there were very few natives to be seen, but they kept up their fire for some time, and if any one of us showed himself he was fired at. We were quite safe in our kopjes, but there was the fear that the natives might get among the horses by a sudden rush and kill them all, but they did not attempt this. Several of the men felt very anxious, and their anxiety was increased by two who could understand what the natives were saying (for although we could not see them we could hear them talking), and who kept on warning them with, "Look out now, they are going to surround us," and "They are going to keep us here till dark and then come on with assegais." They did not make either of these attempts, and after about an hour's desultory firing went away, or rather ceased firing ; owing to the thickness of the bush we could not tell if they had really retired or not.

I had had all the horses saddled up directly the firing had slackened sufficiently to allow two men at a time to leave each kopje, so that we could move on as soon as possible and try to get into the open again, and as soon as the firing ceased I took the other Maxim across the gully and had all the horses brought up. Sergeant Gibson, Bechuanaland Border Police, who was in charge of one of the Maxims,

had been shot dead when sitting near his gun, but that was our only casualty in men, although we left eight horses dead there. In forming up to advance I had all the horses led by natives and as few men as possible, crowded up, and moving on close together with one Maxim in front and one in rear. Captain Raaf took charge of the advanced guard and right flank with about thirty men, and about thirty more remained in the kopjes to cover our advance until we had gone 400 or 500 yards, and then retired protecting our rear. We moved on like this for about two miles, getting down to the river but having to leave it again, as it was too broken to travel along, and came to a small valley the near side of which was very steep and covered with large loose stones; we had seen no natives since leaving the kopjes, and it looked as if we were not going to be molested again. The horses could not take the Maxim over the stones, and had to be taken out, and the gun was half-way down being pulled by men, the other Maxim being in position at the top when firing began again; Captain Raaf was on the right flank and saw some natives amongst the rocks near him, and opened fire on them, which they returned. The gun was pulled up again at once and the horses hurriedly put into a little hollow among the rocks, where they were under cover, the two Maxims got into position and all the men disposed in the best positions round; there was a good deal of firing for some time but no casualty.

While it was going on a heavy storm came on, and as it was getting late I decided to laager there for the night, I told Captain Raaf so, and he and I looked for a suitable place. We found a fairly good one in the rocks close to where the horses were, and made a strong fence round it, moving the guns and horses in as soon as it was ready. While we were doing this Captain Napier came to me and suggested that we should leave the gun carriages behind when we went on, as the horses could scarcely get them along, and they were only a hindrance to us; I told him I would think about it and that I was going to have a talk with Captain Raaf as soon as the laager was finished and settle what we should do. I was very adverse to leaving the carriages, as I did not wish to do anything which would make the natives think they had got the better of us or inconvenienced us in any way, but owing to the weakness of the horses I did not see how it could be avoided; the wounded were

all doing very well and could all ride, and we could carry the Maxim ammunition on horses.

When everything was made ready for the night I went over to Captain Raaf and he at once suggested leaving the carriages; I told Captain Tancred to see if we could carry the gun in any way, and if so we would leave the carriages, we found that six men could carry each gun fairly easily in blankets and so this was decided on. I then discussed the whole situation with Captain Raaf, and we decided as we were leaving the carriages and so could move more quietly, we should start that night at ten o'clock and try to get to the river again by daylight; that the march must be done in perfect silence, no smoking allowed, all horses that were knocked up left in the laager as well as all spare kit, each man taking only a blanket or cloak, and all dogs should be killed before starting. I asked Captain Raaf to let his men know as soon as possible what we were going to do, and said I would tell Captain Napier and went away to do so; just as I got back to the other side of the laager I heard Captain Francis and Mr. Farley shouting "Order!" and I then saw Captain Raaf standing on a rock and he began to address everybody; he began by saying we were in a tight fix and had to get out of it as best we could, and then went on to say what had been arranged. I said in a chaffing way to Captain Napier that the little man looked as if he'd taken charge, but did not stop him, as although he was wrong in doing it I thought it was only done in ignorance of etiquette, and that he meant it for the best. We did not know whether the natives were all round us or not, but hoped to be able to get through them in the dark, they had been heard talking and chopping trees for schirms just before dark, and we knew they were somewhere close.

At ten o'clock we moved as arranged, it was very dark and difficult to find a way over the stones by which we could get the horses into the valley. I went down first with Burnham and formed up the Column as they got into the valley, Captain Raaf stopping at the laager and seeing everyone out of it; we left about twenty horses in the laager with their saddlery, and a number of cloaks, blankets, etc. It seemed a long time waiting in the dark for all the Column to come down, but at last Captain Raaf reported everyone was down, and we started for our first night

march ; the order of march was as follows :—Burnham and I in front selecting the best road, then a Maxim carried by reliefs of six men and followed by prisoners and horses carrying its ammunition, then the wounded riding, and all the surviving horses—about sixty—led four together by one man, and lastly the other Maxim, also carried by six men. Our progress was very slow as the bush was thick and the Maxims heavy, and the carriers had to be frequently relieved. Captain Raaf was the only one except the wounded who rode, and he had bad feet and could not walk ; he kept backwards and forwards along the Column, seeing that it kept closed up, reporting to me if there was any delay in rear, when I halted. At first it was anxious work, and for the only time in the campaign I unloosened my revolver, but we neither saw nor heard anyone, and after going a mile or so I knew we must have got through the line of natives if there was one around us, and were safe for the present. We marched till five o'clock with frequent halts, sometimes to change reliefs of the guns and sometimes when Burnham either heard or smelt cattle in front of us ; on these occasions the Column halted while we went forward to find out what it was and the best way to avoid it. The worst of the halts was that the men went to sleep immediately they laid down, and there was always a chance of one being left behind when we moved on ; the previous day had been a hard one and we were all tired out, it was hard work to keep awake even when standing up. The men carried the gun for some distance, and then as they were getting done up, we tried carrying it, tripod and all, on a horse across the saddle, a man leading the horse and one supporting the gun on each side, this answered very well, and we got on much faster.

By daylight we had got out of the bush and kopjes and on to a large open plain with the river in the distance, we hurried across this and laagered on the bank of the river, having done twelve miles ; we put a strong fence round us, those who had food ate it, and then feeling quite safe, at any rate for a time, as the pickets could see a long distance, all who were not on duty had a good sleep. It was found out at daylight that one of the Victoria Column men, Shelldrake, was missing, and no one knew where he had been lost, it was impossible to send back to look for him, and we could only hope he would turn up all right, as he

did the following day. We moved on again at 1.30 and did six miles through good country by four o'clock, and then rested till midnight when we again started, but as the country was rough and it was very dark we had to stop till morning, got off again at 5.30, and did five miles and then halted. ✕ That morning we saw the Vungu join the Shangani, and knew we could not now be very far away from the waggon drift, I knew the Longwe joined the Shangani on our side about ten miles below the drift, and that the main road crossed it near the Intaba-gi-Momba about half-way between Umhlangeni and the drift, and by keeping up it we could save a good deal of distance. I therefore sent four "boys" on, Grootboom being one of them, to go up to the drift and see if the waggons were there; if not, two were to come back to report, the other two going to Umhlangeni with a note to Captain Delamore asking him to come to meet us down the Longwe. One of the "boys" came back soon afterwards saying that he had a bad foot; his feet were all right but he was afraid to go on, he shortly afterwards did have a very bad foot, as he was bitten by a snake.

Food had been very short for some time, and only those who had been very careful at first had had any bread or coffee for some days, and now we had been entirely out of meat for two days, and had to kill a horse. Some of the men did not like the idea of eating it, and it was not good, but I think everyone had to sooner or later; there was a sort of wild garlic growing all along the river and this flavoured the horse meat. Boots were rather a difficulty as the rough walking had ruined most of them, and all sorts of substitutes had to be made, several of the men walking in wallets. I had intended to halt there for the day, but the grass was so bad we had to move, which we did at 1.30. Just as we were starting Shelldrake, the missing man arrived; he had gone back to the laager for something after we left that night, and in following us had lost the spoor, he had seen a few natives but they had not molested him, he was very tired and hungry but glad to get back safe. We saw a number of cattle about 1,000 yards away soon after we started, but did not try to get them; we could only just manage to carry our wounded and ammunition, and our spare horses for flanking, etc., had now been reduced to six, and capturing cattle might have brought the natives on to us and given us more wounded to take along.

We had gone about a mile and were close to the river when fire was again opened on us from the bush about 200 yards away, the Maxims were got into action at once, all the spare men taking cover as far as they could near them, and the horses and wounded hurried under the river bank. The fire was hot for a few minutes and they were evidently firing at the Maxims, as Trooper Nesbitt, Salisbury Column, who was lying beside one of them, was shot through the arm, and directly afterwards Sergeant Pyke, Bechuanaland Border Police, who was working it, was also shot through the right arm. I was close by him at the time and picked him up and saw at once that the arm was broken and sent him to the doctor. The Maxims kept up a steady fire whenever we saw where the shots were fired from, and as soon as all the horses were under cover I withdrew the men to the river bank, carrying the Maxims back one at a time. There was a wide strip of grass half-way down the bank and the horses could move along this quite protected, and as there were evidently not a great many natives there, we moved on, all spare men not required to lead horses keeping along the top of the bank, the Maxims being carried on mules but ready to be brought into action at a moment's notice. We moved along like this for about two miles and then came to a decent position where we could halt under cover; the enemy had kept up a slight fire all the time but had done us no further damage. There was a small rocky ridge close by running parallel with the river and about 150 yards from it, and this Captain Raaf managed to occupy with the flanking party before the enemy got there, and so effectually covered us. We formed up here and firing was kept up on both sides for some time, the natives making an attempt at getting into some trees under the river bank but being stopped by the Maxim; a heavy thunderstorm broke as usual just before dark.

At 11 p.m. we started again and by daylight had done ten miles, going through some very nasty kopjes and thick bush, but seeing no one rested till nine and then on again until twelve, halting between some high kopjes and the river. At 2 p.m. we were off again, and saw a high range of hills running down to the river at right angles in front of us, Captain Raaf rode on to see if we could get round them, but he found we could not and returned. Just then we came on three parallel paths through the grass, along which a considerable number of

natives had gone very recently, as it looked as if they were going to wait for us in the kopjes I crossed the river there (it was quite shallow), went about two miles on the other side and then re-crossed, laagering in an open space. Just after crossing to the other side natives were heard shouting out in the bush on our left, and there was some little excitement for a minute but nothing happened. We moved again at 7.30, and shortly afterwards it began to rain very heavily; I knew we must be close to the Longwe and that it was the only river of any size that ran in from our side, but nobody knew it by sight. After going about a mile we saw what looked like the junction of two rivers, and a little further on Burnham, Chappé, and I went to find out if it was still the Shangani or another river. There was a sandy bed about 300 yards wide and we could see the bush on the other side, we crossed to this and then found we were on an island, the river dividing higher up; we went back to the Column which was halted and moved on. In about another mile we crossed a dry sandy river, and as some of our "boys" said this was the Longwe, we got on to an open place near and lay down till daylight, it was very cold and rained all night. As soon as it was light enough to see where we were going we got down to the Shangani, we had halted about half a mile from it and followed it again looking for a good place to laager; I had told the "boys" I had sent on that I should wait for them there, and they ought to be back at any time. We had to go about two miles before we got to anything like a decent place, and then on coming out of the bush saw what was unmistakably the Longwe in front of us; as the ground on the other side of the Shangani was better for laagering, we crossed and formed up in a patch of bush in a large open.

While coming along that morning and when it was barely light, we passed a small kraal of five huts and heard cattle lowing, I knew that there were nothing but Maholi kraals about and they would probably be friendly, and if they were not, with over 100 men I could surround the kraal and take them all without firing a shot, and I intended to do so, but Captain Raaf protested so strongly against it that I had to give it up, and we left the beef behind and killed a horse when we laagered. We had finished our breakfast, in most cases horse-meat and garlic only, though I was astonished on going to see Raaf afterwards

to find that he still had cookies and coffee, when a native appeared ; he turned out to be a Maholi, and the head of the small kraal that we had passed, had heard us pass while he was in bed but thought it was thunder, and in the morning saw our spoor and came to see us. He told us we had left all the Matabeli behind us now, and that that part of the country was quite quiet, he also said a number of Matabeli were returning up the Shangani with their cattle and going back to their kraals ; he told us he could take us straight across to Umhlangeni, and if we started at once we could be there by the same time next day. I told him we wanted meat, and that I would give him four cows on arrival at Umhlangeni for two now, and he went to fetch them. While he was away the two "boys" returned to say there were no waggons at the drift, and they had gone back some distance along the Umhlangeni road but had seen none, and had then come back down the Longwe, Grootboom going on by himself to Umhlangeni. The native returned with the two cows, which were very wild, and as we were afraid of losing them if we tried to drive them I had them both killed at once, one we ate straight off, and the other we cut up and carried with us.

As soon as we had had our meal we started again, guided by our friendly native, and did about five miles and then halted for the night in an open valley. We had scarcely done so when two men appeared riding towards us, they were greeted with cheers, and turned out to be Messrs. Selous and Acutt ; they told us that a relief column, with Mr. Rhodes and Dr. Jameson, was only one-and-a-half miles away with food, etc. I told Captain Raaf to bring the Column on as soon as the men had had some food, and rode back myself with Mr. Selous to see the Doctor ; the Column arrived just after dark and were received with open arms and lots of cookies and coffee. The relief Column consisted of about 150 men under Captain Heany, and with it were Mr. Rhodes, Dr. Jameson, Major Sawyer and Sir J. Willoughby. Major Sawyer had been sent up by Sir H. Loch to report on what was being done. All the men had a good meal followed by a good night's rest, and the following morning we started for Umhlangeni ; Captain Heany gave horses for all my men to ride, his own men walking, the wounded were carried in carts and we did the twenty-

two miles to Umhlangeni by dark. When we started in the morning Mr. Rhodes and Dr. Jameson rode straight in and at once sent off to announce our safety; Captain Heyman was in command at Umhlangeni with a mixed force, and the day after our return we went on to Buluwayo, Captain Heyman following the next day with all British South Africa Company's Troops, leaving some of the Bechuanaland Border Police and Cape Mounted Rifles with all the guns to garrison Umhlangeni, under command of Captain Coventry. The morning after our arrival at Umhlangeni Pyke's arm was successfully amputated at the shoulder, and he and all the other wounded were doing very well.

We had a very wet journey to Buluwayo but got in on the third day, and as all the Company's troops were now there Dr. Jameson began to make arrangements for disbanding them; there were plenty of stores in Buluwayo now, and by the 20th arrangements had been made, and on the 21st December all



MAHOLI MARCHING IN TO BULUWAYO TO SURRENDER THEIR ARMS.

The native in foreground is wearing the distinguishing mark—yellow "limbo" round his head, as worn by our "friendlies."

the men who wished to return to Salisbury or Victoria started off in waggons, having received a month's rations for the road, and on the following day all those who were returning to Johannesburg left via Tati. The latter did a very good journey, getting through to Johannesburg in five weeks, but the Salisbury and Victoria parties found the country very boggy and were consequently very much delayed, but got through safely; the Salisbury party under command of Captain Spreckley arriving on the 20th January, and the Victoria party under Lieutenant Beale about the 18th; Captain Carr, of Raaf's Column, was in charge of the Johannesburg party. A large number of men decided on stopping in Matabeliland, and

the Company at once raised a Police force 150 strong under Lieutenant Bodle, and on the 25th December the country was thrown open for prospecting and pegging off farms.

Nearly all the chiefs had now surrendered and there was no fear of further trouble. Captain Raaf was not very well when we returned and was not sufficiently careful, consequently he became worse and died shortly afterwards. My brother was still in bed when I returned to Buluwayo, his arm being still troublesome, and Dr. Jameson did not consider him fit to risk the post-cart journey to Vryburg; he therefore gave us the Bishop's travelling waggon, which had been taken over by the Company, and on the 31st December we started for Salisbury accompanied by Captain Finch, and arrived on the 20th January. Before the men were disbanded Mr. Rhodes had a parade of all the forces and addressed them; all the arms, ammunition, equipments, etc., were taken into store at Buluwayo, and just enough issued to each party going away to take them through; the Company had about 350 horses left after the men were disbanded, and the majority of them were handed over to the Police, every man remaining in the country had a rifle and ammunition issued to him and a month's free rations. We heard many different accounts from natives about Major Wilson's party after we returned to Buluwayo, some of them stating that men had escaped, but most of them that they had all been killed; it was not however until Mr. Dawson found their bones that I gave up all hopes of some having got away.

In conclusion I would wish to express my appreciation of the behaviour of all the Company's Troops during the campaign, and above all, my sincere sorrow at the loss of gallant Major Wilson and his brave band, and my heart-felt sympathy with their relations and friends. The story of how these thirty-four (nearly all of whom were great friends of my own) stood and fell, shoulder to shoulder, rather than desert two of their number who could not escape with them, will not only remain for ever in our history, but will be handed down through generations of the native tribes of Africa as an instance of how Englishmen can and will die, and the effect of their heroism on the natives, who above all else honour personal bravery, cannot be over-estimated.



MAJOR SIR JOHN C. WILLOUGHBY, BART.

(Chief Staff Officer to His Honour the Administrator.)

CHAPTER XIII.

CROSSING THE BORDER.

By MAJOR SIR JOHN C. WILLOUGHBY, BART.

The Victoria incident—The state of public feeling—The organisation of the Volunteers—Correspondence with the High Commissioner—The Southern Column—The start of the Columns—Our rival allies—Crossing the Border—Junction of the Salisbury and Victoria Columns.

FOR some time prior to July 14th, 1893, in the Victoria district, the Matabeli had been raiding in great force—their numbers being estimated at 5,000 to 6,000 men—killing the Mashonas right and left, including those in the employ of Europeans, under the very eyes of the latter, and even in the township of Victoria itself. They had also burnt the huts and stores on farms occupied by Europeans, and had stolen their cattle. On hearing of these events His Honour the Administrator, Dr. L. S. Jameson, hastened to Victoria from Salisbury, arriving there on the above-named date, and at once sent for the head indunas of the Matabeli impi: Manyou, Mjan, and Mangandan. These, on being interviewed, were very insolent. Dr. Jameson therefore gave them an ultimatum, ordering them to retire across the border forthwith, and informing them that he should drive them out if they had not commenced to do so within one hour.

One hour and forty minutes' law was actually given, and then Captain Lendy, R.A., at that time Magistrate of the Victoria district, received instructions to go out with thirty-eight mounted men, and, if the impi had not by then commenced to retire, to open fire on them.

Captain Lendy and his small party encountered 300 Matabeli, forming the advance party of the impi that were laying siege to Magomela's Kraal, four miles north-west of Victoria. Immediately the Matabeli saw the advanced guard of the mounted troop they opened fire. This was returned, whereupon the Matabeli fled, and were pursued

for three miles. The mounted men had no casualties, but forty Matabeli were killed, and several wounded ; Mangandan, the most impertinent of the indunas, being amongst the first to be shot. Had Captain Lendy continued the pursuit two miles further he would have encountered the main body of the Matabeli, which, as soon as it heard the firing, fled for a considerable distance, a part of it however returning during the night to recover its dead and the cattle it had raided.

At daylight next morning Dr. Jameson again sent out a party to ascertain whether the Matabeli had re-crossed the border, and on finding that such was the case, telegraphed via Palapye to Lobengula, informing him of what had occurred, and asking him to punish the indunas responsible, finally demanding compensation for the damage done by his impi to the property of Europeans, and the restitution of the cattle stolen from them ; he also informed Lobengula that the white people could not give up Mashona women and children to be slaughtered, as they had claimed their protection ; but that if any of the people had done wrong they would be tried in the usual manner before the magistrate of the district, and if convicted, punished accordingly.

A complete narrative of the above events was then telegraphed to His Excellency the High Commissioner at Cape Town, who at once sent a strong remonstrance to Lobengula, telling him to comply with Dr. Jameson's demands, at the same time expressing a wish to remain on friendly terms with him and his people.

The question of compensation was afterwards dropped by order of the Colonial Office, and was never again referred to.

Lobengula, before receiving his own people's account of the engagement, replied in a most friendly manner, informing Dr. Jameson that he would be quite right to drive his impis away if troublesome, because they had distinct orders not to interfere with the white people and acknowledged he was wrong in having allowed them to go so near the white settlement.

When, however, his own people reported the skirmish, he sent a second message, more threatening in tone, and demanding the unconditional surrender of Mashona men, women, and children, before he would even enter into the question of compensation for damage experienced by the white men.

At this point all communication between Dr. Jameson and Lobengula ceased ; but His Excellency the High Commissioner continued still to send friendly messages.

The European population in the Victoria district had been much scared by the occurrences during the Matabeli raid, and even subsequently to the skirmish which ensued they continued in a great state of alarm. Almost all development work, both mining and agricultural, remained practically at a standstill ; native labour and waggon transport were absolutely unattainable ; and all waggons on the road at the time turned back, many of the transport riders off-loading and leaving their goods in the veld, to accelerate their escape out of the country.

Meetings were held, and the people were openly clamouring for the Matabeli question to be settled once for all by vigorous and instantaneous action ; and declaring that, if the British South Africa Company did not undertake this at once, they would leave the country en masse, considering both their lives and their property in danger.

Dr. Jameson, having himself from the first taken the same view of the situation, thereupon, to satisfy their demands, commenced the organisation of defence columns, which at the same time would be sufficiently strong for offence, should such subsequently be required. The necessity of offensive action being taken was fully realised by everyone in Mashonaland, and by those outside who knew anything of the Matabeli, as the only solution possible ; though of course no active measures of offence could be undertaken without the sanction of the Imperial Government.


Acting on this determination, Captain Raaf, C.M.G., Magistrate of Tuli, was authorised to purchase 750 horses as speedily as possible, and to organise a Volunteer Force of 250 mounted men, with fifty additional pack horses : the force to be recruited from Tuli and the surrounding districts.

The original idea was that this force should consist entirely of Dutchmen, who it was erroneously supposed (as subsequently proved to be the case) would be willing to campaign with merely ammunition and biltong, and in the event of a forward movement would live on the native produce of the country, thus obviating the necessity of a train of waggons. Captain Raaf, however, found that, with few exceptions, the

Dutchmen were unwilling to come forward, and therefore had to look elsewhere.

At the same time a Volunteer Force was started at Salisbury by Major Forbes, the Magistrate of that district, and also at Victoria by Captain Allan Wilson, of the Bechuanaland Exploration Company, who had had considerable experience in all the later Kaffir wars, and who was personally known to most of the prospectors in the district, possessing their full confidence. Each of these corps were to consist of 250 mounted men, with the object of defending the border, but, if necessary, of invading Matabeliland, unencumbered by waggons, but with pack and spare horses. (The latter idea was afterwards abandoned as

impracticable, owing to the poor condition of the horses. The numbers of both corps were afterwards considerably augmented and a sufficient train of waggons engaged to accompany each.)



A CORNER OF THE HORSE LINES IN LAAGER.

In the meantime the best routes into Matabeliland from the East side, along which the natural features of the country offered fewest obstacles, such as thick bush or broken country, to an advance, were surveyed as far as possible, and the services engaged of such guides as were forthcoming, both European and Native, who to some extent were acquainted with the intervening country between Mashonaland and Buluwayo.

Finding that Captain Raaf was not collecting so many horses as he had been instructed to do, 300 more horses, mostly salted (i.e., proof against horse-sickness), were also purchased, and the reserves of ammunition, machine guns, and all kinds of equipments, of which the Company had a large stock at Tuli, were pushed up to Victoria and Salisbury, while contracts were made with Mr. Napier and Mr. Bezeidenhout to supply the necessary waggon transport and oxen for the Victoria

and Salisbury Columns respectively, in the event of an advance becoming necessary.

On my arrival at Victoria, September 7th, the work of organisation had made great progress. I found the Salisbury Column was already equipped, organised, and on the march to Charter, which place was considered, from its central position, as most suitable for occupation, being central for the defence of the North Eastern border, as also the nearest point to the most Northern and most favourable route by which this Column could enter Matabeliland if offensive action became unavoidable. The Victoria Column was not so forward in its organisation, owing to its reinforcements from below not having yet arrived. With the exception of the Artillery Troop, under Captain Lendy, fifty strong, garrisoning the Fort, the remainder were encamped five miles North of Victoria.

Both columns were still awaiting the full complement of the horses, there being only 100 at the time belonging to the Company, though an additional 100 were subsequently purchased from private individuals when it was found that Captain Raaf had failed to get his full authorised number.

The next fortnight was spent by Dr. Jameson and myself in visiting the forces at Tuli and Charter. In the meantime frequent scares occurred, one of which seemed especially well founded, as all the Mashonas in the neighbourhood of Victoria were busily fortifying themselves, laying up stores of food and water in their caves of refuge, and sending in to inform us that the Matabeli were coming back in a short time.

On September 30th, two men of Captain White's patrol were fired on near the border, within thirty miles of Victoria, and fresh spoor of impis and raided cattle crossing the border were observed by the same patrol.

From native information received locally at Victoria and Charter we were led to believe that the Matabeli were advancing in great force and in two divisions—one on Victoria and the other in the direction of Tati. This was also corroborated by Mr. Colenbrander's report to His Excellency the High Commissioner after a trip taken by him to beyond Tati; and the fact that the Matabeli should have ventured to fire on Captain White's patrol near a kraal that a short time previously had been visited by white men without any molestation, was naturally considered

a proof that those Matabeli were but the outposts of a large impi, as it was unlikely that they would have ventured to fire unless emboldened by the support of large reinforcements in their rear.

About the same time a report came in that the Matabeli were raiding some little distance west of Sinoia; Matabeli had also been seen on the road between Tuli and Victoria.

On October 5th a patrol of the Bechuanaland Border Police was fired on in the Protectorate and South of the Shashi River, and shortly afterwards His Excellency the High Commissioner telegraphed his sanction to a general forward movement into Matabeliland.

I.

[Copy of Telegram.]

From

DR. JAMESON,
Victoria,

To

HIS EXCELLENCY THE HIGH COMMISSIONER,
Cape Town.

(Dated 2nd October, 1893.)

"Have just arrived from Charter and found Captain White awaiting me with the following report:—

"About twenty-five miles from Victoria a Mashona kraal reported that an impi of Matabeli crossed Shashi to this side, captured cattle and returned beyond border.

"Captain White's patrol took up spoor of natives and cattle which led up to a kraal eight miles beyond Shashi. Police demanded to see Induna, whereupon a large number of Matabeli appeared upon the rocks and fired on them. Police returned fire, and retired beyond Shashi to main body of patrol. Captain White then at once came into camp to report the occurrence. Captain White also reports, twenty-five miles north-west of Victoria, spoor made by Matabeli regiments, consisting of sixteen pathways; calculated by native experts that from 6,000 to 7,000 men have been there.

"Now I feel sure Your Excellency will agree with me that the natives would not have fired even upon two policemen unless large bodies of Matabeli were in the neighbourhood. Captain White further reports that natives all along the border report the existence of large bodies of Matabeli all along the Shashi, and I have little doubt that this kraal which fired on the police is one of the advance posts of the Matabeli regiments.

"Captain White also states that the kraals along the Shashi refused to give

or sell food, but told him he might take anything, because they were afraid of Matabeli in the immediate neighbourhood.

"I will now keep Captain White and his party here until I hear from Your Excellency, in case you should allow me to move further forward with both the Salisbury and Victoria parties, and a few days later the Tuli Company, who have a shorter distance to go, should it be necessary to go right into the country. Should you still desire me to send out the large patrol I mentioned from Charter, I will keep Captain White's party in readiness to go on receipt of your wire."

NOTE.—There are two Shasha or Shashi Rivers, the northern being a small tributary of the Tokwe River, and the southern river demarcating the Shashi-Macloutsie territory.

II.

[Copy of Telegram.]

From

HIGH COMMISSIONER,
Cape Town,

To

HIS HONOUR DR. JAMESON,
Victoria.

(Dated October 5th, 1893.)

October 5th.—Following telegram dated to-day received from officer commanding Macloutsie (Colonel Goold-Adams) begins—"A patrol of mine, consisting of a non-commissioned officer and two men, reports by heliograph from my post between here and the Shashi, that whilst patrolling this morning on the bank of the Shashi River, they were fired upon by, as far as they could gather, about thirty Matabeli; our men returned the fire; on some more of our men coming up the Matabeli retired. I cannot hear of any large body of Matabeli, and suppose this was only a party pushing forward to see what we are doing. There were no casualties on our side. I have a patrol of one non-commissioned officer and ten men out at that spot on the Shashi, and am in constant communication by the heliograph. What are Your Excellency's instructions?" Ends—"Will you please make arrangements at once for placing the Tuli mounted force under Colonel Goold-Adams?"

III.

[Copy of Telegram.]

From

HIGH COMMISSIONER,
Cape Town,

To

HIS HONOUR DR. JAMESON,
Victoria.

(Dated 5th October, 1893.)

October 5th.—"Received last evening Sir J. Willoughby's and your long

telegrams reporting the result of Captain White's and Mr. Brabant's scouting. I quite agree, as I pointed out in my telegram of the 2nd inst., that it would be very imprudent to attempt to push back the Impis by attacking them in the rough ground which they apparently occupy; whatever your plans are with regard to the advance of the columns from Fort Charter and Fort Victoria they had better now be carried out, and an endeavour made to induce the Matabeli to abandon the position from which you would have great difficulty to dislodge them by force. Have you any concerted plan by which this can be done? The Impis now, whether large or small, must be withdrawn to greater distance than they are apparently at present, and it must be left for you to decide what course should be adopted for this purpose. Should the Impis withdraw peaceably and of their own accord to a safe distance, they must be allowed to do so without interruption; but if they should resist, then I have informed you you may take such measures as may be necessary under the circumstances for the protection of life and property. Should hostilities occur, Colonel Goold-Adams has orders to advance at once on Tati and Monarch Mine, and I have requested Khama that 1,000 of his men may be immediately placed under Colonel Goold-Adams' command. It would doubtless greatly strengthen his column if the mounted men belonging to the British South Africa Company at Tuli were placed under his directions; and it would be for you, in consultation with Colonel Goold-Adams, to decide whether this force should move forward by itself by the Mangwe River towards Mangwe, or accompany Colonel Goold-Adams to Tati, etc., etc. In either case, as the British South Africa Company's men would be working within the Bechuanaland Protectorate Territory, I shall require them to come under the Company's Discipline Act of 1891 for a period say of three or four months on such terms as may have been already arranged between them and the Company, and that they should be under any circumstances under Colonel Goold-Adams' authority while within or passing through the Protectorate. I have given strict orders that no pillaging or cruelty to the natives will be permitted, and that anyone acting in contravention of these orders will be very severely punished. I have also desired Colonel Goold-Adams to pay for any supplies required. I trust you will enjoin on the Officers and men of the Company's forces acting in Mashonaland, the necessity for strict attention being paid during military operations to the requirements of humanity. The men are not under any military law, but I have every confidence in the restraining influence of the Officers and the good feeling of the men to act as if they were under strict military regulation; and that there will be no necessity for me in the exercise of the authority I possess to enact any special laws by proclamation to provide for

the punishment of offences against the people or breach of good discipline. I trust that discipline and obedience to orders will ensure to the British South Africa Company's troops the success which their undoubted bravery and devotion to duty in coming forward in defence of the country deserve."

IV.

[Copy of Telegram.]

From

JAMESON,

To

HIS EXCELLENCY THE HIGH COMMISSIONER,

Cape Town.

(Dated October 6th, 1893.)

October 6th.—"Have received your three wires of yesterday, and am now acting upon Your Excellency's instructions to carry out my plans, the outline of which I wired to you on October 4th. Both the Charter and Victoria Columns are now moving forward, and with Sir John Willoughby I shall follow and join the Victoria Column, proceeding with it until its junction with the Charter force, when further movement if necessary will be decided upon.

"I have telegraphed Captain Raaf this morning to place himself under the orders of Colonel Goold-Adams, and have asked the latter to telegraph his instructions to Captain Raaf. As in the attestation paper of the Tuli Force Ordinance No. 1 of 1891 is not mentioned, I have telegraphed Captain Raaf to get the signatures of all his men to an attestation paper with the following heading: 'We, the undersigned, do promise and swear that we will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Queen Victoria, and to her heirs and successors according to law, and that we will faithfully serve in the British South Africa Company's Police, and that we will perform the duties assigned to us to the best of our ability under the provisions of the British South Africa Company's Ordinance No. 1 of 1891.' " Ends—"As I shall still be here two days I have asked Colonel Goold-Adams to keep me informed of his movements and intentions during that time, and after leaving I shall as far as possible by native runners keep Your Excellency and Colonel Goold-Adams informed of our progress and of the movements of the Matabeli. I note Your Excellency's confidence that no pillaging or cruelty to the natives will be permitted by the officers of the expedition, and I am sure this confidence will not be abused. To further ensure good discipline, and no unnecessary cruelty to the natives en route, any native allies which accompany us have been placed under reliable white men. I can further assure Your Excellency that the whole expedition is

under strict military discipline. I thank Your Excellency on behalf of the officers and men for the good wishes expressed at the end of your telegram, which will be communicated to them.

"The Patrol which I expected last night has not yet returned, but as it is under Mr. Brabant and accompanied by reliable native scouts I have no anxiety about its return. Should it meet the column en route, or should it arrive here, I will at once telegraph to Your Excellency Mr. Brabant's report.

"The Salisbury and Victoria Forces are attested under the provisions of Ordinance No. 1 of 1891."

V.

[Copy of Telegram.]

From
JAMESON,

To
GOULD-ADAMS,
Macloutsie.

(Dated October 6th, 1893.)

"His Excellency wired me last night to make arrangements for placing Tuli mounted force under you; I have wired Raaf accordingly this morning, and he is now entirely under your orders.

"Victoria and Salisbury Columns start this morning. I shall be here with Willoughby till Sunday in case you wish to communicate; we will then join Victoria Column en route. Will send back as far as possible native runners from time to time with any information particularly as to our progress and movements of Matabeli which may be wired to Macloutsie, and from there you might make similar arrangements."

As already stated, it had been intended previously that the Tuli, Victoria, and Salisbury Columns, in the event of an invasion of Matabeliland becoming necessary, should each march from different points unencumbered by waggons. It had also been intended that each column should act independently and march by its own separate route to Buluwayo. This plan of campaign was afterwards modified; the Victoria and Salisbury Columns to take with them each twelve waggons carrying food supplies and reserve of ammunition; and subsequently, when the Bechuanaland Border Police were ordered to take part in the Campaign, the Tuli Force reinforced them, having its

own waggon transport, and henceforth became a portion of the Southern Column under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Goold-Adams.

The number of waggons of the Victoria and Salisbury Columns was also subsequently increased to eighteen in each column. The idea of these two columns marching independently of one another was also abandoned, and it was arranged that they should meet at Iron Mine Hill, at the head waters of the Tokwe, a spot situated equi-distant from Victoria and Charter, and at a sufficiently safe distance from where it was likely that any very serious opposition from the Matabeli could be met with.

The Salisbury Column finally received its orders to march on Iron Mine Hill October 7th, and taking a road of its own across the veld reached that place October 14th, having traversed a distance of eighty-six miles through a bushy country without incident.

The Victoria Column started October 6th, via Makouris (old post station), near which it turned off the main road and struck out in the direction of Iron Mine Hill, this detour being necessary to avoid the very broken country of Chilimanzi's; it then halted for three days eight miles beyond, where it turned off the main road and thirty-eight miles from Victoria, to await the Artillery Troop and the arrival of its dismounted men enlisted at Tuli. This halt was invaluable to the horses after their long journey up country, as they still much needed further rest and there was good grazing in the vicinity. A good position was taken up at the foot of an almost impregnable granite kopje, which it was intended to hold in preference to the laager in case of attack. Though it was improbable that any such attack would take place, it was just possible, as it was rumoured that a Matabeli impi was stationed in the broken country of Chilimanzi's; this rumour it was impossible to verify as the broken nature of the country in that direction to the south rendered efficient scouting quite impossible.

On October 8th, Dr. Jameson and myself, having settled all the final details, and having seen off the last drafts of dismounted men for the Victoria Column, left Victoria, rejoining that force at its temporary halting-place the following day.

The only information hitherto received from the scouts was to the effect that a few Matabeli had been seen on our side of the border.


The following day the Artillery troop under Captain Lendy and the last detachment of dismounted men arrived. The latter, fifty-six in number, had done exceedingly well, having marched from Tuli, a distance of 240 miles, in twelve days. During the previous night a slight alarm was occasioned by a native report sent in by our advanced scouts under Captain the Hon. C. J. White, that two impis of Matabeli were

within five miles of the camp in broken country and threatening our left flank.

As the country was too broken for the mounted scouts to reconnoitre in that direction, native scouts were sent out, and reported that this information was incorrect; it was afterwards ascertained that a force of Matabeli had been stationed in the hills behind Chilimanzi's principal kraal, some fifteen miles south-west of the camp, but that it retired on gaining notice of our advance. Native information through Mr. Brabant led us to believe that the

Umbezu, Hlahlangela, Inyamindlhovo, Amaveni, Imzinzati, Inyati, and Enxna regiments were all retreating on the Shangani River. Major Wilson rode on from camp to Chaka's kraal, eight miles ahead, and while

interviewing with Mr. Quested's Mashona contingent, recruited in the district, the kraal was raided by Mr. Brabant's Mashona contingent—a slight misunderstanding amongst our rival allies which was soon explained and put right.



CROSSING THE SHASHI RIVER.

It had originally been intended to attack Chilimanzi and Ndema, both powerful Makalaka chiefs, who were reported to have been hostile to whites and in league with the Matabeli; but as both these chiefs on our approach sent friendly messages and presents of oxen, with offers of help in the way of a contingent from each, it was decided to push on direct to Iron Mine Hill and combine forces with the Salisbury Column. The column accordingly started at 6 a.m. on the 12th, and trekked seven miles to within two miles of the Shashi River, making poor progress through rather heavy sand, and being delayed somewhat in crossing the Umshagashi River. The small kraals of Chitakabi and Masendeka on granite kopjes were passed, and the columns halted near Chaka's kraal, Chaka being chief of the three above-mentioned kraals; these were apparently friendly to us, as were also the few kraals along the line of march still further ahead. From here onwards Mr. Brabant's natives commenced their scouting duties at least one trek ahead of the columns, being subdivided into smaller parties under the men forming Mr. Dollar's European party of scouts (twelve in number), while Mr. Qusted's natives commenced scouting some miles to the south-east on our left and most threatened flank. As we advanced further and across the border, the whole of the native contingents were distributed in front and rear and both flanks to a radius of five or six miles, until we got in touch with the Matabeli impis, when they showed such a strong disinclination to keep any distance in advance, that it was considered advisable to depend merely on our European scouts for information of the country in advance; however, the native contingents were excessively useful in saving our horses much hard work during the earlier stages of the advance.

On October the 13th the Column did two treks of seven miles and five miles respectively; during the first the Shashi River was crossed without difficulty (this river was the nominal border between Mashonaland and Matabeliland), also the Tetekwe River, where the Column made its midday halt. The Salisbury Column was here reported by natives to be at Iron Mine Hill, and two Matabeli impis were also reported to be between it and us; later information of the natives during the day sent in by our scouts was that there were four impis lying between us and the Salisbury Column. During the day's march the kraals of Chaka and Masibadonda were passed. On the first information being received

concerning the arrival of the Salisbury Column at Iron Mine Hill, four scouts were sent on at once to verify it, but returned, having found the hill but no one there. The Column halted for the night about one-and-a-half miles south-west of the Matonga River. Dr. Jameson and myself here left the Column to push on to Iron Mine Hill, sleeping that night with Captain White's inner circle of scouts near Makamia's kraal, four miles ahead of the Column.

Next morning we reached the Umgezi River, eight miles distant, and two miles further on gained a high plateau and open country, the line of march up to this point since leaving the Salisbury main road having led us through more or less bush country (chiefly Magondi forest), skirting, as before stated, the very broken granite country of Chilimanzi's. Iron Mine Hill, a distance of twenty-nine miles from where we left the Column, was reached without incident at 5 p.m., not a single native having been encountered, the country, till close to Iron Mine Hill, being very open and waterless. Here we found the Salisbury Column, which had arrived that morning, just starting to form laager at the head of the Tokwe, one-and-a-half miles beyond, for the position at Iron Mine Hill was a very bad one, far from water, and the laager being formed at the foot of the hill immediately commanded by it. The Salisbury scouts reported no Matabeli impis in the vicinity, but a few men of the Insukameni Regiment, in charge of cattle that had been recently raided from Victoria in the Mgagoshla Hills, some seven miles north-west. Indaima, whose principal kraal lies fifteen miles south-west of Iron Mine Hill, was also reported anxious to be friendly. As the Salisbury Column had to halt here pending the arrival of the Victoria Column, it was decided to employ the time in recapturing the above-mentioned cattle and reconnoitring ahead.

[From this point, for the details of the daily marches, of the work accomplished, and of the engagements fought, the reader is referred to Major Forbes' account of the operations. Major Willoughby's account is resumed at a later point, dealing with the conclusion of the campaign.]

CHAPTER XIV.

THE CLOSE OF THE CAMPAIGN.

BY MAJOR SIR JOHN C. WILLOUGHBY, BART.

The surrender of Indunas—Major Forbes instructed to pursue Lobengula—The Shangani reached—Major Wilson sent on ahead—The party surrounded and cut off—The last stand—A relief party organized—The retreat of Major Forbes' patrol—Hardships on the way—Submission of the Matabeli—The duties of the British South Africa Company's Police and the Bechuanaland Border Police—Messrs. Dawson and Riley's mission—The death of Lobengula—The final settlement of the country.


WITHOUT recapitulating the facts embracing the return of Major Forbes to Inyati, it may be mentioned that some of the head indunas of the country, including Babyan, Glishu, Maarswee, and Sikombo, had come in to surrender; and that from information obtained from John Jacobs, one of the colonial natives with the King, who had also come in to give himself up, it was supposed that the patrol after the King was on the wrong tack, and that the King was not on the Bubyie at all, but in the direction of the Gwai River to the North-West of Shiloh. Instructions were therefore sent to Major Forbes to proceed at once with his whole force to Shiloh, where reinforcements and food supplies would be awaiting him, and from there to follow the King's waggon spoor, which would be pointed out to him by John Jacobs. He was then to make every endeavour to overtake and capture the King; the original instructions to disarm all armed natives, or to shoot them if they refused compliance, were still to be adhered to. Ten waggons, with 220 men, twelve days' rations for the whole force, and reserves of ammunition, were sent to Shiloh; and on the 25th of November the patrol, reconstituted and re-equipped, made a second advance from that place. The force, as rearranged, consisted of about 165 mounted and 105 dismounted men, four Maxims, and the Hotchkiss, and five waggons carrying reserves of ammunition, and sixteen days' short rations (i.e., half ration of meal); the balance of the force, 280 men,

partly mounted, five waggons, and the seven-pounder, returned to Buluwayo. By this time heavy rains had set in, making the veld very bad travelling for both waggons and horses ; and during the next few days the Patrol made such poor progress that on the 29th Major Forbes decided to push on without waggons. He accordingly again subdivided his force, taking on with him only 165 mounted men, spare and pack horses, two Maxims, ten days' rations, and 20,000 rounds of ammunition, leaving Captain Delamere with instructions to proceed with the remainder of the men and the waggons to Umhlangeni.

Up to the 3rd of December the progress of the patrol was without incident. All natives met appeared to be friendly, with the exception that two scouts, on the 2nd of December, were surrounded by some twenty Matabeli, who told them they intended to take them to Gambo, their induna ; the scouts, however, escaped from them. All native reports induced Major Forbes to consider that there were only a few men actually with the King, and that he would meet with little, if any, opposition. On the 3rd a point on the Shangani was reached, a distance of eighty-four miles N.N.W. of Shiloh ; here the King's latest scherm was found, and in it a Matabeli boy and a young Maholi were captured, from whom it was ascertained that the King had only left that morning on the news of the near approach of the white men, that his waggons had experienced much difficulty in crossing the river, and that an impi had been sent back to attack the patrol in the thick bush, through which it had just passed ; if it failed to do this, that the impi was to follow it up and attack it wherever it was. Major Wilson and eighteen men were sent forward in the afternoon to reconnoitre along the King's spoor, with instructions to be back by sun-down. He however did not return.

Captain Napier and two others returned about midnight to inform Major Forbes that the King was some five or six miles ahead, and that Major Wilson was close to him ; that there were more natives with him than was expected (Captain Napier described their passing in the dark through a number of schirms, some of them of great size), and that it would be advisable for the whole force and Maxims (on packs) to come on at once. As it was a dark night and the horses were knocked up, and as he thought he was at the time surrounded by an impi and that

he might be attacked at any moment, Major Forbes thought it unsafe to take on the whole force (150 men), but he sent on Captain Borrow and twenty men without any Maxims, and decided to move on himself at daylight. The main body, it would appear, however, did not make a move till nearly one hour after daylight, and some time before it started heavy firing was heard in the direction of Major Wilson's party. Soon after making a move the main body was attacked on its way along the river down towards the drift where the King had crossed. The enemy opened fire from the bush about 250 to 300 yards away to the left of the force, which thereupon formed up in the open, where it remained for one hour until the enemy's fire was silenced. During the whole of the engagement the natives kept well under cover in the bush, a very few showing themselves, and it was impossible to ascertain their numbers. It was not till the enemy's fire was silenced that the force at length retreated to a better position. The casualties of the patrol were, five men wounded, sixteen horses and two mules killed. About 8 a.m. Messrs. Burnham, Ingram, and Gooding came back from Major Wilson's party. They reported that they had all ridden up at daylight to the King's scherms and called to him to come out, upon which about 100 natives ran out and opened fire, killing or wounding two horses. The fire was returned, and the party then retreated 600 yards, where it was again attacked. The three above-mentioned were then ordered to return to hurry on the main body, and on the way were met by a large body of Matabeli, who pursued them and drove them off to the left and up the river. They succeeded in effecting their escape, but on reaching the river, found it had come down, and had to swim across it. The main body, still thinking it was surrounded, formed a strong scherm, and it was decided to await the return of Major Wilson till the next morning, it being considered impossible to go to his assistance on account of the river having risen. Natives were seen and heard on the opposite side of the river during the day. From subsequent information obtained from



MATABELI SCOUTS
ON THE BANKS OF
THE SHANGANI.

natives who were on the spot, and whom I have personally cross-examined, it seems that Major Wilson momentarily repulsed the men actually round the waggons ; but the King had fled on horseback with the indunas Bosumwan, Magwegwe, and one other, the previous afternoon. On Major Wilson retreating while pursued by the enemy, he encountered and was surrounded by the larger portion of the impi that had been sent on December 2nd under Mjan (commander-in-chief), Manondwan, and Manyou, to waylay the patrol in the thick bush. This impi consisted of a mixed lot from the Insuka, Umbezu, Ingubu, Inhlati, Mlecho and Umhlahlangela regiments, and people from the towns of Induba and others, the King being left with the Buluwayo people, Mabambani and part of the Icapa (Gambo's division). When this impi failed to catch the patrol and found it encamped in the open on the river, Mjan decided to take back the Umbezu and Ingubu across the river to guard the King, leaving orders for part of the Insuka, Isezeba, Mlecho, Inhlati and Umhlahlangela to cross the river at once, and lie in ambush near the drift, and the remainder to stay on the left bank. These orders were disobeyed on account of the night being very wet and dark ; and the force that was to have crossed the river did not do so till next morning after daylight, and then, hearing the firing at the King's waggons, it rushed on and intercepted Major Wilson's party while retreating.

On the night of the 3rd, Mjan, with the Umbezu and Ingubu, reached the King's waggons after Major Wilson had ridden up to them, and had then retreated into the bush. The people at the waggons, in the absence of any induna, had not known quite what to do, and had been at first inclined to open fire on the party, but were stopped by Major Wilson telling them not to do so, as he had not come to fight, but only to talk to the King, and asking where he was, they replied "that he had gone." On Mjan's arrival, finding the King had disappeared, and that no one knew where he or Major Wilson's party were, Mjan said, "We can do nothing in the dark, so we will sleep round the waggons, and see what happens in the morning." When Major Wilson and his party again rode up in the morning he was at once attacked by this force, and Mjan's son was one of the first killed, two of the horses of the party being also shot. While retreating, Major Wilson sent off Messrs.

Burnham, Ingram, and Gooding. These, as before narrated, effected their escape, soon after which Major Wilson's party encountered all those portions of the regiments which Mjan had detailed to cross the river the previous night, and who were hurrying up to reinforce the party round the King's waggons. He was then completely surrounded by these, though he tried on every side at first to get out, and finding this impossible, he formed a ring of his horses and made his last stand on the King's waggon spoor. Here he and his party fought for several hours. As the horses dropped shot they formed a barricade of their dead bodies. They twice drove the enemy off, and but for their ammunition running short would probably have beaten him off altogether, as, after their experience of Shangani and Imbembesi, the Matabeli were disinclined to expose themselves in a rush. As it was, however, it was the continuous stream of reinforcements coming in on all sides that overwhelmed them. All died game to the last. One man was especially mentioned, for when all the others were shot down and more or less wounded, and though himself wounded in several places, he collected some rifles and revolvers and made a stand on a neighbouring ant-heap, keeping the enemy at bay. For a long time the enemy could not kill him, and he shot down at least eight or ten before he was eventually shot dead himself, and on running in at last they found him with six or eight wounds on his body. Nearly every man of the party received four or five wounds ; the party killed at least ten men for every one of its own, and there was literally a fence of dead bodies piled one upon the other around it. The bodies were all stripped, but not mutilated ; and at first Major Wilson's was left untouched out of respect, though it was afterwards stripped like the rest. The natives were especially struck with admiration at the way in which all died, when they could fight no longer, without a struggle or a murmur, and secondly, for the way in which they fought on when wounded, and the coolness with which one would take off his shirt while under fire, tear it into strips and bind up the wounds of a comrade, who would then resume the fight. Though all Englishmen cannot but deplore the circumstances that led to the heroic death of this gallant band, they must all feel proud of these their countrymen, who have achieved a record of heroism worthy to be placed amongst the highest in the

annals of the race. It is men such as these who have made our country great.

The Matabeli, after burying a portion of their dead, retired in the afternoon with the idea of attacking the main body of the Patrol, but the river had risen too high to permit of crossing, and no doubt, after their experience of the morning, they were probably not too keen to do so if they had been able. When the Patrol retreated up the river the following morning, the enemy followed all day on the opposite side ; but then, being still unable to cross, returned to the drift, and there crossed and followed in rear for a few days. The enemy then returned to the drift and encamped there, and a week later, received orders from the King to disperse and collect women and cattle and return to him. This was done in some cases, but the majority gave up all idea of returning, and have since submitted.

Major Forbes on the night of the 4th sent two mounted messengers back to Buluwayo to inform Dr. Jameson of what had happened, and asking for reinforcements and supplies, especially ammunition, to be sent him ; " that he intended, if possible, to effect his retreat up the Shangani River ; as he thought it very possible that these messengers would not get through he would not put any details in writing." The messengers reached Buluwayo on the seventh, having met with no hostile natives. Dr. Jameson and myself started next day with a party, under Captain Heany, of 119 men, partly mounted and partly dismounted, 250 Mashona Contingent, and waggons carrying food supplies and ammunition, for Umhlangeni (Inyati), which place we reached on the 10th. Here we fully expected to find further news as to Major Forbes' movements awaiting us, and failing such, we were for the moment at a loss what to do, as the Patrol might take any one of four routes, viz., the long roundabout one along the Shangani to the Hartley Hill Road, and by that road to Umhlangeni ; up the Shangani to the junction with it of the Longwe, and then up that river to the Hartley Hill Road and thence to Umhlangeni ; along the Inyoka road across the veld, the most direct route of all ; or back along the King's waggon spoor to Shiloh. In the state the veld was in, after the continuous heavy rains, it appeared unwise to start a force to the Shangani, with the prospect of intervening rivers rising, and so

preventing its return in case the Patrol had gone some other way. It was therefore decided to await more definite news, and in the meantime strong patrols were sent out in all directions to try and obtain information from the natives, while Messrs. Graham and Schulz, who volunteered for the purpose, rode down some thirty miles below the junction of the Longwe and Shangani, a distance of over fifty miles from Umhlangeni. These latter returned in four days' time, having actually passed the Patrol without knowing it. They met with no resistance and disarmed several natives, but in the meantime, and before they returned, a colonial native came through to Umhlangeni on the night of the 13th with messages from the Patrol to say that it was fifteen miles below the junction of the Longwe on the 12th, which place it would reach on the 14th. On receipt of this news two Scotch carts and one light ambulance waggon were loaded up at once during the night with supplies and ammunition, and at daylight next morning we started, with 100 mounted and fifty dismounted men, to the relief of the Patrol, reaching to within three miles of the junction—a distance of twenty-four miles—before dark the same day. The march was without incident, the few armed natives being encountered being promptly disarmed without any show of resistance. Messrs. Selous and Acutt then rode on to the junction and met the Patrol, which then came on and joined the relief column. The whole party, including the few wounded, five in number, had had a very severe time of it; the men had undergone considerable hardships from their clothes and boots being worn out with the rough wear, and from want of food, the last few days, having had to eat some of their horses. One more slight attack from natives of a cattle post was experienced on the morning of the 12th. The total casualties of the Patrol throughout, exclusive of Major Wilson's party, were one man killed and seven wounded, including Serjeant Pike and one native driver. Twenty-eight horses and two mules were shot, but the Patrol had left behind (abandoned) nearly 100 horses (some of these have since been recovered from the natives). I have been unable to ascertain the actual amount of ammunition expended by the Patrol, as no record was kept, but the expenditure must have been about 8,000 rounds, and the Patrol returned with considerably more than half the ammunition it started with. I should mention that Mr. Rhodes and Major Sawyer, Military Secretary

to His Excellency the High Commissioner, who had followed us to Umhlangeni, accompanied the relief force that went to meet the Patrol on the Longwe River.

On the 15th December, the Patrol returned to Umhlangeni, and the whole force left for Buluwayo the following day, with the exception of 118 men left to garrison Umhlangeni, where it had been decided to keep a strong post during the remainder of the rainy season.

On our first arrival at Umhlangeni it was found that a large number of natives in the neighbourhood had already tendered their submission, but they were still in possession of their arms. Dr. Jameson immediately ordered all arms to be brought in, and during the five days we were there over 1,000 assegais and 100 guns, including some Martini, had been given up. The numerous herds of the king's cattle found in possession of the natives were left with them to be taken care of, and also the cattle actually brought in by natives to be given up were returned to them to be taken care of pending the settlement of the country. The same proceedings had already been instituted at Buluwayo, Umpandine (a post temporarily occupied by the Bechuanaland Border Police, on the edge of the Matopo hills), Mangwe, and the Nek; and subsequently at Shiloh, where another post of British South Africa Company Police was afterwards established, and also at Umhlangeni. The satisfactory result was that by the end of December large numbers of natives, including many of the principal indunas, had already submitted, were settling down at their kraals, and had commenced ploughing their lands; and about 10,000 assegais and over 1,000 guns and rifles had been given up.

On his return to Buluwayo, Dr. Jameson at once commenced preparations for the disbandment of the Volunteer Forces and the organisation of a civil Police Force, and on December 23rd the whole of the Volunteer Force was disbanded. Those volunteers wishing to leave the country were started off with necessary food and waggons (at the expense of the British South Africa Company) to take them to their various destinations—Salisbury, Victoria, Tuli, and Johannesburg. From the 450 who elected to remain in the country, a civil Police Force of 150 men, under Inspector Bodle, was formed, the remainder being enrolled as Burghers ready to be called up in case of necessity. Lieut.-Colonel Goold-Adams at the same time decided to keep 420

men of the Bechuanaland Border Police in the country during the rainy season, merely for the purpose of doing garrison work, and sixty men distributed along the southern line of communication at Mangwe, the Nek, and Tati ; the remainder of the Bechuanaland Border Police, including the reinforcements under Major Grey that had been sent up to be ready in case of our expedition meeting with any serious reverse, being stationed at Macloutsie. It was first intended for the British South Africa Company to take over thirty-five of the Cape Mounted Rifles, who had formed Mr. Rhodes' escort on his journey to Buluwayo ; but these were subsequently sent back to the Colony at their own request, as they were anxious to be back to take part in any operations in Pondoland, rumours of the possibility of such being undertaken having reached them. The arrangement with Colonel Goold-Adams was that, acting on the High Commissioner's instruction, his force of 240 men in the country were to garrison Buluwayo only, and that the British South Africa Company Police were to do all patrols ; but as he wished himself to undertake the Patrol in force down the Shangani River, which Dr. Jameson was anxious to send immediately in search of Major Wilson's party, in order that he might himself recover his Maxim gun carriages abandoned by the Patrol during its retreat up that river, it was arranged that he should take his whole force to Umhlangeni and garrison that place until this patrol should be accomplished. The British South Africa Company Police therefore garrisoned Buluwayo and the stations at Mapondein and Shiloh.

The rains prevalent in November and December ceased towards the end of the latter month, and an uninterrupted spell of fine weather ensued throughout the greater portion of January. Unfortunately Colonel Goold-Adams was delayed, partly by the time the making of the above arrangements took, and also because of the communications necessary between the Bechuanaland Border Police and the authorities. Another factor in this delay was the difficulty of getting reliable information of the movements of the King or his exact whereabouts. When at last all arrangements were complete and Colonel Goold-Adams was able to make a start, wet weather again set in, rendering the progress of a large patrol difficult.

Dr. Jameson, in the meantime, had been making every endeavour


to open up communication with the King and to send him the High Commissioner's message, with a view to getting him to submit and so avoid the necessity of any further hostilities. For a long time none of the old white residents at Buluwayo would hear of going on this mission, and of the natives asked to go most refused, the few who assented invariably returning after they had gone a short distance.

At length Messrs. Tainton, Riley, and Dawson, volunteered to go, provided that indunas could be found willing to accompany them. This latter condition was a serious difficulty, as all the indunas who had submitted, having once left the King, were afraid to go back to him.

At last, however, after much negotiation, one named Malibamba undertook to accompany Messrs. James Dawson and Patrick Riley, and this mission started from Buluwayo for Umhlangeni on February the 2nd. The above mission was all the more expedient, because, from the most reliable information hitherto obtained, the King and his following of young men were by now in the neighbourhood of the Zambesi, and therefore too far off to be reached by any military operations until the rains were over.

Dr. Jameson and myself awaited the return of this mission at Umhlangeni. The mission was much delayed by the heavy rains, and did not return to Umhlangeni till the first week in March. Messrs. Dawson and Riley brought back with them authentic news of Lobengula's death, concerning which we had already heard many rumours. They had found a large number of natives still encamped on the Shangani River, near the furthest point reached by the patrol under Major Forbes; these at first appeared distrustful, and inclined to be hostile, assuming that they were but the

advance party of a second attacking force. However, on hearing the object of the party, the natives all gladly promised submission, and many forthwith started for their homes. They were found to be in a very wretched plight; what with fever and small-pox



MJAN THE MATABELI GENERAL.

and the result of a long course of meat diet, numbers had already died.

Messrs. Dawson and Riley, with the assistance of the natives, had found the remainder of Major Wilson's party, and had temporarily buried them on the spot. On their return they volunteered to go back a second time to bring the remains into Buluwayo, and also to take waggons with food and medicines to help bring in the principal indunas and Lobengula's queens and children.

While this was being done, Gambo, the head Induna of the Tcapa Division (comprising the Southern portion of the Matabeli nation), who, next to Mjan, was the most powerful chief in the country, came in with all his indunas to tender his submission, and at length, in the beginning of April, all those chiefs who had hitherto been holding out faithful to Lobengula, including Mjan (the commander-in-chief of the Matabeli armies), Manondwan, the commander of the Insukameni, and many others, arrived with Messrs. Dawson and Riley at Buluwayo.

From Mjan we received confirmation of Lobengula's death, which occurred within forty miles of the Zambesi. The Induna Bosamwan was the only one present with him at the time, and had at once sent for Mjan, who thereupon had hastened to the spot and had himself interred the body.

To sum up : at the time of the disbandment of the volunteer forces, Matabeliland was already practically pacified, with the exception of that portion of the nation then following the King in his flight. This portion consisted of a few of the older men who still remained faithful to him, and a large sprinkling of the younger and more enterprising men of the nation who still clung to him in the hopes that he would lead them across the Zambesi, when circumstances should permit, to start a new dominion on the other side.

The death of Lobengula may be looked upon as the closing event of the campaign ; although the possibility that any further opposition would have occurred on his part, had he lived, is clearly disproved by the fact recently brought to light, and since investigated, viz., that when Lobengula became convinced that Major Forbes' Patrol was following him up in earnest, he at once sent messengers to negotiate terms of ppeace, with a large sum of money : the surest test that a Kaffir can give

of his desire to submit. † This, as stated by Mjan, was accompanied by a message, that he was prepared to come in and talk matters over with Dr. Jameson at Buluwayo, merely asking to be assured of his own personal safety.

It may appear to many rather an anomaly that it should have been considered safe to disband the volunteer force immediately on the return of Major Forbes' Patrol; but the gallant and heroic conduct of Major Wilson and his small party, and the fact that a handful of whites should have fought to the last under adverse circumstances, surrounded in thick bush, and without any machine guns to support it, should have killed at least ten times its own number before being finally overwhelmed—these, I contend, had as much to do with showing the Matabeli the hopelessness of any further resistance, as had any of our previous successes.

Dr. Jameson was correct in his estimate of the final situation, and as a result, at a final interview with him on April the 11th, Mjan and all the head indunas were definitely informed of the conditions of their submission, and the settlement of the Native and land questions was determined.

All commissariat arrangements for large food supplies to follow in rear of both the Mashonaland and Southern columns turned out most satisfactorily. Waggons from the south came in within a fortnight of our arrival at Buluwayo, and the first convoy from Mashonaland arrived at the end of November. But for the heavy rains the latter would have arrived much sooner. It is a curious fact that, once the expedition had made the road, it was perfectly safe for small parties; for, as the expedition advanced, the fighting portion of the Matabeli nation receded in front of it; and none ever seem to have thought of harassing us by molesting those who soon followed in on our tracks in small parties. There was some little difficulty, at first, in persuading transport riders that the Tati road was perfectly safe, and it was not till this had been proved by Dr. Jameson sending our own oxen and drivers down to Tati that independent transport riders would bring their waggons on to Buluwayo. During the month of December waggons kept on arriving almost daily, and by January, 1894, there was eight months' reserve of rations at Buluwayo for all those who were remaining in the country.



Photo by W. & D. Downey, Ebury Street, S.W.]

LIEUT.-COLONEL H. GOOLD-ADAMS, C.M.G.

(Commanding the Bechuanaland Border Police and the Southern Column into Matabeliland.)

CHAPTER XV.

WITH THE SOUTHERN COLUMN.

The diversion of a part of Lobengula's army—8,000 men under Gambo sent to intercept Colonel Goold-Adams—Mr. Dawson's mission—The indunas arrested—Mantuse and Inqubo, in attempting to escape, are killed—Major Sawyer's enquiry—Commandant Raaf joins the Column—Meet Chief Khama at Shashi River—The plans of the march—Scarcity of water—The Matabeli in force in front—The waggons attacked—The Matabeli rush the rearmost waggons—Mr. Selous wounded—Driven off by the Maxims—Small-pox breaks out amongst Khama's men—He decides to return home—Submission of Makalaka chiefs—News of victories of Major Forbes' Column—At Buluwayo.

AS soon as permission had been granted to the Chartered Company to take the field against the Matabeli, Sir Henry Loch decided to move up to the front a support consisting of Bechuanaland Border Police, with some volunteers from the regular troops stationed in the Cape Colony. The advance was made on the 11th October, when a junction was effected with Commandant Raaf, commanding the Tuli Column. The brunt of the fighting fell, of course, upon the columns commanded by Major P. W. Forbes, but it should not be forgotten that a very important diversion was effected by the simultaneous entry into Matabeliland of a body of troops from the south. Of this the net result was the division of Lobengula's force into two bodies, as it was afterwards found that no less than 8,000 men (from twenty-three towns), under Gambo, the king's brother-in-law, had been sent to intercept the forces under Colonel Goold-Adams. It is true that the fighting done by the Southern Column was not of a very serious character, consisting as it did in repelling a half-hearted attack made by a force of six or seven hundred Matabeli; but that it did not subsequently meet with more determined opposition was due to the fact that Gambo and his men had been disheartened by intelligence of the reverses incurred by the other half of Lobengula's army on the Shangani and Imbembesi Rivers, and decided

to retreat, as Colonel Goold-Adams explains in his report. The successful action fought with Gambo enabled Colonel Goold-Adams to supply food to the Company's forces, which, on their arrival at Buluwayo, were reduced to three or four days' rations. Subsequently the Bechuanaland Border Police took a prominent part in the pursuit of Lobengula, and generally did their utmost to assist the Chartered Company in the conduct of the campaign.

Upon reaching Tati the Southern Column was met by a mission consisting of Mr. Dawson (a white trader at Buluwayo) and three indunas: Ingubogubo (a half-brother of Lobengula), Mantuse and Inqubo. Unfortunately the indunas were killed in ignorance of their character. Nobody seems to have been to blame in particular, and in fact the whole unfortunate affair consisted of a series of misconceptions on the part of the indunas and the whites concerned. On arriving at the camp Mr. Dawson, who did not expect to find white troops there, went off with Mr. Selous to get some refreshment, being considerably exhausted with his long ride under the hot sun, while an employé of the Tati Company went off with the envoys to find accommodation for them and their horses. Just then the interpreter of the forces came to Colonel Goold-Adams with the news that the indunas were meditating an escape. At this Colonel Goold-Adams, who was entirely ignorant of the fact that they were envoys from Lobengula, and merely supposed them to be natives who had escaped with Dawson out of Buluwayo, instantly ordered their arrest, but at the same time assured them that they had nothing to fear. They became however thoroughly alarmed, and Mantuse, snatching a bayonet from one of the troopers, stabbed two of his guards and was shot while endeavouring to escape. The second induna, Inqubo, making a like attempt, was also killed. The third, Ingubogubo, offering no resistance, was simply secured and placed under arrest. Meantime Mr. Dawson, after having had a meal, was making his way to the Colonel's tent in order to report the object of his mission when he received the first intimation of the incident.

The matter was promptly seized upon by a few newspapers hostile to the Chartered Company, and was made the subject of a good deal of gross misrepresentation. As a consequence Major W. H. Sawyer, the High Commissioner's Military Secretary, was despatched to institute a

complete inquiry into the circumstances on the spot. Major Sawyer completely exonerated the officers and men of the Bechuanaland Border Police, and delivered it as his opinion that the death of the indunas might clearly be traced to a series of extraordinary mischances, and to the fact that the indunas themselves also refrained from giving any intelligible indication of their character as envoys. Mr. Dawson's omission was due to the fact that the camp was situated some distance away from the Tati Company's settlement, and on the other side of the river, and to the fact that being considerably fatigued with his journey, he thought that the business might stand over until he had had some refreshment. On the other hand, Major Sawyer's report stated that the evidence he had collected showed that the indunas had made a violent and determined effort to escape. The success of the expedition depended in great measure upon the maintenance of secrecy as to its existence and movements, and it was the obvious duty of the guards to prevent the evasion of any natives likely to carry news to the enemy.

The following is Lieut.-Col. Goold-Adams' report, dated November 21st, 1893 :—

“ Under instructions from his Excellency, after leaving sufficient men to garrison Macloutsie, I started from that place with 225 officers and men, 210 horses, four Maxim guns, two seven-pounder guns, fourteen waggons, and fifty native drivers. I was joined on the morning of 11th October by Commandant Raaf, of the British South Africa Company, with 225 officers and men, 191 horses, one Maxim gun, and eleven waggons, with their complement of drivers. Since I considered it expedient to occupy Tati Settlement as soon as possible, I pushed forward with 145 mounted men of the Bechuanaland Border Police, and seventy mounted men of the British South Africa Company, the waggons being pushed on as rapidly as possible after us. I reached the Shashi River 13th October, and here I met the Chief Khama with 130 mounted men, and between 1,700 and 1,800 dismounted men, about half of whom were armed with Martini-Henri rifles. He also had with him about thirty waggons and a number of pack horses. Having ascertained that water was very scarce at Tati, I pushed on with my mounted men only, and left Khama and his people on the Shashi River. Our waggon train arrived at Shashi River 18th October, and

on the 19th I made a move from Tati, being joined by the waggons that evening.

"The force leaving Tati numbered about 440 Europeans and about 2,000 natives, 520 horses, and about 2,000 head of oxen. The proposed route was to the Monarch Mine, thence to the Ramokabane River, up that river to its source, across to the upper waters of the Mitangwe River, and along the high veld to the eastward, striking the main road about the Fig Tree. The first move was made by sending Commandant Raaf with 100 of his mounted men and 100 of Khama's mounted men up the main road towards Makkobis, intended as a feint to cover the flank movement to the Monarch Mine with the waggon train. So far no Matabeli had actually been seen, but the spoor of their scouting parties had often been cut by ours. A party of scouts under Mr. Selous proceeded up the Ramokabane River to ascertain whether it was practicable to take the column that way. He returned with the information that it was absolutely impossible, there being great scarcity of water, not nearly enough for our great numbers of men and animals. I then decided to push forward on to the Mpakwe River, to try to get round the point of the hills by moving to the head waters of the Mpakwe or Nguisi Rivers.

"Considering it impracticable to take the whole of my waggon train, I pushed on with only 190 mounted men of the Bechuanaland Border Police, 200 mounted men of the British South Africa Company, twelve waggons, three Maxim guns, and two seven-pounder guns, leaving Khama and his men and the remainder of my force in laager at the Ramokabane. I arrived at the Singuesi River, a tributary of the Mpakwe, 29th October, without meeting with any resistance. From Makalaka we captured we learnt that the Matabeli had been down and gathered in the whole of their cattle, and had taken them up to the hills; that the Matabeli were in force in our immediate front, divided into two large impi, one at or near the Semokwe Poort, and the other at a town called Khosingnana, at the north-eastern extremity of the hills. Further, we learnt that there was no water to be depended upon even for our force, should we succeed in getting round the hills to the northward. My only alternative then was to send back for Khama and the men left behind at Ramokabane to join me without delay, and to push on to the foot of

the hills with the whole force and try to get the Matabeli to attack us, and if not, to actually storm their position and drive them before us. Orders were sent to this effect on 30th October. Meanwhile I laagered as strong as possible close to water. The position was not a good one, but was the best that could be found within reach of the water. There were high kopjes of from 150 to 300 feet about 1,000 yards to the south and south-east of the laager, and rising ground to the north from the bank of the river.

"On the afternoon of 1st November, the Chief Khama with his people and waggons arrived, and drew up about 200 yards to the east of my laager. At about 7 p.m. I received a message from Captain Tancred, who was in command of the party I had left at the Ramokabane, to the effect that his oxen were knocked up for want of water; that he had outspanned them about three miles from my laager, and had sent them on to the water. It being dark, it was impossible to send the cattle back that evening, and orders were given that they should start at sunrise next morning, and bring the waggons on without delay. In accordance with this order, the oxen started shortly after daylight, and from the report furnished by Captain Tancred, it appeared that some of the spans arrived some time before others, and that these were inspanned and started immediately. When these waggons were within about a mile and a-half of the laager, they were attacked from the rear by a force of about 600 or 700 Matabeli. Immediately the sound of firing was heard from the laager, mounted men were sent out to assist in getting in the waggons. Mr. Selous, who had his horse close to him when the firing commenced, arrived first at the waggons, and in trying to stop the rush of the Matabeli had already been wounded when the mounted men arrived. But by this time the rearmost of the waggons had been rushed, Corporal Mundy and a native driver who were with it being both assegaied, the waggon fired, its contents, principally quartermaster's stores, destroyed, and the oxen taken away. Our mounted men covered the movement of the waggons to the laager, and fell back with them, the Matabeli following them up through the bush, eventually getting to within 150 yards of the laager, when the Maxim guns opened fire, and they at once turned. The Matabeli then retired into the hills to the southward. I then

ordered our mounted men out after them, and Khama's men to storm the hills, our men going round the base of the hills to prevent the Matabeli, as much as possible, from getting out. Firing was kept up on the hills for about an hour, when nothing more could be seen of the Matabeli. We afterwards ascertained that they must have remained in hiding in the caves and rocks until nightfall, when they made their way back to the Motopo Mountains. Over sixty dead bodies were counted, and a great number must have gone away wounded. Sergeant Dahm (British South Africa Company) was shot through the head during the attack on the hills, three of Khama's men were killed, and six or seven wounded. Mr. Selous, Sergeant-Major Codrington, and Corporal Ransome (Bechuanaland Border Police) were slightly wounded, and Sergeant-Major Robertson and Sergeant Dempsey (British South Africa Company) were also wounded, but not seriously. Two Bechuanaland Border Police horses and two British South Africa Company horses were shot.

"On 3rd November I moved on to a good site, close to Umpandine Kraal. On 5th November, just as I was inspanning preparatory to moving on towards Mangwe, the Chief Khama informed me that neither he nor his people could go on any farther, that small-pox had broken out among his people, and that unless he could get back to his own country his people would be dying in the veld. I asked him if he did not understand that he had already agreed with his Excellency to place 1,000 of his men under my immediate orders, which men were to receive 1s. a day, and had been rationed by me since the date of their leaving Palapye. He replied that he quite understood that, but now that small-pox had broken out he must take them all back, and that, of course, he forfeited all claim to money. I did my utmost to persuade him to lend me a few waggons and oxen to assist me in getting forward to a position nearer the hills, from whence I should be within striking distance of the Matabeli. This he refused to do. I then asked him to remain in laager where he was, until I could get forward to a new position, for I did not want the Matabeli to see that he was leaving me and going home. This he at first said he would do. Within half an hour, however, he sent me a message to say that he must go at once. I again saw him and asked him whether he was

going home in consequence of any action of mine. He assured me positively that it was only on account of the small-pox having broken out among his people. My oxen being in very poor condition, I had lightened my waggons by putting some of the loads on Khama's waggons. This stuff he off-loaded and trekked away. I was thus left with a very large quantity of stuff, with which, with the waggons and oxen at my disposal, I could scarcely get forward.

"Within a few hours of Khama's leaving, I received a deputation from the Makalaka Chiefs Malaba and Manyami, stating that they wanted protection for their people. They also informed me that the Column from Mashonaland had had a battle near Buluwayo, that the Matabeli had been beaten, and that King Lobengula had fled. They also stated that the impis that had been in our immediate front, on hearing the news from Buluwayo, had fled in the direction of the Gwai River. On 6th November I received a message from Dr. Jameson confirming these reports. I immediately despatched 100 mounted men up the main road to Buluwayo to see if the road was clear, and leaving a party of fifty men with two Maxim guns at Umpadine, under Lieutenant Munro, I started with the remainder of my force to Mangwe, and thence by the main road to Buluwayo, which I reached 15th November, travelling by easy stages."

As the representative of Her Majesty's Government, Sir Henry Brougham Loch, to whom reference is frequently made in the preceding and following pages, exercised an important influence over the campaign. His action has been sufficiently recorded in the Blue Books, and in Sir John Willoughby's chapter bearing upon the causes of the war. Suffice it to say, therefore, that when Sir Henry had satisfied himself that war was unavoidable, he gave the fullest possible discretion to the Administrator, and heartily supported the advance by ordering up Lieut.-Colonel Goold-Adams with the Bechuanaland Border Police and a contingent of Khama's levies. Sir H. B. Loch, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Cape Colony, and Her Majesty's High Commissioner for South Africa, commenced his varied and distinguished public career in the Royal Navy, but relinquished that service for the Bengal Light Cavalry, acting as A.D.C. to Lord Gough during the Sutlej Campaign. He was

sent by the War Office in 1854 to assist in organising the Turkish troops, and crossed from Varna to the Crimea. In 1857 he accompanied Lord Elgin's special mission to China. In 1858 he accompanied Lord Elgin's second embassy, and in the subsequent war was captured by the Chinese and subjected to indignity and torture. He was



SIR HENRY BROUGHAM LOCH, G.C.M.G., K.C.B.

Governor of the Cape Colony, and Her Majesty's High Commissioner for South Africa.

afterwards private secretary to Sir George Grey, then Home Secretary, and in 1863 became Governor of the Isle of Man, for which he secured a new constitution. In 1882 he was appointed Commissioner of Woods and Forests, and in 1884 Governor of Victoria, Australia. Five years later he succeeded Sir Hercules Robinson as Governor of the Cape,

where he rendered a great public service by his firmness and promptitude on the occasion of the great Boer Trek, which was turned back by Dr. Jameson and the British South Africa Company's Troopers at the Limpopo. Sir Henry has recently returned from the Transvaal, where he has successfully arranged what promised to be a very serious difficulty between the Boers and "uitlanders" in respect to the "commandeering" question. In a country proverbially the grave of reputations, Sir Henry Loch has made no very material mistakes, is generally respected and admired, and is personally very much liked.

The Bechuanaland Border Police formed a considerable portion of the flying patrol sent after Lobengula, and though in point of fact their assistance was never needed, it was at all times available; and, had the campaign been less ably conducted, there is no doubt but that their support would have been absolutely necessary to the Rhodesian forces. Their commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Goold-Adams, is a son of the late Mr. Richard Wallis Goold-Adams, of Jamesbrook, Cloyne, Co. Cork, Ireland, and a cousin of the first Earl of Bantry. His mother was a daughter of Sir William Wrixon Becher, of Ballygiblin, Mallow, who married Miss O'Neil, the famous actress. He was originally intended for the navy, and after failing for the entrance to the "Britannia," went to the "Conway" training ship in the Mersey. After completing his training there, he was apprenticed to a sailing ship, and started on a voyage to Australia, but the vessel was nearly lost in the Bay of Biscay. The crew only just managed to get back to Falmouth, where most of them, including Mr. Goold-Adams, concluded that the charms of a sea-going life were somewhat overrated. He returned home in such a miserable plight that his parents decided to buy him out, and to let him enter the army, which his other brothers intended making their profession. He therefore went to Eastman's Royal Naval Academy at Southsea, and thence to Mr. Wolfram's at Blackheath. In 1878 he passed into the Royal Military College; ultimately joining the "Royal Scots" in Malta, and proceeding to India on promotion to the other battalion, with which he returned to this country in 1881. After remaining in Ireland for a year or two with his regiment, he exchanged to the battalion stationed in Malta, subsequently proceeding with it to the West Indies, and thence on to

the Cape. There he joined Sir Charles Warren's Expedition into Bechuanaland, serving with the mounted infantry troop of his regiment. Subsequently he exchanged into the Bechuanaland Border Police, and on the retirement of Sir Frederick Carrington succeeded to the supreme command. Colonel Goold-Adams' services were recognised by his being appointed C.M.G. on Her Majesty's last birthday.

Among his earlier work with the Bechuanaland Border Police Colonel Goold-Adams personally commanded a punitive expedition against Lehutetu, a Bushman village in the Kalahari Desert, and was in command of the escort which accompanied Sir Sidney Shippard to the frontier on the occasion of the "Grobelaar incident," and thence to Buluwayo. Here the whole party was in very serious danger, as the Matabele nation was in a very excited state at the time, "dancing" before Lobengula for several days, and demanding permission to attack the white strangers. It was only owing to the King's firmness that the party got away safely, Lobengula very chivalrously ordering his people, if they really wanted to fight, to go down to Kimberley and attack the whites there; not to attempt to harm a small party who were his guests. Colonel Goold-Adams is spoken of by those who know him as a sound, well-grounded, and accomplished officer, with plenty of tact, and he is very popular.

Raaf's Rangers, which formed part of the Southern Column, were placed under the command of Commandant Raaf, whose senior officer was Captain Hermann Melville Heyman. He is son of an artillery officer holding a command at Woolwich, and has also a brother in the Royal Artillery. He came out to South Africa to join the Cape Mounted Rifles, in which he became captain, resigning in order to go up to the Johannesburg Goldfields. He has taken part in all the recent down-country wars since and including the Basuto Campaign, and bears the reputation of being cool in action and an energetic and useful officer. Captain Heyman is especially good as an artilleryman, and has gone through a special course of gunnery. He also at one time held a commission in the Cape Field Artillery. He entered Mashonaland as a captain in the British South Africa Police, on whose disbandment he received a magistracy in the Company's service. Subsequently he was the hero of the Massi Kessi incident, when, with thirty troopers, he

utterly routed and drove away 500 Portuguese soldiers. After this he was appointed resident magistrate at Umtali. At the beginning of the war he was requested by Dr. Jameson to join Commandant Raaf as senior officer under him. He was the first of the Southern Column to reach Buluwayo, where he remained as commandant while Major Forbes went forward with the flying Patrol, and now occupies the important position of chief magistrate there. He is, according to his brother officers, courageous to a fault, tactful, and reliable, and one of the Company's best officers.

It would not be fair to record the events of the brief campaign in Matabeliland without reference to the share—small though it was—taken therein by Khama, paramount chief of the Bamangwatos. Khama stands easily in front of all other South African chiefs, either as a loyal subject of the Queen, or as an enlightened and able ruler of his numerous people. From the time when he first voluntarily placed himself under British protection he has been a potent influence for good in the north-western regions of our South African empire. It was his action, by inviting Sir Charles Warren's mission and by loyally supporting him in every way, which led to the establishment of our protectorate over those vast territories, and which was an important step towards the subsequent acquisition of Mashonaland, Matabeliland, Barotsiland, and the adjacent countries. He is a straightforward Kaffir chieftain, and was highly spoken of by Livingstone; is uniformly courteous and generously hospitable to white traders or travellers, and under his wise rule the Bamangwato nation is flourishing like the green bay tree.

He discourages polygamy, and is a rigid teetotaler, the sale of alcoholic liquor being absolutely forbidden, either by whites or blacks, throughout his dominions. As to the wisdom of this course—among natives—there is no question; it is the only thing which can save the South African races from degradation. He even discourages the use of Kaffir beer and tobacco, but at the same time is by no means puritanical. Since Khama became paramount chief there has been only one or two executions in his dominions; he is beloved by all his subjects, and is in every way a striking contrast to his hereditary foe, the late King Lobengula. He has been educated—reading and writing Sechuana—by the missionaries, who, however, neglected to teach him English. He

is an excellent shot and a keen sportsman ; and though sixty years of age is active and for all purposes a vigorous young man still. He is an extraordinary character—exceedingly able and conscientious. When the Bechuanaland Border Police were ordered to the front, Sir Henry Loch requested that Khama should march against Lobengula with 1,000 men. The old king promptly took the field, but the Bamangwatos are not of good fighting stuff, besides which the crops wanted reaping, and small-pox broke out among his men. Khama's force soon turned back—a proceeding which naturally gave a great deal of annoyance, but which was readily understood and condoned by those who knew the Bamangwatos.



THE WAGGONS ARRIVING AT BULUWAYO.

CHAPTER XVI.

THE PATTERSON EMBASSY TO LOBENGULA.

BY H. RIDER HAGGARD.

(Being a Note on the circumstances attending the Deaths of Captain R. Robert Patterson, Mr. J. Sargeaunt, and Mr. Thomas in Matabeliland in September, 1878.)

I HAVE been asked by the Editors of this book to place on record briefly such facts as are within my knowledge concerning the unhappy deaths of my late friends, Captain Robert Patterson and Mr. John Sargeaunt, who together with a certain Mr. Thomas, the young son of a missionary in the Amandabeli country, came to their ends while on a journey from the kraal of Lobengula, then King of the Matabeli, to the Falls of the Zambesi. The task is not altogether an easy one, seeing that the evidence obtainable is necessarily of a hearsay character; that many years have gone by since the tragedy occurred, and that it was impracticable to investigate its circumstances upon the spot. Still, a residuum remains which may fairly be accepted as fact, and that is perhaps worthy of preservation.

Captain Patterson, when I became acquainted with him, was a man in early middle life, florid in appearance, and rather stout in person, of an open manner and a genial disposition. Being, I believe, the possessor of considerable means, in an ill-omened moment a desire entered into him to visit what were then the less explored districts of South Africa. The evil opportunity was not lacking. At that time, namely in 1878, the late Sir William, then Mr. Sargeaunt, was commissioned by the Colonial Office to proceed to Africa and report upon the financial condition of the Transvaal, which had recently been annexed to the British Empire. Being on terms of intimacy with Sir William, Captain Patterson arranged to join his expedition in an unofficial capacity. With them went also Sir William's

young son, Mr. John Sargeaunt, a gentleman of about twenty years of age, and my friend, Mr. Arthur Henry Douglas Cochrane, who is to-day the sole survivor of that party.

On arriving in the Transvaal, Captain Patterson and Mr. John Sargeaunt took journeys to the neighbourhood of Secoeconi's country and elsewhere for the purpose of shooting game. Captain Patterson's appetite for travel in the veldt being whetted by these pleasant and successful excursions, he determined, before returning to England, to journey further afield and to visit the famous Falls of the Zambesi. About this time Sir William Sargeaunt went home, the object of his mission being accomplished; but unfortunately enough he assented to the wish of his son, Mr. John Sargeaunt, and allowed him to become a member of Captain Patterson's expedition northwards. As it chanced at this juncture, Sir Bartle Frere, the High Commissioner for the Cape, was anxious to send a friendly mission to Lobengula, the King of the Matabeli. This chief had been making himself obnoxious by allowing white traders in his country to be molested, and as Captain Patterson proposed to visit the district, it occurred to the authorities that here was a cheap and favourable opportunity of opening negotiations with him. Accordingly Captain Patterson was asked to combine business with pleasure and undertake the affair, which he readily agreed to do. Sir Bartle Frere's choice was in one way ill-considered, as its terrible issue proved, seeing that his envoy had little experience of natives of Zulu blood and none of dealing with them diplomatically.

The party at its start consisted of Captain Patterson, Mr. J. Sargeaunt, Mr. Gray Palmer, the interpreter, a hunter and guide of experience, two of my own and Mr. Cochrane's servants, named Khiva, a Zulu boy who spoke English perfectly, and Vent-vogel or Wind Bird, a clever Hottentot driver, together with a few other natives. That Mr. Cochrane and I did not accompany it was owing only to our being unable to obtain leave from the Government of the Transvaal, which we both of us served in different capacities.

I remember well that after the waggon had started, together with Mr. Cochrane I rode out from Pretoria to the place of the first outspan, where we bade our friends good-bye—for ever.

The mission reached Lobengula's kraal in safety. At first—so we

gathered from information and letters received—the King did not greet them well, for when Mr. Sargeaunt went forward to see him, he asked rudely how it came about that the Government at the Cape sent a beardless boy to talk to him? Captain Patterson, however, opened his business, and finding that Lobengula's attitude remained unfriendly, it would seem that at a certain point in the negotiations he made a great mistake which was to cost him and his companions their lives, though whether he did this by accident, or by design in his ignorance of the character and habits of native tyrants, will never now be known.

In those days a pretender to the throne of Matabeliland named Kruman, or Korooman, by many believed to be its rightful heir, was living in Natal, whither he had fled to escape the assegai. I have a recollection of hearing the late Sir Theophilus Shepstone tell Captain Patterson the story of this Kruman, who I think was at one time in his employ as a gardener, but of whose rights to the chieftainship of the nation a section of the Matabeli people were advocates. Of the existence of this rival Captain Patterson is believed to have been so unfortunate as to remind the King, either by way of a hint which that potentate was not slow to take, or perhaps incidentally in the course of general conversation. At any rate the effect seems to have been startling, for from that moment Lobengula, to whom the name of Kruman was as a writing on the wall, became profusely civil to the envoys, and from that moment, as I believe, he doomed them to a sudden and cruel death.

The political object of their journey being to all appearance accomplished satisfactorily, Captain Patterson told the King that before returning to the Transvaal he was anxious to visit the Zambesi Falls. Lobengula readily gave the required permission; but when he was asked to allow young Mr. Thomas, the son of a missionary of that name, to accompany him, he at first refused, nor would he alter his decision until considerable pressure had been brought to bear upon him. The reason of this attitude was doubtless that he entertained kindly feelings towards the lad, and did not wish to include him in a slaughter which was already planned.

At length, all having been arranged, Captain Patterson, Messrs. Sargeaunt and Thomas, Khiva, Vent-vogel, and twenty bearers furnished by Lobengula, started on foot to make the twelve days'

journey to the Falls. The waggon, with the interpreter, Mr. Gray Palmer, and the other native servants, remained at the King's kraal to await their return. The next thing we at Pretoria heard of the progress of the party was from the lips of messengers sent by Lobengula, who announced that the bearers had returned to the King's kraal, but that the three white men and their two servants had died of drinking poisoned water. The manner of their deaths was given in great detail, Mr. Sargeant, I remember, being represented as having lived the longest because he was "very strong."

In the first shock and confusion of such news it was not very closely scrutinised—at any rate, by the friends of the dead men; but on reflection there were several things about it that struck us as strange. For instance, we knew well that however thirsty he might be, Captain Patterson was in the habit when travelling of never drinking water until it had been boiled to destroy impurities. It seemed odd that on this one occasion he should have neglected an invariable precaution. Also it was curious that while Lobengula's bearers appeared to have escaped, the white men and their two servants had perished without exception. Lastly, even in that district it is not usual to find water so virulent that it will kill as rapidly as it was reported to have done in this instance, unless indeed it had been poisoned designedly. Such were the doubts which assailed us—doubts that on the return of the waggon in the charge of the interpreter, who brought with him most of the effects of the deceased men, resolved themselves into something like certainty. Then, by putting two and two together, we were able to piece out the real history of the diabolical plot whereof I believe that our poor friends were the victims. It was a terrible story, and one which shows to what depths of wickedness and treachery the savage will sink who thinks that his place and interests are threatened.

Among the articles taken from the bodies and brought to Pretoria by Mr. Gray Palmer, was a rough diary consisting of some sheets of paper fastened together with string. This diary belonged to Captain Patterson, who was an extremely methodical man and had the habit of making notes of all that he did. In it we found entries of his preparations for a trip to the Falls, and among them the number and names of the bearers provided by Lobengula, with, if my memory serves me, a

list of the goods entrusted to each man. There also we found a brief chronicle of the first three days' journey and that of the morning of the fourth day. Then the record stopped abruptly. It seems probable that the last entry was made a few minutes before Captain Patterson was killed. One striking omission is to be noted in this diary. It makes no mention of the fact of the party having passed several days without water, as was stated by the messengers to be the case, and of the ultimate discovery of the poisoned spring. Also, although the story of the messengers was to the effect that some of the party lingered a long while, no single line appeared to indicate that this was so. Had their tale been true, would not Captain Patterson or one of his companions have made shift to scrawl some few words of explanation and farewell?

These coincidences and omissions taken by themselves, however, would not have amounted to anything worthy of the name of evidence. But now comes the curious part of the story, which exemplifies in a striking manner the truth of the old saw—"Murder will out." On the arrival of the waggon at Pretoria we learned from the interpreter, Mr. Gray Palmer, and the native servants that on their return journey, while they were outspanned one day beyond the borders of Lobengula's country, some Kaffirs—Bechuanas I think—arrived and fell into conversation with the driver, remarking that he had come up country with a full waggon and that now he went down with an empty one. The driver replied with lamentations over the death of his masters from drinking poisoned water, whereupon the head man of the Bechuanas, who was wearing a shooting coat made of a yellowish cloth of the nature of "kharkee," which was recognised as having belonged to Captain Patterson, told him the following story: He said that a while back a brother of his was out hunting in the desert for ostriches in the company of other natives, when hearing shots fired some way off they followed the sound, thinking that white men were shooting game and that they would be able to beg meat. On reaching a spot by a pool of water they were horrified to see the bodies of three white men lying on the ground, and with them those of a Hottentot and a Kaffir, surrounded by a number of armed Matabeli. They asked the Matabeli what they had been doing—killing the white men? and were told to "be still," for the deed was done by "order of the King," who killed

whom he chose. Then they learned the story of this treacherous massacre.

It appeared that the white men had made a midday halt by the pool, where Captain Patterson sat down under a tree, at a little distance, and entered in his diary the last words that he was destined to write on earth. Presently one of the bearers, following a pre-arranged plan, went to the edge of the pool and called suddenly to the white men to come and see, for there was "a great snake in the water." Captain Patterson, who was devoted to natural history, at once ran up, and as he leaned over the edge of the pool, his neck was broken by a blow from his own axe. The others were then shot and assegai'd, Mr. Sargeaunt making a desperate resistance and being the last to fall. Vent-vogel, the Hottentot, almost effected his escape, for with the cunning of his race he sprang from side to side as he ran, disconcerting the aim of the murderers. At last, however, when he had covered about a hundred and fifty yards of ground, a bullet "winged with fate" broke his back and he died. The Bechuana further described the clothes that his brother had seen upon the bodies, and also some articles belonging to the white men that had been given to members of his party by the Matabeli soldiers. His description was so accurate that, when considered in conjunction with the fact that he was wearing Captain Patterson's coat, which he had obtained from his brother, it left little doubt as to the truth of his story.

In confirmation of this version of the facts, I may mention two things: first that Mr. F. C. Selous, who has travelled a great deal in Matabeliland, informed me recently, that as a result of inquiries carried out on the spot he had no doubt but that Patterson and his party were murdered. Secondly, when the articles belonging to the ill-fated expedition were sold by public auction at Pretoria, I purchased Mr. Sargeaunt's double-barrelled breach-loading gun. On examination it was found to show traces of violence and struggle, the breach being choked with mud and the locks strained. Moreover, Sir Theophilus Shepstone, who knew natives and their temper better perhaps than any white man who has ever lived, told me that he was convinced that the party came to their end by foul means. In this connection also it may be well to quote a foot-note to a paper by the late Captain Patterson,

which was communicated by the Colonial Office and read before the Royal Geographical Society, on Feb. 10th, 1879. It runs thus :—

According to a letter since received from Sir Bartle Frere, statements have been subsequently made to Sir Theophilus Shepstone which throw doubt upon Lobengula's story, and afford but too much reason for suspecting that the unfortunate explorers were the victims of a foul conspiracy.

No public notice was taken of the matter, for the obvious reason that without enormous expense and the undertaking of war upon a large scale, it was impossible to get at Lobengula to punish him. Nor indeed would it have been easy to come by legal evidence to disprove that chief's ingenious story of the death of the party through the accidental drinking of poisoned water, since anybody trying to reach the spot of the massacre, and there to investigate the facts, would very probably have fallen a victim to some similar unlucky chance before he returned with his proofs.

Such is the brief account of the fate of Sir Bartle Frere's ill-starred embassy to Lobengula in the year 1878. If, as I believe to be the case, it is indeed true that the King did plan and execute this most wicked murder, his subsequent history and end may give food for reflection to those who hold that such crimes meet with a just reward at the hand of Providence. Perhaps as he lay dying, a hunted fugitive in the neighbourhood of the Shangani River, Lobengula may have remembered the innocent white men whom he butchered nearly twenty years before. Perhaps, on the other hand, in the river of blood which he had shed, to his hardened sense theirs would have seemed of small account. However these things may be, it has seemed to the writer of this note that the story of the tragic and mysterious end of his friends, as far as it can be pieced together after the lapse of so long a time, may prove an incident of interest, worthy of record in the annals of the early history of Matabeliland; one, moreover, which will be remembered in after generations, when that country is the prosperous home of tens of thousands of white men.

CHAPTER XVII.

IN MEMORIAM.

The effect of the war—Its causes—The vassals of the Matabeli—The cost of the campaign—A story of heroes—The last stand—A hallowed circle—The national regret—The memorials at Buluwayo and Zimbabwe—The conduct of the expedition—Major Allan Wilson—Commandant P. J. Raaf, C.M.G.—Captain H. J. Borrow—Captain A. L. Campbell—Captain F. Fitzgerald—Captain Greenfield—Captain Judd—Captain A. B. Kirton—Captain C. F. Lendy, R.A.—Captain O. G. Williams, and the others.

ALMOST every page of South African history is stained with the blood shed in a long series of wars undertaken to establish the supremacy of the white races, and—it sounds paradoxical, but is none the less true—to secure that “pax Britannica” which is our proud tradition. It is therefore no small thing to say that it seems quite possible that the war lately concluded has finally removed the need for another. The Matabeli nation constituted the last unbroken military power which menaced the general peace of South Africa; and, as we had already found before in that country, so it proved to be now: a trial of strength was inevitable. Apart altogether from Matabeliland, the moral effect of the object lesson among the other native races has been striking: witness the case of Pondoland—till lately the scene of the most horrible forms of savage cruelty—which has been reclaimed to civilisation without firing a single shot.

The whole story of the country, which, as “Rhodesia,” is named after the man who brilliantly conceived and ably carried out the scheme of its acquisition in British interests, savours strongly of old-time romance. It carries us back to the far-off days when Elizabethan adventurers roamed the globe in search of new worlds; a race of merchant-soldiers of whom Mr. Rhodes seems to be a latter-day survival. So in this last of our “little wars.” Even the most cynical cannot honestly deny that it has achieved much in the general interests of mankind, and that it



Photo by Harry Walter, Strand.]

MAJOR ALLAN WILSON.

(Commanding the Victoria Column.)

BORN 1853. KILLED AT SHANGHAI, DECEMBER 4TH, 1893.

has brought in another fair inheritance which South Africa will bequeath to her children; another area of expansion for those overcrowded populations which struggle for survival in these our islands. From every point of view the war was inevitable, necessary, and advisable, and its causes and conduct were alike creditable to the colonists upon whom it was forced. It originated in the manful determination to deliver at all costs the Mashonas, over whom the white man's protecting arm had been extended, from the assegai of the Matabeli majagha; and it was absolutely necessary for the well-being of the settlers, for the protection of their hard-won interests, for their very safety.

If the campaign recently closed illustrates one thing more than another, it is the self-reliant spirit of the Englishmen dwelling on the fringe of barbarism in South Central Africa. With plans hastily, though well-matured—the season of the summer rains was drawing dangerously near—with all arrangements for commissariat and equipment made in a few anxious weeks, they fearlessly ignored the prophets of disaster, marched out to grapple with a foe whose strength they knew not, in a comparatively unknown land, and succeeded in dispelling the thunder-cloud which had long darkened the South African sky. It is not necessary to attempt to forecast here the ultimate and important results of the final settlement of the Zambesi regions. Suffice it to say that the chief and most immediate effect has been the liberation of the subject races of Mashonaland and Matabeliland from the terrible thrall under which they had groaned in helpless and hopeless misery for the last half-century. Every hunter, trader, or traveller who had visited those countries agreed that the cruelty and ferocity of the Matabeli towards their vassal tribes knew no limits. Old men and boys, mothers and the babes at their breasts, were alike sacrificed to crimson the virgin assegai, or driven off into a slavery more ruthless than death itself; and the most competent authorities have estimated the Matabeli "butcher's bill" at some two thousand men, women, and children slaughtered yearly. The "raids" were no mere looting forays; they were organised plans of wholesale and periodical carnage, which, however, were looked upon by the Matabeli very much as an Englishman might view the annual training of a militia battalion, or his yearly "shoot" on the moors. No; whether

we consider the causes of the war, its conduct, or its most probable effects, the South African people have every claim to be congratulated; and it is difficult to understand how any right-minded man can deny that it is one of the most creditable enterprises to which they have set their hands; or can fail to feel proud of the way in which the frontier forces, from the commanding officer to the last trooper, have carried out this bold and honourable enterprise.

But, — the cost. We shrink from considering the price at which peace and security have been purchased, when lives of gallant men form the currency. Nevertheless, the bond had to be redeemed. Let it be some assuagement of the grief of the friends and countrymen of those who fell in Matabeliland, in the cause of humanity and for their country's credit, to know that the sacrifice was not in vain. The story of the last heroic episode of the war is one which has reached us in fragments, and we have chiefly to thank Mr. Selous and a few others for scanty records—sifted from Matabeli sources—of that last desperate struggle on the Shangani River. Those records, however, very materially supplement the plain and accurate statements set forth by Majors Forbes and Sir John Willoughby. They enable us to say with confidence that few of the splendid military legends which have ennobled the pages of British history since the days of Boadicea are more creditable to the nation, more worthy of its high traditions, than that which tells how a handful of civilians met a soldier's death on our African frontier. And of those immortal tales, few perhaps prove more completely that the devotion to duty and a cause, displayed when the Saxons died round Harold at Hastings, or when the Scots fell round James on Flodden Field, is still, in times of difficulty and danger, conspicuous in their descendants. We learn once more that the latter-day civilisation has not fined down all the noblest instincts of the race to the vanishing point, and that courage and fidelity may still be counted among its surviving virtues.

Picking up the threads of the grim story, we are told by Majors Forbes and Sir John Willoughby that, after crossing the river and following the king's spoor, Major Wilson and his men reached a series of scherms, or temporary encampments protected by felled bush or trees. These scherms were filled with Matabeli, who, however, offered no resistance, probably because they did not know the strength

of the whites, or believed them to be but the advance guard of a larger body. So the Patrol rode on till they reached the royal scherm, within which the king's waggons were dimly visible in the gathering gloom. Here a halt was called, and Lobengula summoned to surrender. The reply was an ominous rattle of arms within the reed fence, while parties of Matabeli, rifle in hand, came hurrying up from the rear. With so small a force nothing could be done, and the Patrol withdrew into the bush, Captain Napier and Troopers Robertson and Mayne being sent for reinforcements. These in due time appeared in the form of Captain Borrow with eighteen mounted men. A miserable night was passed under arms in the drenching rain, and when day at length dawned, Major Wilson decided to make one more dash for the king, with the tragic result which will not soon be forgotten in South Africa. From the start the Patrol was outnumbered, and almost as soon as the attack began, Ingram, Burnham, and Gooding had to be sent to cross the river, if that were possible, to ask for further support. That support, however, never arrived, and Burnham's first breathless remark to Major Forbes, after reaching the main body, was, "I think I may say we are the sole survivors of that party." The Shangani had risen in flood, added to which Major Forbes was himself attacked in force on the way down to the river. Either of these circumstances was enough to prevent the arrival of succour in time to save the doomed men, to whom the last chance of escape was lost. To the end, however, there was no thought of surrender, no request for quarter. They resolved to show the Matabeli that the white man could play a losing as well as a winning game. Taking cover behind the dead bodies of their horses, with an iron calmness they fought on for two long hours, pouring a destructive fire into their encircling foes, and coolly singling out the Indunas for their aim. One by one, however, they sank under the heavy fire from the bush, but many of the wounded continued, so the natives say, to re-load and pass their rifles to their uninjured comrades. Again and again the Matabeli would issue from their cover to attempt a conclusive charge, but again and again were repulsed with a well-directed fire; upon which Wilson and his men would wake the echoes with an undismayed, defiant cheer. But at last the end came.

Of the thirty-four valiant men whose hearts beat high with hope and courage as they rode behind their leader in the early dawn that morning, only one remained erect; the rest lay prone, dead or dying, upon that "field of honour." The name of the one man who stood at bay against an army of Matabeli will never be known; his remains could not be identified. But the natives tell that, picking up several rifles and bandoliers, this hero amongst heroes made his way to an ant-heap some twenty yards from where the rest lay stretched upon the earth. From that point of vantage he checked, single-handed, several rushes of the Matabeli with a cool and deadly fire. At length, shot through the hips, he sank on his knees, but continued to load and fire until he succumbed to his wounds. Then, and not till then, the Matabeli came out from the bush, but on reaching the hallowed circle where the Patrol lay side by side, were fired upon by several of the unconquerable wounded who were still alive. So great had been the terror and demoralisation inspired by the desperate bravery of the Patrol, that when the revolvers rang out the natives turned and fled precipitately into the bush; and it was not till several hours later—"when the sun was right overhead," as the Matabeli tell the tale—that they again ventured to leave their cover. But by this time death had mercifully come to the wounded, and as the native warriors gazed upon the forms of their fallen foes there was silence.

For some weeks afterwards the comrades of these brave men had hoped against hope that even one of the Patrol might have escaped down the Shangani River, although, as Ingram, the American scout, had explained, "Two of the men were dismounted, and many of the horses were completely done up. Some of those with the best mounts might have got away, but, — well, they were not the sort of men to leave their chums." He added, "No; I guess they fought it out right there—where they stood." Thus it was; for when Dawson crossed the river some weeks afterwards, the bones of thirty-three of Wilson's heroic band were found laying close together, even as they had stood at the last supreme moment. Those of the dauntless man who had faced the Matabeli alone lay apart.

Thus they died. Youths fresh from our schools and universities, older men who looked back upon a useful span of life spent upon the

frontiers of our great African empire, they were alike stout-hearted and loyal Britons, who had deliberately chosen death rather than desert their comrades in that last dark hour. We live in an age when sentiment is out of fashion and cynicism the vogue. The Little-Englanders may say that the men who fell on the Shangani were adventurers who entered Matabeliland to kill or be killed. But let us hope that even the thin stream which flows through the veins of such may course a little faster when they remember that "some of them might have got away, but they weren't the sort of men to leave their chums." Those who knew Wilson and Borrow and their comrades knew them to be courageous and high-minded men who would have reflected credit upon any community; who were representative of the best types of Englishmen. Their glorious end forms the most stirring incident in the history of South Africa, where their memory will always be cherished in proud regret. No fitter memorial could have been suggested than the hospital which is to be reared at Buluwayo by their friends and countrymen; no fitter place of sepulture than Zimbabwe, where the monuments of a pre-historic cultivation look down upon a land consecrated by the blood of the advance guard of modern civilisation; where a simple obelisk of granite, the tribute of another Englishman, will rise to mark the resting-place of the lion-hearted dead.

MAJOR ALLAN WILSON is one of the heroic figures of the campaign; a type of the hardy race of British colonists whom no dangers can daunt, whose bold spirit no hardships can tame. His repeated attack on Lobengula's encampment, held by such a large force of Matabeli, has occasionally been adversely criticised; but it must always be borne in mind that if the brave men who fought and conquered Lobengula had stayed to weigh risks too minutely they would never have entered Matabeliland at all, and that chief would still be cutting throats throughout Mashonaland to-day. And even granting that the deed was daring for a commercial age, the nation which remembers the exploits of its Elizabethan forefathers, of Robert Clive and Warren Hastings, and the Charge at Balaclava, will not think coldly of Allan Wilson and the gallant men who fell with him on the Shangani River. Major Wilson was a Scotchman, the son of Mr. Robert Wilson, a railway and road contractor, and was born

in Ross-shire in the year 1856. He was educated at the Grammar School at Kirkwall, Orkney, and Milne's Institution, Fochabers, Morayshire. An old school-fellow of Major Wilson's, writing to the "Westminster Budget," gives us an interesting glimpse of his earlier life.

"Poor Allan Wilson!" will be the audible or inaudible exclamation of everyone who, having known him, now knows that he can see him no more. The world can ill want such a type, for a type he was. I can speak of him from the days of his rough boyhood. And yet he was not rough, for he was, with all his superior strength of frame, gentle and kindly. Wilson was a good-hearted fellow, no more clever at books than Clive, equally larksome, popular with everyone, and ready to lead anyone to do or to dare. A poor cricketer himself, he was captain of the school eleven, and a nod or a gesture from Wilson behind the wicket arranged the manœuvres of every over. No one would have dreamed of doubting his judgment or decision in any situation. There was the spirit of decision and dictation behind that physical prowess which we all used so much to admire. He had an unconscious pride in his herculean build, and in all feats of manly strength and vigour he not only excelled, but inspired others to take part in. He came of a "large" family (his father being a contractor for the building of railways, bridges, and roads), and the whole family seem to have inherited a spirit of enterprise and adventure. It was not unnatural that three years' experience of life as a bank clerk turned all the tastes of Allan Wilson away from sedentary life. All the while in his northern home at Fochabers, under the shadow of Gordon Castle, he was organising "Highland Gatherings," so called, to which the tossing of the caber, the putting of the stone, the tug of war, the playing of the bagpipes, and the dancing of the sword-dance, attracted hundreds. These Spey side gatherings were a great impetus to local athletics.

But the fire of venture was in his veins; he could be no home-keeping youth. He joined the ranks of the Cape Mounted Police, and it did not take his superiors long to find out that Trooper Wilson was a man to lead and command, and not always to follow and obey. The events of the last few months have done no more than to show forth more widely his superior qualities as a man and a soldier. The word "fear" was not in his vocabulary. He was intrepid, cool, resolute, decisive, and determined; honest as truth itself, and freely frank as the pure light of the sun. The opportunities for martial heroism now are infrequent, but we may yet expect to hear some true tribute to Major Wilson as one of the staunchest guiding spirits of the recent campaign.

After leaving the Cape Mounted Rifles, Allan Wilson received a

lieutenant's commission in the Basuto Police. This he afterwards relinquished for the service of the Bechuanaland Exploration Company. Before the war he was senior officer in the Victoria Volunteer Force (Mounted Infantry). When the war broke out he at once volunteered, and was appointed Major in command of the Victoria Column, rendering signal service until killed at the Shangani. He was wonderfully popular among all classes, and it is said of him that he had not an enemy or an ill-wisher in the world. Speaking of him as the commanding officer of the Victoria Rangers, Major Forbes says, "No better man could possibly have been found." He was famous for the power that he possessed over his officers and men. Nine of the former fell during the campaign—six by his side on the Shangani.



COMMANDANT P. J. RAAF, C.M.G.

The late COMMANDANT PIETER JOHANNES RAAF, C.M.G., was a well-known figure throughout South Africa, in whose wars he had served with bravery and distinction—notably in the Zulu War in 1879, in which he organised and commanded Raaf's Rangers, being created C.M.G. for his services. He was also offered, in recognition of his work, a junior commission in one of the Native East Indian Regiments. This, however he declined. At the close of the Zulu war Commandant Raaf returned to Pretoria, where he was in the British service, Sir Owen Lanyon being Administrator. When the war with the Boers began, Raaf went down to Potchefstroom, where

he organised a second "Raaf's Rangers" among the loyal residents of the place, and ably assisted Sir Marshall Clarke in the work of defence. He was for some time subsequently engaged in prospecting for gold in the Transvaal, but ultimately went up to Mashonaland, and was appointed Resident Magistrate at Fort Tuli. On the outbreak of the Matabeli war he was commissioned to raise a corps of 250 mounted men in the Transvaal. Thus for the third time

Raaf's Rangers came into existence, recruited mostly from the mining population of Johannesburg. During the war Raaf's Rangers were placed under the supreme command of Lieutenant-Colonel Goold-Adams, and formed part of the Southern Column. After the occupation of Buluwayo Commandant Raaf went forward with ninety men of the Bechuanaland Border Police in the patrol sent to attempt the capture of Lobengula, and survived all the perils and hardships of the campaign, including the retreat from the Shangani, only to fall a victim to inflammation of the bowels at Buluwayo after its close, on January 26th, 1894. He was one of the best known among the frontier soldiers so numerous throughout South Africa, and his death was greatly deplored by a large number of old comrades and friends, and especially by the burgher population, among whom Commandant Raaf had great influence. There are innumerable stories told of Commandant Raaf which are "ben trovato," even if not true. The Boers themselves recount that before Majuba, Raaf used to say, "Never mind the Boers; if you drum upon an old kettle they will run." He was wrong, however.

One of the most prominent men in Mashonaland, and one of the most popular in that new community, was CAPTAIN HENRY JOHN BORROW, the second in rank of the ill-fated Wilson Patrol. One of the very earliest pioneers in British Zambesia, he had taken a leading share in the arduous work of developing the mineral resources of the country, where his loss has been severely felt.

Captain Borrow was the eldest son of the Rev. H. J. Borrow, formerly rector of Lanivet, Cornwall, and now residing at the Old Palace, Bekesbourne, Canterbury, and was the grand-nephew of George Borrow, the author. He was born on March 17th, 1865, and educated (with Captain Greenfield, of the Victoria Rangers, who met his death at the same time) at Tavistock Grammar School, and at Sherborne.

Accompanied by his father, he went out to the Cape Colony in 1882, and passed three years in ostrich farming with Mr. Hilton Barber near Cradock. The life was not much to his liking, and about Christmas, 1884, he joined the Second Mounted Rifles (Carrington's Horse), under command of Colonel Sir Frederick Carrington, and with his corps accompanied the Warren Expedition. After the disbandment of the expedition he joined the Bechuanaland Border Police, also under Sir



Photo by London Stereoscopic Company, Regent Street.

CAPTAIN HENRY JOHN BORROW.

(Commanding B Troop, Salisbury Horse.)

BORN 17TH MARCH, 1865. KILLED AT SHANGANI, DECEMBER 4TH, 1893.

Frederick Carrington, and received promotion while serving with that force. In March, 1887, he left the Bechuanaland Border Police, and joined his friends, Frank Johnson and Maurice Heany, in an expedition to Matabeliland; this expedition ultimately resulted in the formation of the Bechuanaland Exploration Company, Limited, of which Captain Borrow became Assistant-Superintendent. It was in this capacity he first became acquainted with the late Major Allan Wilson, who had been sent up country as an employé of his Company. Also while with the Bechuanaland Company, Captain Borrow escorted to Buluwayo the Queen's messengers, Captain Fergusson, Surgeon-Major Melladew, and Major Gascoigne, who were the bearers of Her Majesty's first letter to Lobengula.

When Mr. Rhodes decided upon the effective occupation of Mashonaland, Captain Borrow was a party to the contract, together with his old Bechuanaland companions, Major Johnson and Captain Heany. They at once proceeded to raise and equip the now famous Mashonaland Pioneers, in which corps d'élite Captain Borrow held the rank of lieutenant and adjutant. When the Pioneers were disbanded, the three friends formed themselves into the firm of Johnson, Heany, and Borrow. They did wonders in the way of opening up the gold districts and the country generally, and in arranging communication with the East Coast, and ultimately became merged into Frank Johnson and Co., Limited, of which company Captain Borrow became one of the Local-Managing Directors at Salisbury. After several years of the severest labour and almost uninterrupted hardships, during which, by his kindness and generosity, he endeared himself to the whole community, he returned to England in February, 1893, and floated an offshoot of his company, viz., the Mashonaland Central Gold Mining Company, of which also he became a Director.

At length the war broke out, and Captain Borrow threw himself heart and soul into the task of organising the forces, in which work the influence of his firm as large employers of labour was very strong. He had commanded a troop of the Local Volunteer Force (the Mashonaland Horse), and when the Salisbury Horse was enrolled he was appointed Captain in command of "B" Troop. Throughout the campaign he took prominent part in all the engagements and was

always to the fore in times of danger and emergency. At the battle of the Imbembesi, his troop being on the inner face of the laager and not very actively engaged, Captain Borrow was among the first to observe the threatened loss of all the horses of the command, and with Sir John Willoughby took the initiative in preventing their capture by the enemy. Rushing to the centre of the laager he sprang upon one of the few horses which happened to be within the lines, and galloped off to the rescue of the others, thus exposing himself to a heavy fire from the enemy at close quarters, and only accomplished his object at very imminent risk.

The day preceding the fight at Shangani, he was out with his Troop collecting cattle and burning kraals, and only returned to the laager, with many hundreds of head of cattle, long after dark. The day after the loss of Captain Gwynyth Williams, no information relative to him having been received, Captain Borrow with fifteen men scouted the country for many miles in rear of the Column searching for the spoor of the missing officer's horse, and only returned to the laager late at night. This was a service of great risk, and was very ably performed. He was, moreover, the first man of the united Columns to enter Buluwayo, having been sent forward with twenty men to take possession the day before the main body arrived.

During the campaign he acted as special correspondent of the *Times*, and sent home several interesting accounts, notably Mr. James Fairbairn's diary of events in Buluwayo prior to its occupation. He was a splendid horseman and a keen sportsman, being passionately fond of shooting, hunting, and racing. He was a good all-round athlete, and one of the very best shots in a country where good shots abound, big game of all sorts having fallen to his rifle. He stood over six feet, and was finely built and very handsome, modest, unconscious of his gifts, and thoroughly kind-hearted. Despite his numerous occupations he was a great reader and a deep student of mining and all that went with it, and there was probably no better or more practical judge of a gold reef in Mashonaland. Captain Borrow had very many warm friends in South Africa, where his straightforward, manly, and energetic character made him universally respected and admired. Fairly launched as he was in his career, no man in the country had brighter prospects than he

when he went cheerfully to meet his death by the Shangani River on that morning of the 5th of December, 1893.

The late CAPTAIN JOHN ALEXANDER LIVINGSTONE CAMPBELL, R.A., who was the first to fall in the campaign, was born on the 6th of January, 1856. He entered the Royal Artillery on the 2nd of February, 1876, after passing through Woolwich, and received his captaincy on January 10th, 1885. In 1888 he left the service, and four years afterwards went out to South Africa, entering a year later the service of the British South Africa Company. He became a magistrate in Mashonaland, and at the outbreak of the war volunteered for active service with the Salisbury Horse, being attached to the staff of Major Forbes. He was shot in the hip-joint by



CAPTAIN J. A. L. CAMPBELL.

a native from behind a rock, while driving in some captured cattle on 15th October, 1893, and died the following day at Iron Mine Hill. Captain Campbell was exceedingly popular among the members of the Chartered Company's forces, and his loss was deeply regretted. On the day on which the Victoria Column arrived, Captain Campbell was buried with full military honours at dusk in the evening. As he was an ex-Artillery officer, the Artillery volunteered to furnish the carrying party, and "A" Troop furnished the firing party. All the Salisbury and a great many of the Victoria Column attended the funeral, and the service was conducted by the Bishop. "I think there were a good many standing round the grave that evening," says Major Forbes, "who realised for the first time that what we had undertaken was no child's play, but stern reality, and that poor Campbell's fate might at any time be the fate of one or all of us; but there could be no turning back. We had undertaken the work, and had to go through with it."

Captain FREDERICK FITZGERALD, commanding No. 1 Troop of the Victoria Rangers, and killed with Major Wilson, was an exceedingly popular officer, who had done excellent work throughout the campaign, being several times mentioned by Major Forbes for special services. Before the war broke out he was Sub-Inspector of the British South Africa Company's Police at Victoria, and after the Victoria incident took a prominent share in the organisation of the Victoria Rangers, receiving the command of the senior Troop. He had a high character and an amiable disposition, and had the power of keeping his men well in hand.

Also among those who died with Wilson and Borrow on the Shangani was CAPTAIN HARRY GREENFIELD, son of Mr. T. W. Greenfield, of Tavistock, Devon, where he was born, being thirty-two years of age at the time of his death. He was educated at the Tavistock Grammar School, and the Independent College, Taunton. Like Major Wilson, he commenced life in the office of a bank, and obtained, after several years spent in this kind of occupation, the chance of going abroad as a member of the staff of the National Bank of the Orange Free State. Subsequently he migrated to Kimberley, where he became overseer at one of the mines. Captain Greenfield appears to have had a full share of the roving and adventurous disposition for which the men of Devon have always been famous, and after the occupation of Mashonaland, made his way to that country in charge of stores for one of the leading South African merchant firms. On war being declared against the Matabeli, Captain Greenfield, like all the pick of the white men in Mashonaland, volunteered his services, and was appointed quartermaster and subsequently captain of the Victoria Rangers. He still is well remembered in Tavistock as a genial and high-spirited boy, and leaves, it is sad to say, a widow and two children, who are now at Salisbury, Mashonaland. Captain Greenfield, who possessed considerable literary taste, occasionally amused himself by writing descriptive accounts of his travels for the newspapers. His last letter to his father, in which, amid much lighter references, he hazards the suggestion that the lines may come to be looked upon as "touches of a vanished hand," has been reproduced in nearly every journal in the kingdom, and was made the subject of a



CAPTAIN HARRY GREENFIELD.

(Quartermaster to the Victoria Column.)

BORN 1861. KILLED AT SHANGANI, DECEMBER 4TH, 1893.

stirring picture in the "Graphic" by Mr. John Charlton. It bears important and independent witness to the causes of the war with Lobengula. The following is the letter in question :—

MY DEAREST FATHER,—By the time this reaches you I shall be—well, I don't exactly know where, but not in Mashonaland. You have, of course, heard in the English papers of the trouble we have had with our beloved next door neighbour, Lobengula. Not content with the snug annuity the Chartered Company has been paying him (£1,200) for some years past, he must needs kick up his heels, and allow his warriors to approach our very towns in pursuit of the helpless, and likewise worthless Mashonas. An Englishman can, and does, stand a lot of cheek from a nigger, but when it comes to killing our own native servants in the precincts of the town—even we, who take our pleasures sadly and our cheek soberly, had to rise in our wrath, and chastise our dusky brethren. Of course, according to the gospels of "St. Labby" and Exeter Hall, we should not have done this, but let them gang their ain gait until the wet season had properly set in—those of us who had not the sense or means to go down country, being all more or less down with fever, the full rivers forbidding relief columns or more provisions; and then they would have swooped down in their tens of thousands, and butchered man, woman, and child. This is the programme Exeter Hall would have liked us to follow, rather than injure a few of their petted heathen, who, by-the-bye, would have as much pleasure in slitting a few of the above-named trageophilists, as those of their Mashona vassals. Being, however, men who live among the black devils, and know their ways, we are taking the bull by the horns and are going to make a bold push for Buluwayo, the head-quarters of this savage potentate. Remember, I am in no way a servant of the British South Africa Company, and in many ways I have despised their ways and their policy, so that you may regard me as a perfectly unbiassed witness in the matter. That being so, I say, without the slightest fear of contradiction, that the Company has been forced into any action they have taken by Lobengula himself; for at the time the disturbance took place they had neither the means nor inclination to commence what may eventuate into a big war. As to the inuendos in several of the English papers about a hankering after Matabeliland by the Company, that's all bosh; but what would have happened had they not taken the stand they have done, would have been a slaughter of almost every white person in Mashonaland, and the Company would have lost what they have already got, and paid so dear for—Mashonaland. Had the affairs been in less capable hands than those of our Administrator, Dr. Jameson, I dread to think what would have

happened ; but on the occasion there arose a man to cope with it ; and if the expedition is successful, as it must be, the Chartered Company ought to recognise that in Dr. Jameson they have a man second in ability only to Cecil Rhodes himself.

I have been wandering away from what I intended to say at the outset, that one of the three columns about to invade Matabeliland is starting from this place, and that I am going with it. You know of old my wandering and erratic spirit, and will not, therefore, be astonished at my going. I have got a captaincy in the Victoria column, and hope I shall do nothing that would in any way be a discredit to yourself or the place I come from. Of course, the odds against us will be very great. The Matabeli number about 25,000 ; we shall scarcely muster 1,000 all told ; but then we are all accustomed to horse and rifle, both of which the Matabeli know nothing or little of ; and in addition to that we have seven Maxim quick-firing guns, with deadly hail of about 500 bullets per minute. This is the first time for the Maxim gun to be used in actual warfare, so that our movements, for that reason alone, will be watched with great interest by the outside world. It is a great piece of work—equipping, clothing, arming, and rationing 300 men in an out-of-the-way place like this—and, being quartermaster, a lot of work falls on me ; but we shall start in a few days, and then most of the heavy work will be over ; after which plenty of fighting and hardships for the next six months ; but, as I said before, better that than stay here to be killed like rats in a hole.

Our column will consist of about 300, man and horse, 16 waggons (each drawn by 16 oxen), containing rations and ammunition, three Maxim guns drawn by horses, one Hotchkiss shell gun, and one 7-pounder, in addition to which we shall secure about 60 niggers of all sorts, mostly colonial natives. The Salisbury column will consist of about an equal number, and the Tuli column about 50 less. Of course, we gain greatly by having three distinct columns, small though they may be, for each is, so to say, a separate army perfectly independent of each other, and the three can combine or not just as may be found advisable. The English Government has, so far, not recognised our claim as British subjects, but from latest advices we hear that John Bull has at last aroused from his lethargy, and is going to send the Bechuanaland Border Police—a fine regiment about 600 strong—to assist us on the south, and has also removed his veto from his vassal Khama, the chief of the Bamangwatos, who will put about 1,000 trained warriors into the field. If this is a fact, the power of Lobengula is doomed, and the whole campaign will be at an end in a few months. Of course, in the coming struggle a good many of our horses will lose their riders, and a

good many of us will be spoken of in the past tense as "Poor old So-and-so," but in this case, unquestionably, *le jeu vaut la chandelle*, and as nothing worth having is acquired without danger, we must take things as they come, and if you have afterwards to regard this letter as "touches of a vanished hand," you and others—amongst whom I hope will not be any long-suffering creditors—will be sorry for one that is gone. Anyhow, I know that from all my old friends in Tavistock I shall receive a hearty God speed, and when I see you all, which I hope to do within the next year or so, we will crack a bottle of the very best for "Auld Lang Syne."

By Major Wilson's side also died Captain WILLIAM JOSEPH JUDD, commanding No. 4 Troop of the Victoria Rangers. He was originally a farmer in the Cape Colony, but sold his farm for the purpose of joining the Pioneer Force, in which he was a trooper. After the Occupation of Mashonaland he became engaged in transport riding, making his head-quarters at Victoria, where he was elected Commandant of the local Burghers. When the war broke out he volunteered, and received the command of a troop in the Victoria Rangers, which many of the more prominent burghers joined. He rendered excellent service throughout the war, being quick and ready as an officer, and to be absolutely relied upon in any emergency. Personally he was exceedingly popular with the forces, and was well known as an expert shot with gun and rifle.

Yet another of the officers of the expedition killed on the Shangani among the Wilson Patrol was CAPTAIN ARGENT BLUNDELL KIRTON, who was born on February 6th, 1857. He was the son of Major Edward B. Kirton, formerly attached to the Admiralty, but subsequently to the Royal Engineering Department, War Office. Major Kirton served for some years at the Cape, and was a great friend of Sir Harry Smith. Argent Kirton was born at Portsmouth, and was educated at the St. Paul's Grammar School, Cosham. He left for South Africa at the age of sixteen to join his two brothers, who were already established there: Joseph Kirton, C.E., who subsequently died of fever; and George Kirton, who was killed by a fall from his horse. Among Argent Kirton's earlier exploits, it may be mentioned that, at imminent risk, he carried despatches through the Boer lines during the war, for which he was complimented by Lord Wolseley. He lived on

his own farm in the bush-veld, about thirty miles from Zeerust, and was already familiar with Mashonaland and Matabeliland through successive trips to those countries, prior to the advent of the Chartered Company. For many years he was on terms of intimacy with Lobengula. At the time that hostilities broke out, he was acting for Sir John Willoughby, at Victoria, on behalf of an English syndicate which had acquired farms in Mashonaland, and immediately volunteered for service. He was placed in charge of the Transport Department, with the local rank of captain of the Victoria Rangers,

and was present at every battle with the Matabeli. On the arrival of the column at Buluwayo, he volunteered for service with Major Forbes' Patrol, and was killed with Major Wilson. A pluckier man never wore shoe leather, and he was popular throughout the country. His motto, "*Fortis voluntas vincit*," was characteristic of the man. He married, in 1887, Katherine, daughter of the Rev. Mr. Thomas, a missionary in Matabeliland, one of whose sons was murdered by Lobengula at the time Captain Patterson was treacherously done to death by the Matabeli. Captain Kirton leaves a widow and three children.

Another general favourite among the officers who died during the campaign was the late CAPTAIN CHARLES FREDERICK LENDY, who was born at Sunbury House, Sunbury-on-Thames, on the 7th of January, 1863. He was the eldest son of the late Major A. F. Lendy, F.L.S., F.G.S., etc., formerly Captain on the French Staff, who came to England in 1850, and became, after eleven years, a naturalised English subject, joining the 4th Middlesex Militia (7th Fusiliers). He was one of the first to start a practical and military college, in 1855, at Sunbury-on-Thames, where he lived for thirty-four years, and died October 10th,



CAPTAIN A. B. KIRTON.



Photo by West & Son, Gosport.

CAPTAIN CHARLES FREDERICK LENDY, R.A.
(Commanding the Artillery of the Victoria Column.)

BORN 7TH JANUARY, 1863. DIED BULUWAYO, 13TH JANUARY, 1894.

1889. He was of French-Swiss extraction, his father, Colonel Lendy, being aide-de-camp to the Duc de Nemours, and Commandant of the Military School at Metz.

Captain C. F. Lendy was educated in Paris (at the Lyceé St. Louis), Germany, and Harrow, and passed sixth into Woolwich in February, 1881. On leaving he went through the Long Course at Shoeburyness, and from thence to Gibraltar in 1883, and afterwards to Bermuda. On his return to England in 1886, he went to the Isle of Wight and Hurst Castle, during which time he passed as interpreter both in French and German. He next went to Gosport and Weymouth, where he was stationed when seconded from the Artillery to take command of the Maxim guns for the British South Africa Company. He sailed from England May 17th, 1890, delighted with the prospect of an adventurous life. From a very early age he evinced great aptitude for science: chemistry, geology, and botany, and was also a keen sportsman, being particularly devoted to shooting and fishing. He was a very powerful man, being able to lift very heavy weights and perform many unusual feats of strength. He always travelled about with very heavy dumb-bells (20 lbs. each), which he used night and morning with unfailing regularity. These he carried in a small portmanteau, besides shots of 30 lbs. and 16 lbs. weight, for "putting the weight," a branch of sport in which he excelled, and which finally caused his sad end. Bad luck alone prevented him from being amongst the list of amateur champions, as the only summer he was in England of late years found him at Gosport, and on the morning of the Championship Meeting at Stamford Bridge he, unfortunately (after a long, tiring night spent in signalling), missed the only train which would have got him to London in time to compete. The same afternoon, before his brother officers, he covered just over forty feet with more than one "put," whereas the winner of the Championship "put" only over thirty-eight feet. Just before going to Africa, while stationed at Weymouth, he went in zealously for sculling, and it was his intention to have tried for the Diamond Sculls at Henley, for which many good judges thought he held a very good chance, in spite of his having taken to it so recently; he had also been very successful in various punting competitions on the Thames.


Captain Lendy was at first stationed at Fort Charter, but subsequently at Fort Victoria, where he was appointed magistrate. On one occasion, which Mr. Labouchere has made famous in this country, Captain Lendy was sent to suppress a disturbance at the kraal of 'Ngomo, a Mashona chief who had defied the authorities. It was found necessary to employ force, and, of course, several natives were killed. Captain Lendy was thereupon held up to the execration of mankind in Mr. Labouchere's highly-coloured but ineffective manner. This, however, is what Mr. Selous has to say on the subject :—

There is not an Englishman in Mashonaland who does not deprecate the cruel aspersions which have been cast upon the character of Captain Lendy—aspersions which, in spite of all the testimony as to the honourable career of that unfortunate young officer, his detractors have not sufficient generosity of character to withdraw, but still allow to blacken his memory.

Captain Lendy died after the campaign was over in consequence of a strain brought about while pur-

suing his hobby of "putting the shot," being, unknown to himself no doubt, considerably weakened by the hardships gone through. He was attended to the last by Dr. Jameson and Dr. Hogg, the date of his death being the 13th of January. He was brother to Captain E. A. W. Lendy, D.S.O., the gallant and promising officer who was killed in the Warina "blunder" on the West Coast of Africa, December 23rd, 1893.

It is difficult to express the deep regret with which the news that so promising a career had been cut short was received both in South Africa and England. The estimation in which his abilities were generally held is fully shown by the fact that he received



THE LENDY MEMORIAL AT SUNBURY-ON-THAMES.

the command of the artillery of the combined columns throughout the campaign. It is understood too that it was owing to his advice that the number of the Maxim guns taken with the British South Africa Company's forces were increased, and it is only necessary to read any account of the campaign to see how important an influence this step had upon the result of the war. All who knew Captain Lendy felt confident that his would be a most successful future; among others, the Duke of Abercorn, President of the Chartered Company, who, in a letter to the deceased officer's relatives, spoke most highly of his services, and alluded to the severe loss which the Company had sustained in his untimely death. At Sunbury, where their boyhood was spent, a fountain is being erected by the inhabitants as a memorial of the two brothers, who both died in their country's service within the space of a few weeks.

The third to fall in the campaign was CAPTAIN OWEN GWYNETH ST. GEORGE WILLIAMS, eldest son of General Owen Williams. He was chief of the Scouts of the Salisbury Column. His close friend, the late Captain H. J. Borrow, told the story of his death as follows: "He had been out with several others, and they had been surrounded and very nearly entrapped by a large body of armed natives. They succeeded in getting through, however. Captain Williams' horse was fresh, but those of the others were completely knocked up, so that when the party came together later on he was missing.

It was, however, confidently believed that he was ahead, and would turn up safely. As he did not return to laager that night, signal rockets were discharged, and two of our best native hunters were sent out to take up his spoor. This they did, but could only follow it a few miles, as the natives pursued and fired on them continually. They reported that, as far as they could judge, his horse, though wounded, was going well and



CAPTAIN O. G. WILLIAMS.

strong, and the tracks of his pursuers were growing fainter. I was sent out at once with a party and took up the track from where they had left it, following it for nearly ten miles, and not returning till late at night. My report corroborated that of the native scouts, and the general conclusion arrived at was that he was heading for Hartley Hills or Salisbury. He was known to be a good man on the veld, well able to take care of himself, and the anxiety felt on his account was therefore lessened. However, nothing more could be done, for the enemy were about on all sides, and further delay was out of the question. We now learn that he was eventually overtaken, and after shooting some of his pursuers, sat down on a rock, revolver in hand, and faced the rest, who then retired about 200 yards and fired upon him, and he fell, shot through the temple. Thus amongst the officers of the expedition, has another promising career been prematurely cut short." Captain Williams formerly held a captain's commission in the Royal Horse Guards, and had first come to Mashonaland as a member of Lord Randolph Churchill's expedition. Referring to his untimely death, Major Forbes says that he was a very great loss to the expedition. He was most popular wherever he was known, and had been particularly useful both on account of his professional military training, and by reason of his remarkable natural grasp of locality, which stood him in excellent stead as an officer of scouts.

This completes the list of those holding the military or local rank of captain who were killed during the campaign. Among the junior officers was **LIEUTENANT AREND HERMANUS HOFMEYR**, of the Victoria Rangers, killed with Major Wilson's party. The only information to hand concerning him is that he was the son of a clergyman of the Dutch Reformed Church in the Cape Colony, and a connection of the Hon. J. H. Hofmeyr, the famous leader of the Afrikaner party in the Cape Parliament. He was second lieutenant in No. 4 Troop.


LIEUTENANT GEORGE HUGHES, one of the Wilson Patrol, was the son of an Irish Methodist Minister. He was educated at the Methodist College, Belfast, from which he took a mathematical scholarship in the Royal University, where he matriculated and passed his first two examinations in Arts. Having a strong bent towards travel and adventure, he quitted college before taking his degree and emigrated

to America. He remained there for some months and then went to South Africa to join an elder brother. He joined the British South Africa Company's Pioneer Force ("D" Troop) in 1889, and when it was disbanded entered the service of the Bechuana-land Exploration Company as prospector. When the Matabeli war broke out he at once volunteered and was appointed lieutenant in the Victoria Rangers, No. 1 Troop.

LIEUTENANT RIXON, a popular officer of the Victoria Rangers, died at Buluwayo on November 5th from fever. He was English born, and was for some time resident in Johannes-



LIEUTENANT RIXON.



LIEUTENANT GEORGE HUGHES.

burg. About the time of the occupation he went up to Mashonaland, where he was engaged in storekeeping.

Another of those killed with the Wilson Patrol was SERGEANT WILLIAM HENRY BIRKLEY, Salisbury Horse, who was born in London and educated at the Reading Grammar School. He emigrated to South Africa in the year 1884. Mr. Birkley, who claimed descent from King Robert II. of Scotland and his Queen Euphemia, went to Africa when Sir Hercules Robinson was Governor, and was for some time in the Cape Mounted Rifles, but afterwards enlisted into Colonel Carrington's Horse. He volunteered at the outbreak of the war, and joined "B" Troop of the Salisbury Horse. Mr. Birkley from time to time wrote home



SERGEANT W. H. BIRKLEY.

a number of very interesting and amusing letters, some of which now, however, read rather pathetically. One of the last, dated October the 19th, from Matabeliland, concludes: "The natives round here yesterday predicted that there wouldn't be a white man left in the country by the time the sun goes down to-night. The Matabeli will have to look pretty sharp, as it only wants about an hour to sundown." He held the rank of sergeant during the campaign, and was thirty-one years of age when killed. He died a soldier's death, which has been the fate won in many of his family, who have many records of honour and glory of the by-gone battles and campaigns. Before

going out to South Africa, Mr. Birkley was articled to a solicitor, and was established in business in Salisbury when hostilities commenced. He was particularly well-connected, as indeed were a very large proportion of the rank and file, and possessed many sterling qualities which won for him the respect of his comrades and fellow colonists. As a sergeant in the Salisbury Horse he spared no effort for the success of the undertaking.

SERGEANT CLIFFORD BRADBURN, killed with Major Wilson's Patrol, was twenty-five years of age when he died. He was formerly in the Birmingham Bank, and after the formation of the British South Africa Company was one of the first to join the Pioneer Force. About two years ago, hearing that his mother was dangerously ill,



SERGEANT C. BRADBURN.

he started for England, but unfortunately arrived too late. He returned to South Africa, and when the war broke out volunteered, being appointed sergeant in the Victoria Rangers. On New Year's Day a very cheering letter was received by his friends, stating that he, as one of a volunteer patrol, was about to attempt a dangerous and difficult enterprise—the capture of Lobengula. He hoped, however, to be with them at home in June next. Mr. Bradburn was the son of Mr. Alfred Bradburn, of Edgbaston, Birmingham. Before going to Matabeliland he was in the Cape Mounted Rifles, from which he resigned in order to come home on a visit. He was born on December 17th, 1868, at Moseley, Birmingham, was educated at Queen's College in that town, and went out to South Africa in 1890.

SERGEANT HAROLD ALEXANDER BROWN, killed with Major Wilson on the Shangani, was sergeant of the Victoria Rangers. He was educated at Harrow and Exeter College, Oxford, and was exceedingly fond of travel, having, even before leaving Oxford, explored many out-of-the-way corners of Europe, Africa, and Asia. He possessed a large share of that daring and adventurous spirit characteristic of Englishmen in the frontier colonies. Mr. R. Bosworth Smith, his old form-master at Harrow, describes him as quick-tempered, strong, and active, and, when at school, "fond of escapades, and quite ungovernable if you got on his wrong side." He could not put together two lines of Greek or Latin without alarming mistakes, but possessed, nevertheless, great ability, with almost a touch of genius. He was exceedingly well read, and had gained, while in the Fifth form at Harrow, the school prize for English verse—a feat not often performed. His rough-hewn, determined, fearless character was instinct with the spirit of daring and the love of travel and adventure. He had



SERGEANT H. A. BROWN.

wandered, often alone, through Egypt, the interior of Asia Minor and Morocco, Albania, Montenegro, the Balearic Islands, and left a full account of one of his most dangerous journeys in the shape of a volume (published by Griffith and Farran) entitled, "A Winter in Albania." Mr. Brown accompanied the Pioneers to Salisbury, and one of his private letters describing the events of the march, published anonymously in the "Pall Mall Gazette," so much interested Mr. Cecil Rhodes, that it is said he wrote to the editor asking him to divulge the name of the writer.

SERGEANT DAHM, Raaf's Rangers, was the only one of that force killed during the advance of the Southern Column, being shot through the head in attacking the Matabeli in the hills near the Singuesi River on November 2nd. Unfortunately no biographical information has been received.

ARMOUR-SERGEANT D. W. GIBSON was one of the two white men of Lieutenant-Colonel Goold-Adams' forces killed during the campaign, meeting his death on December 10th during the march from the Shangani to Umhlangeni. Of him, too, no biographical information has been received in time for this edition.



TROOP-SERGT.-MAJOR S. C. HARDING.

TROOP-SERGEANT-MAJOR SIDNEY CHARLES HARDING, Victoria Rangers, killed with Major Wilson, was educated at Felstead School and at St. John's College, Cambridge. Developing a disposition for out-door life in preference to sedentary work, he looked to South Africa as an area for the display of an active spirit. He resigned the lieutenancy he held in the 2nd Cambridgeshire (University) Rifle Volunteers, and on his arrival at Capetown he was offered, and accepted, a commission as lieutenant in Dyme's Mounted Rifles. Before the Basuto question was at an end he had seen something of South African warfare.

This over he went up to Natal, and served under Colonel Dartnell, C.M.G.,

in the Natal Mounted Police. In 1885 he returned to England, where his father hoped he would remain to fill an appointment which he had obtained for him, but the fascination of colonial freedom was too strong, and after a few months' stay at home he was reluctantly parted with, and returned to Natal, when he again entered the Mounted Police service. Subsequently, in 1889, he joined the Bechuanaland Border Police. From Fort Elebe, in that year, he wrote of Bechuanaland as a "grand country when it is opened up." "Big game" hunting while on periodical leave reconciled him to the monotony of life. During the four years he served in Bechuanaland, at Macloutsie and elsewhere, he seems to have made himself a general favourite, taking a prominent part in the local recreative and social movements. He was a fine young Englishman, with a reputation for determination, energy and pluck. He was born in the old Court suburb of Kensington on the 10th December, 1861, and was the son of Colonel Charles Harding Hon. Colonel of the 4th V.B. Queen's Royal West Surrey Regiment.

CORPORAL SAMUEL CALCRAFT, killed at the Imbembesi, was the eldest son of Mr. Samuel Calcraft, of Camden Town. He was born on December 22nd, 1858, in the Parish of St. Pancras, London, and was educated at the Camden High Schools. At the age of nineteen he went out to South Africa, where he was several years Chief Clerk and Controller in the General Post Office at Port Elizabeth, under Sir Henry Wilmot. He afterwards left for the gold fields and still later served in the Bechuanaland Border Police, in which he became Corporal. When the Matabeli War broke out he volunteered for active service with the Salisbury Horse and was wounded in the Battle of Imbembesi. He died from his wound on November 6th, 1893.



CORPORAL SAMUEL CALCRAFT.



CORPORAL F. C. COLQUHOUN.

CORPL. FREDERICK CROSSLEY COLQUHOUN, who was killed with the Wilson Patrol, was the son of Mr. Francis Crossley Colquhoun, Assistant Commissary-General, who served throughout the Crimean war. He was born in Edinburgh in the year 1867, was educated at the Bedford Modern School, and first went to the Cape in 1889, but had previously been for nearly two years learning farming in Manitoba. When he first went to South Africa he was at Mr. Featherstone's farm near Somerset, but joined the Pioneer Corps and went with it into Mashonaland. After this he went into the British South Africa Company's service at

Victoria. On the outbreak of hostilities he at once volunteered for service with the Victoria Rangers. He bore the character of being eminently a young fellow who could be counted upon to always do his duty, and was very popular.

CORPORAL HARRY GRAHAM KINLOCH, who was one of Major Wilson's party, was born at Norwood, Surrey, in 1863, and was educated at Harrow and Trinity College, Cambridge. He entered Mashonaland about three years ago, and practised with considerable success as a solicitor at Salisbury. He had also attained some reputation as an athlete, was a good cricketer, and an ex-amateur champion light-weight boxer. When war against Lobengula was declared he entered the Salisbury Horse as a trooper, and went through the whole campaign until killed on the Shangani River. No man was more thoroughly popular in the whole country than Mr. Kinloch, who united quiet unassuming manners to considerable abilities and sterling qualities.

LANCE-CORPORAL R. MUNDY, of the Bechuanaland Border Police, was assailed when the waggons were rushed by the Matabeli on the Singesi River on November 2nd, on the occasion on which Mr. F. C.

Selous was wounded. Unfortunately no biographical information has been received.

IN MR. ALBERT EDWARD BURNETT, who was mortally wounded in a skirmish at the commencement of the campaign, the expedition lost one of its best known, most popular, and most trusted members. He had seen service before, having passed through the Warren Expedition in Colonel Gough's Regiment (3rd Mounted Rifles). Afterwards he joined the Bechuanaland Border Police under Colonel Sir F. Carrington, leaving that force to go north with Messrs. Johnson, Heany, and Borrow, with whom he was connected up to the time of the flotation of the Bechuanaland Exploration Company. After that he was commissioned to proceed with Mr. Selous to Tette on the Zambesi, and thence down-country to secure a concession of Mashonaland from the Mashona chiefs, the attempt to obtain the concession of that country from Lobengula having up to that time proved a failure. The concessions so obtained were afterwards ceded to Mr. Rhodes. Subsequently he joined the Pioneers as Captain in charge of the Transport Department, and rendered signally good service in road making and in other ways. After the occupation he embarked in mining in Mashonaland, and was so engaged until the war broke out, when he volunteered. On the departure of the Salisbury Horse, he remained behind for the purpose of bringing on despatches from Mr. Rhodes. No man in the country had a better knowledge of the veld than Mr. Burnett, who was a perfect scout. Mr. Burnett, who was killed while out on scouting duty, was born in East London (Cape Colony), and was at one time engaged in diamond mining at Kimberley. He was a keen sportsman and a wonderfully good shot, and as already said, very well known and a general favourite in many parts of South Africa.

Altogether twenty-eight troopers were killed or died of sickness during the campaign, twenty of these (fifteen being Salisbury and five Victoria men) being among those gallant fellows who died round Major Wilson. Of these one was Trooper WILLIAM ABBOTT, Salisbury Horse, who was the son of Mr. Joseph Abbott, of High Hill, Keswick, and was born at Thornthwaite, Cumberland. He sailed for South Africa on the 21st May, 1889, and after staying for some time in



TROOPER WILLIAM ABBOTT.

through the Basuto Campaign in 1879, taking part with Major Wilson in that famous incident in Kaffir warfare, the storming of Morosi's Mountain. He was promoted to Sergeant in 1881, but subsequently left the Cape Mounted Rifles and became overseer of a diamond mine at Kimberley. Later on again, he joined the British Bechuanaland Border Police, which he left to come home in 1889. After remaining in England for two years and a-half, he left for Johannesburg on April 2nd, 1892, and there had charge of the battery at the Langlaagte Estate and Gold Mining Company. He went to Mashonaland on June 24th, 1893, and volunteered for service in the Salisbury Horse when the Matabeli War broke out.

Capetown and Kimberley, went into the employ of the Bechuanaland Trading Association, in which service he remained for three years. He afterwards settled down to mining work in the Mazoe fields, Mashonaland, volunteering when the Matabeli War broke out.

Among the twenty men taken by Captain Borrow to relieve Major Wilson was Trooper WILLIAM BATH, the eldest son of Mr. Job Bath. He was born on November 11th, 1856, in the county of Middlesex, and was educated in the Commercial Schools, Clapham. He joined the Cape Mounted Rifles in October, 1876, and went



TROOPER WILLIAM BATH.

TROOPER WILLIAM HENRY BRITTON, Salisbury Horse, who was killed with the Wilson Patrol, was born in 1870, at Halstead, Essex, where he was educated. He was always of an adventurous disposition, and on the death of his father decided to try his fortune in South Africa. He therefore, at the age of nineteen, left Halstead for that country, and finally settled at Fort Salisbury. After the Victoria incident he volunteered for service in Matabeliland, and went through the whole campaign.

TROOPER EDWARD BROCK, Salisbury Horse, formed one of Major Wilson's party. No biographical information has yet been received.



TROOPER W. H. BRITTON.



TROOPER W. A. CARY.

TROOPER WILLIAM ARTHUR CARY, killed at the battle of Imbembesi, was born in 1872, and is the fourth son of Colonel Francis W. Cary, commanding the 53rd Regt. District. He accompanied his father to South Africa when the latter commanded the 1st Battalion of the East Yorkshire Regiment, in the autumn of 1888, and continued his education at the Diocesan College, Rondebosch, near Capetown. In May, 1891, when only nineteen years old, he joined, with his brother, Mr. Charles Cary, the British South Africa Company's Police. He was, therefore, only twenty-one years of age when he died, but was a fine manly young fellow,

who is spoken of by his comrades as possessing all the characteristics of an honourable and upright English gentleman. He was devoted to athletic pursuits, and was notably a good cricketer. He was also a first-rate shot, and in his college cadet corps (of which he was sergeant-major) won the challenge cup for rifle shooting with the highest score ever made in South Africa by a member of a cadet corps. On the outbreak of the Matabeli war he volunteered for service, and was attached to the Salisbury Horse, Captain Heany's Troop. That officer says of him that "he was a general favourite, an adept at all field sports, and a clever lad all round; and sincerely regretted by his comrades. He was especially anxious (being a wonderfully good shot) to make good shooting at Imbembesi, and it was in eagerly exposing himself with that object that he was hit in the head with a Martini bullet."

TROOPERS PHILIP WOUTER DE VOS and L. DEWIS, Salisbury Horse, were killed with Major Wilson. No other information has been received.



MR. D. M. C. DILLON.

TROOPER DENNIS MICHAEL CRONLY DILLON, son of the late John Cronly Dillon, Postmaster-General of the Punjaub, was born at Burdwan, India, on April 20th, 1868. He was sent to England at the age of nine or ten, and was educated at St. Edmund's College, Hertfordshire, from where he took a first class in the matriculation examination at the London University, and also passed his intermediate Arts at the same University, finishing his education at Stonyhurst College. Failing in the examination for the Ceylon Civil Service, he went to Africa in October, 1888. There he joined the "Pioneer Force," and had his


share of the hard work of opening up Mashonaland. On the outbreak of the war he joined the Victoria Rangers and acted as signaller until killed with Major Wilson's party. A clever scholar and good athlete, he was at college a general favourite both with his professors and fellow students, as also among his comrades in Mashona-

land. The portrait is from a photograph taken at the age of twenty.

TROOPER EUSTACE MACLEOD FORBES, who was drowned while endeavouring to cross the Umsingwani River, was a brother of Major P. W. Forbes, and the fourth son of Mr. Alex. C. Forbes, of Whitchurch, Oxon. He was born on 21st November, 1862, and was educated at Repton, and Jesus College, Cambridge, at both of which he took a leading part in cricket and football, being in the Repton cricket and football elevens for some years, and Captain of the Jesus College cricket eleven.

After taking the degree of Bachelor of Arts at Cambridge, he went through a course of electric engineering at Messrs. Crompton's Works at Colchester, but finding no opening in this country, went out to Mashonaland in October, 1891, to join his brother. He was a clerk in the Public Prosecutor's Office of the British South Africa Company, and afterwards in the Mines Office, and it was while in the latter that he volunteered to join the force going into Matabeliland. He served through the war as a Trooper in the Salisbury Horse, and was wounded through the left elbow at the Shangani fight; and it was owing to this wound that he was drowned on 11th February, 1894, when trying to cross the Umsingwani River on his way home. This sad event was the result of Mr. Forbes' plucky endeavour to assist in finding a drift across the river for the waggons to cross by. He had got out of his depth, and having only the use of one arm, was swept away by the current and drowned, despite the strenuous efforts made by several friends who were present to save him.

TROOPER HAROLD JOHN HELLET, Victoria Rangers, was killed with Major Wilson; and TROOPER ABE LEVY, Victoria Rangers, was



TROOPER E. M. FORBES.

wounded at the battle of Shangani, October 25th, and died the following day. Further information as to these two last is still wanting.

Among those killed on the Shangani River was TROOPER GEORGE SAWERS MACKENZIE, who was born at Murree, Punjab, India, in 1860. He entered Mashonaland in 1889 with the Pioneer Force, and shortly after it was disbanded went into the service of the Zambesia Exploration Company as assayer. He held this position until the war broke out, when he volunteered for service with the Salisbury Horse.

TROOPER MATTHEW MEIKLEJOHN (Salisbury Horse, killed with Major Wilson), whose family reside in Cape Town, was prior to the war in the employ of Messrs. Frank Johnson and Co., Limited, by whom he is spoken of in high terms. He formerly resided in the Transvaal.



TROOPER H. D. W. M. MONEY.

TROOPER HAROLD DALTON WATSON MOORE MONEY, who was killed with Major Wilson, was a son of Major-General R. C. Money. He went out to Salisbury in company with Captain Borrow. On the outbreak of hostilities he volunteered to serve in Borrow's Troop—"B" Troop of the Salisbury Horse—which he did with much credit, and was one of the twenty of his troop ordered out on the pursuit of Lobengula. Young Money was of a fearless and courageous character, of high principles, and a great favourite. He came from a family of soldiers, and his natural desire had been to enter the army, although he failed to pass the Sandhurst examinations. He was only twenty-one

years of age, having been born on June 30th, 1872, at Tulpigori, Bengal. He was educated at Wellington College, and went out to South Africa in May, 1893. At the time of the outbreak of the war he had not been many weeks in Mashonaland, and was a most enthusiastic volunteer. In one letter to his relatives he said that though he "could not get into Her Majesty's Service at home, he would win a V. C. out here." He was one of the seven who made up a Public School Mess in Borrow's

troop, and all seven were killed except Batley, who was stopped in Shiloh with rheumatism, and Gisborne, sent back with despatches. The five killed were Watson and Money (Wellington), Brown and Kinloch (Harrow), and Vogel (Charterhouse). As a boy he was noted for his good influence over other boys. A Wellington master, writing of him, says:—"He was as good a boy as ever lived. Most men would give worlds to have had as innocent and happy a boyhood as his. He was as much liked by the boys as he was by all the masters who had anything to do with him, and I could always feel that there was an influence for good among my boys when Harold was among them. We feel that we have lost a Wellingtonian who would always have been an honour to the school." He was very devoted to sport of every kind, especially riding and shooting.

TROOPER EDWARD GRADDON MORRISON, Salisbury Horse, died while on service at Buluwayo, on January 15th, of sickness. He originally came to the country with young Mr. Swinburne, his close friend. He was educated at an English public school, was a splendidly built man, a good all-round athlete, and exceedingly plucky; and he was much liked and sincerely regretted by all his comrades.

TROOPER PERCY CRAMPTON NUNN was born at Bury St. Edmunds in 1855, and was the son of Mr. Robert Nunn, professor of music. In 1881 he left England for the Cape, joined the Cape Mounted Rifles, and afterwards the Bechuanaland Border Police. He was a trooper in the Salisbury Horse. During the march on Buluwayo he forwarded from time to time to the "Daily Graphic" illustrated accounts of the fighting. His last contribution appeared on December 19th. He was one of the ill-fated Wilson Patrol.

TROOPERS ROBERT OLIVER and ALEXANDER HAY ROBERTSON, Victoria Rangers, were killed with Major Wilson. Other information is wanting.



TROOPER P. C. NUNN.



TROOPER J. ROBERTSON.

TROOPER JOHN ROBERTSON, another of the gallant band killed on the Shangani River, was just twenty-six years of age. He was the youngest son of Mr. John Robertson, of Auchnahyle, Pitlochry, upon whose death about six years since he decided to seek his fortune abroad. Young Robertson was a fine, handsome man, standing about six feet high, and was just the sort to volunteer in any hazardous undertaking, and, as his last few letters to his people have been full of the atrocities of the Matabeli to the Mashonas, his friends were not surprised to find him in the front in the Victoria Rangers.

TROOPER JULIUS SIEBERT, Salisbury Horse, was dangerously wounded on November 1st at Imbembesi, and died near Buluwayo on November 3rd. Other information is wanting.

TROOPER FREDERICK THOMPSON, killed at the battle of Imbembesi, was the son of the late Mr. Henry Thompson, of Ballina House, Maryborough, Queen's Co., Ireland, and was born in 1857 at Ballingarry Castle, Co. Tipperary. He was educated at Rockwell College, Tipperary, and commenced life in a bank, resigning after a few years to join his brother in South Africa. He first joined the Cape Mounted Rifles, and after spending four years in that service was induced by his brother to leave and go to the gold fields, where he remained until the latter's death. He then joined the British South Africa Company's Police, and at the expiration



TROOPER FREDERICK THOMPSON.

of his period of service went in for prospecting, in which he was engaged when the Matabeli War broke out. He at once volunteered his services to the British South Africa Company and joined "C" (Captain Spreckley's) Troop of the Salisbury Horse. He was killed on 1st November, 1893, while on picket duty in the bush just before the battle of that date commenced. His commanding officer, Captain Spreckley, said in a letter that he would ask for no better soldier to stand by him. In the end, when surprised on duty, he shot two Matabeli and wounded two others, but the natives were too many for him, and he was killed without a chance of getting away.

TROOPER WILLIAM ALEXANDER THOMSON, killed with Major Wilson, was born in Aberdeen on the 8th of January, 1871, but a few months afterwards his parents removed to Elgin, Morayshire (only eight miles from the home of Major Wilson), so that he always looked on Elgin as his native place. He was educated at the Elgin Academy, but when fifteen years old he went to Aberdeen, where he lived for two and a-half years. He had always a desire to go abroad, and in May, 1889, he left for the Cape, where he was for two years with Messrs. J. Forrest and Co., of Rondebosch,



TROOPER W. A. THOMSON.

near Cape Town. When the Vander Byl settlement at Laurence-dale, Mashonaland, was being organised, he applied for a place in the Expedition and obtained one. Here a knowledge of drugs stood him in good stead, and proved of value to the Expedition. He had charge of the medicine chest, and was called "The Doctor" by his comrades. Mr. Thomson saw a good deal of Mashonaland, his knowledge of the country growing rapidly, and his admiration for it growing with his knowledge. He always had

great faith in the future development of Mashonaland, and he expressed his determination to stick to it "through thick and thin." When war broke out with the Matabeli, he at once volunteered his services as a trooper, and was placed in "B" Troop of the Salisbury Horse, under the late Captain Borrow. He served with his troop through the campaign until the end and bore the reputation of being energetic and straightforward. He was also very popular, being genial and warm-hearted, and having many friends. He was a good athlete and a keen angler, and was also a volunteer in the Cape Highlanders during the time he lived at the Cape. Like many others of those who fell in the war, he was a mere boy—scarcely twenty-three—when he died.

TROOPER HENRY ST. JOHN TUCK, one of Wilson's party killed on the Shangani, was born in 1868, and was the eldest son of William Henry Tuck, M.A. He was educated at Lancing College and in Germany, and in 1889 proceeded to South Africa, when he enlisted in the Cape Mounted Rifles, and subsequently joined the Pioneer Force on the occupation of Mashonaland. For this service he received, with the others, a grant of land. When the Matabeli war broke out, however, he volunteered his services and joined the Salisbury Horse, serving throughout the campaign. Before going to South Africa Mr. Tuck, like some of the other members of the forces, learned his first lesson in a volunteer corps in England, having been a member of the late corps of Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers.

TROOPER FRANK LEON VOGEL was one of the gallant men forming Major Wilson's heroic party. He was the second son of the Hon. Sir Julius Vogel, K.C.M.G., and was born on October 21st, 1870, at Auckland, New Zealand. After being educated at Charterhouse he went, in 1890, into the London Office of the British South Africa Company.



TROOPER HENRY ST. JOHN TUCK.

He left England for South Africa on April 4th, 1891, and became a trooper in the Mashonaland Mounted Police at Tuli. When this force was disbanded, in 1892, he went into the Survey Department at Salisbury, and subsequently became Acting Assistant-Secretary to Dr. L. S. Jameson. When the war broke out he volunteered, was enrolled in the "B" Troop of the Salisbury Horse under Captain Borrow, and during the campaign served the Maxim gun attached to his troop, under Lieut. Llewellyn. He left Salisbury with the column, but returned alone two or three weeks afterwards on business. Rejoining his troop two or three days after they left Fort Charter, he marched with the column, and was in all the engagements on the way to Buluwayo, serving the Maxim gun, besides volunteering for special scouting expeditions. He was one of the small party sent out in search of Captain G.

Williams, and also one of the expedition on which Captain Campbell was killed. He served the Maxim at the engagement on the Shangani River on the 25th of October, and also at Imbembesi on the 1st November, where he had a narrow escape, one bullet passing through his hat. He reached Buluwayo safe and sound on November 4th, and on the 10th wrote his last letter to his relatives, being then evidently in high spirits, and regarding the campaign as over. He left Buluwayo on the 14th, and remained with Major Forbes throughout the patrol which ended at Shiloh; thence again, as a volunteer, he accompanied the force under Major Forbes to the Shangani River, where, under Captain Borrow, he joined Major Wilson, with whom he was killed.

TROOPER THOMAS COLCLOUGH WATSON, another of the public school men who fell with the Wilson Patrol, was a son of Colonel Thomas James Watson, a grandson of Colonel Thomas Colclough Watson, and a great-grandson of Colonel Jonas Watson, who was killed



MR. F. L. VOGEL.



TROOPER THOMAS COLCLOUGH WATSON.


in the Irish Rebellion. After being educated at Wellington College he joined his father in India. The family afterwards went out to Tasmania, where Mr. Watson resided for three or four years; subsequently he returned to England, and finally went out in 1891 to Mashonaland, volunteering for service when the war broke out.

TROOPER HENRY GEORGE WATSON, Salisbury Horse, was killed with Wilson's party on the Shangani. TROOPER EDWARD EARLE WELBY, Victoria Rangers, was also killed with Major Wilson. TROOPER PERCY WOOD, who died almost at the commencement of the march upon Buluwayo, of fever, was in the Victoria

Rangers. Further information is wanting as to the last named three members of the expedition.

Of the several memorials of these valiant men, one will take the very fitting and suitable form of a hospital at Buluwayo,—formerly “The Place of Slaughter,” now a place of healing; and a bronze tablet, whereon will be inscribed the names of the dead, will be placed in the church at Salisbury. The bones of Wilson and the famed patrol are now being removed from the distant part of the country where they met their death, to consecrated ground near the ruins of Zimbabwe. Here a granite monolith will be placed above their resting-place by Mr. Cecil Rhodes—a last honour to those “pickets of civilisation,” whose noble deaths marked the downfall of a fierce and blood-stained barbarism—the rise of a civilised era. But the most eloquent tribute of all has been the profound impression created, not only among their friends, relatives, and countrymen, but among their savage foes, by the splendid gallantry of the fallen. Some of the horses have lost their riders; too many of the men are spoken of, as Captain Greenfield prophesied, as “poor old So-and-so.” But splendid legacies remain:

a fair country for the expansion of the race ; a high example of duty and devotion. May the remembrance of their heroism be ever green among the Englishmen who keep watch and ward on the frontiers of our broad South African domains ; may it ever be present in their minds, to nerve their arms and fire their courage should the time again come to saddle-up and march.



THE SALISBURY MEMORIAL TABLET.

THE FOLLOWING IS A COMPLETE LIST OF THOSE KILLED; THOSE WHO DIED OF WOUNDS OR SICKNESS; AND THOSE WOUNDED; IN THE RECENT CAMPAIGN.

Revised and Corrected to August, 1894.

MASHONALAND FORCE. TOTAL STRENGTH, ABOUT 672 EUROPEANS, 155 COLONIAL NATIVES.

Name.	Corps.	Date of Death.	Place.	Remarks.
		1893.		
Trooper Percy Wood	Victoria Rangers ..	Oct. 16th	Iron Mine Hill ..	Fever.
Capt. John A. L. Campbell ..	Salisbury Horse ..	"	"	Wounded Oct. 15th.
Mr. Albert Edward Burnett ..	Scout	Oct. 23rd	Nr. Shangani R.	Mortally wounded.
Capt. Owen Gwynydd St. George	Commanding Salisbury	Oct. 26th	Zinyangene ..	Horse shot. Cut off
Williams	Scouts	"	"	when scouting.
Trooper Abe Levy	Victoria Rangers ..	Oct. 26th	Shangani ..	Wounded Oct. 25th,
				Battle Shangani.
" Frederick Thompson ..	Salisbury Horse ..	Nov. 1st	Imbembezi ..	"
" William Arthur Cary ..	" ..	Nov. 3rd	Near Buluwayo	Wounded Nov. 1st,
				Battle Imbembesi.
" Julius Siebert	" ..	"	"	"
Lieut. Milner R. Theodore Rixon	Victoria Rangers ..	Nov. 5th	Buluwayo ..	Fever.
Corpl. Samuel Calcraft ..	Salisbury Horse ..	Nov. 6th	"	Battle Imbembesi.
Major Allan Wilson	Officer Commanding	"	"	Party surrounded
	Victoria Rangers ..	Dec. 4th	Shangani ..	and cut up.
Capt. Frederick Fitzgerald ..	Victoria Rangers ..	"	"	"
" William Joseph Judd ..	" ..	"	"	"
" Harry Moxon Greenfield ..	" ..	"	"	"
" Argent Blundell Kirton ..	" ..	"	"	"
Lieut. George Hughes	" ..	"	"	"
" Arend Hermans Hoffmeyr	" ..	"	"	"
Sgt.-Mjr. Sidney Chas. Harding	" ..	"	"	"
Sergt. Harold Alexander Brown	" ..	"	"	"
" Clifford Bradburn	" ..	"	"	"
Corpl. Fredk. Crossley Colquhoun	" ..	"	"	"
Trooper Edward Earle Welby ..	" ..	"	"	"
" John Robertson	" ..	"	"	"
" Alex. Hay Robertson ..	" ..	"	"	"
" Harold John Hellet	" ..	"	"	"
" Denis Cronly Dillon	" ..	"	"	"
Capt. Henry John Borrow ..	Salisbury Horse ..	"	"	"
Sergt. William Henry Birkley ..	" ..	"	"	"
Corpl. Harry Graham Kinloch ..	" ..	"	"	"
Trooper Harold Dalton Watson	" ..	"	"	"
" Moore Money	" ..	"	"	"
" Frank Leon Vogel	" ..	"	"	"
" L. Dewis	" ..	"	"	"
" William Henry Britton ..	" ..	"	"	"
" Philip Wouter De Vos ..	" ..	"	"	"
" Thos. Colclough Watson	" ..	"	"	"
" Henry George Watson ..	" ..	"	"	"
" Edward Brock	" ..	"	"	"
" William Bath	" ..	"	"	"
" Percy Crampton Nunn ..	" ..	"	"	"
" Henry St. John Tuck ..	" ..	"	"	"
" William Alex. Thomson	" ..	"	"	"
" William Abbott	" ..	"	"	"
" Geo. Sawers MacKenzie	" ..	"	"	"
" Matthew Meiklejohn ..	" ..	"	"	"
Trooper Robert Oliver	Victoria Rangers ..	Not known		
The following died at the close of the Campaign :				
Comdnt. Pieter Johannes Raaf ..	O. C. Tuli Column ..	Dec. 26th	Buluwayo ..	Died from illness.
		1894.		
Capt. Charles Frederick Lendy	Victoria Rangers ..	Jan. 15th	" ..	"
Trooper Edwd. Graddon Morrison	Salisbury Horse ..	"	"	Dysentery.
" Eustace Macleod Forbes	" ..	Feb. 11th	Umzingwane ..	Drowned.
		1893.		
Colonial Native Contingent ..	Salisbury	Oct. 25th	" ..	1
Mashona	" ..	"	"	27
"	" ..	"	On march ..	3

MASHONALAND FORCE.—LIST OF WOUNDED.

Name.	Corps.	Date of Casualty.	Place.	Remarks.
Trooper Conrath	Victoria Rangers ..	1893. Oct. 25th	Shangani ..	Slightly.
" William Nutt	"	"	"	"
" J. Behrmann	Salisbury Horse ..	"	"	"
Asst.-Conductor J. Dunman ..	"	"	"	"
Mr. W. Quested	Mashonaland Cont. ..	"	"	Severely.
Trooper J. H. Lucas	Salisbury Horse ..	Oct. 27th	Zinyangene ..	Slightly. Severely in attack on the march.
" F. Mack	"	Nov. 1st	Imbembesi ..	Slightly.
" F. H. Crewe	"	"	"	Severely.
" M. H. Barnard	"	"	"	"
Capt. W. F. Moberley	"	"	"	Slightly.
Trooper F. Nesbitt	"	Dec. 12th	Shangani ..	"
Colonial Native Contingent ..	Salisbury	Nov. 1st	Imbembesi ..	Slightly 1
Mashona Contingent " Coolie ..	"	Oct. 25th	Shangani ..	Severely 1
"	"	"	On march ..	26
"	"	"	"	5

LIST OF KILLED, OR DIED OF WOUNDS, OF THE SOUTHERN FORCE, 445 EUROPEANS, AND
KHAMA'S FORCE, 2,000; LATTER RETIRED ON NOVEMBER 6TH.

Name.	Corps.	Date of Death.	Place.	Remarks.
L.-Corpl. R. Mundy	B. B. P.	1893. Nov. 2nd	Singuesi ..	"
Sergt. Dahm	Raaf's Rangers ..	"	"	"
Arm.-Sergt. D. W. Gibson ..	B. B. P.	Dec. 10th	Shangani ..	"
Coloured Driver W. Le Fleur ..	"	1894. Jan. 2nd	"	Dangerously wounded Dec. 4th.
Khama's Force	"	1893. Nov. 2nd	Singuesi ..	" 7

LIST OF WOUNDED.—SOUTHERN FORCE.

Name.	Corps.	Date of Casualty.	Place.	Remarks.
Mr. F. C. Selous	Scout	1893. Nov. 2nd	Singuesi ..	Slightly.
Sergt.-Major R. Codrington ..	B. B. P.	"	"	"
Corpl. F. A. Ransom	"	"	"	"
Sergt. Dempsey	Raaf's Rangers ..	"	"	Severely.
" Robinson	"	"	"	Slightly.
Farrier Corpl. G. D. Newton ..	B. B. P.	Dec. 4th	Shangani ..	"
L. Corpl. W. Williams	"	"	"	Severely.
Trooper W. Shannahan	"	"	"	Slightly.
" H. Middleton	"	"	"	"
Sergt. A. C. Pyke	"	Dec. 12th	"	Dangerously.
One Native Driver	"	Nov. 2nd	Singuesi ..	"
Khama's Force	"	"	"	11

SUMMARY OF CASUALTIES.

Mashonaland Force.		Southern Force.	
Europeans, killed, or died of wounds	42	Europeans, killed	4
" died from other causes	7	Khama's Force, killed	7
Colonial Native, killed	1	"	—11
Mashona Contingent, killed	30	Europeans, wounded	10
"	—20	Colonial Native	1
Europeans, wounded	12	Khama's Force	11
Colonial Natives or Coolies, wounded	2	"	—22
Mashona Contingent	31	Total casualties in both Forces—officers, men, and natives	158
"	—45		

A considerable number of trek oxen were shot also.

List of horses killed and wounded:—

Mashonaland Force	65	Southern Force, including 3 mules	29
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In addition to this a large number of horses had to be left on the road, owing to their weakness.

CHAPTER XVIII.

THE RHODESIAN ROLL CALL.

The character of the troops—Their esprit de corps and stamina—The Administrator—The Commanding Officer—Sir J. C. Willoughby, Bart.—Major Hamilton Browne—Captain Finch—Captain Heany—Captain Spreckley—Captain Moberley—Captain Kennedy—Adjutant Kennelly—Captain Bastard—Captain Napier—Captain Delamere—Captain Reid—Captain White—Captain Donovan—The other officers.

It is difficult to speak too highly of the manner in which the campaign was conducted alike by officers and men. In particular the Administrator's forethought and decision were admirable. It is easy now, looking back upon a successful issue, to underrate his difficulties. Dr. Jameson really felt, and a good many others, taking their tone from him, confidently expressed, a certainty of victory; but an important and well-informed section of the colonial press and public were far from sanguine upon the subject. The troops, few in number, were, at the commencement of the rainy season, advancing upon a savage foe, whose military strength was known to be formidable, and whose traditional ferocity lent a terror to their very name. Arms and ammunition, horses, equipment, food supplies: all had to be procured at the shortest possible notice. But the end was success, and a success unparalleled in British native wars.

That this was so may be attributed not merely to the ability, energy, and care of the leading officers, but in great measure also to the extraordinary personnel of the whole of the troops. For not only were the men who formed the columns very considerably above the average in the accidents of birth, education, and physique—they were equally remarkable in point of character, reputation, and position. To illustrate this statement it is only necessary to note what an exceedingly large proportion of the members of the expedition had passed through our leading schools and universities, and what a number of the rank and file held a very considerable interest in the country. Equally conspicuous were

the calmness and cool courage with which the officers and troopers—mere lads in some cases—faced fire for the first time ; or, as we have already recounted, met death with unflinching firmness. From first to last the Mashonalanders showed that they possessed a rare amount of that pluck and spirit which has made our nation great and honoured. That is the fact, and it can be accounted for. The handful of men who vanquished Lobengula had overcome still more formidable enemies to the development of the country ; they were the fittest who had survived all the troubles, dangers, and difficulties which had followed close upon each other since the occupation in 1890. The weaklings had succumbed to the hardships and privations endured, the faint-hearted had turned back from the fight and gone back to the creature comforts of civilized regions. Those who stayed to see the end were of strong character and fine physique, men not easily daunted by danger or difficulty, nor lightly turned from a set purpose ; whose stout frames and stouter hearts were alike “in utrumque paratus.”

The command of this fine body of irregular troops was offered (under conditions which he himself recounts on other pages) to Major P. W. Forbes by the Administrator. The circumstances were unique, and called for a leader who possessed the knowledge only to be gained in the regular forces, with an adaptability and resourcefulness of character which could develop new methods under new phases of warfare. Major Forbes, an officer in the Inniskilling Dragoons, was at the time filling a magisterial appointment in Mashonaland, and knew the men and the country. He had also had some experience of natives while serving with his regiment in Zululand. Dr. Jameson's justification for appointing him to the chief command exists in the signal success which attended the operations of the columns—a success which was achieved in the face of most serious difficulties and discouragements, which was as finally effective as it was rapid, and which has not been paralleled in South Africa since the defeat of Dingaan and Umziligazi by the Dutch voortrekkers. Including even the dire loss of Major Wilson's party on the Shangani, no South African native war of similar importance has been concluded with such small loss of life ; and that this was so may be very largely attributed to the commanding officer's painstaking vigilance and unrelaxing carefulness. The whole scheme of

the campaign was devised and carried out with conspicuous ability, and Major Forbes issues from a severe ordeal with a distinguished record of service under difficult and exceptional conditions of warfare.



MAJOR P. W. FORBES.

MAJOR PATRICK WILLIAM FORBES, Commanding the British South Africa Company's Forces in Matabeliland throughout the war, is the son of Mr. Alexander Clark Forbes, and was born at Whitchurch, Oxon, on August 31st, 1861. He was educated at Rugby and Sandhurst, and obtained a commission in the Inniskilling Dragoons, in which he now holds the rank of Captain. He went out to South Africa in 1880, and was seconded for the British South Africa Company's service in November, 1889. He was second in command of the British South Africa Company's Police when they entered Mashonaland, and became

major in the Police in May, 1890, which rank he has held ever since. When the advance into Matabeliland was determined upon, he received the command of all the Company's forces. He raised and commanded the Salisbury Column, and on their junction with the Victoria division took command of the combined columns. The Tuli force (Raaf's Rangers) would also have been under his control had the war not been finished before the arrival of the latter at Buluwayo. Before the disbandment of the British South Africa Company's Police Major Forbes secured Manica to the Company by his action at Mutassa's Kraal on November 15th, 1891. He had served for five or six years among the Zulus with his regiment, and before the commencement of hostilities was in command of the volunteers at Salisbury and resident magistrate there. He was known to and by almost everyone in the country, where his earnestness and strength of character had made him universally respected.

The post of Senior Military Adviser on the staff of His Honour the Administrator is held by MAJOR SIR JOHN CHRISTOPHER WILLOUGHBY, Bart., late Captain in the Royal Horse Guards. Sir John Willoughby is one of the Pioneers of British Zambesia, having been attached to the staff of Lieutenant-Colonel Pennefather, commanding the Pioneer Expedition in 1890. Since that date he has taken an active and zealous interest in the development of the country, into which he has brought a large amount of capital, and in whose prosperity he is heavily concerned. He has formed two powerful companies (Willoughby's Expedition Syndicate and the Mashonaland Development Company), both of which, under his excellent management, are flourishing. Sir John Willoughby went through the campaign with the Administrator until the occupation of Buluwayo, and subsequently accompanied the Column sent under the command of Captain Heany to relieve Major Forbes after the loss of Major Wilson's party. He holds the local rank of Major in the British South Africa Company's military service, and in his official capacity has done very useful and effective work. Sir John Willoughby, of Baldon House, near Oxford, Berwick Lodge, near Bristol, and Fulmer Hall, Slough, Bucks, was born in Westbourne Terrace, London, and is the only surviving son of the late Sir John Pollard Willoughby, Bart. He was educated at Eton, where he evinced a special taste for modern languages, winning prizes for proficiency in Italian and French. He was captain of the Eton shooting team which won the Ashburton Shield in 1878. At a later date his sporting instincts were concentrated upon racing, and he succeeded in running a dead-heat for the Derby with one of his horses. Sir John is very popular in Rhodesia, where his whole-hearted endeavours to open up the country are viewed with much appreciation, and where his unassuming character is much liked. He returns to England for a well-earned holiday at about the end of the year.

MAJOR HAMILTON BROWNE, who for a time at the commencement of the campaign acted as Staff Officer to Major Forbes, has served in the Maori War, and was formerly in the Royal Engineers. He spent his earlier life in New Zealand, but afterwards campaigned in several other parts of the world. He took part in the Zulu and most of the other recent South African wars, including the Boer war and the

Warren Expedition. He was at one time Major and Adjutant of the Diamond Fields Horse, a volunteer corps which has done good service in the colonial wars, and was subsequently Chief Staff Officer in the Mashonaland Volunteers. The post of Staff Officer was subsequently taken by Captain Finch, but Major Browne remained with the column until the close of the war, taking part in the various engagements.



CAPTAIN ALAN G. FINCH.

Major Forbes' chief staff officer was CAPTAIN ALAN GEORGE FINCH, late Lieutenant in the 1st Life Guards. Captain Finch's connection with South Africa dates from 1890, since when he has been engaged in Mashonaland in investing in gold properties and real estate. When the war broke out he volunteered his services, and at first acted as remount officer for the forces, afterwards accompanying Major Forbes as staff officer, and ultimately returning to England with him. Mr. Finch is the eldest son of Mr. George H. Finch, M.P., of Burley-on-the-Hill, Oakham, Rutland. He was educated at Eton, after which he spent some years in travel, and in 1884 obtained a com-

mission in the 1st Life Guards, leaving the service in 1890. Mr. Finch has also been a traveller in various parts of Europe and America, having visited Ecuador and Columbia, among other places, and the Andes.

Major Forbes' Personal Staff included CAPTAIN J. H. KENNEDY, who has just returned to this country for a holiday, after serving with the Chartered Forces throughout the war. He was for many years in the Civil Service of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, and subsequently resided for some time in Johannesburg. At present, under the British South Africa Company, he holds the appointment in Mashonaland of Master of the High Court at Salisbury,

and Chief Accountant in the Chartered Company's territory. He volunteered for service with the Salisbury Column in Matabeliland at the commencement of the recent war, and joined that Column as quartermaster, with the rank of captain, in which capacity he served until the arrival of the joint Columns at Buluwayo, when he assumed the duties of Chief Commissariat Officer. He has been favourably mentioned in reports both from Dr. Jameson, the Administrator, and Major Forbes, commanding the Combined Columns, and took an active part in the two engagements with the Matabeli.



CAPTAIN J. H. KENNEDY.

Captain Kennedy was, at the time of joining the Salisbury Horse, one of the chief officials of the Chartered Company, and at the head of a very important department, yet he was quite ready to join the field force in any capacity whatever, having placed himself entirely in the hands of the officer commanding that force. Such an example had an excellent effect upon the other volunteers.

MR. C. M. ACUTT, the interpreter and guide, is a member of a well-known Natal family, and was particularly selected on account of his acquaintance with the Zulu and other native languages.

MR. P. L. CHAPPE, the Acting-Veterinary Surgeon and Trumpeter, served in the Zulu War, and did good work of a miscellaneous character throughout the recent campaign, being energetic and ready to turn his hand to any duty. MR. T. E. TANNER, Orderly Officer and Galloper, is a New Zealander by birth. He entered Mashonaland in the British South Africa Company's Police, and became magistrate's clerk (to Major Forbes) at Buluwayo.

CAPTAIN J. A. L. CAMPBELL, late R.A., was Ordnance Store Officer.

In referring to the other officers who led the British South Africa Company's forces in the campaign, those of the three columns will be mentioned in the order in which they are named in Major Forbes' report. Taking first the Salisbury Horse, it will be seen by referring to the earlier pages of the commanding officer's account of the campaign that the senior ("A") Troop was offered to and promptly accepted

by CAPTAIN MAURICE HEANY, who is a Pioneer of Pioneers in British Zambesia—one of the famous trinity, Johnson, Heany, and Borrow—who did such splendid work in 1890, who were the first genuine miners in the country, and one of whom, poor Borrow, died in maintaining his hard-earned rights. Captain Heany is an American by birth but has been for sixteen years in the outlying portions of South Africa—usually a good bit ahead of civilisation, and has taken part in every South African war—the Basuto campaign excepted—since he landed in the country. He served in Carrington's Horse in the Warren Expedition, and afterwards in the Bechuanaland Border Police with his two friends and partners, Major



CAPTAIN MAURICE HEANY.

Johnson and Captain Borrow. Leaving the Bechuanaland Border Police the three formed a syndicate in Cape Town—the Northern Goldfields Pioneer Syndicate—which secured from Lobengula a concession to work what are now the Mazoe Goldfields. This however was afterwards rescinded, but the syndicate was ultimately exceedingly successful, and acquired from Khama a valuable concession, which was placed upon a working basis as the Bechuanaland Exploration Company, of which Captain Heany was for some years general superintendent. The idea of the Bechuanaland Trading Association originated with him, and he became, after its flotation, its general superintendent. When Mr. Rhodes decided upon the occupation of

Mashonaland, the three friends resigned from the service of the Bechuanaland Exploration Company, and entered that of the Chartered Company, being entrusted with the organisation and equipment of the Pioneer Corps, in which Captain Heany was senior Captain. When the Pioneers were disbanded, the firm of Johnson, Heany, and Borrow was formed, and did splendid work in opening up routes and developing the mining districts. Just before the Massi-Kessi incident Captain Heany, in opening up the east coast trade route, was taken prisoner by the Portuguese and sent down to Beira. Later on, its operations having become exceedingly large, the firm was placed on a broader basis as F. Johnson and Co., Limited, with a capital of £200,000, and Captain Heany was appointed one of the resident managing directors. When the Matabeli war broke out he took part in the raising and equipping of the Salisbury Horse, and was appointed senior Captain of the same in command of "A" Troop. He is exceedingly popular throughout Mashonaland and Matabeliland, where his generosity and kindness of heart are almost proverbial. Speaking of him and of his partners Mr. Selous, in his last and exceedingly interesting book, says:—

So much has been written concerning the march up to Mashonaland, and the composition of the force that took part in it, that it would be mere repetition were I to say very much on the subject. The whole force of police and pioneers was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Pennefather, of the 6th (Inniskilling) Dragoons; but the pioneers, one company of whom were always in advance to prepare the road, were commanded by Mr. Frank Johnson. Everyone in South Africa has heard of Frank Johnson and Co.—the Co. being Messrs. Heany and Borrow. All three names are household words in Mashonaland. Johnson and Borrow are two fine young Englishmen, and Heany is an American; and all three are brimming over with enthusiasm and energy, and are possessed of that dogged perseverance and untiring patience which has already won half the world for the Anglo-Saxon race. They are the men who raised and equipped the Pioneer Corps, with an admirable attention to every detail of outfit; and ever since the occupation of Mashonaland they have been the life and soul of the country. In 1891 they tried to open up a transport road to the east coast. Owing to the tse-tse fly this enterprise was a failure, and cost the firm a large portion of the money they had won by the successful conduct of the Pioneer Force. All honour to them for the valiant attempt they made to

overcome what proved to be insuperable difficulties. "It is not in mortals to command success." During the hard times experienced by the Pioneers in the first rainy season after the occupation of Mashonaland, Heany and Borrow (Johnson had gone down to Cape Town to prepare for the opening up of the east coast route from Beira) endeared themselves to all classes of the community by their kindness to all who were in distress ; and I think all old Pioneers will join me in wishing luck to Johnson, Heany, and Borrow, and hoping they will live to reap the reward their pluck and perseverance so richly deserve.

LIEUTENANT W. BODLE ("A" Troop, Salisbury Horse) had been before the war a sub-inspector of Police. He is an old campaigner, having formerly served in the Cape Mounted Rifles, and also in the Zulu and Basuto Campaigns, entering Mashonaland as regimental sergeant-major of the British South Africa Company's Police. He is now in command of the Company's Police at Buluwayo, with the rank of inspector. During the war he was senior lieutenant in Captain Heany's Troop and rendered useful service throughout the war.

LIEUTENANT FRANK ELLIOTT LOCKNER ("A" Troop, Salisbury Horse) had served in the Natal Mounted Police, in the Warren Expedition, and Bechuanaland Border Police. In 1889 he was sent by Mr. Rhodes to negotiate on behalf of the British South Africa Company a concession with Lewanika, King of the Barotsi, in which object he was successful. After the occupation of Mashonaland he devoted himself to mining (being at one time in partnership with the late Mr. E. Burnett), but when the war broke out volunteered and went through the campaign with the rank of junior lieutenant.

LIEUTENANT TYNDALE-BISCOE, R.N. ("A" Troop, Salisbury Horse) is an officer in the Royal Navy, who has distinguished himself in the Egyptian campaign in command of machine guns, gaining the D.S.O. He entered the country in command of the Pioneer Force's machine guns, and subsequently devoted himself to mining. During the campaign he was attached to "A" Troop, Salisbury Horse, in charge of the galloping Maxim, and rendered excellent service throughout the campaign.

"B" Troop of the Salisbury Horse was led by the late CAPTAIN HENRY J. BORROW, whose senior lieutenant, MR. SNODGRASS, is a New Zealander by birth, and had previously seen service in American

native wars and in the Maori campaign. He was engaged in business at Salisbury until the war commenced.

LIEUTENANT REID ("B" Troop, Salisbury Horse), formerly a non-commissioned officer in the Inniskilling Dragoons, entered Mashonaland as troop sergeant-major in the British South Africa Company's Police, and subsequently settled in business in the country. Volunteering when the war broke out, he was appointed second lieutenant under Captain Borrow.

The "B" Troop Maxim was entrusted to MR. LLEWELLYN, who was appointed lieutenant. He was formerly in the Royal Navy, and had seen a considerable amount of service on the African Coasts.

The command of "C" Troop of the Salisbury Horse was offered to and at once accepted by CAPTAIN JOHN A. SPRECKLEY, who is one of the most popular men between Capetown and Fort Salisbury. Captain Spreckley, who is an old friend of the three well-known pioneers, Major Johnson, Captain Heany, and the late Captain Borrow, was born at Fulbeck, Lincolnshire, was educated at Derby School, and went out to South Africa twelve years ago. His first occupation was that of ostrich farming in the Eastern Province of the Cape Colony, but in 1886 he entered the Bechuanaland Border Police. A year afterwards he joined his friends, Messrs. Johnson, Heany and Borrow, as a member of the Expedition despatched to Lobengula's country by the Northern Goldfields Syndicate, and with them penetrated as far north as the present site of Salisbury. On his return to civilized regions he entered the Cape Civil Service, but resigned to go to the Witwatersrand goldfields, where he was engaged in mining business, and was, as his high spirits and genial disposition made him, as everywhere, a general favourite. In the



CAPTAIN JOHN A. SPRECKLEY.

depression which followed the "boom" of 1889 and 1890, Mr. Rhodes made his plans for the occupation of Mashonaland, and Mr. Spreckley rejoined many old comrades as Quartermaster in the Pioneer Force. Since the occupation he has been one of the chief mining officials of the country, having held the offices of Mining Commissioner at Lo Mogunda's, Mazoe, and Umtali, being wonderfully popular with all classes at those places during the time he held these appointments. On the breaking out of the Matabeli War, he relinquished his post at Umtali and reported himself for volunteer service at Salisbury, and was actively engaged, with the rank of Captain, in raising a troop for the Salisbury Horse. He went through the campaign with that Force, and at its close conducted back to Salisbury the men sent there to be disbanded, this being a most trying and onerous march, owing to its being carried out in the midst of the rainy season. Captain Spreckley, who is now Mining Commissioner at Victoria, is described by Captain Heany as being "gifted with a wonderful flow of animal spirits, bright humour, and untiring energy. All these have stood him in good stead. He is deservedly popular with everybody, and counts his friends in the country by hundreds."



LIEUT. THOMAS J. CHRISTISON.

MR. LAING, Senior Lieutenant "C" Troop, was formerly in the Cape Colony Military Service and had been through most of the recent South African wars, including the Zulu and Basuto Campaigns. Up to the outbreak of the war he was engaged in mining business on behalf of the South African Trust and Finance Company.

MR. THOMAS J. CHRISTISON, Junior Lieutenant "C" Troop, was born in Forfarshire, Scotland, and went to South Africa in 1883. On the formation of the Cape Town Highlanders he became Lieutenant and Acting Adjutant,

being subsequently promoted to a Captaincy and appointed Adjutant of the Regiment. He resigned in 1889 and joined the British South Africa Company's Pioneer Force, serving under Captain Heany ("A" Troop). On arriving at Salisbury he was appointed to the Civil Staff, and soon after obtained the position of Mining Commissioner there. In 1891 (May) he volunteered for service in Manica during the trouble with the Portuguese, returning to his duties in Salisbury, where he remained till the Matabeli war broke out. He then joined "C" Troop, Salisbury Horse, as Lieutenant and went through the campaign. He was appointed Mining Commissioner at Buluwayo till the end of March this year, when he was allowed six months' leave. Mr. Christison is returning in September to resume his duties in the Mines Office, Salisbury, where he has been appointed a Justice of the Peace for the district.

The artillery of the Salisbury Horse, together with the dismounted men forming "D" Troop, were placed under the command of CAPTAIN MOBERLEY, late Captain and Battery-Adjutant of the Royal Artillery, and therefore a competent and experienced officer. Captain Moberley had entered Mashonaland with the Pioneers, and was subsequently on the staff of the Company's Volunteer Forces. Throughout the campaign he rendered particularly useful plucky service. At Imbembesi the fire was very hot round the Gardner, and Trooper Calcraft was killed while serving it. Captain Moberley, himself grazed by the same bullet, stepped into his place, and the gun did not cease firing. At the close of the war he was sent down to Pondoland by Mr. Rhodes in view of possible trouble in connection with the Civil War between the native chiefs and the resultant annexation of the country, being attached to the Cape Mounted Rifles in command of the Maxim gun.

Under Captain Moberley MR. TENNANT had charge of the seven-pounder gun, with the rank of lieutenant. He had formerly served in the late force of the Cape Artillery (now the Artillery Troop of the Cape Mounted Rifles) and rendered good service throughout the campaign.

MR. J. CARDEN, assistant remount officer of the Salisbury Horse and galloper to the commanding officer, was, when the war broke out, sub-inspector of police.

Of the Medical Staff, DR. EDGELOW, the principal Medical Officer, was the District Surgeon at Salisbury when the war broke out, and had formerly been Resident Physician at Lorenzo Marques to the Delagoa Bay Railway Company. DR. J. STEWART was the Assistant Medical Officer attached to the Salisbury Horse.

CAPTAIN J. W. NESBITT, a son of Major Nesbitt, well known in the Cape Colony, organised and commanded a contingent of the Salisbury colonial natives and coolies, who urged that they were subjects of Her Majesty and begged for permission to fight in her service against the Matabeli. They did excellent work and were of the greatest use in laagering, etc., during the campaign, saving the whites a great many additional hardships. Several were killed in the different engagements. Chief among this contingent must be mentioned John Grootboom, a Cape native, of whom one of the officers says there never was a native like him. He was ready to face absolutely any risks, and appeared to be ignorant of the nature of fear. He was always prepared to undertake the most dangerous mission at a moment's notice—as for instance when, taking his life in his hands, he set out from Buluwayo to take a summons to surrender to the fugitive Lobengula. What makes his courage still more conspicuous is that he was fully alive to the dangers he was facing; and it has been said of him, “He was all pluck right away through.”

The Salisbury scouts, in charge of CAPTAIN O. G. WILLIAMS, who, as already recounted, met his death early in the campaign, were Messrs. Gerald Paget, J. Murray Gourlay, and Ifah Williams. Mr. GERALD CECIL STEWART PAGET is a son of General Lord Alfred Henry Paget, C.B., and was born in 1854. He commenced to travel at a very early age, and for some time was engaged in cattle ranching in America. In May, 1893, Mr. Paget went to South Africa with Captain Gwynyth Williams and Captain H. J. Borrow, driving up with the former and Mr. Hirsch from Johannesburg to Salisbury. The party arrived at Victoria in July just at the time of the Victoria incident. Mr. Paget proceeded to Salisbury, and when the campaign commenced volunteered for service against the Matabeli. Mr. Paget went through the whole campaign, and a very interesting account of the general operations was supplied by him on his arrival in England to the “Times,” appearing in the issue of

21st December, 1893, of that newspaper. Mr. Paget was the first man to come through to the Cape and to England with news of the fighting. He rode the first 250 miles from Buluwayo to Palapye in five days, the greater part of the way alone, and suffered much privation from want of sleep. From Palapye he travelled by trotting ox waggon five days and nights, changing from every ten to fifteen miles in order to get down quickly to Vryburg, the whole distance being about 500 miles. He came straight through to Cape Town, saw Sir Henry Loch, handed him the first despatches from Buluwayo in the morning, and caught the afternoon boat, reaching England in thirty-three days after leaving Buluwayo.



MR. GERALD C. S. PAGET.

MR. J. MURRAY GOURLAY, who rendered signal services during the war among those who are called the "eyes and ears" of a military force, has assisted in the task of supplying this work with some most valuable photographs made during the campaign. MR. IFAH WILLIAMS, who is the second son of General Owen Williams, had been ranching in Mexico before he came out to South Africa to join his brother. He arrived by the East Coast route just as the expedition started, but at once volunteered and joined the Columns at Charter.

Among the wounded may be mentioned TROOPER MOSTYN



TROOPER MOSTYN WILLIAM BARNARD.

WILLIAM BARNARD, born in London January 28th, 1871, the fifth son of the late Colonel Barnard, Grenadier Guards and 96th Regiment; and grandson of the late Sir Henry Barnard, K.C.B., who died in command at Delhi during the Indian Mutiny. He went out to South Africa in August, 1890, and joined the British South Africa Company's Police as trooper, serving till the disbandment of that force. He then joined the Mashonaland Mounted Police, and served throughout the Matabeli War as a volunteer attached to "A" Troop, Salisbury Horse, under Captain Heany. He was present at the two chief battles (Shangani and Imbembesi), and the intermediate skirmishes. He was shot in the knee at the latter engagement, and after leaving hospital at Buluwayo was granted six months' sick leave to England.



MR. R. C. BATLEY.

TO MR. RALPH CECIL BATLEY we are indebted for a number of photographs which have been reproduced or utilised in this book, and which were taken in Matabeliland by his friend MR. J. MURRAY GOURLAY, well known as one of the scouts of the Chartered Company's forces. Mr. Batley went into the country in March, 1893, on a shooting expedition in the north of Mashonaland. When the

Matabeli troubles began he was in the "fly" district, but at once returned and joined Captain Borrow's troop of the Salisbury Horse. He went all through the campaign as a corporal and was one of the first to enter Buluwayo. He served throughout the last patrol in pursuit of the King, but was invalided back to Buluwayo three days before the disaster to Major Wilson's party. Mr. Batley, an old

Cambridge man, was one of the many University and public school men in the Salisbury Horse.

THE HON. MAURICE RAYMOND GIFFORD, a brother of Lord Gifford, V.C., is well known in Mashonaland and Matabeliland as the manager of the Bechuanaland Exploration Company. He was born at Ampney Park, Gloucester, on May 5th, 1859, and was educated privately. On the completion of his education he entered the Merchant Service, and was on board the training ship "Worcester" for three years. In 1878 he entered the service of the British Steam Navigation Company, in which he remained until 1882, visiting many parts of the globe. In the last-named year he happened to be on the Red Sea at the time of the outbreak of the Egyptian war, and acted as assistant correspondent to the "Daily Telegraph" at the time of the engagement of Tel-el-Kebir. He afterwards went to Canada, where he fought as a trooper in Lord Minto's forces (in "French's Scouts") sent to crush the Riel rebellion in the north-west, receiving the medal and clasp. On his return from Canada, he went to South Africa and accepted the management of the Bechuanaland Exploration Company, and was at Khama's chief town when war was declared against the Matabeli. He at once volunteered to serve in Major Forbes' Column. He was the last white man who spoke to the late Captain Gwynyth Williams, and had a very narrow escape himself, not only on this, but on another occasion, when he shot the Matabeli who had killed the late Mr. E. Burnett.



THE HON. M. R. GIFFORD.

SERGEANT ROBERT T. CORYNDON is a Cape Colonist by birth, and was born in 1870. He was educated at an English public school—Cheltenham. On his return to South Africa, he joined the Bechuanaland



SERGEANT ROBERT T. CORYNDON.

sioned to shoot a couple of white rhinoceri for the Rothschild collection, and in this quest he was successful. On the outbreak of hostilities Mr. Coryndon returned to Salisbury, and joined the Salisbury Horse as a sergeant. He recently came to England for a short holiday, but has since returned to the Tanganyika district to resume his occupation as a big game hunter.

SERGEANT W. HACKER, who acted as sergeant throughout the campaign, was an Australian colonist of many years' standing. After returning to this country he was attracted by very good reports to South Africa, and went out, prin-

Border Police, afterwards transferring into the British South Africa Company's Police, and thence into the Pioneer Corps, with which he entered Mashonaland in 1890. On the 30th September the Pioneers were disbanded, and Mr. Coryndon entered the Chartered Company's Survey Office. In the winter of 1892, he went on a hunting expedition up to the Zambesi (Zumbo). On his way back with a Mr. Eyre, he came across the white rhinoceros, then supposed to be extinct; and two specimens were shot by Mr. Eyre. In the ensuing dry season he again went hunting in north-eastern Mashonaland, having been commis-



SERGEANT W. HACKER.

cipally with the object of Kaffir trading in Johannesburg, in the early part of 1891. He left for Mashonaland just in front of Lord Randolph Churchill's Expedition, and remained there trading until the war broke out. He at once volunteered and was attached to the Artillery with the local rank of sergeant, serving one of the seven-pounder guns throughout the war.

TROOPER H. N. FIFE SCOTT, who is the second son of Mr. Fife J. Scott, a well-known Newcastle merchant, went out some six years ago to Johannesburg. He left the Transvaal to join the Pioneer Expedition of the Chartered Company with his elder brother, Mr. Fife J. Scott, jun. Mr. Fife Scott continued in the service of the Company until the troops were disbanded, when he commenced prospecting and developing on his own account. As a Trooper of Captain Heany's Troop (Salisbury Horse) he marched to Buluwayo, and when the stampede of horses

took place at Imbembesi was one of those who, following Sir John Willoughby, Captain Borrow, and another trooper, left the cover of the laager to stop the stampede and secure the horses. He also served with Major Forbes' patrol, during which exposure brought on an acute attack of malarial fever, and on returning to camp was immediately invalided home, carrying Dr. Jameson's despatches to Palapye on the way.

The organisation and command of the Victoria Horse were entrusted to MAJOR ALLAN WILSON, who was supported by a number of excellent officers, eight of whom fell before the close of the war. Of Major Wilson's staff, ADJUTANT KENNELLY had formerly served in the Bechuanaland Border Police, CAPTAIN AND QUARTER-



TROOPER H. N. FIFE SCOTT.

MASTER HARRY GREENFIELD was killed on the Shangani with so large a number of his brother officers, and Major Wilson's first orderly officer, LIEUTENANT BOWEN, only escaped sharing his fate by the fact that he had a particularly good horse, and was left behind to keep him fresh to carry down the news of the anticipated capture of the King. Mr. Bowen, who was a close friend of Major Wilson, is a son of the Right Hon. Sir George Ferguson Bowen, P.C., G.C.M.G., D.C.L., late Governor of Queensland, New Zealand, Victoria, Mauritius, etc., and a son-in-law of the Bishop of Derry. He was fresh from Australia when he went into Mashonaland as a Pioneer, and was an official of the British South Africa Company when the war broke out. He is now Mining Commissioner at Fort Salisbury. The other galloper was LIEUTENANT CHALK, now a sub-inspector in the Company's Police.

LIEUTENANTS WARE and BROWNE acted as Pioneers for the Column throughout the campaign. The former is one of the Pioneers of Northern Zambesia—an old-time up-country trader, who has passed his life in the Lake N'gami and Barotse countries, or as a miner in the river diggings near Kimberley. Some years ago he obtained a concession of a large tract of the Barotse country from the Chief Lewanika, which he afterwards ceded to the Chartered Company. He chanced to be at Victoria when the war broke out, and went through the campaign in charge of a number of road-making natives who, prior to the crossing of the Shangani River by the Salisbury and Victoria Columns, generally kept ahead with the scouts. Both the Pioneers did most useful work in the campaign. The latter is a son of Lord Richard Browne, and is an engineer by profession, being engaged on survey work before the war.



LIEUT. A. B. HARRIS.

The captain and junior lieutenant of No. 1 Troop (CAPT. FITZGERALD and MR. HUGHES) were killed with Major

Lieut. Stoddart. Lieut. Hofmeyer. Capt. Bastard. Lieut. Harris. Lieut. Chalk. Capt. Fitzgerald. Adjutant Kennelly. Lieut. Molyneux. Lieut. Bowne. Lieut. Sampson.



Lieut. H. Ware. Capt. Judd. Capt. Lendy. Major Wilson. Capt. Rixon. Lieut. Hamilton.
 Lieut. Williams. Mr. Swan. Capt. Greenfield. Lieut. Beal.

OFFICERS OF THE VICTORIA COLUMN.

Wilson. The senior lieutenant of the Troop, MR. A. B. HARRIS, was born in Bradford, Yorkshire, on November 11th, 1867, and was educated at Shrewsbury and Hertford College, Oxford. Before going out to South Africa (in March, 1891), he held a commission in the third Battalion of the 4th Royal Lancaster Regiment. He is engaged in business in Mashonaland, where he has again returned after a brief holiday spent in England since the war.

No. 2 Troop of the Rangers was entrusted to CAPTAIN BASTARD, R.N., who was engaged in mining at Victoria when the hostilities commenced. He rendered excellent service throughout the campaign, and at its close remained at Buluwayo, where he is still engaged in his former occupation.

His lieutenant was MR. WOOLLS SAMPSON, formerly in the Bechuanaland Border Police and subsequently a professional mine manager at Johannesburg and elsewhere. He is now engaged in mining business in the Matabeliland goldfields.

No. 3 Troop was led by CAPTAIN NAPIER, one of the few survivors of Major Wilson's party, who owes his life to the fact that he was sent back to Major Forbes to ask for reinforcements. He is, we are informed, a Natal colonist by birth, and was engaged in business at Victoria until the commencement of the campaign, during which he rendered a good account of himself.

His first lieutenant, MR. WILLIAMS, had formerly served in the regular forces, and was engaged in business in Victoria until the war broke out. No information is to hand as to the second lieutenant, MR. STODDART.

No. 4 Troop was commanded by CAPTAIN JUDD, who was killed on the Shangani. His first lieutenant, MR. ROBERT BEALE, is an ex-sergeant-major of the Bechuanaland Border Police, and came into Mashonaland as lieutenant in the Pioneer Expedition. When this was disbanded, he was elected first lieutenant of the Salisbury Volunteers (the Mashonaland Horse), in which fine body the late Captain Borrow held a troop. For several years he has been in Mashonaland engaged in road-making, is very well known in the country, and has been a most energetic and useful pioneer. The second lieutenant of the troop was MR. HOFMEYR, killed on the Shangani.

The dismounted men, of whom there were about 250, armed with rifles and bayonets, were placed under the command of CAPTAIN DELAMERE, well-known in the old Cape wars and who had been farming near Victoria, with Lieutenant W. KEPPEL STIER (formerly in the Cape Mounted Rifles and Pioneer Expedition) as first lieutenant. Lieutenant Stier was at the outset of the campaign a corporal in the Salisbury Horse, but obtained his discharge from Major Forbes and joined the Victoria Contingent. As to the second lieutenant, MR. ROBINSON, no information has been received.

The artillery of the Rangers was entrusted to the late CAPTAIN LENDY, R.A., who on the junction of the columns took chief command of the guns. He was assisted by CAPTAIN REID, who worked one of the Maxims with the greatest precision, possessed an expert knowledge of its mechanism, and rendered good service throughout the campaign. His lieutenant, MR. RIXON, died under circumstances narrated in the last chapter.



CAPTAIN THE HON. C. J. WHITE.

Perhaps no single feature contributed more to the success of the campaign than the manner in which the scouting operations were conducted. The difficult nature of the unknown country to be traversed, the disparity of the numbers of the natives and the whites, made it fatal to allow the former to come within assegai range, and rendered every precaution against surprise a paramount necessity. There were in all about sixty men employed in scouting duty. These formed a cordon about ten miles away from the main body, equivalent to about an hour's notice of the neighbourhood of the enemy. The chief command of the scouting parties of the combined Salisbury and Victoria

Columns was on their junction entrusted to CAPTAIN THE HON.

C. J. WHITE, who carried out the important and difficult duties attaching to the post with conspicuous effectiveness, and earned the respect of both officers and men for his zeal and energy. Captain White, who was born in June, 1860, is the third son of Baron Annaly. He was educated at Eton, and in 1879 entered the Longford Rifles Militia, joining the 7th Royal Fusiliers (City of London Regiment) in 1881. After serving in England until 1884, he exchanged into the foreign Battalion, then quartered at Bellary in Madras. On his return home in 1886, he served as adjutant to the Depôt of the Royal Fusiliers at Aldershot for eighteen months, and proceeded for the second time to India in 1887. He obtained his company in the home Battalion in 1889, and remained in England until the spring of 1891, when he was seconded with a view to taking service with the British South Africa Company. He has served with the Company for the last three years (during the last in command of their Police), until the commencement of the war, when he volunteered to serve in any capacity. After the war Captain White, who came home for a brief period of rest and change, decided to settle in the country under the British South Africa Company. He therefore retired from Her Majesty's Service in May, 1894, and returned to South Africa to resume his duties as Chief Commissioner of Police in Rhodesia.

LIEUTENANT DOLLAR, of the Victoria Scouts, who was farming in Mashonaland when war was decided upon, was selected for scouting work, owing to his possessing an unusually good knowledge of the veld and of native languages. He was placed in chief charge of the scouts under the first organisation, and rendered excellent service throughout the campaign.

In connection with the scouting the names of BURNHAM, INGRAM (two Californians now settled in Mashonaland), and VAVASOUR especially call for mention. Their services were simply invaluable, and they were always to the fore when any exceptionally difficult or dangerous scouting duty had to be performed. Burnham and Ingram, who had been miners and prospectors in America and who had seen hard work on the Western plains, were at Victoria when the war broke out. Vavasour had lived for some time at Buluwayo and knew the country thereabouts, and therefore volunteered to go with Burnham and


Ingram when they made their famous and daring reconnaissance towards Buluwayo. There were two other Victoria scouts, MAYNE (who with Burnham and Ingram escaped from the ill-fated Wilson Patrol, bearing messages to the commanding officer) and POSSELT, both of whom did very useful and hazardous work.

LIEUTENANT BRABANT, in charge of the Victoria Native Contingent, is the son of Colonel Brabant, well known in the Cape as a power among the natives. Following the example of his father, he had acquired considerable influence over the natives around Victoria. On the declaration of war he organised a corps of Mashonas, notoriously the most useless, lazy, and unreliable among natives, and got a great deal of exceedingly useful work—such as bushing up the laagers, collecting fuel, scouting, etc.—out of material which would have been absolutely worthless, or worse, in other hands.

Another body of natives was under charge of MR. QUESTED. He had a thorough knowledge of natives and their customs, and possessed great influence among those round Victoria, a number of whom he found readily responded to his call for volunteers for service in the campaign. It was his contingent that received the first attack at the battle of Shangani, where he managed to make a plucky stand with his natives for some time. He was wounded in the arm and side, and had his thumb shot off, and about forty or fifty of his men were killed. He then came into the laager, after making—considering the material—a very good fight. Mr. Quested, who is now convalescing, entered Mashonaland in the Pioneer Force, and was afterwards in the service of Messrs. Johnson, Heany, and Borrow. His force was very useful in scouting work. A like command was held by MR. ARNOLD, very much the same stamp of man, who also rendered excellent service.

CAPTAIN C. H. W. DONOVAN, who accompanied the Victoria Rangers as a volunteer unattached, has just returned from South Africa—where he has had a number of interesting and varied experiences. He was on a hunting expedition in that country when he heard of the Matabeli raid at Victoria. He volunteered and served with the Artillery under Captain Lendy, R.A., taking part in all the engagements previous to the occupation of Buluwayo. He also went forward with the Patrol sent after Lobengula, returning from the

Bubye River with despatches from Major Forbes for the Administrator. He was then sent on with despatches and mails by Dr. Jameson to Capetown and England. The latter he reached on the last day of December, having left Major Forbes eighty miles north of Buluwayo on the afternoon of November 19th, and so beating the record for that journey. Captain C. H. W. Donovan is now in the Army Service Corps, but formerly held a lieutenant's commission in the 4th Dragoon Guards. He has seen a good deal of service, having been in Egypt in 1885, up the Nile with the Heavy Camel Regiment, receiving the medal and clasp of the Khedive's Star. Subsequently, he spent eighteen months on the West Coast of Africa, taking



CAPTAIN C. H. W. DONOVAN.

part in the two expeditions in the Tambacca country (1892), for which he received the medal and clasp. He was A.D.C. to the Administrator of Sierra Leone (Sir W. H. Quayle-Jones), and was on leave from the West Coast when he went to South Africa to hunt, meeting with splendid sport in the Mozambique country, between the Lundi and Sabi Rivers. He joined the 4th Dragoon Guards in August, 1882, and the Army Service Corps in February, 1887. Captain Donovan is the second son of the late Mr. Richard Donovan, J.P., D.L., of Ballymore Camolin, Co. Wexford, Ireland, and was born at Pole Hore, in the same county, on June 26th, 1860. He was educated at Clifton College. He is now engaged in writing a book dealing with his sporting and military experiences in South Africa.

The transport arrangements were entrusted to CAPTAIN A. B. KIRTON, who was killed with Major Wilson on the Shangani.

Last, but by no means least among the officers of the little army, must be mentioned BISHOP KNIGHT-BRUCE, late Bishop of Bloemfontein, and now Bishop of Mashonaland, whose courage in sharing the

perils of the campaign appealed in a particularly direct manner to his flock, and whose presence as one of the columns forms a very emphatic contradiction, were that needed, to the ridiculous allegations that the war was one of conquest and not of self-protection.



MAJOR FORBES AND HIS STAFF.



Photo by Debenham, Southsea.

MR. PHILIP B. S. WREY, A.M.Inst.C.E.
(Consulting Engineer to the Mashonaland Agency Company.)

CHAPTER XIX.

THE POSITION AND PROSPECTS OF MASHONALAND.

BY PHILIP B. S. WREY, A.M.I.C.E.

A land of promise—A succession of gardens—Climatic conditions—The question of markets—
A comparison with Johannesburg in its early days—Labour and fuel—The native
population—The administration—A final conclusion.

ASKED what one's opinion of Mashonaland is to-day, and its future prospects, there can be but one answer. It is a country full of promise, and its prospects are most excellent and encouraging.

Of course, those who expect a country of the size and distance from civilisation as is Mashonaland to be changed in a year or so from a wild, uncultivated area into a territory full of the conveniences of a long-established colony, must lay themselves open to many disappointments. But people who do not look for the impossible cannot help being struck with the rapid strides that have been made in the civilising of the country. The three main townships—Salisbury, Victoria, and Umtali—are not, as many suppose, mere collections of huts, but consist of well-laid-out streets, properly surveyed, and the houses erected on the stands are in nearly all cases built of burnt bricks and roofed with iron sheeting. A friend remarked to me, that he supposed, "unless we shot game of some sort, we had no meat whatsoever to live on"; he would, indeed, be surprised to see the excellent and varied menus provided by any one of the numerous hotels in either of the three towns; and should he wish to feed in his own house, he would find butchers' shops in any town where, for sixpence a pound, he could obtain most excellent beef or mutton. Again, the excellent system of mail coaches renders travelling a matter of simplicity, and the post and telegraph services are indeed a credit to a country three-and-a-half years old. The route taken by some of the mail coaches through the low-lying

country between Tuli and Victoria, and from thence along the watershed of the country to Salisbury, does not convey to the traveller anything of the grand country lying on either side of this watershed. But one has only to ride across country, say from Victoria to Umtali, to be satisfied that the prospects of Mashonaland, from an agricultural point of view, are all that can be desired. Natives, as a rule, are very good judges of soil, and it is seldom, unless compelled so to do, that they will ever farm anywhere but where the country is fertile. The whole distance, covering about 160 miles, may be said to be one succession of small groups of gardens, growing all kinds of produce, such as maize and various growths of millet, rice, and tobacco. In the neighbourhood of Salisbury, either in the Mazoe or Umtali directions, land is now being energetically farmed, and it is no exaggeration to say that exceptionally fine wheat, oats, mealies, and tobacco are being grown. Most of these crops are grown on the highland country, but at a lower elevation tea and coffee have been tried as an experiment, and the results are most encouraging. Grapes have also been planted with equal success.

Matabeliland appears to be the better country for stock raising, and the reason is not far to seek. The Mashonas possess extremely few sheep or cattle, for the yearly raids of the Matabeli decimated their herds. The captured cattle have been always driven into Matabeliland, where, forming an ever-increasing herd, they have kept the pasture short and sweet, changing it from the strong sour grass into the short, sweet veld so well suited for sheep and cattle. Stock Mashonaland with cattle and the same result will be seen, for I am confident the soil in the two districts is identical. On all sides of the main watershed of the country the various districts are well watered, affording ample scope for irrigation if required.

The climate of the high plateau land of Mashonaland and Matabeliland is most excellent, no great maximum of heat or cold being maintained, and even in the height of summer the mid-day sun is always tempered with a cool breeze. The changes of temperature are neither so rapid nor so great as in many other parts of Africa. It is, of course, on this plateau that the townships are built, and farming operations carried on. The low-lying country, covered as it is in many parts with forest

and swampy ground, is most unhealthy for fully five months in the year, and malarial fever is a certainty to anyone who remains any length of time in those parts. It will take years before this improves, but of course it must be remembered that many parts of Africa which are now inhabited and civilised have been equally unhealthy, but are now comparatively free from malaria. The yearly rains may be said to commence early in December, and to last, with certain periods of intercession, until the following April. The amount of rainfall varies considerably, some years being far greater than others.

Of course it may be argued that it is not much good having excellent soil and energetic colonists to farm it, unless there be a market for your produce. This is very true, but I maintain that there is a market already in the country. Not a large one, perhaps, but fully extensive enough to absorb the crops of a considerable number of farmers, who, from the very nature of their ground, cannot individually produce any very big amount for the first few years of occupation. Take for example wheat. At the present time the price of imported flour is about £5 a bag of 200-lbs. Granted the population is not a large one at present, yet the yearly consumption must be considerable, and the price per bag must yield heavy profits to the local grower. In maize there is even now a large market. The various mining companies take large supplies of both it and millet upon which to feed their native labour. The coaching company absorbs a large stock every month for feeding its mules, and the Chartered Company and private individuals for feeding their horses. Oats, or forage as it is commonly known, grows luxuriantly, and from sixpence to a shilling a bundle can be readily obtained in any one of the towns. Stock-rearing, in a country where transport by means of the ox-waggon must be in vogue for many years to come, is bound to be a profitable business, and as the population of the country increases, so do I expect to see large tracts of land utilized for breeding on a large scale.

Of course the main cause of the increase in population will be due to mining operations, and I should now like to say a few words as to prospects in this direction.

Everyone knows the old saying, "Distant hills always appear the greenest," and there is no greater truism when the subject concerned is

gold mining. In 1890, when the Pioneer forces first entered Mashonaland, Johannesburg was under a heavy financial cloud, and many were only too glad to start afresh for a country whose prospects had been so glowingly painted by travellers and hunters. Everyone remembers the rumours of the wonderfully rich reefs said to exist in the country, and there was much wild talk about eclipsing the marvellous output of Johannesburg mines, and of the rapidity with which the lost fortunes were again to be made. The first year of occupation was, indeed, a hard one for all concerned. An extremely heavy rainy season, to commence with, rendered prospecting a matter of great difficulty, and the transport of the necessaries of life almost an impossibility. Men became sick and down-hearted; a thorough reaction set in, and no word was bad enough with which to describe the country. The disappointment to many was the finding that they had quartz reef formations to contend with in place of the bedded lodes of Johannesburg, rendering prospecting and development a far more difficult and expensive operation than the mere quarrying they had been accustomed to. Again, on closer inspection, the distant hills did not prove to be any greener than those previously met with, and where men had talked of ounces they had to content themselves with pennyweights. As time went on these pessimistic views of the country again underwent a change. Prospectors went further afield, new strikes became more frequent, and the results of development in many cases proved most successful. Many capitalists in the country took over properties, and mining was rapidly pushed ahead. The success attending this work was such that in the latter part of 1892 and early months of 1893, several companies were floated in London to thoroughly explore and develop certain reefs.

The unfortunate series of events culminating in what is known as the Matabeli war effectually paralysed all work, and it was only in one or two cases that development was continued. Where, however, such work was carried on, the results were most encouraging. The reefs not only held in depth, but their quality, though in places extremely variable, maintained its average. Everyone knows that quartz reef mining is an acute form of speculation, and Mashonaland will prove no exception to this rule. Disappointments are bound to be frequent, but I feel assured there is a large amount of gold to be obtained, affording lucrative

employment to a large number of men, and that the country abounds in what may be termed excellent mining possibilities.

Now that the Matabeli question is settled once and for all, the capital at present in the country will vigorously develop the reefs owned by the various companies, and fresh European money will purchase many of the numerous reefs already found, and only awaiting further funds to open them up. In many cases it will be found that, although the assay value retains its average when the lode is sunk on, yet the gold gradually becomes less free and more and more enveloped in sulphides. The many recent scientific discoveries for the proper treatment of refractory ores will gradually overcome any difficulty that may arise to commence with in dealing with them. Labour is distinctly cheap, fuel is plentiful, and the circumstances under which gold mining can be carried on will be decidedly favourable, so soon as transport is cheapened and facilitated, and the malaria existing in most parts of the low-lying country has begun to disappear. By this time there are several batteries either crushing or in course of erection; I am in hopes of seeing many more coming into the country, and anticipate seeing a steady yearly increase in the output.

From the foregoing remarks it will be seen that the mining prospects of Mashonaland are decidedly encouraging, and that the working of this industry will necessitate a population which will absorb the increasing produce of the country, and thereby obviate any tendency to glut the market, with consequent lowering of prices and profits to the farmer and stock-breeder. News from Matabeliland coming home by every mail leads one to believe that the promise of fresh discoveries of gold reefs are most satisfactory, and already a large amount of capital and energy is being devoted to this fresh field for enterprise.

In a country full of promise to the mining and farming community, trade and commerce must in like manner have their share in prosperity, and I have no hesitation in saying that the prospects of merchants and storekeepers are most excellent. Most thoroughly do they deserve good profits, for their enterprise in transporting the many and varied requirements, such as a community like that in Mashonaland demands, is a very serious undertaking, necessitating a large expenditure of capital. Business men are not as a rule philanthropists, and I consider one of the

best signs of the future success of the country is the fact that so much capital has been sunk by them already, with full confidence of receiving good returns for their outlay.


In speaking on the subject of trade and its future, one must not forget what excellent prospects the native population affords. Now that the country is settled, the natives will soon find out the advantages to be derived from working for the white man, and receiving his money for their labour. And although at present a down-trodden and impecunious race, there can be no doubt the Mashonas will improve immensely under the civilising influence of our rule. They are a people, also, who will very soon appreciate the small luxuries of life, such as coffee, sugar, and European clothing ; and this taste gradually increasing, will in time create a very large field for commercial enterprise.

It will be readily understood that, no matter how good the prospects, mineral, agricultural, or pastoral, of a country may be, unless its administration be well looked after, it will never be a success. No one but those who have lived in Mashonaland for the last three years or so can have any conception of the difficulties that must have been met with in the administering of the country. The new townships to be laid out, farms to be beaconed off, the sale and registration of titles to both stands and farms, the organisation of a proper staff of magistrates and officials, the institution of courts of law and all legal matters connected therewith, the enrolling and subsequent controlling of an efficient body of police in the country, the proper supervision of all mining areas, registration of claims, conserving of woods and forests, the undertaking and proper carrying out of an efficient weekly mail connecting Mashonaland with the Cape Colony, the construction and maintenance of telegraphic communication with the Colony and England, the building of good substantial public offices—all these and many other details not only have “to be done,” but actually have “been done,” in a country which was, four years ago, a wild stretch of uncivilised and almost unexplored veld.

Too much praise cannot be given to Dr. Jameson, who, with his able staff, has administered the country since the autumn of 1891. It would, indeed, be difficult to find a man so well adapted to the position he holds, and his infinite tact and ready resource have much to

do with his success as an administrator. In no instance were his powers more clearly shown than during the time previous to the declaration of war against the Matabeli. And, before closing, I would like to add my testimony towards proving that, far from forcing on the war, it was only after every effort to maintain peaceful relations with Lobengula had failed, that Dr. Jameson was compelled to recommend the course of action finally adopted.

Having briefly discussed the position of Mashonaland to-day, and its prospects from a farming, mining, and commercial point of view, I hope I have made it clear that I consider it a country which offers good scope for all branches of enterprise. Any man going there must be prepared to face many difficulties, much discomfort, and if he travels in the low country, a certainty of fever. But on the other hand, though large fortunes will not be rapidly made, I am certain that any steady man possessing a profession or trade cannot fail to improve his position; and should he have command of capital, it is a country offering far better prospects for commercial enterprise than can be had in more civilised, but at the same time more crowded, parts of South Africa.



A MASHONA PIANO.

CHAPTER XVIII.


THE SETTLEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF ZAMBESIA.

The extent of our latest territorial acquisitions—Northern Zambesia—The gold areas—The value of real estate—Terms of settlement with the Colonial Office—Mr. Rhodes' views on the fiscal policy of the Empire—Railways, telegraphs, and coach services—Native labour.

STAY-AT-HOME, incurious Britons are strangely unacquainted with the outlying portions of that vast empire of which these islands form so small a part. What Englishman of average intelligence and education could, for instance, be trusted to write, without reference, anything that could be described as a correct and briefly comprehensive account of our Australian or Canadian dominions, or of the vast and populous satrapy which was won for us by the resourceful genius of Robert Clive and Warren Hastings? How many really grasp the importance of the fact that within the last four years a few British "adventurers"—the term is officially applied to the founders of that most conservative of institutions, the Bank of England—have added to the empire a territory which is eight times the size of Great Britain herself, equal in area to the combined extents of the United Kingdom, France, Austria, and Italy, and larger than our East Indian possessions? Still less is it generally understood that of British Zambesia hundreds of thousands of square miles are fertile, well-watered, well-timbered, endowed with a pleasant and healthful sub-tropical climate—all in the most emphatic sense of these phrases—and that, moreover, immense stretches of country are highly mineralised. Yet this is so. There is probably no healthier country in South Africa than the enormous upland region called Matabeliland, which possesses the finest pasturage between the Zambesi and the southern littorals of our Cape dependencies. In addition to this, the countries of the Matabeli and Mashona are known to be auriferous; indeed, they are believed to be richly so. It is, however, still too early to pronounce upon this matter with the certainty born of actual

results. Systematic crushing has already commenced at some of the mines, and within the next six months more definite data will either confirm or disappoint the hopeful anticipations entertained. In the meantime it may be noted that important economic adjuncts in the form of coalfields have been discovered near Salisbury and Bulawayo. Other minerals are known to exist in various parts of the country, but the limits of this volume will not permit any detailed reference to their character. The occasion may be utilised, however, to take a bird's-eye view of the territories of the British South Africa

Company as a whole; to take some brief note of their resources, prospects, and of the considerable progress made in the task of their development since the historic occupation of Mashonaland.



A WIDE REACH ON THE
LIMPOPO RIVER.

The Chartered Company's sphere extends over an approximate area of three-quarters of a million square

miles. This enormous territory is sectioned off by the Zambesi River into two main divisions, to which the names of NORTHERN and SOUTHERN ZAMBESIA have been respectively suggested.

NORTHERN ZAMBESIA is defined to be the territory which, with the exception of Nyasaland, has been declared by Her Majesty's Government to be within the field of operations of the Charter of the British



THE CROCODILE ON LIMPOPO RIVER.

South Africa Company. It is, in accordance with the terms of the Anglo-Portuguese Agreement, bordered on the east by a line starting from the eastern shore of Lake Nyasa at the point of the parallel of the confluence of the Rivers Rovuma and M'Sinje. Following the shore southwards as far as the parallel of latitude $13^{\circ} 30'$ south, it proceeds in a south-easterly direction to the eastern shore of Lake Chiuta, which it follows. Thence the boundary line runs in a direct line to the eastern shore of Lake Kilwa or Shirwa, which it follows to its south-easternmost point. From that point the line proceeds in a direct line to the easternmost affluent of the River Ruo, and thence follows that affluent, and subsequently the centre of the channel of the Ruo, to its confluence with the River Shiré. From the confluence of the Ruo and Shiré the boundary follows the centre of the channel of the latter river to a point just below Chiwanga; thence runs due westward until it reaches the watershed of the Zambesi and the Shiré Rivers. Following that watershed and afterwards the watershed between the former river and Lake Nyasa, it reaches parallel 14° of south latitude. From parallel 14° it runs in a south-westerly direction to the point where south latitude 15° meets the River Aroangwa or Loangwa, and follows the mid-channel of that river to its junction with the Zambesi.

On the west Northern Zambesia is bordered by a line following the centre of the channel of the Upper Zambesi, starting from the Katima Rapids up to the point where it reaches the territory of the Barotse kingdom. That territory remains within the British sphere; but its exact limits to the westward, which will constitute the boundary between the British and Portuguese spheres of influence, are yet to be decided by a joint Anglo-Portuguese Commission.

In the early part of 1891, Her Majesty's Government extended the field of operations of the Charter of the British South Africa Company, so as to include the whole of the British sphere north of the Zambesi, except Nyasaland. Under the latter name are included certain districts in the Lake Nyasa region where British missionaries had been settled for over fifteen years, and the African Lakes Company had been at work for the same period. These, in 1889, were declared to be within the British sphere of influence. On the 14th of May, 1891,



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Bechuanaland, to the north and north-west of the Transvaal Republic, to the west of the Portuguese province of Mozambique, and to the east of the German sphere in South West Africa. In addition to this, it may also be mentioned that the British South Africa Company is deeply concerned in the development of the



these districts were proclaimed a Protectorate of Great Britain under the name of the British Central Africa Protectorate. The Protectorate is administered by Her Majesty's Commissioner, who also practically exercises administrative authority on behalf of the British South Africa Company, over the whole sphere of influence the Zambesi, Barotseland. ZAMBESIA is known region cludes Ma- and Matabe- together form- the fairest of South point of situ- lies immedi- north of



A HUNTING PARTY AT SHASHI RIVER.

Bechuanaland Protectorate, having acquired from the Chief Khama a concession of the entire mineral rights throughout his extensive dominions.

The development of the mineral areas of these vast countries has been taken in hand by the Company and numerous more or less affiliated concerns with conspicuous energy and determination, and with results which are, under all the untoward circumstances (among which the Matabeli war may be classed), equally surprising. Gold mining centres, some already of considerable importance, have already been established at Victoria, Manica, Hartley Hill (Salisbury), Mazoe, Lo Mogundi, Kaiser Wilhelm, and elsewhere in Mashonaland.

The number of claims which had been registered in the following Mining Districts there before the end of July, 1894, were approximately:—Umfuli, 7,590; Mazoe, 6,510; Victoria, 6,150; Lo Mogundi, 2,600; Salisbury, 3,560; Manica, 10,150; total, 34,560. Since the occupation of Matabeliland discoveries of gold bearing districts have rapidly succeeded each other, finds having been made at Buluwayo, Sebakwe, Gwelo, Matopo, Bembesi, Balingwe, Umswizwe and Selukwe. Altogether, on the 21st July, 1894, 12,000 claims were reported as registered in these Mining Districts of Matabeliland. The foregoing substantial results had been achieved in three years. What has been done in Matabeliland seems still more phenomenal, seeing that the Chartered Company's troops only marched into Buluwayo on November 3rd of last year (1893).

Apart from mining operations, townships have been established at Salisbury, Victoria, Umtali, Hartley Hill, and Mazoe in Mashonaland; and at Buluwayo and Gwelo in Matabeliland. Real estate has already reached a considerable value, as may be gauged from the fact that in July, 1893, 348 "stands," or town lots, were sold for £17,786. Three other large auction sales of stands at Buluwayo, Gwelo, Salisbury, Victoria, Umtali, and Mazoe, have recently taken place, or are to be held in July to September of the current year, and an indication of values is afforded by the upset price, which ranges from £40 for town lots (per stand) to £100 for residential sites. In all probability the upset prices will be considerably exceeded, as in the past; but even on the basis of

the upset figure the stands would realise £93,560.* This sum—to-day the purchase-price of a few acres—would, ten years ago, have acquired the whole of the Witwatersrand and every then known concession in Zambesia, affording a typical instance of the kaleidoscopic changes which have transfigured South Africa—still practically a virgin country—during recent years.

Upon the disbanding of the Chartered Company's Forces immediate steps were taken to ensure the proper administration of Matabeliland, and the opportunity was afforded to revise the whole scheme of the government of Southern Zambesia. The chief points to be settled were connected with the natives; the devising of a proper legal system adapted to the native codes and customs, and the allocation of habitable areas sufficient for the needs of the black population. But several important side issues were raised in view of possible political contingencies. It will be apparent to even the most cursory reader of it that the agreement ultimately arrived at between Her Majesty's Government and the British South Africa Company makes complete provision for the protection of the native interests involved, and for proper legislation in that connection. The following is the full text of the agreement in question :—

CLAUSE 1.—The territories referred to in this Memorandum are those parts of South Africa bounded by British Bechuanaland, the German Protectorate, the Rivers Chobe and Zambesi, the Portuguese Possessions, and the South African Republic, within which the British South Africa Company, in this Memorandum referred to as "the Company," carries on operations under and by virtue of Her Majesty's Charter of October 29th, 1889: save and except the territories defined in the third section of the Proclamation of the High Commissioner of September 27th, 1892, and known as the Bechuanaland Protectorate.

CLAUSE 2.—The administration of the Government of the said territories shall be conducted by the Company in accordance with its Charter, and under an Administrator and a Council of four members composed of a Judge and three other members. Any two members shall form a quorum.

CLAUSE 3.—The Administrator shall be appointed by the Company with the approval of the Secretary of State, and may be removed either by the Secretary of State or by the Company with the approval of the Secretary of

* Since the above was written, 535 stands at Buluwayo and Gwelo were sold on August 1st for £52,592. This result, though not unexpected, created a deep impression as the evidence of unprecedented progress in a new country.

State. He shall, unless sooner removed, hold his office for a term of three years, and after the end of that term shall continue to hold his office until his successor is appointed. An Administrator whose term of office has expired may be re-appointed. The Company may appoint an Acting Administrator, of whom the Secretary of State approves, to act as Administrator during the absence on leave or incapacitating illness of the Administrator. When there is no Administrator or Acting Administrator present in the said territories and capable of acting, the duties and powers of the Administrator shall devolve on the Judge.

CLAUSE 4.—The Judge shall be appointed by the Company with the approval of the Secretary of State, and may be removed only by the Secretary of State. He shall be a member of the Council *ex officio*.

CLAUSE 5.—The members of the Council, other than the Judge, shall be appointed by the Company with the approval of the Secretary of State, and may be removed by the Company. On the expiration of two years from the first appointment of members, and on the expiration of every succeeding period of two years, one member of the Council shall retire from office. The first two members to retire shall be determined by agreement, or, in default of agreement, by lot. Subsequently, the member shall retire who shall have been longest in office without re-appointment. A retiring member may be re-appointed, and shall hold his office until the appointment of his successor.

CLAUSE 6.—When the Administrator or the Judge or other member of the Council resigns, is removed, or dies, the Company shall, within nine months of his resignation, removal, or death, appoint a successor of whom the Secretary of State approves, and if they fail to do so the appointment may be made by the Secretary of State. A member of the Council (other than the Judge) appointed under this clause shall hold office so long only as the person in whose stead he is appointed would have been entitled to hold office.

CLAUSE 7.—The salaries of the Administrator and of the Judge shall be paid by the Company; the salaries shall be fixed by the Company, with the approval of the Secretary of State, and shall not be increased or diminished save with his approval.

CLAUSE 8.—The Administrator shall, as representative of the Company, administer the government of the said territories, but shall take the advice of his Council on all questions of importance affecting the government of the said territories. If in cases of emergency it shall be impracticable to assemble a quorum, the Administrator may take action alone, but he shall report such action to the Council at its next meeting.

CLAUSE 9.—If the Administrator dissents from the opinion of the Council, or the Majority of the Council, he may overrule their opinion; but in such case he shall report the matter forthwith to the Company, with the reasons for his action, and in every such case any member of the Council who dissents may

require that the reasons for his dissent shall be recorded and transmitted to the Company. The Company may rescind the decision of the Administrator, whether made with or without or against the advice of the Council.

CLAUSE 10.—It shall be lawful for the Administrator, with the concurrence of at least two members of the Council, and with the approval of the High Commissioner, to frame and issue Regulations; and every such Regulation, after it has received the approval of the High Commissioner, shall on its promulgation have the force of law. Provided that either the Secretary of State or the Company may veto any such Regulation at any time within twelve months of the date of approval by the High Commissioner. In case of the exercise of such veto, the Regulation shall be of no force and effect save as to any act done, right acquired, or liability incurred thereunder before the exercise of the said veto has been communicated to the Administrator and public notice of the same has been given by him.

CLAUSE 11.—A Regulation approved and promulgated as aforesaid may suspend any provision of any Ordinance of the Company which shall be specified therein, but every such Regulation shall itself be subject to repeal or amendment by Ordinance of the Company.

CLAUSE 12.—Neither the Company nor the Administrator in Council can by Ordinance, or Regulation, or otherwise, amend or repeal any Order made by Her Majesty in Council, nor, except with the previous consent of the High Commissioner, any Proclamation issued by such High Commissioner under the authority of an Order made by Her Majesty in Council.

Where an Ordinance of the Company, or Regulation of the Administrator in Council, is in any respect repugnant to the provisions of an Order made by Her Majesty in Council, or, except in the case of previous consent above specified, of a Proclamation issued by the High Commissioner under such an Order, it shall be read subject to such Order or Proclamation, and shall, to the extent of such repugnancy, but not otherwise, be and remain absolutely void and inoperative.

CLAUSE 13.—The power of making Ordinances, granted to the Company under clause 10 of its Charter, shall be deemed to include the power of imposing by such Ordinances all such taxes as may be necessary for the order and good government of the said territories and for the raising of revenue therein, and also the right to impose and to collect Customs duties.

CLAUSE 14.—The Company may by Ordinance empower, or the Administrator in Council may by Regulation empower, any local municipal body or other local authority to levy municipal rates and taxes, and to prescribe and enforce moderate money penalties for breach of local regulations.

CLAUSE 15.—The Judge shall have jurisdiction over all causes, both civil and criminal, and shall hold courts at such places as may be from time to time prescribed by Proclamation of the High Commissioner or by Ordinance of the Company. The procedure, rules, and regulations of the said courts shall be the

same, as far as is applicable, as the procedure, rules, and regulations of the Supreme Court of the Cape Colony. If and when the Parliament of the Cape Colony shall express its assent thereto, Her Majesty's Government will advise the issue of an Order in Council under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890, providing that appeals from the decision of the Judge shall lie to the said Supreme Court.

CLAUSE 16.—The said territories shall be divided by the Company into magisterial districts. There shall be an appeal in all civil and criminal cases from the decision of the magistrate of any district to the Judge upon the same terms and conditions, and subject to the limitations, rules, and regulations, as far as possible, which regulate appeals in the Cape Colony; and all criminal cases that would, if the same had been tried by a Resident Magistrate in the said Colony, be liable to review by a Judge of the Supreme Court shall be liable to review by the Judge.

CLAUSE 17.—All civil and criminal cases, whether between native and native, or between native and non-native, or between non-native and non-native, shall be cognisable by the courts of the Judge and magistrates within the respective jurisdictions assigned to such courts.

CLAUSE 18.—In civil cases between native and native the said courts shall decide the said cases in accordance with native law, in so far as the said law is not repugnant to principles of morality, or to any law or ordinance in force in the said territories; provided that in any suit in which the effect or consequence of any marriage contracted according to native law or custom shall be involved, any such marriage contracted by a native in the lifetime of one or more other wives of the said native, married to him according to the said law or custom, may be recognised and regarded as in all civil respects and for all civil purposes a valid marriage, in so far as such polygamous marriages are recognised by the said native law or custom. In all civil cases between natives, any magistrate or the Judge may call to his assistance two native assessors to advise him upon native law and customs, but the decision of the case shall be vested in the magistrate or Judge alone. Subject as aforesaid, the same procedure shall, as far as possible, be observed as though the said cases had been tried in the Cape Colony.

CLAUSE 19.—All criminal cases, whether between native and native, or between native and non-native, or between non-native and non-native, shall be dealt with in accordance with the laws applicable to non-natives, and the same procedure, as far as possible, shall be observed as though the said cases had been tried in the Cape Colony.

CLAUSE 20.—The magistrates shall be appointed by the Company with the approval of the High Commissioner, and shall thereupon enter on office, but the appointment shall be subject to confirmation by the Secretary of State. The magistrates may be removed either by the Secretary of State, or by the Company with the approval of the Secretary of State.

CLAUSE 21.—The High Commissioner may suspend the Judge or any

magistrate from office for misconduct, but shall immediately report to the Secretary of State the grounds of such suspension. The Secretary of State may either confirm or disallow the suspension.

CLAUSE 22.—Fines levied upon native chiefs or tribes for misconduct or rebellion may only be imposed by the Administrator in Council, and every such case shall be forthwith reported to the High Commissioner.

CLAUSE 23.—Natives shall not be subjected to any exceptional legislation save as regards liquor, arms, and ammunition and as regards the title to and occupation of land as hereinafter referred to in Clause 27 and as regards any other matter which the Administrator in Council may, with the approval of the High Commissioner and the assent of the Secretary of State, subsequently by Regulation define; provided that nothing herein contained shall prevent a hut tax being imposed by legislative authority in respect of the occupation of huts by natives.

CLAUSE 24.—A Commission shall be appointed to deal with all questions as to native settlements in the portion of the said territories termed Matabeliland. It shall be called the "Land Commission," and shall be composed of three persons, namely, the Judge, one member appointed by the Secretary of State, and one member appointed by the Company.

CLAUSE 25.—Any decision of the Land Commission shall, on sufficient cause being shown to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State, be subject to revision by him, if within twelve months from the date of the award being received by him he shall give notice of his intention to proceed to such revision.

CLAUSE 26.—The Land Commission shall continue for such time as may be approved by the Secretary of State after consultation with the Company; after which time all the powers and duties of the said Commission shall become and be vested in the Judge alone.

CLAUSE 27.—The Land Commission shall, as regards the portion of the said territories termed Matabeliland, assign to the natives now inhabiting the said portion land sufficient and suitable for their agricultural and grazing requirements, and cattle sufficient for their needs.

CLAUSE 28.—The Company shall retain the mineral rights in, over, or under all land so assigned to natives; and, if the Company should require any such land for the purpose of mineral development, it shall be lawful for the Company to make application to the Land Commission, and upon good and sufficient cause shown, the Commission may order the land so required, or any portion thereof, to be given up, and assign to the natives concerned just compensation in land elsewhere, situate in as convenient a position as possible, and, as far as possible, of equal suitability for their requirements in other respects.

CLAUSE 29.—In like manner, should any land assigned to natives be required for sites for townships, railways, or for any public works, then upon application to the Land Commission, and upon good and sufficient cause being shown that

the land is required for any of the above purposes, the Commission may order the land so required, or any portion thereof, to be given up, and assign to the natives concerned just compensation in land elsewhere, situate in as convenient a position as possible, and, as far as possible, of equal suitability for their requirements in other respects.

CLAUSE 30.—No removal of natives from any kraal, or from any portion of land assigned by the Land Commission, shall take place to another locality, except after due inquiry made upon the spot and with the authority of the said Commission.

CLAUSE 31.—The land to be assigned to natives shall include a fair and equitable portion of springs or permanent water and of grazing and arable land.

CLAUSE 32.—The Land Commission shall have power to appoint a subordinate court, to be called the "district land court," in each magisterial district, consisting of the magistrate of the district and two assessors to be appointed by the Land Commission. The said district land courts shall report or make recommendation to the Land Commission on all questions which shall be remitted to them by the Land Commission. The Land Commission may confirm or disallow, with or without amendments, any recommendation of such district land courts.

CLAUSE 33.—Natives shall have the right to acquire and hold and dispose of landed property in the same manner as persons who are not natives, and in all respects such property shall be liable in the usual manner for any obligations for which such property shall be liable. But these provisions shall not apply to land assigned under Clause 27; and no contract for alienating or encumbering a native's land shall be valid unless it is made before a magistrate and attested by him, after satisfying himself that the native understands the bargain.

CLAUSE 34.—Persons who may be appointed to such offices as may be designated in a Proclamation or Proclamations by the High Commissioner, shall not (except in the case of an acting appointment) have any interest, either direct or indirect, in the commercial undertakings or shares of the Company. The offices to be designated in the said Proclamations shall be such as may be agreed upon by the Secretary of State after consultation with the Company.

CLAUSE 35.—The armed forces of the Company shall not, without the permission of Her Majesty's Government, act outside the limits defined in Clause 1 of this Memorandum.

CLAUSE 36.—The cost of any inquiry which the Secretary of State may think it necessary to institute into the administrative or judicial system established in the said territories, shall be borne by the Company. The Company shall likewise provide such payment as may be agreed upon between Her Majesty's Government and the Company, to the member of the Land Commission appointed by the Secretary of State.

CLAUSE 37.—None of the provisions in this Memorandum contained shall be construed so as in any way to diminish or detract from the powers conferred

upon Her Majesty's Secretary of State or High Commissioner by Her Majesty's Order in Council of May 9th, 1891, or by the Charter incorporating the Company ; but the said provisions shall be considered as subsidiary to, and in augmentation of, the powers so conferred : and nothing herein contained shall be construed so as in any way to diminish or detract from the powers granted to the Company by its Charter.

Executed in London this 23rd day of May A.D. 1894.

Signed on behalf of	The Common Seal of British South Africa	} ABERCORN, FIFE, Directors.
Her Majesty's	Company was affixed hereto, pursuant	
Government,	to a Resolution of the Board of Directors	
HENRY B. LOCH,	passed and dated the 23rd May, 1894,	
High Commissioner.	in the presence of	

HERBERT CANNING,
Secretary.

Of the matters dealt with in the foregoing, the first is the method of the administration, which is to be carried on by the Administrator, advised but not controlled by a Council of Advice consisting of a Judge and three other members. All the members of this are to be appointed by the Company, but their nomination is subject to the approval of the Secretary of State. The judicial member of the Council has already been appointed in the person of MR. JOSEPH VINTCENT, whose office is only second in importance to that of the Administrator, whose duties, in case of absence or death, and should there be no acting Administrator, devolve upon him. He may only be removed by the Secretary of State. The new Chief Justice in Matabeliland is the eldest son of the Hon. L. A. Vintcent, Member of the Legislative Assembly of the Cape Colony, and was born at Mossel Bay, November 9th, 1861. He was educated at the Diocesan College, Rondebosch, Charterhouse, and Trinity Hall, Cambridge. He afterwards qualified for the Bar, and after returning to the Cape was admitted as an advocate to the Supreme Court of the Cape Colony. In 1885 he went to practice in the High Court at Vryburg, British Bechuanaland, and was subsequently appointed Crown Prosecutor of the Colony. He remained in Bechuanaland until he received his present important appointment. At a farewell banquet given in his honour before leaving Vryburg, Sir Sidney Shippard, Administrator of British Bechuanaland, referred in the most eulogistic terms to his services, and

said that no more efficient Public Prosecutor could have been found; and added that Mr. Rhodes could not have made a happier choice if he had searched the whole of the Cape Colony. In a sporting country such as South Africa eminently is, some mention of the athletic career of any member of the Vintcent family is naturally looked for. The name of Mr. C. A. Vintcent is too well-known in sporting circles throughout South Africa to need mention. Another brother, Mr. Louis Vintcent, who was one of the Pioneer Force, and who died of fever shortly after the occupation, also achieved a reputation as a good all-round athlete. The new judge did well at cricket and football at Charterhouse, and at Cambridge got his "blue" for Association football, and obtained a fair amount of success as a cricketer. While studying for the Bar he played for London in nearly all the Association matches of the day, and for the Old Carthusians when at their best. He was said to have been sure of international honours, but at this point damaged his knee so badly that he had to give up the game entirely.

The remaining three members have not yet been appointed. It will be observed that the Administrator has power to act even in opposition to the advice of a majority of his Council, and is only subject to the authority of the Company, which in turn is under the supreme authority of the High Commissioner representing Her Majesty's Government. The land rights of the natives are protected by a Land Commission consisting of three members: the Judge, one appointed by the Company, and one—this is a somewhat important proviso—appointed directly by the Secretary of State. In purely native cases the native law is followed where it does not clash with the morals of civilised communities; but here again an important exception is very properly made by the official recognition of polygamy among the natives. The stipulation providing that "if and when the Parliament shall express its consent thereto" appeals from the decision of the Judge—the present supreme legal authority in British Zambesia—shall lie to the Supreme Court of the Cape Colony, is important as showing the grooves along which the Rhodesian legal system, the framework of which is designed to follow as closely as possible the judicial system of the Cape Colony, is expected to run. This is noticeable in the clause (No. 19) which provides that in all criminal cases the procedure of the Cape

Colony shall be followed. The only exceptional legislation to which the natives are to be subjected is in respect to liquor, arms, and ammunition, with regard to which it is to be hoped that Mr. Rhodes' policy of total prohibition of alcoholic liquors among the natives will be carried out in its full stringency. Only in this way can the physique and self-respect of the natives be kept up to anything like a satisfactory level. By a further clause the necessities of the Matabeli in respect of cattle and land for farming, grazing, or dwelling purposes, are met by a clause providing that the Land Commission shall satisfy the wants of the natives of Matabeliland in this respect. When this agreement, of which the salient points were agreed upon by Sir Henry Loch and Mr. Rhodes in consultation, was being framed by the Colonial Office on the one side and the Board of Directors of the Company on the other, Mr. Rhodes wished that it should contain a stipulation that the British South Africa Company should, in perpetuum, pledge itself never to impose duties upon British goods higher than those levied by the Cape Colony; and also a stipulation that the produce of that Colony should be always admitted free into the territories of the Company. These provisions, however, were rejected upon grounds which are stated in a letter from the Marquis of Ripon, of which a copy is appended hereto, together with a copy of the letter embodying Mr. Rhodes' views. The following is the text of the letter, dated 22nd May, 1894, sent by the British South Africa Company, embodying Mr. Rhodes' views, and of Lord Ripon's reply.

SIR,—In acknowledging the receipt of your letter of the 8th instant, and the draft of the proposed Memorandum as to the administration of Matabeliland and Mashonaland, my Directors desire me to say, for the information of the Right Hon. the Secretary of State, that they accept the Memorandum as fairly and adequately meeting the present conditions of the territories, and are prepared to affix the Seal of the Company to a copy.

I am instructed at the same time to lay before Her Majesty's Government the grounds upon which Mr. Rhodes desired Clause 13 to take a different form to that now settled.

The clause in the Agreement runs :—

The power of making Ordinances, granted to the Company under

Clause 10 of its Charter, shall be deemed to include the power of imposing by such Ordinances all such taxes as may be necessary for the order and good government of the said territories and for the raising of revenue therein, and also the right to impose and to collect Customs duties.

Mr. Rhodes wished the following proviso to be added :—

Provided that if Customs dues are levied, then in so far as Customs dues on British goods are concerned, they shall not exceed the duties thereon according to the tariff at present in force in the South African Customs Union ; and provided further that the produce of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope shall pass free into the Chartered territories the subject of this Memorandum.

The following remarks were forwarded as embodying Mr. Rhodes' reasons for this addition :—

It must be remembered that this Agreement contains the principles of the constitution for the Chartered territories, and Mr. Rhodes thinks that it is a wise provision that the Customs duties on British goods should not exceed the present Cape tariff, which is a reasonable one, and is imposed for the purpose of revenue and not for protection, and not with the view of making prohibitive tariffs against British manufactures. He thinks it is a pity that when responsible government was given to the Colonies, provision was not made at the time that duties imposed upon British goods should not exceed a certain amount. Such an arrangement would have been a fair return by the Colonists to the Mother Country for the heavy expenditure she had incurred in founding their settlements, and at the same time would have been a salutary check against the introduction of the principles of extreme protection, the results of which to the ordinary community are, that all the necessities of life are made infinitely dearer, and in addition to this, such an Agreement would have been one of the strongest ties between the Mother Country and her Colonies. Mr. Rhodes objects to the proviso extending to goods from Foreign States, as he wishes, in case the United States and other European Powers continue their policy of excluding British manufactures from their countries, to reserve power and right to consider the advisability of meeting them in the same spirit. He says it must be noted that the amendments proposed in the McKinlay tariff are in the direction of admitting raw products on a freer basis, but still very high tariffs are kept against foreign manufactures, the object being to keep out British manufactured goods, and by increasing the supply of raw materials—which are lacking in the United States—to compete with manufactured British goods in the outside markets of the world. Mr. Rhodes thinks, therefore, that the arrangement suggested by him—which is a just one—should be made to apply only to British goods ; and as to the rest of the world the question should be left open, so

that we are free to consider the situation. If the unfriendly attitude of Foreign Powers against British goods continues, the English people may have to reconsider the question of tariff, and in the future have to consider the advisability of imposing tariffs against those countries which treat their manufactures in a hostile manner. Mr. Rhodes does not now ask for the Company the right of imposing a differential tariff, but says, in return for the benefit that we have received from the Mother Country let us make it a portion of our constitution that British goods shall never pay a tariff exceeding the present tariff in force in the Cape Colony. This tariff is not a prohibitive or protective one, but is merely for the purpose of revenue, and under it British goods receive the utmost fair play. Mr. Rhodes wishes this tariff to become, in so far as British goods are concerned, a portion of the constitution of the Chartered Company's territories, *i.e.*, that we shall not have the power to impose a higher tariff on British goods, as that would be in the direction of a protective or prohibitive tariff. The proviso respecting "British goods," Mr. Rhodes points out, gives the Company no power to impose any differential rate—and therefore the argument of interference with the general fiscal policy of Her Majesty's Government falls to the ground—as the Ordinance imposing the dues would be subject to the approval of Her Majesty's Government; Mr. Rhodes prefers the clause with the insertion of the words "British goods," because it would then bind the Company in the future never to put an excessive rate upon British manufactures, and leaves—as it should do—the rest of the question open. Mr. Rhodes says the provision that our tariff on British goods should not exceed the present Cape tariff was suggested by himself in the interests of the English people, who are daily perceiving that the only return made them by the Colonies and States that they have founded, for all the blood and treasure they have spent, is, that the present occupants place hostile and prohibitive tariffs against their goods, thereby removing the only existing benefit to the British manufacturer. Mr. Rhodes wishes to guard against a repetition of this in the Chartered Company's territories. It rests with Her Majesty's Government, he says, whether they will support him in this idea, and if they reject it the onus of rejection lies with them; but, he says, "they will agree with me that the insertion of the words 'British goods' is immaterial to the Charter, and dictated solely in the interests of the English people." The latter part of the suggested proviso has been objected to, as giving a preferential right to the products of the Cape Colony; but Mr. Rhodes would point out that this has already been arranged for in the present "Cape Customs Union," in which the products of the Cape and Orange Free State pass free. It is highly probable that the Chartered territories will in the future desire to join the "Cape Customs Union," just as the present Government has allowed Her Majesty's Protectorate of Bechuanaland to enter the

same Union. In this Customs Union it is provided that the products of the territories shall pass free between each other, and under this clause they have a preferential rate against goods imported from other territories. It will be seen, therefore, that the objection made against the latter portion of this clause, that Her Majesty's Government could not propose to Parliament special preferential rights of free import for the Cape Colony, applies with equal force to the action of Her Majesty's Government in sanctioning the Bechuanaland Protectorate joining the Cape Customs Union.

It is to be observed that the whole proviso proposed by Mr. Rhodes would not have run counter to Her Majesty's Treaty obligations, to which, of course, the fiscal arrangements in Matabeliland and Mashonaland would be subject, and would have had a free trade rather than a protective tendency.

Against such a proposal it may be urged that this agreement for the administration of the territories of the British South Africa Company is of a more or less temporary character, and that such a provision could be subsequently either inserted or expunged. It is, however, considered that if such a provision had been contained in the first instrument of government, it would have had a great effect in shaping the policy of the community upon which a constitution is now being conferred.

The provision would no doubt have a great effect upon the future fiscal policy of South Africa, but it was on account of its bearing upon the future of the British South Africa Company and the territories under its control, that my Board wished to press the proposed proviso upon Her Majesty's Government. Lord Ripon will appreciate how much the success of such an enterprise as the Company has undertaken depends upon the good will, support, and sympathy of the community at home. His Lordship is also well aware that in many quarters there is a feeling that Chartered Companies in general are a source of weakness and embarrassment in the Empire, carrying with them no counterbalancing advantages. This Company, which is placed in the position of founders, as it were, of what it is hoped will prove a wealthy and prosperous country, wished to take the first opportunity of acknowledging its debt to the Mother Country, and of providing on its part that within its territories the produce of English labour should not be subjected to a hostile protective tariff.

My Directors regret that Her Majesty's Government has been unable to adopt the proviso so strongly advocated by Mr. Rhodes, but they do not further press the point, and are ready, as stated, to seal and complete the agreement forthwith.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) HERBERT CANNING,
Secretary.

The Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies,
Colonial Office, Downing Street, S.W.

The following is the Marquis of Ripon's reply, dated 11th June, 1894 :—

SIR,

I have laid before the Marquis of Ripon your letter of the 22nd ultimo, recording the acceptance by the British South Africa Company of the Memorandum of Settlement respecting the affairs of Mashonaland and Matabeliland, but putting on record the reasons why Mr. Rhodes, with the support of his colleagues, desired that a proviso should be added to Clause 13 of the Memorandum, dealing with the taxation of British and Cape goods.

The Memorandum having been duly executed without the proviso, it now only remains for Lord Ripon to notice the nature of that proviso, and the reasons which you have set forth as having influenced Mr. Rhodes in desiring its adoption, and to explain what were the considerations which prevented him from accepting the proposal made by Mr. Rhodes.

In the first place the proviso is, in Lord Ripon's opinion, unnecessary. The Company can only impose taxation by Ordinance, and such Ordinances are subject to disallowance by the Secretary of State: consequently no Customs Duties could be levied which the Secretary of State was not prepared to sanction. There is therefore no reason to fear that the Company would be allowed, so long as the Memorandum remains in force, to impose excessive duties.

Instead of acting as a restriction on the imposition of duties by the British South Africa Company, the proposed proviso would have tended to hinder the Secretary of State in the free exercise of his power to

control, inasmuch as if he were at any time to desire to prevent the levying of Customs Duties in excess of what he thought proper, but not in excess of those levied under the tariff at present in force within the South African Customs Union, the Company might have objected that the wording of the proviso implied that they would be permitted to impose without check any duties they pleased, so long as they were not greater than those raised by the Customs Union. Lord Ripon is not prepared to bind himself or his successors to permit, as a matter of course, Customs Duties to be levied up to that amount.

The Customs Tariff of the Company must, in his Lordship's opinion, be regulated by the circumstances of the time, by the requirements of the administration of the Company's territory, and by the relation which its Customs receipts bear to the other sources of taxation which may be available; and the Company may rest assured that neither the present nor any future Secretary of State, so long as he possesses the powers conferred on him by the Charter and Memorandum of Settlement, will allow any Customs Duties to be levied in excess of what is necessary, and that he will not fail to protect "the best interests of the English people."

If the Company's territory should hereafter pass into the condition of a self-governing Colony, the inhabitants will enjoy all the freedom which that status involves.

But altogether apart from this, the proposal, in Lord Ripon's opinion, lies entirely outside the scope of such an instrument as the Memorandum. Indeed, it is stated in your letter that "the insertion of the words 'British goods' is immaterial to the Charter"; which is taken to mean that the insertion of the proviso was proposed, not as a matter material to the settlement of the questions immediately affecting the administration of the Company's territories, but as embodying the general principle of fiscal policy indicated in your letter. The principles and objects of that policy are well known, and they have been advocated by various persons in this country for some time. But whatever may be their merits or demerits, the adoption of this policy would involve a departure from the course pursued now for many years by the British Government, and it would be altogether out of the question for Her Majesty's Government to inaugurate such a change indirectly, and as it

were by a side wind, in a document of the nature of the Memorandum, which calls for no such provision, and to the purposes of which it is admittedly immaterial. It is not necessary to say more in explanation of the grounds upon which Lord Ripon, although desirous of meeting Mr. Rhodes' wishes as far as possible, has felt bound to decline to accept the proviso which the Directors were anxious to introduce.

But there are other portions of your letter which seem to his Lordship to call for some further observations. One reason stated in favour of the proviso is that the policy of this country in giving complete fiscal and financial freedom to the Colonies has been mistaken, and that when self-government was given to them it ought to have been accompanied by conditions preventing them from taxing British goods beyond a certain limit. Whether it would at any time have been practicable or expedient to impose any limit, in the manner suggested, on the financial freedom of the self-governing Colonies may well be doubted.

The particular proposal now under consideration is not a proposal to prohibit protection in general, but to prohibit anything like protective duties on British goods, thus leaving a presumption that the Company should be free so far as may be possible to impose what duties it pleases on foreign goods, and the proposal is supported by the suggestion that the Mother Country herself may very possibly hereafter depart from her own Free Trade policy by levying protective or prohibitive duties on foreign goods. Upon this it is only necessary to observe that the Home Government and Parliament have, in the interests of the people of this country, consistently refrained for many years from all attempts to either nurse, fetter, or interfere with the free action and development of its commerce by protective duties, whether upon colonial or on foreign goods, and there are at present no signs that this policy is likely to be abandoned.

Lord Ripon does not doubt that the Directors of the British South Africa Company desire to retain the good will, support, and sympathy of the community at home in the task which they have undertaken, but the fiscal policy which they now advocate is not the one which has commended itself for the last half century to the large majority of the

people of this country, and, as has been shown above, the Memorandum as finally agreed upon provides ample securities that in the territories of the British South Africa Company the produce of British labour will not be liable to be subjected to a hostile Protective Tariff.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) R. H. MEADE.

The Secretary of the
British South Africa Company.

The above correspondence is chiefly interesting as embodying the views of the present Cape Ministry upon the fiscal policy of the Empire, and as being one of the efforts lately made by individual colonies to place themselves in closer touch with other portions of the British dominions. The logical force of the attitude assumed by the Colonial Office with respect to this particular matter is much weakened by the fact that the suggested provisoes were rather in the direction of free trade than of protection, and also by the fact that Her Majesty's Government has already permitted the inhabitants of the Bechuanaland Protectorate to range themselves within the Cape Customs Union.

The chief cause which has militated against the more rapid development of Mashonaland has been the difficulty of transport. Formerly the cost of carrying machinery from the coast to Fort Salisbury was prohibitive. That obstacle, however, has been energetically grappled with, and is being rapidly overcome. Matabeliland is to be opened up by a railway from the south, and both Mashonaland and Matabeliland by a line from the eastern seaboard. Already considerable progress has been made with both lines. In the first year the British South Africa Company extended the Cape Colony Railway from Kimberley to Vryburg, the Cape Government having since taken over this section of the line. Arrangements have also been made with the Bechuanaland Railway Company, Limited (incorporated in May, 1893), to extend the Cape system from Vryburg to Palapye (a distance of 400 miles). The first section to Mafeking (100 miles) is nearing completion, the rails having now (August, 1894), been laid to within fifteen miles of Mafeking.

On the east seventy-five miles of the Beira line, starting from



Fontesvilla, were opened in October, 1893, and the line is being extended to Chimoio, a further distance of forty-three miles. This extension will, it is believed, be completed by not later than December, 1894.

At an early period in its history as a white settlement, Mashonaland was connected with the outside world by an

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of the business transacted with the department by private persons (Cape Government messages being carried free) may be founded upon the fact that the line is already returning some 4 per cent. upon the cost of its construction. So successful indeed has the experiment proved that it has been decided to extend the system northward into



ELAND SHOOTING—A WATER BUCK FROM LAKE 'NGAMI.

Nyasaland, thence via Lake Tanganyika to Uganda, and, if and when possible, across the Egyptian Soudan. This will bring an immense and hitherto hardly accessible central African region into immediate and close communication with the civilised world. It will do much towards the establishment of law and order in the wild districts traversed, will develop their commerce, and will undoubtedly pave the way for the proper and effective opening up of the Lakes route as a great central African trade route. Meantime the telegraph poles have already been laid from Salisbury to Zomba in Nyasaland (a distance of 400 miles) by the African Transcontinental Telegraph Company, an undertaking which chiefly owes its funds to Mr. Rhodes' munificence and public spirit. A branch telegraph line from Palapye into Matabeliland has also been rapidly pushed forward. A station was opened to Mangwe on the 25th April, 1894, and Buluwayo itself was reached in July, 1894—within nine months from its occupation by the combined columns. The distance of $108\frac{1}{2}$ miles from Tati to Buluwayo was completed in the short time of 133 days, and at the cost of under £3,400.

Proper arrangements for the conveyance of mails and passengers in Mashonaland and Matabeliland have also been made, and regular services have been contracted for as follows :—

Palapye to Tati; time occupied, 25 hours	...	90 miles.
Tati to Buluwayo; time occupied, 33 hours	...	150 „
Buluwayo to Salisbury; time occupied, 5 days		260 „
Chimoio to Salisbury; time occupied, 84 hours		223 „
Tuli to Buluwayo; time occupied 48 hours	...	200 „

During the dry season there is, in addition to the above, a weekly service each way with oxen between Tuli and Victoria, the time occupied being 84 hours. The latest time tables for the mail and passenger service of Mashonaland and Matabeliland are inserted, as in addition to their own inherent interest, they may prove of utility for purposes of reference to those corresponding with persons resident in Mashonaland and Matabeliland, or for intending travellers to those interesting and attractive countries.

TIME TABLE OF MAIL AND PASSENGER SERVICE.

BULUWAYO TO SALISBURY

DEPART.		ARRIVE.	APPROXIMATE DISTANCE.
Buluwayo	Tuesday 3 a.m.	Salisbury Saturday 3 a.m.	260 miles.
RETURN.			
Salisbury	Monday 6 p.m.	Buluwayo Friday 6 p.m.	260 „

SALISBURY TO CHIMOIO.

DEPART.		ARRIVE.	APPROX. DIST.
Salisbury	Tuesday 6 a.m.	Umtali Wednesday 6 p.m.	149½ miles.
Umtali	Thursday 6 a.m.	Chimoio Friday 6 p.m.	73 „
RETURN.			
Chimoio	Tuesday 6 a.m.	Umtali Wednesday 6 p.m.	73 „
Umtali	Thursday 6 a.m.	Salisbury Friday 6 p.m.	149½ „

TULI TO BULUWAYO.

DEPART.		ARRIVE.	APPROX. DIST.
Tuli	Monday 10 a.m.	Buluwayo Wednesday 10 a.m.	200 miles.
RETURN.			
Buluwayo	Thursday 6 p.m.	Tuli Saturday 6 p.m.	200 „

CAPE TOWN TO BULUWAYO VIA PALAPYE.

DEPART.		ARRIVE.	APPROX. DIST.
Cape Town	Thursday 9 p.m.	Mafeking Sunday 6.30 p.m.	87½ miles.
Mafeking	Monday noon.	Palapye Saturday 10 a.m.	293 „
Palapye	Saturday 10 a.m.	Tati Sunday 6 p.m.	90 „
Tati	Sunday 6 p.m.	Buluwayo Tuesday 10 am.*	150 „
RETURN.			
Buluwayo	Saturday 8 a.m.	Tati Sunday midnight.	150 „
Tati	Monday 1 a.m.	Palapye Tuesday 5 a.m.	90 „
Palapye	Tuesday 5.30 a.m.	Mafeking Sunday 5 a.m.	293 „
Mafeking	Sunday 5.30 a.m.	Cape Town Wednesday 1 p.m.	87½ „

CAPE TOWN TO TULI VIA PRETORIA (*connecting with Tuli-Buluwayo Service.*)

DEPART.		ARRIVE.	APPROX. DIST.
Cape Town	Sunday 9.m.	Pretoria Wednesday 7.30 a.m.	1,031 miles.
Pretoria	Thursday 5 a.m.	Pietersburg Friday 9 p.m.	
Pietersburg	Saturday 3 a.m.	Hendrikzdal Sunday noon.	
Hendrikzdal	Sunday noon.	Tuli Sunday 8 p.m.	
RETURN.			
Tuli	Sunday 4 a.m.	Hendrikzdal Sunday noon.	
Hendrikzal	Sunday 1 p.m.	Pietersburg Monday Noon.	
Pietersburg	Monday 9 p.m.	Pretoria Wednesday 6 p.m.	
Pretoria	Wednesday 8.30 p.m.	Cape Town Saturday 6.40 a.m.	1,031 „

*40 hours' allowance. Tuesday 3 a.m. contract time.





POSTAGE STAMPS, NORTHERN ZAMBESIA.

Comparatively unimportant, but interesting as an evidence of the trade and development of the Rhodesian colonies, is the British South Africa Company's issue of postage and revenue stamps. Two sets of the postage stamps, one of Southern Zambesia (Mashonaland and Matabeleland), and the other of Northern Zambesia (Nyasaland), have been photographed to form an accompanying illustration hereto. The Southern Zambesia issue, which dates from 1891, originally included only the 1d., 6d., and 1s. values, but it now ranges from $\frac{1}{2}$ d. to £10, and is available indiscriminately for postage or revenue purposes. The aggregate face value is £19 17s. 9d. There is also an issue of registered letter envelopes and post cards—inland (1d.), international ($1\frac{1}{2}$ d.), and reply (1d. on each half). The issue designed for Northern Zambesia also dates from 1891, when Mr. H. H. Johnston went out to Nyasaland, and is distinguished by the over-printed letters "B.C.A." (British Central Africa). The postage issue includes stamps having face values ranging from 1d. to £10 (total values £19 10s. 3d.), registered letter envelopes, and postcards of $1\frac{1}{2}$ d. and $2\frac{1}{2}$ d. each. The revenue issue of Nyasaland, also inaugurated in 1891, has stamps of an entirely different and oblong pattern, ranging in face value from 1s. to £50, with a total value of £86 18s. Up to August, 1893, £78,000 worth of stamps had been sent out, and as an interesting indication of the increasing business of the country it may be mentioned that since that date no less than 785,026 postage stamps have been issued. The design of the stamps is handsome and effective, consisting of the Company's arms above its proud motto: "Justice, Freedom, Commerce." It may be of interest to philatelists to know that an issue of postage stamps of a somewhat new design is, we believe, contemplated in the ensuing year.

To touch upon one more point, and that point an all-important one, Dr. Jameson reported at the end of June last:—"As a proof of the peaceable state of the country and the satisfied feeling of the natives, I may state that there is abundant labour to be obtained at Buluwayo, and by the large number of prospectors now distributed through the country; and there is less complaint of want of labour than we have experienced during the last three years in Mashonaland."

Within the next few months Dr. Jameson (whose portrait, taken ten years ago, appears on a preceding page) will for a brief space



COLONEL F. W. RHODES, D.S.O.

return to Europe for a well-earned holiday, leaving the onerous duties of his official position in the hands of Colonel Francis W. Rhodes as Acting-Administrator. A brief allusion to that officer's distinguished career has been made in preceding pages, but it may be added that Colonel Rhodes is understood to have considerable administrative capacity; and the deep interest which he has displayed in the development of Uganda, the opening up of the Lakes Route, and other important African questions, justifies the confidence placed in him.

As the book goes to press, Mr. James Dawson, who was of late years Lobengula's chief adviser, has reached England after a lengthy residence in South Africa. Mr. Dawson had great influence, which he always used in a proper way, over the King, and it was he who brought down Lobengula's indunas (two of whom were unfortunately killed) to Tati. He is a Scotchman, and began his career many years ago as a trader at Khama's capital, Palachwe, but afterwards removed to Buluwayo, where he went into partnership with the late Mr. James Fairbairn. Proverbially hospitable, he is enterprising, able, and cultured, and universally popular up-country. After re-entering Buluwayo he volunteered to go to the King, who was then believed to be on the Shangani, with the object of inducing him to surrender—a most dangerous mission, especially in view of the Tati incident. Mr. P. Riley, another up-country trader, also volunteered, and the two went on in ignorance of the King's death, ultimately discovering the remains of Wilson and his comrades on the spot where they fell. Before returning, however, they materially assisted in the work of pacification by inducing 'Mjan, and the other leading-indunas who had followed the King, to come in and offer their submission. Mr. Dawson is much trusted by Dr. Jameson, who thinks very highly of his character and abilities. Of the other Buluwayo traders, the late Mr. James Fairbairn was an Edinburgh man. He and Mr. Usher, a Cape colonist, were the only two whites left in Buluwayo when Mr. Dawson went down with the indunas to Tati, and the forces on their arrival were considerably astonished to find that their lives had been spared. After the occupation of Buluwayo Mr. Fairbairn rendered very valuable service—knowing so many of the native chiefs—in inducing them to come in and lay down their arms.

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
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